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For my Mother and Father, 
Whose own investigations 
Instigated these.
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And it is important for thinkers of all schools not to go on repeating things 
about experience and empirical method that have been proved factually false. 
… And were this the proper occasion, I think it could be shown that two 
contemporary schools, now exercising considerable influence, the British 
analytic school and the school of logical positivism, suffer greatly because of 
their dependence upon pre-Jamesian psychology. 
 …Present-day biological, anthropological and psychological knowledge is 
required in order to purge the minds of philosophers of antiquated notions—
whatever be the direct function of this knowledge in philosophy. … The 
significance of James for those who take their stand in philosophy upon 
experience [is that he] … pointed to a new way of analyzing and reporting it. 
And he did more than point. He opened up paths of access to nothing less than 
a revolutionary change in traditional empiricism.  
John Dewey {Dewey, 1942 #854@54} 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[‘the’ del.] [intrl. marked by caret cut off] [illeg. word, poss. ‘microcosm’] 
cobwebs, *[‘lost’ del.] gone like [ab. del. ‘burst through’] bubbles in the sun. 
[‘There’ del.] Once heavy [‘weights’ del.] upon us, they [‘now count no m’ 
del.] weigh[‘s’ del.] no more than air. [del. ‘We are free of them, we sing, we 
move, we [‘float’ del.] soar, *we sing [intrl., undel. in error]’] We are borne on 
a [‘wave that overflows it glorious’ del.] wave that [‘rolls them under, their 
pressure is unfelt towers above them, *and [ab. del. ‘as it’]’ del.] rolls them 
[‘under’ del.] so easily *under its **volume [‘v’ ov. ‘gl’] [intrl.] that their very 
resistance is unfelt. [‘These superior levels of personal energy’ del.] We are 
free of them, we move, we soar, we sing. This *sense of enfranchisement and 
ease [ab. del. ‘carolling and lyric[‘al’ del.] quality’ del.] characterize[‘s’ del.] 
all these superior levels of personal energy and gives them *a glad & [ab. del. 
‘the’] carolling [‘and lyric’ del.] 
 
William James, from an undated notebook 
(WB, 422)
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Alexander M. Klein 
THE RISE OF EMPIRICISM: WILLIAM JAMES, THOMAS HILL GREEN,  
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER PSYCHOLOGY 
The concept of empiricism evokes both a historical tradition and a set of philosophical 
theses. The theses are usually understood to have been developed by Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume. But these figures did not use the term “empiricism,” and they did not see themselves 
as united by a shared epistemology into one school of thought. My dissertation analyzes the 
debate that elevated the concept of empiricism (and of an empiricist tradition) to prominence 
in English-language philosophy. 
In the 1870s and ’80s a lively debate about psychology emerged. Neo-Kantian idealists 
criticized the very idea that the mind can be studied scientifically. A group of philosopher-
psychologists responded, often in Mind. They were among the first to call themselves 
“empiricists,” arguing that psychology could provide a scientific basis for philosophical 
progress.  
Idealists held that empirical psychology depended on premises developed by Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume. These premises were allegedly absurd because they rendered ideas of 
extension, as well as other ideas crucial to natural science, unreal. Those who wanted to 
advance psychology towards becoming a legitimate science were forced to engage these 
philosophical attacks, while at the same time to develop empirical theories that could 
successfully explain some characteristics of experience. I show how James’s theory of space 
perception accomplished both tasks.  
In developing this theory, James found he had to reject the Lockean notion that reality is 
associated with passively-registered sensations. James also abandoned Berkeley and Hume’s 
claim that ideas are ultimately derived from atomic sensations. Instead, James presented 
experimental evidence that sensation is a continuous stream. The mind must actively parse 
this stream if it is to gain a coherent representation of its environment. I argue that James’s 
stream-of-thought thesis served as a presupposition of his entire psychology. The thesis 
showed how the labor of investigating the mind could be divided between philosophers and 
scientists, and in a manner sensitive to the concerns of both. The stream thesis also provided 
a scientific basis for a new philosophical empiricism that, I argue, has a hidden legacy in the 
history of analytic philosophy. 
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Introduction 
Why We Should Wonder about the Rise of  Empiricism 
1.  THE MAIN PUZZLE 
“Empiricism” denotes both a historical tradition and a set of substantive 
philosophical theses. We usually identify the tradition by citing the founding work of 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and perhaps by contrasting these figures with Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibniz. And we usually recognize a family of characteristically empiricist 
theses that concern either knowledge or meaning. In particular, empiricists typically 
hold that experience is in some sense the source of all genuine knowledge, of all 
legitimate meaning, or both. 
What is the relationship between the tradition and the set of theses, though? Here 
are two possibilities that come to mind.  
First, it may be that the empiricist tradition is composed of a group of 17th and 18th 
century philosophers—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—who self-consciously banded 
together to defend these theses. Or second, perhaps the theses are simply what 
posterity has deemed this group’s most important legacy.  
Neither answer is really satisfactory, for reasons to which I will return. In fact, the 
concept of an empiricist tradition first played a prominent role in English-language 
philosophy only in the late 19th century. But what tied Locke, Berkeley, and Hume into 
one tradition was not then thought to be a shared epistemology, at least not in the first 
instance. These three were grouped together because they were thought to be 
philosophical forefathers of empirical psychology.  
In the 1870s and ’80s, a lively debate emerged over the idea that the mind is the 
sort of thing that can be studied scientifically. On one side were neo-Kantian and -
Hegelian idealists like Edward Caird (1835-1908), F. H. Bradley (1846-1924), and 
especially T. H. Green (1836-1882). These figures often criticized the very idea of a 
science of mind. On the other side were philosopher-psychologists like Alexander Bain 
 2  
(1818-1903), G. Croom Robertson (1842-1892), and especially William James (1842-
1910). This dissertation is a historical and philosophical analysis of their debate. 
In Part One, I will show that together these groups helped construct the notion of a 
British empiricist tradition. The groups developed this historical-philosophical concept 
as a way to encapsulate the myriad of issues at stake in their debate over psychology. 
For instance, one of psychology’s contested promises was that it might provide a 
scientific basis for philosophical progress. In this vein, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
were portrayed as having developed a metaphysics in which the empirical study of 
experience played a starring role. Reality itself was to be associated with what is 
passively received by the mind, or in other words with sensation. In turn, sensation was 
to be studied via scientific methods, with a special reliance on introspective 
observation. Late 19th-century idealists were severely critical of this entire 
metaphysical picture. Others defended the notion that the fledgling science of mind 
would provide a route to more rigorous, more scientific philosophy. It was this latter 
group who first donned the mantle of empiricism. 
In Part Two, I will critically investigate the case against psychology. Idealists 
argued that Lockean metaphysics—the metaphysics with which psychology was 
enmeshed—had long been discredited. Specifically, Hume had reduced Lockean 
metaphysics to absurdity by showing that it entails skepticism. But late-19th century 
psychologists were blithely ignoring the lessons of history, idealists argued. Since 
mental science was inextricable from a broadly Lockean metaphysics, empirical 
psychology should be discarded as an absurd enterprise as well. To put the point in 
Hegelian terms, idealists accused psychologists of working inside a dialectical stage of 
history that Hume had reduced to absurdity almost a hundred and fifty years earlier. 
In Part Three I will explore William James’s response. Those like James who 
wanted to advance psychology towards becoming a legitimate science were forced to 
pursue two projects simultaneously. On one hand, idealists were very publicly arguing, 
on a priori grounds, that mental science was an absurdity. So psychologists had to 
engage these metaphysical attacks. But on the other, no enterprise could pretend to 
have scientific legitimacy unless it produced empirical successes. So psychologists also 
 3  
had to generate empirical theories that could actually explain some characteristics of 
experience, particularly of perception. In other words, they had to practice science and 
philosophy simultaneously.  
James’s way of striking this balance was particularly interesting. To evade idealist 
criticisms of mental science, he abandoned key pieces of Lockean metaphysics that had 
been prominent in the then-dominant school of associationist psychology. For instance, 
he abandoned the notion that reality is associated with passively-registered sensations. 
He also abandoned the notion that all ideas are either simple, or are complex 
compounds built from simple ideas. Instead, James held that experience was ultimately 
a continuous stream, not a collection of discrete ideas. He produced experimental 
results that supported his contention.  
This move would have profound implications for both philosophy and psychology. 
In Chapter Five, I show that James’s “stream of thought,” as he called it, functioned to 
delimit a proper sphere for the scientific investigation of mind, thereby helping launch 
psychology as a legitimate science. In Chapters Two and Four and in Appendix III, I 
show that the stream of thought also provided a scientific basis for a new philosophical 
empiricism, an empiricism that emphasized James’s empirical psychology rather than 
the older, Lockean conception of mind. This form of empiricism flourished especially in 
the United States, though it has been largely forgotten for reasons I will consider in this 
introduction. 
 
My title might seem purposefully provocative, since it suggests that “the rise of 
empiricism” happened only in the late 19th century. But consider the two more obvious 
possibilities I mentioned (see above, p.1) for connecting Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
with the theses we now think of as comprising empiricist epistemology.  
The first possibility was that these three figures self-consciously banded together to 
pursue a common epistemological project. Now, it is true that in professing empiricism, 
many 20th-century philosophers meant to espouse as a goal the justification or 
application of some theses like those I cited in my opening paragraph. But the same 
cannot be said of the alleged founders of this tradition. Locke, Berkeley, and Hume did 
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not use the word “empiricism” or any of its variants, as we will see in Chapter One. In 
fact, these figures did not see themselves as allies in an epistemological or meta-
semantic tradition, under any name. And they did not see themselves as united in a 
philosophical struggle against a rival school on the Continent. So we cannot regard the 
empiricist tradition, at least in the 17th and 18th centuries, as composed of philosophers 
who consciously banded together to pursue a common epistemological or meta-
semantic agenda. 
No, we constructed a tradition of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in retrospect. So the 
second possibility seems at least closer to the truth. At some point, philosophers 
apparently came to see the most important legacy of these three figures as involving 
the epistemological and semantic theses I have mentioned.  
But this is not yet a satisfying answer. Why did we begin looking for a common 
legacy in just these figures, rather than in any other group of competent philosophers of 
the era? And why did we begin to see a distinct epistemology, as opposed to a 
metaphysics, an ethics, an aesthetics, or a political philosophy, as the characteristic 
contribution of these three?  
I believe these two questions must be given different answers. In this dissertation, 
I will pay close attention to the first question, but I will only be able to speculate about 
the second. In the late 19th century as now, the canonical figures in the empiricist 
tradition were thought to be Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. However, these figures were 
grouped together not because of a shared epistemology, but because they held that a 
“science of man” (as Hume called it)1 provided the key to progress in philosophy. We 
will see that in the late 19th-century at least, the most important and controversial part 
of this science was the part dedicated to studying the mind. That is, the most important 
part was empirical psychology, or “mental science” as I am also calling it (following late 
19th-century usage). 
                                                 
1 Hume used this expression at, for example, (THN, xv-xvi). This was the aspect of Hume’s 
work that 19th century philosophers took to be characteristic of the empiricist tradition. Recall 
that Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature bears this subtitle: Being An Attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. As (De Pierris 2002) has argued, the 
“experimental method” in question is meant to be the method of Newtonian science.  
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At the end of Chapter Five, I will propose a hypothesis about the second question, 
though I leave the task of really defending it to future research. James and his allies 
were remarkably successful at setting psychology on a path to scientific legitimacy. But 
they were less successful at building an enduring community of empiricist philosophers 
who would seek to put the latest in mental science to philosophical use. The chief 
problem was that as psychology became more scientific, it also became more 
specialized. Before long, professional philosophers would lack the training needed to 
make sense of the new psychology. Among empiricists at least, I will suggest that the 
eventual emphasis on epistemology resulted from the ensuing loss of contact with 
psychology. Philosophers had to find new questions they could pursue in relative 
isolation from empirical research about the mind. What they came up with was 
epistemology for its own sake, rather than epistemology in service of a more scientific 
worldview.  
2.   THE PUZZLE’S SIGNIFICANCE 
So if successful, this dissertation will help solve the puzzle of how and why English-
speaking philosophers began using the concept of empiricism. This puzzle is significant 
for at least two reasons that may not be obvious. First, a good solution stands to lessen 
a gap in our understanding of the history of analytic philosophy and of logical 
positivism.2 And second, a good solution—my solution, at any rate—calls attention to 
an important but relatively neglected topic in the philosophy of science: how fledgling 
fields like psychology gain scientific legitimacy. In this section, I will briefly consider 
each of these points in turn. 
 
J. S. Mill, on some accounts the last of the classic empiricists, died in 1873. Like 
the other canonical figures in this tradition, Mill did not himself use the concept of 
empiricism. About a half century later, logical positivism and (what we now call) 
                                                 
2 I will only use the phrase “analytic philosophy” to refer to the British tradition of which 
Russell and Moore are generally regarded as founders. I will not use the phrase in its wider 
sense, as an umbrella term that also covers logical positivists like Carnap and Reichenbach.  
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analytic philosophy began to dominate the English-language scene. These groups 
united under the flag of empiricism. But how empiricism rose to such prominence 
during the interim remains a vexed question. 
The long-held view had been that logical positivism and analytic philosophy were 
both self-consciously designed as part of the empiricist tradition, where “empiricist 
tradition” is understood as an epistemological or meta-semantic movement centering 
around Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But a raft of recent scholarship casts this view 
into serious doubt. A “revisionist”3 literature instead emphasizes the debt founding 
figures of positivism4 and analytic philosophy owe to neo-Kantians. Contrary to 
received wisdom, early figures of these two movements were often hostile towards 
positions they regarded as forms of empiricism.  
For instance, an older reading holds that Carnap’s 1928 Der logische Aufbau der 
Welt was a characteristically “empiricist” attempt to set science on secure epistemic 
footing. Carnap’s alleged method was to reduce scientific theories to the allegedly 
incorrigible realm of given experience. More recently, Michael Friedman and Alan 
Richardson have argued that the Aufbau is better read as a Kant-flavored attempt to 
account for the objectivity of scientific knowledge. Far from doubting the security of 
science, they argue, Carnap actually began with the assumption that science produces 
objective knowledge. Carnap’s question was not whether, but how this objectivity is 
possible (Friedman 1999; Richardson 1998). 
To be sure, such research has shed new light not just on Carnap, but also on Frege, 
Moore, Russell, Schlick, and Reichenbach’s respective philosophical development.5 
                                                 
3 I follow Gerrard in using this phrase, at (Gerrard 2002, 42). 
4 Throughout this dissertation, I will use “positivism” as shorthand for “logical positivism.” I will 
have no occasion to refer to the older, 19th century positivism often associated with August 
Comte. 
5 Examples of the revisionist literature I have in mind are, on Carnap, Reichenbach, and 
Schlick: (Friedman 1999; Gower 2000; Richardson 1998); cf. (Oberdan 1996); on Russell and 
Moore: (Baldwin 1984; Gerrard 2002; Hylton 1990); on Frege: (Gabriel 2002; Kitcher 1979; 
Sluga 1980; Weiner 1990). Four examples of edited volumes that have collected this sort of 
revisionist work are: (Floyd and Shieh 2001; Giere and Richardson 1996; Reck 2002; Tait 
1997). Alan Richardson gives a helpful set of references to such work at (Richardson 1998, 2-3). 
Many of these seek to renew the reputation of positivism by downplaying the role of the 
 7  
But the research has quietly raised a new question about the rise to dominance of 
logical positivism and analytic philosophy. We now ought to wonder why empiricism 
should ever have emerged as a unifying commitment of these movements. Thus, when 
I ask what accounts for the rise of empiricism in English-language philosophy, I am 
thinking especially of empiricism as it has long been associated with figures like those I 
mentioned at the start of this paragraph. 
Here is one prominent hypothesis about how positivists came to be associated with 
empiricism. A. J. Ayer’s Language, Truth, and Logic (Ayer 1936) is sometimes cited as 
an important source of empiricist interpretations of logical positivism (e.g., Friedman 
1999, xiv). Relatively speaking, 1936 is a late date for a new characteristic to emerge 
as central to logical positivism. Many of the canonical projects associated with 
positivism had been developed in Germany and Austria during the 1910s and ’20s.6 So 
the publication of Ayer’s book is sometimes taken roughly to demarcate an earlier 
period, when positivists were more engaged with the neo-Kantianism of central 
Europe, from a later period, when their work began to be repackaged as a form of 
empiricism. 
This hypothesis is insightful, but it only provides the start of an answer to my 
question. If empiricism played just a minimal role in the early projects, why should 
Ayer’s peculiar characterization have caught fire in the mid-1930s? Why should this 
characterization have seemed so attractive it could be used to consolidate an entire 
philosophical movement, especially given that the movement had been on firm, non-
empiricist footing for over a decade?  
                                                                                                                                           
verification principle in early Vienna Circle work, and by emphasizing a Kantian influence 
instead. Cheryl Misak takes a different approach, portraying verificationism as a worthy if often 
misunderstood idea that underpins not just positivism, but pragmatism, some feminism, and 
even self-consciously anti-positivist epistemologies like that advanced by Rorty (Misak 1995, ix-
xvi, 193-200). 
6 For example, in 1917 Schlick published (Schlick 1917/1920) and was then just finishing his 
(Schlick 1918/1985); see (Friedman 1999, 24). In the 1920s came (Reichenbach 1920/1965; 
Reichenbach 1924/1969; Reichenbach 1928/1958). Carnap then published (Carnap 
1929/1967). In this same year, the Vienna Circle manifesto appeared (Hahn, Carnap, and 
Neurath 1929/1996). 
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During the 1930s, no doubt, some founding figures may have been moving for their 
own philosophical reasons towards positions we may wish to describe as more overt 
empiricisms. So part of the answer may well involve theoretical exigencies internal to 
the development of logical positivism, or perhaps Russell’s project.  
But I believe a full answer must also take account of the disproportionate 
popularity of empiricism in the United States. After all, the 1930s was a decade 
distinguished by more than just a shift towards empiricism, for positivists. It was also a 
decade when leading members were fleeing the rise of National Socialism on the 
Continent. Some ended up in Britain, but most ended up in the United States.7 A full 
accounting of logical positivism’s shifting identity in the 1930s must pay heed to the 
impact of its great migration.8 
Specifically, I submit that we cannot understand the many ways in which 
positivism changed during this period unless we pay attention to that movement’s 
constructive interaction with empiricist-inflected philosophy in the American 1930s. 
                                                 
7 In 1930, Herbert Feigl immigrated to the Unites States. Then between 1935 and 1939, all of 
the following found their way to America as well: Rudolf Carnap, Karl Menger, Carl Hempel, 
Hans Reichenbach, Felix Kaufman, Gustav Bergmann, Philipp Frank, Kurt Gödel, and Edgar 
Zilsel. Perhaps the most important factor in shifting the geographical center of logical positivism 
to the United States was Carnap and Charles Morris’ work organizing and publishing the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science at Chicago. See (Reisch 2005, 8-12). 
8 Various pieces of a story about how logical positivism changed during the 1930s, particularly in 
its treatment of empiricism, can be found in (Giere 1996, 341-343; Richardson 1996). There 
have also been some recent attempts to understand the development of logical positivism in 
America more generally. See (De Waal 2005, Chapter Nine; Hardcastle and Richardson 2003; 
Houser 2002; McCumber 2001; Reisch 2002; Reisch 2005; Richardson 2002a; Richardson 
2003). Many of these authors are on the right track, but most do not take up the issue of how 
older traditions in American philosophy affected positivism upon its arrival. Those that do (e.g., 
De Waal and Houser) focus on Charles Morris, a devotee of C. S. Peirce’s pragmatism and the 
chief American contact for the Unity of Science movement. On the history of scientific 
philosophy in the United States leading up to 1930, see (Wilson 1990; Wilson 1995). The older 
of these is a book that focuses on turn-of-the-20th-century scientific philosophy in the United 
States, especially as it grew out of interactions between psychology and philosophy. The more 
recent Wilson piece is a gem of an article that extends the analysis through the 1930s, although 
it gives Peirce and Dewey more credit than James for creating a scientific philosophy in the 
United States (e.g., at p. 123). 
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Given positivists’ well-known struggles to find employment in the United States,9 it 
would be surprising to find that they did not try to adapt their philosophical projects to 
be more intelligible, perhaps even more palatable, to hoped-for audiences in North 
America.  
It is difficult to establish a causal relationship, rather than just a temporal 
correlation, between positivism’s geographic shift to the United States and its 
philosophic shift towards empiricism. Here and in Appendix III, I will merely offer 
suggestive evidence of a causal influence. 
Empiricism’s fate in North America and in Europe diverged sharply after the 
1890s. Revisionist historians agree that idealist movements like those I will consider in 
this dissertation were widely influential across Europe.10 In the wake of these 
                                                 
9 With squinted eyes, some may portray the American 1930s as a place where European Jews 
were openly welcomed, but this is a serious distortion. Many Jewish academics driven from 
Europe by the Nazis were viewed suspiciously by American universities, as well. Consider the 
case of Hans Reichenbach, who taught physics at the University of Berlin until his dismissal in 
the fall of 1933. Reichenbach had failed to meet Nazi criteria for pure Arayan-ness, as his 
paternal grandparents were Jewish. Reichenbach fled to Istanbul, where he secured a five-year 
teaching contract. Eventually dissatisfied with the position, he pursued job opportunities in the 
United States through his extensive network of correspondents (Traiger 1984).  
 As he wrote the following letter to Charles Morris, Reichenbach had just learned that he 
would not be seriously considered for a job at Princeton, despite the support of Einstein who 
was already installed at the Institute for Advanced Study. Reichenbach’s problem, in the United 
States as in Germany, was again his ethnic heritage. In a letter dated September 7, 1936, 
Reichenbach wrote these painful words:  
… What suppresses [sic] me most is that it is antisemitism which excludes me now from 
the U.S.A. Carnap wrote me details about Princeton. This is now Hitler’s success: instead 
of producing a general feeling of nauseousness, in civilised countries, against antisemitism, 
Hitler has succeeded in making antisemitism outside Germany even stronger than before. 
(CMP; correspondence, box 1; quoted by permission) 
The letter is a stirring reminder of the serious obstacles positivists faced in finding jobs in the 
United States. 
10 There is broad agreement on this point in the literature I cited in fn. 5, above. By “idealist 
movements like those I consider,” I refer to neo-Kantian and -Hegelian movements sweeping 
across not just the United Kingdom, but across France, Germany, and what is now Austria as 
well. French neo-Kantians like Charles Renouvier and François Pillon (James dedicated the 
Principles to the latter) have not lately received as much attention as they deserve, compared to 
the German and British movements. On German neo-Kantianism, see below, fn. 11. 
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criticisms, Europeans who founded positivism and analytic philosophy left empiricism 
all but for dead. 
True, Russell and Moore famously revolted against their idealist mentors at the 
turn of the 20th century. But they did not thereby take refuge in empiricism. Peter 
Hylton calls it “perhaps the most striking distortion” that Russell was both “influenced 
by the British empiricist philosophers (especially Hume) and … himself an 
Empiricist.” Hylton cites Ayer and D. F. Pears as particularly responsible for this 
caricature (Hylton 1990, 11). To a greater extent than Moore, Russell would 
eventually move towards a recognizable empiricism, but this was not until much later 
(Baldwin 1984, 357-358; Hylton 1990, 22).  
And Carnap, to take an important example from the German-speaking world, 
studied with Bruno Bauch and Gottlob Frege. All three of these figures were deeply 
influenced by neo-Kantianism, particularly in its so-called “Marburg school” 
incarnation (Friedman 2000, 63, 147).11 Like Russell and Moore, Carnap and his 
Vienna Circle allies also came to see flaws in orthodox neo-Kantian philosophy. The 
German speaking group was particularly unhappy with the Kantian notion of synthetic 
a priori knowledge, for example, and with the attending Kantian conception of pure 
intuition (Friedman 1999, 6, 33). But again, positivists did not thereby retreat to 
Humean empiricism, at least not in the 1920s.12 
                                                 
11 A helpful introduction to the Marburg and Southwest schools of neo-Kantianism flourishing at 
the turn of the 20th century is (Friedman 2000, 25-37).  
12 Friedman sees early logical positivism as centrally focused on problems the Kantian 
philosophy faced in light of the new physics and geometries of the nineteenth- and twentieth-
centuries. His view is explicitly presented as countering a “popular picture” of logical positivism:  
According to one popular picture, logical positivism began as an empiricist or verificationist 
movement in the tradition of Hume, Mach, and Russell’s external world program. ... 
However, if one reads the early (pre 1930) works of the positivists themselves, a very 
different and, I think, much more interesting picture emerges. The verificationism of the 
positivists did not develop along a direct line from Hume and Mach via Russell and 
Wittgenstein. At least equally important is an evolution from German neo-Kantianism and 
neo-idealism via Hilbert and Einstein. (Friedman 1999, 18-19) 
Notice the phrase “at least equally important.” Friedman does not claim that there was no 
empiricist influence on early logical positivists—only that there was less such influence than we 
 11  
In contrast, James’s response to idealism helped spark a long-lived vogue of 
empiricism in America. His response kick-started a host of empiricist-inspired 
movements in North America—not just pragmatism and radical empiricism, but new 
realism and critical realism as well13—that flourished during the first few decades of the 
20th century. By the 1930s, when members of the Vienna Circle were immigrating to 
the United States, empiricism had not recovered its good reputation in Europe, at least 
among most founding figures of logical positivism (as we now know from the scholarship 
cited in fn. 5, above). But these refugees found many such varieties of empiricism still 
flourishing when they arrived in leading American departments.  
I hasten to add that James was not the only important pioneer of American 
empiricism. Two of James’s chief allies in this respect included Charles Peirce and 
Chauncey Wright. Peirce would have a special influence on Charles Morris, whose 
significance in the American reception of positivism is discussed in Appendix III 
(below). Peirce and Wright themselves developed empiricist theories of a priori 
knowledge, of causation, and of space perception, for example.14  
                                                                                                                                           
have come to think. Friedman discusses the relation between positivism and empiricism in more 
detail at (pp. 5-9). 
13 The leading Pragmatists were, of course, Peirce, James, and Dewey. Radical empiricism was 
another position James developed, especially in his (James 1912/1976), and followers included 
Horace Kallen. American New and Critical Realists both published influential, collected 
volumes. See (Drake et al. 1920/1941; Holt et al. 1912). Key New Realists included E. B. 
Holt, W. P. Montague, and R. B. Perry. A new collection of primary sources on New Realism, 
with a helpful introduction, is (De Waal 2001). Leading Critical Realists included Roy Wood 
Sellars, Arthur Lovejoy, and George Santayana. 
14 On Wright’s pragmatic, empiricist conception of the a priori, of space perception, and of 
causation, see (Madden 1963, 98-99, 112-127); and on Wright’s empiricism generally, see 
(Madden 1963, 73-94, 98-103, 107-127; Madden 1972), the earlier of which is largely a 
reprint of his (Madden 1953); and see (Schneider 1946, 520-521) on related topics. (Bowne 
1878) is a harrowing primary source that testifies to Wright’s role in the trenches of arguments 
about empiricism, lengthily excerpted at (Madden 1963, 175-178.n172). On Wright’s impact 
on James, see(Madden 1963, 128-137; RBP I.520-532). On Peirce’s conception of the a priori, 
see (Hookway 1992, 181-207; Misak 1991, 140 ff.). On Peirce’s relationship to James’s 
psychology, particularly in the latter’s theory of space perception, see (Girel 2003). On Peirce’s 
empiricism generally, see (Nagel 1940; Thayer 1968, 101-120). On Peirce’s impact on James 
in this regard, see (Thayer 1968, 136-141), though Thayer sees Peirce’s empiricism as growing 
out of the Kantian rather than the British tradition—a reasonable and common view. Also, 
James himself describes Wright as “a worker on the path opened by Hume, and a treatise on 
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But nobody in the United States did more to usher in a new era of empiricist 
philosophy than William James. Neither Peirce nor Wright held steady academic 
employment, and thus neither impacted the next generation through teaching.15 In 
sharp contrast, James was among the most prominent academics of his generation, in 
any field—he was undoubtedly the most influential American philosopher, and 
undoubtedly the most influential American psychologist as well.16 He was educated and 
spent his career at Harvard, eventually holding professorships in anatomy, physiology, 
psychology, and philosophy. James was elected president of both the American 
Psychological Association and the American Philosophical Association. He received 
                                                                                                                                           
psychology written by him … would probably have been the last and most accomplished 
utterance of what he liked to call the British school,” at (James 1875). Note that the secondary 
literature I have mentioned in this footnote sometimes uses “empiricism” in an anachronistic 
manner, denoting an epistemological project rather than a metaphysical view about the mind. 
In any case, I think Peirce and Wright also contributed in their own ways to the empiricist 
project, as I understand that project in this dissertation. But it is beyond my scope to make this 
case. However, one might begin to make it by consulting (Girel 2003), an interesting look at 
Peirce’s admiring reaction to James’s psychology. (Peirce’s misgivings about James’s later 
formulation of pragmatism are far better known, and on this topic the reader might consult 
(Hookway 1997).) 
15 Out of intellectual respect, and even out of a sense of personal empathy, James worked to 
bring Peirce’s publications to wider attention during much of the latter’s lifetime. But this was 
largely a failure. Peirce spent periods of his life in dire poverty, and James continually sought to 
help his friend renew his reputation and start an academic career. For instance, in an 1897 
letter to James, Peirce wrote that he had not eaten in three days. James swiftly invited Peirce to 
give a series of lectures in Cambridge and secured donors for a much-needed stipend. James 
hoped Peirce would turn his lectures into a book. Delivered in the winter of 1898 in a private 
house, the lectures impressed a few colleagues, but did not substantially improve Peirce’s 
fortunes or professional reputation. Interestingly, it was in August of that same year when 
James unveiled pragmatism in a lecture at Berkeley. In this lecture, James famously credited as 
the founder of pragmatism a figure his audience had surely never heard of: Charles Peirce 
(Menand 2001, 348-351). 
 So the surge in interest in Peirce’s work came only after his death. Royce eventually brought 
Peirce’s papers to Harvard, and a young C. I. Lewis spent two years in the early 1920s 
cataloguing them. This work eventually led to the 1931 publication of an 8-volume Collected 
Papers (Peirce 1931), and these volumes finally brought Peirce a wider audience.  
16 Upon James’s death, this was the judgment of colleagues like Bertrand Russell and John 
Dewey, as well as of newspapers around the world. For example, his obituary in the Paris 
Temps declared James to have been “the most famous American philosopher since Emerson”; 
and the Boston Evening Transcript called his death “the removal of the greatest of 
contemporary Americans” (quoted at Myers 1971, 1, which also contains quotes from Dewey 
and Russell). 
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honors from Princeton and Yale, as well as from universities in Padua, Rome, Oxford, 
Durham, Geneva, Edinburgh, Copenhagen, Paris, Milan, Berlin, and Moscow. He was 
also elected an honorary member of the National Academy of Science, the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, and the British Academy (Myers 1986, 1-
2). And these professional achievements say nothing of James’s gift for connecting with 
audiences of non-academics as well (see Cotkin 1994, 12). In short, James was a 
towering figure in American intellectual life, and he influenced a generation of students 
through his publications, through his teaching at Harvard, and through correspondence 
and informal relationships with far-flung friends and acquaintances.  
I suggest that the brand of empiricism he began to develop in his Principles of 
Psychology represents one important aspect of his intellectual legacy, in the United 
States. In turn, the vogue for empiricism that James sparked may help explain the later 
evolution of American philosophy.  
In particular, it may help explain the particular form of empiricism eventually 
attributed to logical positivists. The American context helps explain why Ayer, at least 
on these shores, would have been so effective in advancing the fortunes of logical 
positivism by pitching it as a new form of empiricism. Whether or not this was his 
intention, empiricism was a slant sure to play well in the American departments that 
would provide new homes for crucial members of his movement.  
If Ayer’s book played a serious role in popularizing the view that positivism is a 
form of empiricism, one still wonders why this view should have caught fire in North 
America, after all. By the 1930s, this continent had had a robust philosophical life of its 
own for a half-century—its own journals, its own academic presses, its own graduate 
programs, its own professional associations, and most of all, its own scholarly debates. 
But we have come to imagine that American departments were like empty 
greenhouses, ready to nurture transplanted European philosophies roots and fruits, 
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without seriously influencing their future development.17 One implication of my 
dissertation is that this suspicious assumption should be reconsidered.  
 
The story of empiricism’s rise is significant for a second reason that is not 
immediately obvious. The story calls our attention to the philosophical and historical 
dimensions of psychology’s birth from philosophy.  
Empiricists of the late 19th-century held that the mind could be the object of a 
legitimate science—empirical psychology—as I have mentioned. But they also held 
that philosophy could only make progress by drawing on the results produced by such a 
science. A workable, philosophical account of the mind had to begin, they held, with 
the best available empirical data.  
I am interested in evaluating this old form of empiricism, not just in recounting the 
story of its development. So our investigation into the rise of empiricism will therefore 
bring us into the territory of philosophy of psychology and general philosophy of 
science. For at heart, the early struggle over empiricism was a struggle over the 
philosophical dimensions of mental science, a struggle that deserves a fresh evaluation.  
One of James’s chief strategies for responding to idealists was to establish a division 
of labor in the study of mind. He sought to erect a disciplinary fence around psychology 
so that those who studied the mind scientifically could be released of responsibility for 
answering certain metaphysical questions, particularly metaphysical questions of the 
sort idealists were asking. In Chapter Five, we will see in detail how this division of 
labor functioned. 
The viability of James’s empiricism required that this disciplinary division be 
defensible. But he claimed that the choice of where to place this division could only be 
made on the basis of a priori assumptions. So to evaluate James’s empiricism, we will 
                                                 
17 The notion that classical American philosophy might have exerted a non-trivial influence on 
the development of logical positivism or early analytic philosophy is sometimes explicitly 
brushed aside. For example, Dummett writes that “… pragmatism was merely an interesting 
tributary that flowed into the mainstream of the analytical tradition,” (Dummett 1994, ix). In 
Dummett’s usage, “analytical philosophy” refers to a movement that encompasses logical 
positivism.  
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have to develop an account of a priori assumptions in a fledgling, human science like 
early psychology.    
Philosophers like Friedman have recently investigated the role of a priori 
presuppositions in science. They have typically drawn their examples from revolutions 
in mature, exact sciences like Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. In Chapter Five, I 
show that when properly modified, such accounts contain crucial insights about 
immature, human sciences as well. Fledgling sciences like late 19th-century psychology 
incorporate what I call “conversational presuppositions,” metaphysical assumptions 
required to inject an intellectual inquiry with scientific legitimacy.  
These assumptions amount to presuppositions in the sense that if they turn out to 
be false, the entire theory is rendered unscientific. The assumptions do not render 
theories scientific through some semantic or syntactic relation (e.g., a false 
conversational presupposition does not render a theory meaningless). Rather, such an 
assumption amounts to a social agreement to respect a stipulated boundary between 
the science in question and an unscientific, neighboring discipline. I argue that such 
social agreement is necessary if an intellectual inquiry is to become a legitimate 
science. 
James used conversational presuppositions to fortify the hitherto contested 
boundary between empirical psychology and philosophy. In other words, he helped 
forge an agreement about which questions about the mind could be treated 
scientifically, and which should be relegated to philosophy. One of James’s lasting 
contributions to both psychology and empiricist philosophy was, therefore, to have 
erected a workable fence inside which mental science could operate without fear of 
attack from metaphysicians. 
It is crucial to note that the boundary James fortified represents a social 
agreement, but “social” does not mean irrational, in this context. On the contrary, I 
show that this boundary’s particular placement was the result of extensive deliberation 
between metaphysicians and aspiring psychologists.  
But note, too, that James’s division between metaphysics and psychology required 
him to give up an older empiricist hope, more recently renewed by (Quine 1969), of 
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collapsing epistemology into psychology. To be sure, James argued for the relevance of 
mental science to philosophy. But this is because psychology, properly understood, 
produces certain unique problems that can only be contemplated from a philosophical 
perspective, not because philosophy should itself become a science. In contrast to 
contemporary forms of naturalism, James’s defense of psychology actually required 
that certain philosophical questions be kept out of science.  
Thus, this dissertation offers an analysis of an early argument over empirical 
psychology. The analysis serves two distinct purposes, ultimately. First, it helps us 
understand empiricism’s rise in English-language philosophy. Second, the analysis 
provides a case study in the kind of inherently social, yet rational deliberation required 
for a legitimate science to break free from existing disciplines. 
3.   SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 
Chapter One begins with a detailed analysis of our contemporary interpretation of 
empiricism—the concept whose evolution I explore in the rest of the dissertation. I 
then analyze a meta-historical literature that argues that there is something illegitimate 
about the very idea of an empiricist tradition. Some in this literature cite T. H. Green 
as the concept’s inventor. Although Green was indeed influential in creating the notion 
of empiricism, I show that he actually used the concept in quite a different manner 
from the way it is now used. Green (and idealist allies) did not think Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume should be treated as a group because these latter three shared an 
epistemology. Rather, idealists held that these three formed a group because they were 
the most important intellectual forefathers of empirical psychology. I then examine 
(what idealists held to be) the metaphysical presuppositions of empirical psychology, as 
articulated by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. 
In Chapter Two, I turn to the empiricist tradition as it was understood by 
psychologist-philosophers like William James and Croom Robertson, the first editor of 
Mind. I offer historical evidence that James was heavily engaged with British idealists 
like Green and Caird, particularly with their attacks against psychology. Although we 
think of James as a quintessentially American philosopher, it was the British journal 
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Mind that published most of the articles eventually incorporated into the Principles. 
Indeed, in the 1880s James participated in a philosophical club in London that 
included Robertson, as well as the main psychologist-philosophers publishing in Mind. I 
analyze the dimensions of this group’s argument with idealists over psychology. I also 
analyze James’s uses of the concept of empiricism throughout his career. I conclude by 
situating my reading of James with respect to some secondary literature.  
In Chapter Three, I critically analyze idealist attacks on Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume. Whether or not empiricists could supply a workable account of space perception 
was a crucial question in the struggle over psychology. I focus on Green’s attack on 
Hume, in this regard. Although recent Hume scholarship has not emphasized the 
latter’s account of space perception, I show that Green’s criticisms provide a formidable 
challenge to would-be defenders of Hume, even today. I compare Green’s reading with 
more recent interpretations of Hume, particularly Don Garrett’s. The point is to 
suggest that the difficulties Green exposed have not been overcome, even on the best 
recent readings of Hume.  
In the final two chapters of the dissertation, I critically examine James’s 
reconfiguration and defense of empiricism. Chapter Four focuses on his response to 
idealist attacks on psychological accounts of space perception. For James, the crucial 
issue dividing empiricists and idealists was whether experience has a native, necessary 
structure. In this connection, spatial perception became a test case for the viability of 
psychology. Idealists argued that our knowledge of spatial relations must be native and 
necessary rather than learned. Therefore, a full explanation of spatial perception 
required transcendental reflection (a kind of a priori inquiry, as we will see) into the 
necessary preconditions of any experience. Idealists argued that therefore, no merely 
empirical inquiry like mental science could hope to reveal the ultimate facts about 
spatial perception. 
James actually accepted the idealist contention that our ability to perceive spatial 
relations is native. However, he did not think it followed that there was one necessary 
metric (e.g., the metric given by Euclid’s axioms) to which all spatial perceptions must 
conform. Thus he rejected that only a priori analysis could explain the facts of space 
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perception. To show that the claim of a necessary metric for spatial perception did not 
follow, he constructed a model of the mind that has the following two properties. First, 
“extensity” as he called it—the experience of extension—was to be a native property of 
sensation. But second, any of a multitude of metrics could be used to organize raw 
sensation into intelligible perceptions of spatial relations. Thus, no one metric could 
give the necessary form of all spatial perception. This is because our raw, natively-
extended sensations are given as a chaotic stream of consciousness, on James’s model. 
The task of organizing this stream into intelligible spatial relations is guided by the 
organism’s interests. Since these interests may change over time, we cannot be 
confident that there exists one necessary pattern for organizing experiences. In the 
specific case of space perception, we cannot be confident that there is one necessary 
metric any conscious subject must use to organize its sensory fields into intelligible 
perceptions of spatial relations. 
The upshot was that how organisms manage to carve spatial relations into the 
stream of consciousness was not a matter that could be gleaned through a priori 
analysis, after all. Instead, the facts of spatial perception required an empirical-
psychological explanation.  
My analysis in Chapter Four will reveal the following tension in James’s 
psychology, however. On one hand, we will see that James offered empirical evidence to 
support his contention that experience is fundamentally a chaotic, continuous stream. 
But on the other hand, James sometimes referred to the stream of consciousness as an 
“a priori assumption,” or framework on which his entire psychology in some sense 
rested. How can the stream of thought both rest on empirical evidence, and yet play 
the role of an a priori framework for his entire psychology?  
In Chapter Five, I try to resolve this tension. James had two complimentary 
strategies for responding to idealist attacks on psychology. As in the case of his work on 
space perception, he sometimes wove philosophical responses into the basic fabric of his 
empirical theories. But he had another strategy as well, which was simply to decline 
responsibility for answering other metaphysical questions idealists were raising. James’s 
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formulation of the notion of a stream of consciousness helped him accomplish this latter 
task. 
He argued that no science can be held responsible for answering the most general, 
metaphysical questions about its subject matter. Such questions are best left to 
metaphysicians, so that scientists can get on with the business of prediction and control 
of nature. But which questions a given science must leave aside is an issue that is not 
decidable solely on the basis of empirical evidence. Instead, the community of inquirers 
must reach a stable agreement—on a priori grounds—of how to divide cognitive labor.  
To this end, I show that James’s stream of consciousness played two distinct roles 
in his psychology. Qua description of experience, the stream of consciousness rested on 
empirical evidence, as we see in Chapter Four. But the stream of consciousness was 
explicitly presented not just as a description of experience simpliciter, but as a 
description of experience’s “ultimate facts,” facts the scientist cannot take 
responsibility for explaining. Psychologists must decide a priori which features of 
experience are to be treated as ultimate, in this sense. So qua description of the 
ultimate objects of psychology, the stream of consciousness was a special kind of a priori 
assumption. In particular, the stream was a “conversational presupposition,” as I am 
calling it, in James’s science.  
Finally, I want to say a word about my use of tense in this dissertation. When I 
began writing, I decided to use the past tense to discuss dead philosophers, and the 
present tense to discuss living ones. I came to find this convention awkward, but it was 
too late to change. So in what follows, I will not write that T. H. Green claims that 
psychology is absurd, for example—Green is dead, and so does not claim anything, 
anymore. In contrast, living philosophers like David Brink do make all sorts of 
interesting claims, which I render in the present tense. For better or worse, I have tried 
to keep to this convention throughout, though economy of expression has sometimes 
required making exceptions. 
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Empiricism:  
On the Origin of  a Historical-Philosophical Concept
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Chapter One 
Empiricism: A Tool for Attacking Psychologists 
The names of our categories may be very old and stable, but the concepts, the modes 
of classifying and interpreting which they represent, undergo progressive alteration 
with the advance of thought.  
C. I. Lewis (Lewis 1929/1956, 235) 
1.   INTRODUCTION TO PART ONE 
William James published his first major article in 1878. At that time, the word 
“empiricism” was not widely used by English-speaking philosophers. Even the most 
scholarly dictionaries listed no philosophical sense of the term, from Noah Webster’s 
erudite American Dictionary of the English Language (1860) to John Ogilvie’s 
then-authoritative18 Imperial Dictionary of the English Language (1883).  
Such dictionaries listed two senses of “empiricist,” both pejorative. In the 
medical fields, an empiricist was a quack, one with no formal education who 
practiced medicine anyway. In common language, the word signified an ignoramus, 
an uneducated person who had pretensions to knowledge.19 
It is not that the philosophical sense of the word had fallen out of fashion. There 
never had been a consistent philosophical meaning of “empiricism” in English. None 
of the canonical British Empiricists described themselves using this term. Even J. S. 
Mill, on many accounts the last of the classic empiricists, explicitly disavowed 
commitment to any position bearing the name (Van Fraassen 2002, 207). 
                                                 
18 The first fascicle of the Oxford English Dictionary appeared in 1884, covering A to Ant in 
352 pages. It would be years before the OED would seriously rival Ogilvie’s 4-volume 
behemoth, which was aptly subtitled: Complete Encyclopedic Lexicon, Literary, Scientific, 
and Technological.   
19 See Appendix I for a timeline and summary of dictionary definitions of “empiricism.” If 
there is any doubt that these dictionaries did not give a philosophical gloss to “empiricism” 
because they did not cover philosophical terms of art at all, consider that Ogilvie’s Imperial 
Dictionary has entries for the following philosophical terms: “metempiricism” 
(“transcendentalism” is given as a synonym), “mode” (a special sense is devoted to Locke’s 
use of the term), “doctrine of occasional essence” (refers to the Cartesian explanation of how 
mind and matter interact), and “realism” (contrasted with “idealism” in metaphysics), to 
take just a few examples. 
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Philosophers had tried to co-opt “empiricism” from time to time as a term of art, 
using the word in a variety of ways usually to describe the follies of others. But no 
stable philosophical meaning—a fortiori, no favorable philosophical meaning—
coalesced until the 1880s.  
During that decade, the concept came to play a central role in philosophical 
debates over empirical psychology. The most important exchanges were published in 
the British journal Mind. By the end of the 1880s, a philosophical connotation 
finally appeared in scholarly dictionaries.20 
                                                 
20 There is something curious about the first dictionary appearances of a philosophical sense 
of “empiricism.” The earliest such entry I can find is in 1889 (see Appendix I), and the entry 
cites then-recent examples. But in 1891, the “E” fascicle of the Oxford English Dictionary 
not only included a philosophical usage of “empiricism,” but supported the usage with 
examples dating back to 1803. It is peculiar that the OED suddenly found a 90-year history of 
a usage of “empiricism” that had been in English dictionaries only two years, up to that 
point. Two factors explain this. First, “empiricism” appeared with more frequency in 
German-language philosophy (especially in connection with Kant) during the 19th century 
than in English-language philosophy. Since English-speaking philosophers sometimes 
engaged with German philosophy, there are scattered examples of early English usages of 
“empiricism” in discussions of Kant. The OED’s first historical citation is just such an 
example. The citation is to an 1803 article in the Edinburgh Review of a French book on 
Kant (the citation is reproduced in Appendix I).  
 Kant had used “empiricism” in the first Critique, in the “Antinomy of Pure Reason.” He 
identified four antinomies, or inconsistent pairs of cosmological ideas that could neither be 
given in experience nor brought by reason into harmony with the laws of nature. In “Section 
3”, Kant associated one side of each inconsistent pair with a type of philosophy. Empiricism 
(“der Empirismus”), exemplified by Epicurus, was associated with what Kant called the 
“antitheses” of the antinomies. Dogmatism (der “Dogmatismus”), exemplified by Plato, was 
associated with the “theses” of the antinomies (CPR, A466/B494 - A476/B504). Kant’s 
second use of “Empirismus” came in the final chapter of the Critique, where he gave a 
“History of Pure Reason.” He wrote that philosophy had made progress primarily in its 
treatment of three controversies. The first controversy was over the object of rational 
knowledge. Sensualists think reality is only to be found in objects of the senses. 
Intellectualists think the senses only give illusion. The second controversy concerns the origin 
of rational knowledge. Empiricists (“Empiristen”) hold that experience is the source of such 
knowledge, while noologists (“Noologisten”) hold that reason alone is the source. Curiously, 
in this passage empiricism is exemplified by Aristotle, and sensationalism by Epicurus 
(whereas earlier Epicurus was the exemplar of empiricism). It is also interesting that Locke, 
not Hume, is the chief recent spokesman for empiricism. The third controversy concerns the 
methods of philosophy. Naturalists eschew reason. Those who use a scientific method (“einer 
szientifischen Methode”) can be dogmatists, like Wolff, or skeptics, like Hume (CPR, A854, 
B882).  
 Even though one can find occasional English-language references to Kant’s discussions of 
empiricism, this seems not to be a prominent strain of English-language Kant scholarship in 
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Over the next half century something dramatic happened to empiricism. The 
concept came to signify such a popular project that by 1939, the American 
philosopher Cornelius Benjamin could confidently proclaim, “the problem is no 
longer whether one is to be a rationalist or an empiricist, but what sort of an 
empiricist one is to be” (Benjamin 1939, 517). He was writing in the influential 
Journal of Philosophy. 
                                                                                                                                       
the 19th century. It was not prominent enough for the Kantian sense of “empiricism” to 
reach English dictionaries before 1889; but it was just prominent enough that the OED could 
retrospectively identify some scattered usages dating back to Kant’s day. Moreover, when 
philosophers used the word as a term of art, they often injected the word with quite different 
meanings before the 1880s. In the English-speaking world, then, the philosophical notion of 
empiricism was used at best very rarely before the ’80s, even in connection with Kant; and 
when it was used, authors could not assume their readers would be familiar with the concept.  
 The second factor in pre-1880 usages of “empiricism” in English is that philosophers 
sometimes used the word in one of its everyday senses. Thus, the next earliest example cited 
by the OED of a distinctively philosophical sense owes to James Mill. But Mill simply used 
“empiricism” to mean pretense to wisdom in the absence of rational methods: “Mere 
observation and empiricism, not even the commencement of science” (see Appendix 1). This 
is exactly the older, pejorative usage of the term. The usage appears distinctively 
philosophical to OED editors merely because the cited author was himself a philosopher, it 
seems.  
 One might make a similar point about van Fraassen’s otherwise excellent discussion of 
early usages of “empiricism.” He cites Bacon’s use of the word as a “clear and early 
precedent” for our modern usage. Bacon wrote that the sciences have been practiced by  
empiricists or dogmatists. The empiricists, like the ants, merely collect and use: the 
rationalists, like spiders, spin webs out of themselves. But the way of the bees lies in 
between: she gathers materials from the flowers of the garden and the field and then by 
her own powers transforms and digests them; and the real work of philosophy is similar. 
(Quoted in Van Fraassen 2002, 203) 
Van Fraassen cites a similar usage in Leibniz. But these usages are not distinctively 
philosophical. In these cases, the word was being used not as a term of art, but in its 
everyday, pejorative sense. Below, I will make a similar case about T. H. Green’s use of the 
word “empiricism” to denote a simplistic reliance on pre-theoretical, common knowledge.  
 So again, the fact that philosophers before the 1880s use the word “empiricism” does not 
tell against my claim that its distinctively philosophical usage only became established in the 
1880s. To sum up, “empiricism” does appear from time to time in English-language 
philosophy before the 1880s. But in the rare cases where it appears as a philosophical term 
of art (e.g., in connection with Kant), it does not appear regularly enough to have established 
itself as a working part of the language of philosophical English. 
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What happened during the interim? What accounts for empiricism’s evolution 
from philosophical epithet to big tent of English-language philosophy? One burden of 
my dissertation is to begin to answer this question.  
In Section Two of this chapter, I analyze our contemporary notion of 
empiricism. After all, we must clearly identify a concept before we can ask how it 
evolved. In Section Three, I consider and reject the prevailing explanation of how 
this term evolved. The prevailing view is that T. H. Green either invented or 
popularized the concept, and that we inherited it from him virtually unchanged. I 
show that this view severely distorts Green’s actual role in the invention of 
empiricism. He did not use the concept in anything like our contemporary manner. 
In Section Four, I develop an alternative account of how Green and his idealist allies 
did use the term during the 1870s. The task of getting clear on how Green 
conceived of his opponents is of crucial importance to my story. James’s version of 
empiricism—the version I will explore in most detail—was formulated partly as a 
response to Green. In Section Five, I deal with some objections to the methodology 
used in this chapter.  
A preliminary word on that methodology is in order, here. Many historians pay 
lip service to the view that our current understanding of history profoundly impacts 
the way we practice philosophy today. For example, Richard Rorty writes: 
The self-image of a philosopher—his identification of himself as such (rather than as, 
perhaps, an historian or a mathematician or a poet)—depends almost entirely upon 
how he sees the history of philosophy. It depends upon which figures he imitates, and 
which episodes and movements he disregards. So a new account of the history of 
philosophy is a challenge which cannot be ignored. (Rorty 1982b, 41) 
I partially concur with the view expressed here. Rorty thinks one’s self-image as a 
philosopher (as opposed to as a historian or mathematician) typically depends21 on 
                                                 
21 I agree that a philosopher’s self-image is likely to be tied up with a particular way of 
understanding the history of philosophy. But I do not agree that a philosopher’s self-image 
usually “depends” on his or her view of history. Sometimes it does. But about as often, it is 
the philosopher’s interest in this or that contemporary research project that drives his or her 
self-image as a philosopher. In such cases, philosophers’ self-images do not depend on their 
reading of history, it seems to me—the self-image depends on contemporary intellectual 
interests. This is an important point because it is also common for a philosopher’s particular 
reading of history, like his or her self image, to depend on  current intellectual interests, and 
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which historical figures one thinks are worth emulating. I would go further, in this 
respect—one’s understanding of one’s own philosophical project (as naturalistic 
rather than Kantian, say) is often bound up with a sense of which historical 
movements one thinks are worth emulating.  
One premise of this dissertation is that my historical subjects were also people 
whose practice of philosophy was tied up with how they understood history. Thus, I 
will be exploring the history of a philosophical debate about psychology. But I will 
also be exploring the history of the history of this debate, as my subjects saw it. This 
is because the struggle over psychology was also a struggle over warring 
interpretations of history, and I have found that these two stories must be told in 
tandem. 
2.  CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICISM 
Whether we are historians or not, contemporary philosophers tacitly treat 
empiricism as what I shall call a “historical-philosophical concept.” I mean that we 
typically take the concept to refer not just to a philosophical thesis. We also take it to 
refer to a set of philosophers we group together precisely in virtue of their common 
commitment to the aforementioned thesis.  
This makes tracing the evolution of empiricism a complicated affair. One can 
inquire about the history of the philosophical thesis that “empiricism” now denotes. 
That is to say, one can ask about the history of (some version of) the view that 
knowledge must be justified by appeal to experience. I will use “‘epistemological 
empiricism’” to refer to this first sense of the word “empiricism.”22  
                                                                                                                                       
not vice versa. In short, sometimes our particular interpretation of history powers our self-
identity; sometimes our self identity powers our particular interpretation of history. So one 
should not insist that self-image always simply “depends” on one’s reading of history, as 
Rorty claims.  
22 Philosophers commonly distinguish between ‘concept-empiricism’, the semantic view that 
all concepts are derived from experience, and ‘knowledge-empiricism’, the epistemological 
view that all propositional knowledge derives from experience. Note that the former version 
of empiricism is a semantic thesis, but it is typically of interest for its epistemological 
implications. On this distinction as it relates to Locke, see (Ayers 1991/1993, 14-15). Ayers 
thinks Locke is only a ‘concept-empiricist’; Green appears to saddle Locke with a version of 
‘knowledge-empiricism’, though Green himself does not employ this distinction. It is 
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But one can inquire about the history of the history to which “empiricism” 
refers, as well. In other words, one can ask about the history of the schematism that 
describes early modern philosophy as an epistemological dispute between British 
Empiricists and Continental Rationalists. I will use “British Empiricism” when I 
want to refer specifically to this second sense of the word “empiricism.”  
I will argue that the histories of the concepts ‘epistemological empiricism’ and 
British Empiricism are intertwined in two respects. First, the concept of 
‘epistemological empiricism’ developed in tandem with the historical schematism 
that divides modern philosophy into an epistemological dispute between British 
Empiricism and Continental Rationalism. Second, our contemporary usage of the 
concept empiricism is constrained by both the epistemological notion of ‘empiricism’ 
and by the historical category of British Empiricism. If this second point is right, 
then we tacitly treat empiricism as a kind of higher-order concept. I contend that 
this higher-order concept itself has a history, a history I will explore in this 
dissertation.  
A word on some typographic conventions is in order, here. I will put single 
quotation marks around –ism words that refer, without invoking any particular 
history, to a position or stance (e.g., ‘adaptationism’ is the view that natural 
selection is the only significant engine of evolutionary change). I will capitalize words 
that refer to historical movements in the first instance (e.g., the New Realists 
published a joint platform in 1912). I use double quotation marks to distinguish 
between use and mention.  
But how should I write about concepts that words like “empiricism” denote? I 
am arguing precisely that our concept of empiricism cannot be reduced without 
remainder either into a bare philosophical position, or into a simple historical 
category. I will underline words that refer to such “historical-philosophical 
concepts,” as I am calling them.  
                                                                                                                                       
important to note that Green’s chief interest in Locke is not epistemological, but 
metaphysical, as we shall see below. 
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Finally, I will leave words like “empiricism” un-underlined, uncapitalized, and 
without quotation marks when I wish to remain agnostic on how the word is being 
used. Often such agnosticism is helpful when I am speaking about other people’s 
usage. For example, I might write “Brink thinks that Green’s target was 
empiricism,” if it is unclear whether Brink thinks Green meant to attack a position 
or a historical movement. 
Here is a summary, for ease of reference: 
SUMMARY OF TYPOGRAPHIC CONVENTION 
‘empiricism’ = a philosophical position 
Empiricism = a historical movement 
empiricism = a historical-philosophical concept 
empiricism = either a position, a historical movement, or some combination 
of the two 
I will use these typographic conventions for the rest of this dissertation.  
 
Today, “empiricism” typically has hybrid connotations. I will now give an 
account of how such hybrid concepts function. I will call concepts defined in terms of 
mutually reinforcing theoretical and historical considerations “historical-
philosophical concepts.” Consider the following definition schema:  
SCHEMA FOR HISTORICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL (HP) CONCEPT X: 
(1) THESIS: concept x denotes a philosophical thesis or stance, and the thesis or 
stance was affirmed by the philosophers mentioned in (2). 
(2) HISTORY: a canonical set of historical figures, S, are to be grouped together 
on the basis of their common commitment to the thesis or stance 
mentioned in (1). 
I will now explain the sense in which each part of the definition-schema constrain 
one other. I will do this by examining one HP concept, empiricism. I will then offer 
evidence that my HP analysis does capture the way contemporary philosophers in 
fact use the concept empiricism. 
What makes empiricism a slippery concept is precisely the relationship between 
the two parts of its definition. Any adequate usage of “empiricism” must conform to 
both parts of its definition, and a change in one part will require a corresponding 
change in the other. Consider how the history constrains the thesis. Though there 
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may be no single philosophical thesis that everyone agrees constitutes ‘empiricism,’ 
the history we associate with empiricism (the HP concept) limits how much 
flexibility we will tolerate in specifying such a thesis. If a philosopher used the 
adjective “empiricist” to describe a philosophical position clearly held by Descartes, 
Spinoza, and Leibniz (“DSL,” henceforth), and denied by Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume (“LBH,” henceforth), we would think the philosopher did not know how to 
use the word “empiricism.” Moreover, as we will see below, one who modifies 
standard ways of filling in (1) is often expected to make it plausible that LBH can be 
read as sharing a commitment to this new variant. If this is right, then the thesis one 
specifies in any construal of empiricism is constrained by the history one associates 
with the concept.  
And the history one associates with empiricism is similarly constrained by the 
thesis one chooses. If a philosopher grouped LBH together on the basis of a pure 
historical fact—these philosophers’ self-conscious effort at building a school united in 
its opposition to DSL, say—we would (or should, at any rate) regard the philosopher 
as historically ignorant.23 LBH did not regard themselves as forming a school. They 
did not regard themselves as united in opposition to Cartesian Rationalists. And 
they certainly did not regard themselves as united by a shared theory about the 
source of all knowledge.  
                                                 
23 For a helpful summary of problems scholars have found with the notion that LBH 
constitute one coherent tradition, see (Loeb 1981, 32-36). One famous exchange among 
historians highlights the point. (Popkin 1959b, 71) wrote that “It is … highly questionable 
whether Hume ever read Berkeley, or derived any views from him.” (Wiener 1959) 
challenged Popkin to substantiate the claim. Popkin responded in (Popkin 1959a) by 
maintaining that Hume was not seriously engaged with Berkeley’s views, and that the 
former’s passing references to Berkeley can be explained without supposing that Hume had 
ever even read Berkeley. In 1963 a Polish journal published a letter in which Hume 
recommended that a friend read Berkeley’s Principles of Human Knowledge. (Popkin 1964) 
finally conceded that Hume had read Berkeley, but that the former was nevertheless not 
seriously engaged with the latter’s philosophy. Today, it is still common to treat Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume as bearing philosophical affinities to one another. But in the wake 
especially of Popkin’s work, it is no longer tenable to hold that these three formed a self-
conscious school united in opposition to what we now call Continental Rationalism. See also 
(Bracken 1977-1978; Kuklick 1984; Loeb 1981; Norton 1981; Norton 1982; Van Fraassen 
2002, 201-225). Cf. (Ayers 1984). 
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Instead, we expect those who group LBH together to do so on the basis of shared 
philosophical commitments among the three that we can ascribe retrospectively. 
Typically, the shared commitment involves the view that experience plays a strong 
role in knowledge. If this is right, then the historical part of any construal of 
empiricism is constrained by the thesis one specifies in part (1). 
Now I will present evidence that what I have just written accurately captures 
our contemporary interpretation of empiricism.  
We find a straightforward example of a definition of empiricism with two 
mutually-constraining parts in the preface to Garrett and Barbanell’s Encyclopedia 
of Empiricism. “Empiricism,” we read, can be used to refer to a “philosophical 
emphasis” on experience over a priori reasoning. It can also indicate  
a particular philosophical movement or tendency of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, originating and centered in Great Britain …. Its … most important 
representatives are John Locke, George Berkeley, and David Hume. (Garrett and 
Barbanell 1997, ix) 
True, the authors continue, these thinkers did not call themselves “Empiricists.”  
Nevertheless, they and the thinkers most directly influenced by them clearly conceived 
of themselves as seeking a more experiential basis for philosophy. In that sense, 
although they lacked the term, they conceived of themselves as empiricists. (Garrett 
and Barbanell 1997, x) 
Thus, Empiricism (the tradition) is to be identified by its founders’ common 
‘empiricist’ epistemology. 
Let us look more closely at Garrett’s own use of “empiricism.” Garrett’s usage 
illustrates that whatever thesis empiricism is used to denote, the thesis is typically 
epistemological. This will be important when we contrast late-19th century 
interpretations. Garrett’s usage also illustrates the way in which the thesis and the 
history components of empiricism typically constrain one another.  
Garrett proposes five flavors of empiricism in his book on Hume. Note that each 
sense of empiricism contains an epistemological component; and that Garrett’s 
senses of empiricism are supposed to be important precisely because they specify a 
set of substantive philosophical commitments that DSL (mostly) oppose, and that 
LBH (mostly) support. Thus, for each sense of “empiricism,” Garrett is at pains to 
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offer evidence that each member of DSL in fact oppose empiricism under the sense 
in question, and that each member of LBH support it.24  
Here are Garrett’s five brands of ‘empiricism.’ First, Hume is a “methodological 
empiricist” because he thinks observation should be the “main determinant of 
theory” (Garrett 1997, 30-33). Second, Hume is a “conceptual empiricist” because 
he holds concepts all to be derived from sense experience (pp. 33-34). Third, Hume 
is a “nomological empiricist” because he holds that laws of nature can only be 
known on the basis of experience (pp. 34-35). Fourth, Hume is an “explanatory 
empiricist” because he thinks there are brute facts that resist sufficient explanation 
(pp. 35-36). Fifth, Hume is a “reductive empiricist” because he often employs a 
pattern of argumentation where he explains the existence of a state of affairs by 
defining that state of affairs in terms of what would typically be regarded only as 
evidence for the existence of that state of affairs.25  
The first meaning of ‘empiricism’ is epistemological in the sense that it gives us 
a method for settling disputes over theoretical knowledge-claims. The second is 
epistemological in the sense that LBH are not portrayed as interested in semantics as 
an end in itself, but only interested insofar as knowing the source of our concepts 
helps figure out how to justify knowledge claims in which they are employed, 
allegedly. The third brand of ‘empiricism’ is straightforwardly epistemological. 
Garrett presents the fourth as simply the negation of the principle of sufficient 
reason—a principle that maintains optimistic expectations about which facts we can 
hope to have an explanation for. Explanation is, for Garrett, an epistemological 
notion. The fifth brand of ‘empiricism’ has epistemological concerns built-in—
                                                 
24 Garrett does allow exceptions. For example, Descartes appears to be an explanatory 
empiricist, “despite his ‘rationalism’ in other respects,” (p. 35). 
25 This last brand of “empiricism” can be clarified with two examples. Locke defined 
personal identity in terms of a subject’s memory of his own chronologically-continuous set of 
experiences. Critics counter that this definition conflates the evidence for personal identity 
with the very concept of personal identity itself (pp. 36-37). A second, prominent example is 
Hume’s definition of causation in terms of constant conjunction (p. 38). Again, critics 
complain that Hume is conflating part of the evidence for a causal relation with the relation 
itself. 
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according to Garrett, reductive empiricists justify their argument strategy by 
insisting it is the only way to avoid epistemological skepticism (p. 36). 
Thus, Garrett proposes five special varieties of ‘epistemological empiricism.’ He 
motivates his use of each by arguing that for the most part, LB & H are all 
committed to the version of ‘empiricism’ in question, and that DS & L all deny it.  
As we proceed, we will need to distinguish carefully the sense of empiricism at 
issue in the 19th century from the way we, today, cash out this idea. Therefore, I 
will use the phrase “contemporary interpretation of empiricism” when I mean to 
talk about our current understanding of this concept, which we can now record as 
follows: 
CONTEMPORARY INTERPRETATION OF EMPIRICISM (CIE): 
(1) THESIS:  ‘empiricism’ is an epistemological thesis emphasizing the role of 
experience in knowledge, a thesis affirmed by the philosophers 
mentioned in (2).  
(2) HISTORY: The Empiricists were a set of 17th and 18th century 
philosophers—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—who should be 
grouped together in virtue of their commitment to the thesis 
mentioned in (1).  
Note that CIE follows the form of the HP concept schema—that is to say, our 
contemporary interpretation of empiricism is what I am calling a historical-
philosophical concept. In future chapters, I will use “empiricism” to denote a 
concept whose meaning evolved over time. I will use “CIE” strictly to refer to 
empiricism in its present incarnation. 
CIE is itself a sketch, and is not intended to be a complete definition of 
“empiricism.” Below, I will argue that our contemporary interpretation of 
empiricism does not map neatly onto older versions of that concept. But to see that 
this is the case, we do not need to identify any one concrete definition that all 
philosophers agree upon—there are, of course, many notions of empiricism in use. 
For our purposes, it will be enough to see that in step (1) of our contemporary 
interpretation, the theses are typically epistemological in character; and that the 
figures mentioned in step (2) are almost invariably Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. (In 
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some cases, current usage countenances a semantic thesis or set of theses in step (1), 
but this is usually in service of a deeper epistemological thesis.)26 
3.  THE USUAL SUSPECT: T. H. GREEN 
A cottage-industry in the meta-history of philosophy flourished especially 
between about 1959 and the early 1980s. A host of authors argued that there is 
something illegitimate about the idea that there were two major schools in modern 
philosophy, Rationalists and Empiricists.27 The literature is especially critical of the 
idea that the Locke-Berkeley-Hume triad really constitutes anything worth calling a 
“tradition.” Two questions to emerge from this literature are when and why the idea 
of British Empiricism became a stable historical category. 
One prominent answer points to Thomas Hill Green. Green was the founder of 
British Idealism,28 and a savage critic of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. He and 
Thomas Grose brought Hume’s Treatise back into print after a long absence. Green 
wrote a 374-page “Introduction” to Hume that criticized, from a neo-Kantian 
perspective, the group we now think of as British Empiricists. Several scholars claim 
Green was not just someone who attacked empiricism, but that he was one of the 
inventors, or chief popularizers, of the very concept of empiricism (Loeb 1981, 31; 
Norton 1981, 332-333). In this section, I will first present the best available 
evidence in favor of this claim. Then I will show that this evidence is not compelling.  
There are three chief reasons why Green is suspected to be an inventor of the 
empiricism concept. First, his “Introduction” does draw together Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume as the three most important figures in the tradition he criticizes. Second, 
Green studied and taught at Balliol College, Oxford, eventually becoming Whyte's 
                                                 
26 See fn. 22. 
27 The literature I have in mind includes (Bracken 1977-1978; Kuklick 1984; Loeb 1981; 
Norton 1981; Norton 1982; Popkin 1959a; Popkin 1964; Van Fraassen 2002, 201-225) (cf. 
Ayers 1984; Wiener 1959). 
28 One need not undertake any complicated meta-history in order to talk about British 
Idealism. This is because unlike the British Empiricists, Idealists (like Green, F. H. Bradley, 
and Bernard Bosanquet, among others) actually saw themselves as part of one philosophical 
movement. It is the ex post facto historical categories about which we need to be careful.  
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Professor of Moral Philosophy there. Green’s students included such Idealist 
luminaries as F. H. Bradley, Bernard Bosanquet, Edward Caird, John Caird, and R. 
L. Nettleship (Loeb 1981, 31.n37). So his students eventually gained the stature 
and influence to spread widely whatever philosophical classifications they had 
learned from Green. 
A third reason has to do with the full version of the modern-philosophy 
narrative as widely taught, today. Most philosophers have been trained to read 
modern philosophy not just as a battle over ‘epistemological empiricism’ between 
DSL and LBH. A crucial part of the story is that Kant is supposed to have ended the 
battle by showing how to synthesize what was right about the two respective 
positions. This is similar to Green’s version of events. He argues that we must read 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume in order to appreciate “the intellectual necessity of the 
Kantian answer,” (INT, §3, 3). 
Green may have contributed to the creation of British Empiricism by grouping 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume together as the key figures of a philosophical tradition. 
But I will now argue that Green did not conceive of his targets in the epistemological 
manner suggested by CIE. Thus, he could not be the inventor of that framework, at 
least as now understood. 
Virtually every philosopher who writes about British Idealism today uses 
“empiricism” as shorthand for whatever tradition or position Idealists were arguing 
against (Brink 2003, 9; Hylton 1985, 91; Hylton 1990, 22; Lemos 1968, v-vi; 
Norton 1981, 332; Randall 1966, 218; Rorty 1979, 147).29 This is a costly mistake, 
                                                 
29 Some philosophers use “empiricism” to denote a tradition Idealists argued against. For 
example, (Hylton 1990, 22) says that according to Green’s “picture, empiricism forms a 
single school of thought …” that is constituted by LBH. Other philosophers use the phrase to 
mark a philosophical position. For example, (Brink 2003, 9) says Green wants to attack “a 
form of empiricism that he finds in common sense, as well as philosophical thought,” citing 
§20 of Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics. Note that Green did not actually use the word 
“empiricism” in the cited section. Brink does give a short but more or less accurate 
description of a philosophical position Green is concerned to argue against: “In this tradition, 
reality is associated with simple ideas delivered to the senses and contrasted with the 
workmanship of the understanding and relations, which are in some sense illusory or 
conventional,” (p. 10). But this is not the doctrine we now call “empiricism.” The brand of 
empiricism Green targets, for Brink, is a metaphysical doctrine about the distinction 
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for it obscures what was at stake in Green’s attack on LBH. Green’s ultimate goal 
was not to criticize an epistemology shared by LB & H. Green wanted to attack this 
group’s shared metaphysics, a metaphysics Green saw as the philosophical 
foundation for empirical psychology. In other words, the philosophical connotations 
of empiricism—step (1) of CIE—do not map neatly onto early Idealists’ conceptions 
of their targets. Note that I will use the phrase “early Idealists” to denote Green and 
his chief early ally, Edward Caird. 
 
I will begin by reviewing two standard accounts of Green on empiricism. Norton 
claims we inherited a particular outline of philosophical history from Green.30 
Although in the 20th century, Norton writes, we discarded Green’s Hegelian 
vocabulary (no more talk of “dialectical movements” for us), we retained that 
history’s substantive core.  
… There has seemed to be little reason to dispute what could be called the ‘factual’ 
side of Green’s account, and thus in the past 60 or so years our favourite, perhaps one 
                                                                                                                                       
between reality and fantasy. The thesis component of empiricism, as it is now standardly 
understood (see fn. 22, above) is an epistemological doctrine about the need to justify 
knowledge claims by appeal to sensation. To be sure, the epistemological claim is related to 
the metaphysical claim. But it is a mistake to run the two together.  
30 Green himself is supposed to have inherited these ideas from Thomas Reid. Norton claims 
Reid is the originator of the idea of that empiricism starts with Locke, is continued by 
Berkeley, and is taken to its logical conclusion by Hume. (Reid is occasionally cited in this 
connection by other authors as well.) For example, Norton writes that according to Reid, 
Berkeley failed to see a lingering problem “inherent in the empiricist theory”; but Hume did 
see the problem, and carried empiricism to its logical conclusion (Norton 1981, 331-332). In 
fact, Reid did not use the words “empiricism” or “empiricist” at all. It is true that he linked 
Berkeley and Hume with Locke, but he did not link these characters in virtue of a shared 
empiricism.  
 There are two reasons we ought not to assimilate Reid’s understanding of history to CIE. 
First, Reid sees Berkeley and Hume as exploring principles laid down not just by Locke, but 
by Descartes and Malebranche as well (Reid 1863, I.101). This is peculiar if we are working 
with the CIE notion of empiricism—Descartes, that supposed grandfather of rationalism, is 
here portrayed as a grandfather of Berkeley and Hume. Second, the principle that ties this 
tradition together is not the principle of ‘epistemological empiricism’, under any name—not 
the principle that knowledge must be justified by appeal to experience. The principle tying 
together Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume concerns perception, 
according to Reid—that perception’s objects are ideas, or some other “image presented to 
the mind” (Reid 1863, I.263). So Reid’s version of Berkeley and Hume’s position in history 
is a far cry from the version given by CIE.  
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could say our standard, historians of philosophy have taken for granted the claims that 
Rationalism and Empiricism were disparate movements, that Locke is to be 
understood as opposing the Rationalists, and that Berkeley and Hume can be 
satisfactorily understood as developments of the Empiricism established by Locke. 
(Norton 1981, 333) 
Norton suggests that we finally give up “the ‘factual side’” of Green’s account. But 
notice that the “‘factual’ side” of Green’s account is supposed to hold that LBH are 
leaders of empiricism, a movement intrinsically opposed to rationalism.31 I agree 
that current philosophers often accept this framework uncritically, and that we ought 
not to do so. But Norton is wrong about one thing—the framework does not come 
from Green. In fact, Green did not work with anything like the ideas imputed to him 
here. He was not even aware of this now-standard framework, as we will see, which 
suggests that its widespread use would only come later. 
The question of whether Green subscribed to the familiar framework is not 
trivial. Norton goes on to claim that Green’s chief goal in the “Introduction” was to 
argue precisely against empiricism: 
T.H. Green set about showing both the legitimacy and inevitability of this victory [of 
German philosophy over the “intellectual world”] by editing the first (and only) 
complete edition of Hume’s philosophical works. The cunning reason for this otherwise 
puzzling step was simple: Green wanted to show that Hume had in fact brought a 
certain mode of philosophy - empiricism - to its ultimate and fully negative conclusion, 
and thus to show that such remaining empiricists as John Stuart Mill were mere 
anachronisms [fn omitted].32 (Norton 1981, 332) 
Norton is right that Green aimed to show that Hume brought a certain philosophical 
tradition to its logical end—but the tradition Hume’s work was supposed to reduce 
to absurdity was not empiricism in anything like our contemporary interpretation of 
that project.  
                                                 
31 I underline “empiricism” and “rationalism” here because Norton seems to think of these 
concepts as involving both a historical schematism and a substantive philosophical 
commitment. 
32 Norton’s footnote cites the first five section of (INT), which do not use the words 
“empiricism” or “empiricist”; they do not suggest that LBH are united by a shared 
epistemology at all. For more on the way these sections are commonly misread, see below, 
pp. 150 ff. 
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Norton’s account of Green’s view of history is standard (for similar accounts, see 
the in-text citations on page 37). Consider one more example. David O. Brink (now 
a leading Green scholar, among other things), concurs:  
Green is concerned with a form of empiricism that he finds in common sense, as well 
as philosophical thought (§20).33 Though Green believes that John Locke’s Essay 
concerning Human Understanding was largely responsible for making empiricism 
philosophically influential, he thinks that only David Hume adheres to empiricist 
principles consistently (Works, i.1-5, 132) and that, as a result, the full metaphysical 
and epistemological difficulties with empiricism become clear only in Hume’s work, 
especially his Treatise of Human Nature. (Brink 2003, 10) 
Again, Green’s aim is supposed to be to show that Hume reduced empiricism to 
absurdity. I admire both Norton and Brink’s respective work.34 However, this 
portrayal of Green is seriously mistaken.  
Brink correctly notes that Green associated Locke’s empiricism with “common 
sense.” But Brink slides into the incorrect claim that Green thought Lockean 
empiricism was influential in philosophy. It is true that Green thought Hume gave 
the most consistent expression to something in Locke’s philosophy. But that 
something was not Locke’s ‘epistemological empiricism.’ It was a metaphysical 
system meant to undergird a science of mind, as we will see in the next section. 
What evidence is there to support Norton and Brink’s view that Green was 
attacking CIE-style empiricism? Few scholars offer positive evidence of this claim. 
Norton is an exception. At (Norton 1981, 332), he cites the following passage. Green 
did write that Locke “gathered up the results of the ‘empirical’ philosophy of his 
predecessors” (INT, §3, 3). Norton infers that since, on Green’s view, Hume 
                                                 
33 This is a reference to Green’s Prolegomena to Ethics, where Green associates Locke—but 
not Berkeley or Hume—with “common-sense.” Green does not use “empiricism” or 
“empiricist” in this passage. He does not mention the view that knowledge somehow reduces 
to experience, either. 
34 I hasten to add that (Norton 1981) is a stab at the sort of meta-history of philosophy I 
pursue in this chapter. His work has been influential on my own thinking. But I cannot 
subscribe to the story that arises out of his meta-history. Brink’s book does a wonderful job of 
presenting Green’s moral philosophy for a contemporary audience. But his brief treatment of 
Green’s view of history—particularly concerning the history of metaphysics and 
epistemology—is also not accurate.  
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reduced certain Lockean principles to absurdity, the principles in question must also 
involve “empiricism.”  
This passage provides a weak foundation for Norton’s inference—but as we 
have nothing stronger to work with, let us consider it in some detail. There are two 
things to notice about this passage. First, Green associated the history of “‘empirical’ 
philosophy” with Locke, not with either Berkeley or Hume. Further study of the 
way Green used “empiricism” reveals that he used the word to denote some position 
that distinguishes Locke from Berkeley and Hume. If I am right, then the passage 
Norton cites is obviously not good evidence that Green saw LB & H as tied together 
by their shared “empiricism,” whatever Green meant by this word. 
Second, note that Green did not actually use either “empiricism” or 
“empiricist” in the passage Norton cites. In fact, Green never calls anyone an 
“empiricist.” The term “empiricism” does appear elsewhere in the Introduction, but 
far too rarely to serve as any organizing concept—it appears exactly four times in 
the entire 371-page work (INT, §118, §119, §224, §227). Neither “empiricism” nor 
“empiricist” appears at all in Green’s lengthy discussions of Hobbes, Spencer, 
Lewes, Mill, or Kant, either. That is, neither word appears in the first two volumes 
of the Collected Works (GWR, I-II), save for the four mentioned instances in the 
“Introduction” to Hume.  
In each of the four instances where Green does use “empiricism,” he uses the 
word not to associate Berkeley and Hume with Locke, but to associate Locke with 
philosophical views to which the common person subscribes. I will now survey each 
of these occurrences of “empiricism” to show that Green used the word differently 
from the way Norton and Brink think he used it.  
Consider Green’s first usage. He said Locke could “claim authorship at once of 
the popular empiricism of the modern world, and of its refutation” (INT, §118, 98). 
This passage is ambiguous. To what does the phrase “the popular empiricism of the 
modern world” refer? If “the modern world” is Green’s shorthand for the world of 
17th and 18th century philosophy, then this passage may assert that Locke 
invented a view called “empiricism” that was “popular” among early modern 
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philosophers. This reading would be consistent with the Norton and Brink’s view. 
But this reading is not defensible. 
Green more likely meant the phrase “popular empiricism” to be a synonym for 
something he usually called “popular philosophy.” Green often wrote that Locke 
was the author of this popular philosophy. The substitution of “empiricism” for 
“philosophy,” here, emphasizes the allegedly ignorant character of popular thought. 
Green was not using “empiricism” as a term of art, but as the then-common epithet 
evoking pretensions to knowledge among the untutored (see Appendix I). Moreover, 
by “the modern world,” Green probably meant the contemporary world—viz., his 
own, Late-Victorian Europe. Green saw Lockean philosophy as still dominating 
popular thought, among Victorians. A closer look at the Greenian notion of “popular 
philosophy” supports my reading.  
 
In “Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life” (first published in 1868) Green 
drew a parallel between the public role of philosophy in Victorian England and in 
Ancient Greece. The Sophists used philosophical ideas merely for rhetorical value. 
According to Green, this shows that philosophy had a sweeping, popular appeal in 
the ancient world. Otherwise Sophists could not have used philosophical ideas for 
public persuasion (GWR, III.92).35 Philosophical ideas were being used for public 
persuasion—for sophistry—in Victorian England as well, according to Green. 
“Popular philosophy” was Green’s name for any set of philosophical principles 
to which the general public subscribed, in a given place and time. The principles 
thereby set out the ideals of the entire culture. The principles were popular enough 
that an appropriate appeal to them in public speech could be expected to have 
rhetorical force. For example, the notion that political freedom is intrinsically 
valuable is a philosophical idea that American politicians today actually evoke in 
their rhetoric. That this is often an effective rhetorical strategy counts as evidence 
                                                 
35 A very useful essay on Green that discusses “Popular Philosophy in its Relation to Life” is 
(Walsh 1986). The introduction to the same volume, (Vincent 1986), is invaluable for 
outlining debates in Green scholarship, and for situating Green in the context of late 
Victorian intellectual life.   
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that some principle concerning the intrinsic value of political freedom would be part 
of contemporary “public philosophy,” in Green’s sense. 
Green seems not to have thought that one could always find a popular 
philosophy in all cultures in all time periods. But Victorian Britain did have a 
popular philosophy, and the philosophy was descended from Ancient Greece and 
filtered through Locke. The popular philosophy was supposed to be a set of ideals 
Locke had popularized, a set of ideals that played a strong rhetorical role in the 
French and American revolutions. Green especially disliked the Lockean notion of 
natural human rights, which he saw as still a major component of the popular 
philosophy of his own age. For Green, political rights come from an individual’s 
participation in a community, not from nature alone.36 Green’s arguments against 
Locke are typically intended to show that the Lockean metaphysics on which the 
popular idea of natural rights rests is incoherent. 
It makes sense that Green would characterize the popular philosophy as a form 
of “empiricism,” because he standardly characterized popular philosophy as 
unsubtle. “Genuine speculation,” Green wrote, leaves “antithetical ideas … fluid 
and elastic.” But in contrast, “popular philosophy … gives them a positive answer, 
Yes or No …” (GWR, III.92). This rush to give a positive answer was a mark of 
intellectual naïveté. Professional philosophy acknowledges, along with Hegel, that 
our deepest questions about the universe have contradictory answers. But popular 
philosophy hurries to resolve contradictions with simplistic pronouncements. Popular 
philosophy’s “dichotomous formulae”—those Yes or No answers—“are inadequate 
to comprehend the real world of morals, religion, and law” (GWR, III.93). 
Green called Locke the “parent” of contemporary, popular philosophy (GWR, 
III.93), the principles of which he formulated this way: 
The doctrine that man, the sensitive man, is the measure of all things, which as being 
par excellence the doctrine that fits philosophy to be an instrument of rhetoric, may be 
taken as characteristic of the Sophists, survived the criticism of Plato and Aristotle. … 
So in the modern world, the doctrines of the Aufklärung are not to be supposed dead 
and done with, because Kant outgrew them nearly a hundred years ago. From the 
                                                 
36 On the topic of Green’s conservative criticism of human rights in this article, see (Sherover 
1989, 113-117). 
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pulpit and the senate, from the newspaper and the journal of science, from saint and 
from sage, the disciple of Kant finds them smite him in the face whichever way he 
look. (GWR, III.93-94) 
We learn from this passage that popular philosophy’s characteristic doctrine is 
Protagoras’s dictum that man is the measure of all things. It is important to note 
that Green qualified the usual way of putting this statement, emphasizing that in 
Lockean popular philosophy, it is “the sensitive man” who is the measure of all 
things. This phrase refers to the human being in his or her capacity for sensory 
experience, as opposed to the human in his or her capacity for intellectual 
deliberation. This is crucial because the fatal flaw Green finds in the Lockean 
“popular philosophy” is that it relies on an inadequate account of the relationship 
between sense and intellect.  
The popular philosophy is essentially the “uncritical expression” of the familiar 
enlightenment ideals proclaiming people’s right “to be free, to enjoy, and to 
understand.” These ideals are supposed to have emerged in the public consciousness 
in the long history of poetry, religion, and metaphysics (GWR, III.97). However: 
The ethical theories of popular philosophy, however various, have this in common, that 
they rest wholly on feeling. Of feeling, as such, they give no account. As in the popular 
theory of knowledge, no distinction is made between sensation itself and the 
intellectual judgment of which sensation is the occasion or accompaniment, so in the 
corresponding theory of morals, feeling is treated as the exhaustive account of all 
modes of consciousness with which it is associated. (GWR, III.97) 
So in their uncritical, “popular” expression, the enlightenment ideals of freedom, 
happiness, and understanding are somehow premised on a conception of “feeling” 
that fails to make adequate sense of the role of the intellect in experience. We will 
see in the next chapter exactly how this failure to understand the relationship 
between sensation and emotion goes awry. For now, we need to note the conclusion 
Green draws from this central flaw in popular philosophy. It literally results in 
man’s37 failure to achieve enlightenment.  
                                                 
37 For all Green’s talk of enlightenment, he was not above the prejudices of his era: “As the 
talk of a woman or a child is tedious from the iteration of ‘I like’ and ‘I don’t like,’ so the 
literature of … [the time of Charles II—he’s talking about Bishop Butler] nauseates with the 
description of agreeable sensations and reflections, and with easy theories of their 
production” (GWR, III.98).  
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Thus, the usually-stodgy Green manages a stirring conclusion. I will quote 
Green at length, because the passage sheds light on his entire project. 
But the modern English utilitarian is generally better than his logic. In defiance of 
Hume and Bentham, he distinguishes higher and lower pleasures by some other 
criterion than that of quantity, and takes as the object to which ‘expediency’ is relative 
a ‘good of others,’ which involves his own. He is not practically the worse for failing to 
perceive that to live for such an object is to live, not for the attainment of any sum of 
agreeable sensations, but for the realisation of an idea, of which the philosophy that 
starts from feeling can give no account. 
The general public shows in its practice an alienation from its own popular 
philosophy. Earlier in the paper, Green argued that popular philosophy evolved from 
the Lockean ideals of the Aufklärung into Millian utilitarianism. Mill famously 
distinguished between higher and lower pleasures, a serious departure from 
Bentham. Green held that Mill had no criterion to draw this distinction, unless the 
latter granted that community flourishing is intrinsically valuable. But this view is 
incompatible, somehow, with the underlying Lockean idea that all reality reduces to 
feeling. Green’s conclusion is very important for understanding his conception of 
Lockean popular philosophy: 
‘Not practically the worse,’—but man, above all the modern man, must theorise his 
practice, and the failure adequately to do so, must cripple the practice itself. Hitherto, 
except from a school of German philosophers, which did not make itself generally 
intelligible, no adequate theory has been forthcoming, and hence that peculiar 
characteristic of our times, the scepticism of the best men. Art, religion, and political 
life have outgrown the nominalistic logic and the psychology of individual introspection; 
yet the only recognised formulae by which the speculative man can account for them 
himself, are derived from that logic and psychology. Thus the more fully he has 
appropriated the results of the spiritual activity of his time, the more he is baffled in his 
theory, and to him this means weakness, and the misery of weakness. Meanwhile, 
pure motive and high aspiration are going for nothing, or issuing only in those wild and 
fruitless outbursts into action, with which speculative misery sometimes seeks to 
relieve itself. The prevalence of such a state of mind might be expected at least to 
excite an interest in a philosophy like that of Hegel, of which it was the professed 
object to find formulae adequate to the action of reason as exhibited in nature and 
human society, in art and religion. (GWR, III.124-125) 
Green seems to think that the fundamental problem with popular philosophy is not 
(just) that it rests on a false metaphysics. Ultimately, Green’s complaint is that those 
who accept the popular philosophy are insufficiently self-critical. Their “practice”—
their life in a community—is “cripple[d]” by a failure to theorize. Humans can only 
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hope to achieve enlightenment by seeking a detailed, metaphysical understanding of 
experience.  
We can now see why Green called Lockean philosophy a form of empiricism. 
The cardinal mistake of the popular philosophy is its intellectual complacency, its 
failure to seek real wisdom. Real wisdom is only gained through the kind of 
metaphysical criticism Green associated with professional, German philosophy. 
Literally, the way to enlightenment is through German academic metaphysics; and 
popular philosophy is the height of empiricism, because it can only deliver a hollow 
pretension to wisdom. 
The only use of “empiricism” I can find in Green’s entire output, outside the 
“Introduction,” appears in this article. Again, it is used to signify the pretension to 
knowledge in the absence of real learning (read “real learning” as a grasp of 
academic metaphysics). Green accused Butler of “laps[ing] … into the raw 
empiricism of popular philosophy …” (GWR, III.100).  
 
Here are the other three uses of “empiricism” in the “Introduction.” Green 
portrayed “the popular Logic” as something “derived” from “Locke’s empiricism” 
(INT, §119, 99). Later, he noted that “Locke’s empiricism becomes invincible as 
soon as it is admitted that qualified things are ‘found in nature’ without any 
constitutive action of the mind” (INT, §224, 185). And finally, he wrote that Locke’s 
“‘empiricism’” (in inverted commas, for some reason) “could not assimilate” the 
view that the mind originates something real (INT, §227, 188). 
Note that in all of these cases, “empiricism” is a label only applied to Locke, 
never to Berkeley or Hume. This seems to be because Green only regarded Locke’s 
philosophy as simplistic enough to have resounded in the popular mind. While 
Berkeley and Hume did develop certain Lockean themes, Green thought these 
latter two developed such themes in a far more sophisticated way. Thus he wrote 
that Hume finally makes  
the doctrines of the popular philosophy … consistent with themselves, and thoroughly 
worked out. For that very reason, probably, his doctrine has never been itself popular, 
since to make such philosophy consistent with itself is to make it offensive to the 
‘heart,’ to destroy its adaptation to the many sides of practical life, to render it 
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unavailable as rhetoric. His greatest and only systematic work on philosophy, ‘The 
Treatise of Human Nature,’ fell, as he tells us, ‘dead-born from the press,’ and has 
always been better known in Germany than in England. Yet it is absolutely the last 
word of the philosophy of Locke. (GWR, III.106) 
So Hume developed Locke’s ideas with honest academic rigor. But it should now be 
clear that Green only used “empiricism” as a pejorative way of describing Locke’s 
contribution to the public philosophy. Hume (and I will just baldly assert that Green 
had the same attitude about Berkeley) was spared this scorn because, though 
ultimately mistaken, Hume was a sophisticated metaphysician. Hume’s hard work 
was sophisticated enough that his philosophy could never be co-opted by popular 
“rhetoric.”  
That Hume was not to be associated with the simplistic (read: “empiricist”) 
popular philosophy is echoed in the “Introduction.” Green wrote that Hume 
adopted the  
premises and method of Locke, he cleared them of all illogical adaptations to popular 
belief, and experimented with them on the body of professed knowledge, as one only 
could do who had neither any twist of vice nor any bias for doing good, but was a 
philosopher because he could not help it. (INT, §2, 2) 
Locke’s philosophy was impure. He had to keep things unsophisticated because he 
wanted his ideas to be adaptable for public rhetoric. But Hume followed 
philosophical ideas where logic led, insulating himself from the naïve demands of 
popular thought. Again, it makes sense that Green reserved “empiricist” for 
Locke—this was a Greenian epithet, not a term of art.  
Another serious blow to Norton and Brink’s idea—that Green read LBH as 
empiricists in our contemporary sense—comes from the following passage. Green 
actually called Locke and Hume “Rationalists”: 
The genius of Locke and Hume was their readiness to follow the lead of Ideas: their 
spirit was the spirit of Rationalism—the spirit which, however baffled and forced into 
inconsistent admissions, is still governed by the faith that all things may ultimately be 
understood. (INT, §5, 5)  
“Rationalism” contrasts here not with CIE’s ‘empiricism,’ but with a religious 
orientation in philosophy that takes some facts to be explicable only by revealed 
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theology.38 Even if Locke’s ideas lent themselves to uncritical expression in the 
popular philosophy, they nevertheless were proposed in the spirit of “Rationalism.” 
So whatever Green meant by “empiricist,” it was clearly not a word meant to 
contrast with his label “Rationalist”—for he used both labels in connection with 
Locke.  
So early Idealists did not use the rhetoric, at least, of CIE—the rhetoric of 
employing “empiricists” and “rationalists” to demarcate people according to their 
answer to a key epistemological question.39 Green did not show the slightest 
awareness, when he used words like “rationalist” and “empiricist,” that his readers 
might expect him to be characterizing either opposed positions in the theory of 
knowledge, or two warring traditions that reigned in the 17th and 18th centuries.  
Finally, Green made no attempt to distinguish Locke, Berkeley, and Hume from 
people we now call “Cartesian Rationalists”, under any name. The person, and 
position, with which Green contrasted LBH is Kant and Kantianism, as we will see 
below. Green never even mentioned Descartes in the “Introduction”; he once 
mentioned Spinoza, saying that Hume showed Berkeley to be “a Spinozist” 
concerning substance (INT, §341, 293); and he mentioned Leibniz on two early 
pages as an influence on Kant (INT, §2-3). 
 
Edward Caird did use the label “empiricism,” and in a very different manner 
from Green. In A Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, Caird’s major early 
work, empiricism seems to be an HP-concept. Historically, Caird used the concept in 
connection with Bacon and, suggestively, Martin Luther (Caird 1877, 30 ff). Caird 
                                                 
38 Note that if this passage is taken literally, Green’s Hume affirms the principle of sufficient 
reason. Green’s Hume would thus differ from Garrett’s on the issue of explanatory 
empiricism. See the text to which fn. 25 is appended, above. 2 
39 Here is evidence that our contemporary interpretation of empiricism is closely linked to 
our contemporary interpretation of rationalism. The Stanford Encyclopedia does not have an 
independent entry for “empiricism”—they only have an entry for “empiricism vs. 
rationalism.” Note that the entry characterizes the debate between the schools as 
fundamentally epistemological: “The dispute between rationalism and empiricism concerns 
the extent to which we are dependent upon sense experience in our effort to gain 
knowledge” (Markie 2004). 
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did not cleave modern philosophy into two sharp groups, like CIE. What draws his 
cast of modern philosophers together is a commitment to something called 
“individualism.” Descartes and Spinoza were the pioneers of modern individualism 
(pp. 27-51), which includes a philosophical assumption, and a question. 
Individualism assumes that reality is metaphysically separate from the thinking 
subject, and then asks the question, How can the thinking subject come to have 
knowledge of said reality? (p. 12). Locke presses forward with the same 
individualistic project, but is less hopeful than Descartes and Spinoza about how 
much the subject can really know about reality (p. 55).  
Locke’s philosophy was to have been plagued, however, by two incompatible 
metaphysical commitments. On one hand, Locke saw reality as a physical universe 
of which the mind, “enclosed in a particular body,” forms a part. On the other, 
Locke saw reality as constituted by whatever appears to the mind in sensation (p. 
59). Locke came to play a stronger role than Descartes as the father of modern 
philosophy—Caird read Berkeley, Hume, and Leibniz each as responding to 
problems inherent in Locke’s original philosophy.40 
Caird also used ‘empiricism’ to denote a thesis, but he is not clear about how 
the thesis is supposed to relate to the Empiricist school of Bacon and Luther. Since 
this is a book on Kant, it is natural that Caird’s philosophical conception of 
                                                 
40 Berkeley tried to make Locke consistent by discarding the first metaphysical commitment, 
and by pursuing only the second (p. 61). But Berkeley attempted to show (what Caird 
thought was impossible) that we learn, through collections of finite sensations alone, about 
God’s infinite nature (p. 64). Hume then tried to correct Berkeley by discarding the latter’s 
pretension that through our sensations, we can know anything beyond the sensations 
themselves (p. 65). But Hume’s skepticism that we can know external objects then 
(somehow—Caird does not clearly spell out an argument) contradicts itself: “But a principle 
that is fatal even to the illusion of knowledge, refutes itself” (p. 71). While Berkeley and 
Hume were pursuing the sensationalist side of Locke’s project, Locke’s “French disciples 
took hold of the other side of his doctrine—his theory of the mechanical action of matter on 
mind,” pursuing a brand of materialism (p. 72). Without mentioning him, Caird seems to 
have Comte in mind, here. Locke’s true successor, however, is Leibniz (p. 73), of all people, 
who develops hints of idealism hiding in Book IV of the Essay (p. 73). Wolff offers a final, 
failed effort to reconcile the respective individualisms of Locke and Leibnitz (p. 120). Kant 
finally refutes individualism in the first Critique, and there builds the first genuine idealism 
(pp. 180-181). 
 50  
‘empiricism’ comes from Kant’s usage in the Antinomies. Kant used the word to 
signify the view that rational knowledge has its origin in experience (see fn. 20, 
above). Thus, some of Caird’s uses of ‘empiricism’ come in a discussion of the 
Antinomies (Caird 1877, 574, 576).41  
So Caird does have a notion of ‘epistemological empiricism’ which he gets from 
Kant. But like Green, Caird does not organize modern philosophy according to a 
split between Continental Rationalists and British Empiricists, whose chief 
disagreement concerns the epistemological question of the extent to which 
knowledge depends on sense experience. In other words, “empiricism” was a word 
Caird primarily used to denote an epistemological thesis; the word barely figured 
into Caird’s interpretation of history, which bears little resemblance to that given by 
CIE.  
Of course this leaves the possibility that Green and Caird use different 
vocabulary, but only superficially different historical schematisms. Perhaps there 
remains a creative way to see CIE lurking in their work yet. I will not argue against 
this possibility directly, because there is no obvious way to fill in the details of such 
an interpretation. The burden falls for developing such a view on those who would 
defend CIE as an intelligible reading of how early Idealists conceived of their targets. 
Instead, I will simply advance my own view of how to conceptualize early Idealists’ 
targets.  
If what I have written in this section is correct, what terminology should we use 
to characterize Idealists’ actual targets? Clearly, Green and Caird did not see 
themselves as arguing against empiricists. I propose to call their targets “proto-
empiricists.”42 We should keep using some form of “empiricism” in this context 
                                                 
41 Caird’s book actually uses “empiricism” with unusually high frequency for this period of 
English-language philosophy (Caird 1877, 158, 164, 168, 502, 574-576, 664, 668). It is 
beyond my scope to give a detailed analysis of Caird’s usage here. But the fact that this is a 
book on Kant, along with the evidence I cited above in fn. 20 suggests that an important 
dimension of the evolution of empiricism runs through Kant. Note well that Caird has more 
sustained discussions about “empirical psychology” (Caird 1877, 374, 434, 474-475, 478-
480, 494, 535) than about Kant’s notion of “empiricism.” 
42 I will use underlined, lowercase “-ist” words (like “proto-empiricist”) to refer to a person 
who subscribes to the project that the “-ism” form of the word denotes. Thus, a “proto-
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because the notion that LBH can be attacked as a group (especially with arguments 
like those used by Idealists) is genetically related to CIE. These Idealist attacks 
sowed the seeds of an interpretation of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume that would 
eventually morph into CIE.  
For our purposes it is not necessary to offer a full account of how this happened, 
exactly. One commentator sees James’s Pragmatism (James 1907/1978) as an 
important source of the contemporary division between Rationalists and Empiricists 
(Kuklick 1984, 131-132). In any case, in the remainder of the chapter I will develop 
a positive account of how Green conceived of his main target, proto-empiricism.  
4.  PROTO-EMPIRICISM: GREEN AND CAIRD’S ACTUAL OPPONENTS 
In this section, I offer a positive account of how early Idealists did conceive of 
their opponents. I will argue that they conceived of their targets in the hybrid 
manner suggested by the HP definition-schema—they used mutually-constraining 
historical and philosophical criteria to specify their target. As I have been arguing, 
the particular way CIE fills out the HP schema is importantly different from how 
Green and Caird would have filled it out on behalf of their opponents. I will identify 
their true opponents by showing how Green, especially, would have filled out each 
step of the schema. 
First, whom did Green mean to attack? Green’s metaphysical and 
epistemological critique was best developed in his “Introduction,” which had three 
clear targets: Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, each of whom was considered in turn. 
Certainly, Green was partly motivated by pure historical interest in these figures. 
His engagement with each was serious, and his criticisms were often detailed.  
However, Green was enough of a Hegelian to have an active conception of how 
the historical dialectic that encompassed LBH stretched down to his own day. The 
story was that recent English43 philosophers—particularly people like Mill who saw 
                                                                                                                                       
empiricist” is one who is committed to the reality principle for the purposes of trying to 
advance a project begun by LBH.  
43 I use “English” rather than “British” deliberately, because this was Green’s own choice of 
words. He insisted on referring even to Hume as an “English philosopher” (see the subtitle 
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a robust role for empirical psychology in philosophy—had failed to understand that 
Hume dealt a death blow to Lockean philosophy. For Green, contemporary English 
psychologists were mistaken in portraying themselves as the inheritors of the 
Lockean tradition; the real successors to LBH were Kant and his German disciples. 
This story comes in part from an oft-cited passage in “Introduction,” §1-5. But 
those who tell this story usually overlook the passage’s most important component—
that the false prophets of LBH were supposed to be contemporary English 
philosophers, particularly those inclined towards empirical psychology. Green argued 
that English philosophers who lived after Hume “cannot understand” that Hume 
dealt Lockean philosophy a fatal blow. 
Hume had shown that if we accept “the method” of Lockean philosophy—pure 
introspection—as a way to explain how knowledge is possible, we are forced to an 
unacceptable, skeptical result. We are forced to accept that knowledge must actually 
be impossible. Here is how Green criticized post-Humean English philosophers: 
Hume was perfectly cognisant of this [skeptical] result, but his successors in England 
and Scotland would seem so far to have been unable to look it in the face. They have 
either thrust their heads again into the bush of uncriticised belief, or they have gone on 
elaborating Hume’s doctrine of association, in apparent forgetfulness of Hume’s own 
proof of its insufficiency to account for an intelligent, as opposed to a merely instinctive 
or habitual, experience. (INT, §3, 2) 
This passage is easily misread. What Hume’s successors attempt to do is develop his 
associationist psychology. For Green, these successors fail to understand that the 
principles of this psychology entail an absurdity, that knowledge is impossible. This 
is an absurdity (and not just unpalatable) because if knowledge is impossible, then 
there can be no science of the association of ideas—there can be no science at all.  
For contemporary readers, Green’s mention of skepticism makes us think he 
sees Hume’s project as an attempt to build a theory of knowledge. We are now used 
to epistemologists whose criterion for a successful epistemology is precisely that the 
                                                                                                                                       
of §2), despite that Hume was, of course, Scottish. Today Scots do not appreciate being 
called “English,” in my experience. I do not know if the distinction between British and 
English simply did not have the same connotations in Green’s day, or whether Green was 
implying that Hume really worked in the tradition of English philosophy, whatever Hume’s 
own personal heritage.  
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theory resists skepticism. But this is not what Green had in mind. He did not see 
Hume as someone whose entire project was to argue with the skeptic. Hume’s 
project was to build a science of mind,44 as he claimed at (THN, xiii-xix). The 
eventual “proof” that knowledge is impossible was a confession that there was a 
fatal flaw in the original project, Green held.45  
Thus, Green was partly motivated by a desire to kill the idols of those of his 
contemporaries who saw Hume as an important pioneer in the science of mind. The 
contemporaries are people Green calls “empirical psychologists” (Green discusses 
such psychologists at INT, §§6, 9, 10, 18, 24, 98, 198, 200).  
Three years after the “Introduction” appeared, Green would more explicitly 
acknowledge that his attack on LBH was supposed to inflict a blow on empirical 
psychologists. Green began a critique of the psychologist-philosophers Herbert 
Spencer and G. H. Lewes by reflecting on the 1874 “Introduction” to Hume. Many 
readers were offended at the “Introduction’s” suggestion that the real advances over 
LBH had occurred in Germany, not England, Green wrote. 
With those who look to ‘mental philosophy’ for discoveries corresponding to those of 
the physical sciences, the German writers referred to [Kant and Hegel] have become 
almost a by-word for unprofitableness, while the ‘empirical psychology’ of our own 
country has been ever showing more of the self-confidence, and winning more of the 
applause, which belong to advancing conquest. It had seemed to me, indeed, that a 
clear exposition, such as I sought to furnish, of the state of the question in metaphysics, 
as Hume left it, would suffice to show that it had not been met but ignored by his 
English followers. A fuller consideration, however, might have taught me that each 
generation requires the questions of philosophy to be put to it in its own language, and 
unless they are so put, will not be at the pains to understand them. (GWR, I.373) 
                                                 
44 Hume actually wrote that he wanted to develop a “science of man” (THN, xvii). But he 
the component of such a science most important to Green and his colleagues was the science 
of mind. I use “science of mind” because it emphasizes the significance of Hume for Green 
and the latter’s contemporaries. Robertson explicitly says he will use the two terms 
interchangeably, in discussing Hume. See below, p. 56. 
45 See (Garrett 1997, ch. 10) for a delicate discussion of how to balance Hume’s skepticism 
with his stated goal of building a science of man. Garrett characterizes this question as the 
deepest in Hume scholarship, and reviews the prevailing literature (p. 206). The received 
view is that Hume cannot begin to establish a science of man, given his skepticism; Garrett 
ingeniously argues that he can.  
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In the “Introduction,” Green did occasionally chide Hume’s hapless “successors” in 
England without naming which successors he had in mind. In the passage just 
quoted, Green confirmed that the successors who (he alleged) did not understand 
Hume were empirical psychologists. Green lamented that empirical psychologists 
did not have the patience to read between the lines, so to speak, of his critique of 
Hume. Since this passage is the opening to an extended attack on two leading 
psychologists, the suggestion is that Green will now read between the lines for them. 
In short, Green saw a tradition running through Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and 
associationist (or “empirical”) psychologists like Hartley, the Mills, Herbert Spencer, 
and G. H. Lewes.  
There is evidence in the “Introduction” itself that Green had meant to attack 
psychologists all along. For one thing, see the sections (cited two paragraphs above) 
where Green portrayed “empirical psychologists” as suffering from the same 
shortcomings as LBH (see especially INT, §9, §18, §200; Green 1882b, 182). 
One should also note how the “Introduction” began and ended. Green both 
introduced and concluded that work by referring to Hume’s “successors in England 
and Scotland” who misunderstood the skeptical results in which Hume showed the 
Lockean tradition to dead end (GWR, I.3, II.64).  
For further evidence that Green had empirical psychologists as a main target, 
note that Green’s Works contain extensive attacks on Spencer, Lewes, and John 
Stuart Mill (GWR, I.373-520, II. 195-335). These attacks adapt arguments first 
deployed against LBH in the “Introduction.” For example, a key argument in the 
“Introduction” is that simple ideas as conceived by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
could not by themselves convey knowledge of reality (e.g., at INT, §§18, 13, 248-
249), as Hylton notes.46 Green claimed that a similar criticism applied to “modern 
treatises of Logic,” at (INT, §320, 272).47 Green would later deploy the same 
argument against J. S. Mill, at (GWR, II.197-200). 
                                                 
46 Hylton couches his discussion of Green in terms of Green’s arguments against Lockean 
epistemology, not metaphysics. So the emphasis on ideas of reality is mine, not Hylton’s. 
But I owe the observation that these passages develop similar arguments to Hylton.  
47 Hylton actually cites p. 267, but that appears to be a mistake. 
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Indeed, R. L. Nettleship, the editor of Green’s Works, notes in a preface that 
three years after finishing his “Introduction,” Green “began to apply the same 
principles of criticism to contemporary English psychology as represented by Mr. 
Herbert Spencer and Mr. G. H. Lewes” (GWR, I.vi). And the fight against 
empirical psychologists stretched into ethics, as well. See (PRL, 67, 73; Green 
1882b, 182). 
Moreover, approximately the first third of (PRL) was originally published as a 
series of articles entitled, “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” (Green 
1882a; Green 1882b; Green and Bradley 1882). The “natural science” in question 
is clearly contemporary empirical psychology, as will be apparent from my 
discussion in the next section.48 
I want to emphasize not just that empirical psychologists were meant to be the 
ultimate targets of Green’s attack on LBH. Empirical psychologists themselves 
ducked as Green’s arrows headed their way. “Can There Be a Natural Science of 
Man?” in particular, was published in the journal Mind, and it ignited fierce 
arguments over the scientific status of psychology for the next decade. Consider how 
Croom Robertson, the editor of Mind who agreed to publish this essay of Green’s, 
described the scope of that argument:  
Locke and his followers to the present day have proceeded in a manner that has laid 
them open to a kind of criticism that apparently makes an end of their pretensions to 
rank as a serious philosophical school. The criticism directed by Green against Locke 
and Hume tells also, as it was plainly meant to tell, against Mill and others in this 
generation who, working at philosophy from the standing-ground of psychology and 
making whatever progress in either department, have been hardly more careful than 
                                                 
48 Again, Green seldom mentioned his targets by name, in this article. He did explicitly 
criticize “accepted representatives of empirical psychology,” Lewes and Mill, on (Green 
1882b, 182). But generally, these pieces do not include sustained discussions of any one 
person or group mentioned by name. Hume, of course, claimed to be building  a science of 
“human nature,” which is to provide a foundation for “a compleat system of the sciences” 
(THN, Intro, xvi). Hume also describes his goal to be to help popularize a “science of man” 
(THN, I.iv.7, 273). Presumably, Green’s title “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” 
alludes to Hume, though Hume is not cited explicitly in connection with the title. Green does 
discuss Hume in the first installment of that article (pp. 1-3), but the issue is the existence of 
the moral faculty. As a side note, there is a laudable, nascent trend of philosophers who have 
lately been looking at Hume again as a kind of scientist, not (just) a skeptic. For a discussion, 
see (Biro 1993). Also see above, fn. 45. 
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Hume or Locke to draw a clear line between natural science of mind (or man) and the 
ulterior consideration of things in relation to mind. The point of the criticism urged by 
Green (after Kant), with a massive persistence that stamps it as an original 
philosophical achievement, is too well-known—repeated as the argument has lately 
been in these pages—to need more than general indication.  (Robertson 1883, 7) 
I will review Robertson’s position in the next chapter. Here I only want to note that 
Green’s contemporaries viewed his writings on Locke and Hume exactly as an 
attack on contemporary empirical psychologists. In this passage, Robertson said 
Green’s arguments were obviously meant to count against Mill (he meant J. S.) and 
others who take up the standpoint of empirical psychology as a starting point for 
doing philosophy.  
Finally, consider Green’s influence as described by one of his own pupils, Henry 
Scott Holland: 
[Many people came to believe that] Scientific Analysis held the key to the universe. 
Under this intellectual dominion we had lost all touch with the Ideals of life in 
Community. There was a dryness in the Oxford air, and there was singularly little 
inspiration to be felt abroad. We were frightened; we saw everything passing into the 
tyranny of rational abstract mechanism …. Then at last, the walls began to break. A 
world of novel influences began to open to us. Philosophically the change in Oxford 
thought and temper came about mainly through the influence of T. H. Green. He 
broke for us the sway of individualistic Sensationalism. He released us from the fear of 
agnostic mechanism. He gave us back the language of self-sacrifice, and taught us how 
we belonged to one another in the one life of high idealism. We took life from him at its 
spiritual value.49 
Many Victorians were rocked by the quick expansion of science in the mid-19th 
Century. In addition to a rich collection of astronomical predictions confirmed by 
observation (such as the existence of Neptune, confirmed in 1846), the period also 
saw the creation of the kinetic theory of gases, the laws of thermodynamics, and of 
course Darwin’s theory of natural selection. Such discoveries threatened to make 
scientifically tractable not just the origins of humanity, but also the very facts of 
human experience itself. Although this passage does not specifically mention 
psychology, it makes clear the “spiritual” stakes of science’s general advance. One of 
the chief attractions of Idealism was Green’s promise to resist what Holland called 
                                                 
49 Quoted in (Tyler 2003). 
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“agnostic mechanism”—and in particular, to resist the form it took in empirical 
psychology. 
The important point is that CIE treats LB & H as the central figures in a certain 
philosophical tradition, British Empiricism. This tradition aims to build an 
epistemology that grounds knowledge in experience. In contemporary discussions, 
the ‘epistemological empiricism’ that ties this school together has as its measure of 
success the formation of an epistemological theory that resists the threat of 
skepticism (for a similar suggestion, see Friedman 1999, 4-5). The moral of this 
chapter so far is that early Idealists, those whose grouping-together of LBH is among 
the earliest known ancestor of our own grouping, did not see LBH as united on the 
basis of a shared ‘epistemological empiricist’ program. Idealists united these 
thinkers into a group on the basis for their role as intellectual forefathers of empirical 
psychology.50  
In other words, what was at stake in the philosophical projects of LBH was not 
the formation of an ‘empiricist’ epistemology, for Green and his colleagues. What 
was at stake was the viability of a science of the mind. 
This is not to say that Idealists drew together LBH purely on the basis of their 
aims, and not on the basis of a shared philosophical position. The point about aims is 
rather that it should set off warnings that the chief goal with which Green saddles 
proto-empiricists is starkly different from the chief goal of contemporary 
empiricists—building a science of mind, not an epistemology that resists skepticism. 
Thus, it should not be surprising to find that the core philosophical idea Green does 
think ties LBH together is metaphysical, and not epistemological.51 
                                                 
50 In the next section, I will offer a historical account of the broader philosophical context in 
which Green was publishing. This account further supports my contention that what was at 
stake in Green’s attack on LBH was not ‘epistemological skepticism,’ in the first instance, but 
the very idea of a science of the human mind. 
51 I am not denying (though neither am I affirming) that the British Empiricists may all have 
held some form of ‘epistemological empiricism.’ My point is that Green did not see 
‘epistemological empiricism’ as what was at stake in his attack on LBH; and neither did he 
see LBH as worth putting into a common historical category on the basis of their 
epistemological commitments, in the first instance.  
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I will now suggest how to fill in the second part of our HP definition-schema for 
the concept proto-empiricism. Since James and philosophers of his generation 
commonly regarded Green as the father of Idealism, I will focus on his work in filling 
in the details of what philosophical position proto-empiricists were supposed to hold.  
Green’s “Introduction” is a rambling affair, launching what can seem like a 
battery of disjointed attacks against Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But there is 
evidence that these three were supposed to share one core commitment, according 
to Green, that I dub “the reality principle”: 
THE REALITY PRINCIPLE:  
the distinction between fantasy and reality matches the distinction between ingredients 
of experience contributed by the mind, and ingredients contributed directly through 
sensation. 
I will explain what the principle is supposed to assert, exactly, by reviewing specific 
instances where Green used it.52 
First, consider §153 of the “Introduction.” Here, Green was summarizing his 
treatment of Locke, and was transitioning to his discussion of Berkeley. Green 
wrote: 
We have now sufficiently explored the system [viz., Locke’s system] which it was 
Hume’s mission to try to make consistent with itself. We have found that it is governed 
throughout by the antithesis between what is given to consciousness—that in regard to 
which the mind is passive—as the supposed real on the one side, and what is 
‘invented,’ ‘created,’ ‘superinduced’ by the mind on the other …. Stripped of these 
superinductions, nothing has been found to remain of it but that of which nothing can 
be said—a chaos of unrelated, and therefore unmeaning, individua. 
                                                 
52 What I am calling the “reality principle” is not original to Green. Kant uses three non-
overlapping distinctions to carve the history of western philosophy, at (CPR, A852 – 856, 
B666-669, 880-884). The first distinction is between those who affirm the reality principle 
(“intellectualists,” in Kant’s terminology), and those who deny it (“sensualists”). Kant cites 
Epicurus as the best example of a sensationalist, and Plato as the best example of an 
intellectualist. Kant’s second historical distinction is between empiricists like Aristotle and 
Locke, and noologists (or rationalists) like Plato and Leibniz. The former affirm, and the 
latter deny, versions of what I am calling ‘epistemological empiricism.’ I can recast my 
overall meta-historical point in Kantian terms. Commentators write as though Green 
conceived of LBH as empiricists. In fact, Green grouped LBH together on the basis of a shared 
sensualism. Kant’s third historical distinction separates “naturalistic” philosophers who 
banish rational methods (particularly mathematics) in favor of pure observation, from 
“scientific” philosophers who are systematic, and do adopt rational methods.  
 59  
Locke’s system is “governed throughout” by two distinctions that track one 
another—the distinction between reality and fantasy, and that between what is given 
in sense and what is created by the mind. On the one hand, we get genuine 
information about reality through what is given to experience by sensation. On the 
other, we get fantastical representations when the mind manipulates material it first 
receives from the senses.53 
Berkeley, according to Green, was also committed to this principle. Though 
Berkeley had good Christian intentions, he pursued a Christian theology via “a 
doctrine resting on an inadequate philosophical principle,” and “it is the principle 
and not the purpose that will regulate the permanent effect of the doctrine” (§154). 
In other words, Berkeley’s philosophy may have had laudable theological goals, but 
he pursued those goals by hewing to a substantive philosophical principle that must 
be assessed independently. Green got around to telling us what the (flawed) 
substantive principle was at §158: Berkeley accepted Lockean materialism’s 
“recognised principle, that all intellectual ‘superinduction’ upon simple feeling is a 
departure from the real.” “Superinduction” is Green’s word for mental operations 
on whatever is given in sensation. 
Although Locke and Berkeley therefore both subscribe to the reality principle, 
according to Green, Berkeley did not accept that reality contains matter, as against 
Lockean materialism. This difference does not affect the underlying commitment to 
the reality principle, though. At §170 Green reaffirms that for Berkeley as much as 
for Locke, information we receive through the senses is associated with what is real. 
What Locke and Berkeley differ over is their view of what causes sensations.  
So Locke and Berkeley both held that the reality principle is true. Here, it will 
be helpful to point out a peculiar word I have used in formulating the reality 
principle. The principle asserts that the distinction between reality and fantasy 
“matches” the distinction between information the mind receives in sensation, and 
                                                 
53 Other passages where Green treats the reality principle as central to Locke’s philosophy 
include §51, 113, and 194. See also (Green 1882a, 15-16), where he (curiously) cites 
(ECHU, II.xii.1) as a basis for attributing such a principle (he might have done better to cite 
II.xxx).  
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features of experience the mind creates in thought. I have used this neutral word 
exactly because Locke and Berkeley (and Hume, as we shall see) do not all agree 
about why these two distinctions go together, on Green’s reading.  
It is not simply that the reality/fantasy distinction is epistemically dependent on 
the other distinction. Green certainly portrayed LB & H as all holding that we only 
learn about the difference between thought and reality by attending to the difference 
between what the mind creates, and what is given in sensation. But Green thought 
such a view is important precisely because it must be undergirded by a prior 
metaphysical commitment to treating reality as composed of stuff that is well-suited 
to affect our senses. It is this metaphysical commitment, as we shall see in Chapter 
Three, that is supposed to be the downfall of proto-empiricism. 
What Berkeley and Locke did not agree on, according to Green, is a particular 
metaphysical story of why reality is constituted in a way that matches up with our 
sensory apparatuses. Locke held there is something about the nature of matter that 
makes it well-suited to being perceived, while Berkeley held that God delivers sense 
impressions, on Green’s view. What Locke and Berkeley share, again, is the 
affirmation that these two distinctions do match up metaphysically, though they 
differ on why that should be the case. In fact, this is why I call the reality principle 
“metaphysical” and not “epistemological.” What LB & H share, according to Green, 
is the metaphysical claim that reality is wholly composed of stuff that is sensible. 
They differ on how we come to know that this claim is true. 
To be clear, I am not claiming that the distinction between reality and fantasy is 
metaphysically parasitic on the difference between thought and sensation, for 
Green. That language suggests that an object is real in virtue of affecting the senses. 
This is clearly not Locke’s view. It is not Berkeley’s view, either, at least according 
to Green. 
There is also evidence that the reality principle was supposed to be Hume’s 
core commitment, as it was for Berkeley and Locke. Green wrote that “Hume was 
trying to explain it [the reality of a physical world] away in order that the same 
theory of reality—the theory which identifies it with feeling—might be consistently 
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maintained” (GWR, I.383).54 Green read Hume as a phenomenalist who refused to 
postulate a separate external world. The material world, for Green’s Hume, is just 
regularities we detect in our impressions and ideas. Thus, Green saw Hume as 
“explain[ing] … away” the reality of the material world in order to preserve the 
reality principle.55   
Finally, Green cited the reality principle when summarizing the key failure of 
proto-empiricism, in general. I cited a passage, on p. 53 above, where Green 
claimed that Hume’s shortcomings had been ignored by empirical psychologists. A 
few pages later, Green summarized exactly what the shortcoming was of Hume’s 
philosophy, as well as of the entire proto-empiricist tradition as exemplified by 
Spencer and Lewes. Green wrote:  
We are thus brought to the contradiction which underlies all Locke’s doctrine, and 
which current philosophy must show that it has overcome if it is to be proof against the 
charge of being anachronistic—the contradiction between that conception of the real on 
the one hand [viz., the real as what is received in simple impressions], which alone 
allows of its being knowable, but at the same time, by finding it in relations, implies 
that it is a work of thought, and a conception which leaves it the unknown negative of 
consciousness on the other hand. Only if the latter conception is the true one, is there 
any reason for taking feeling, on the ground of the mind’s supposed passivity in it, to be 
the organ which reports the real; only if the former conception be the true one, has 
feeling anything real to report. … It was the presence of this contradiction in Locke’s 
system that led to its disintegration at the hands of Berkeley and Hume. (Green 1894, 
I.379) 
This passage comes as Green is summing up the relevance of his attack on LBH to 
contemporary empirical psychology.56 
                                                 
54 This last passage comes in the context of the early part of Green’s discussion of Herbert 
Spencer. Here, Green was specifying the main difficulty inherent in proto-empiricism that 
contemporary empirical psychologists must overcome. Green portrays Spencer’s 
shortcomings along similar lines to LBH’s, at (GWR, I.428-429, 442); and on Lewes in this 
regard, see (GWR, I.489-490, 493).  
55 Specifically, Green read what Hume scholars sometimes call the “copy principle” as 
Hume’s modification of the reality principle. I will not present evidence for this claim until 
below (see pp. 169, ff.) when I explore the role of the copy principle in Hume’s account of 
space perception. 
56 Brink is one of the few commentators who accurately pinpoints what I am calling the 
“reality principle” as the core philosophical commitment (and alleged failure) of empiricism. 
He writes, “In this tradition, reality is associated with simple ideas delivered to the senses 
and contrasted with the workmanship of the understanding and relations, which are in some 
sense illusory or conventional,” (Brink 2003, 10). 
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I now take myself to have established the following. First, Green manufactured 
a tradition in which he placed his chief philosophical opponents. To summarize 
Green’s conception of his rivals’ tradition, I am using the concept of “proto-
empiricism.” Second, like our contemporary interpretation of empiricism (or “CIE”), 
proto-empiricism is an HP-concept. In other words, CIE and proto-empiricism both 
have the same hybrid structure. They each refer both to a substantive thesis, and to 
a historical group of philosophers who are supposed to have developed that thesis. 
But third, although they have the same structure, proto-empiricism and CIE are not 
usefully viewed as the same basic concept. This is because the particular thesis to 
which proto-empiricism refers is not the same as the thesis to which CIE refers. In 
Green’s hands, the thesis that the proto-empiricist tradition was to have jointly 
developed was a metaphysical thesis—viz., the reality principle. In contrast, what 
characterizes the empiricist tradition as we now understand it is a shared 
epistemological commitment—viz., to the view that knowledge must be justified by 
appeal to experience.  
 
Perhaps I am placing too much weight on the dubious claim that the reality 
principle is metaphysical and not epistemological. If this claim cannot be justified 
then the basis appears to collapse for my argument against people like Norton and 
Brink. These two hold that early Idealists conceived of their chief targets more or 
less as CIE-style empiricists. If the reality principle can be shown to entail or in some 
way to be tied up with ‘epistemological empiricism,’ then it seems pointless to insist 
that CIE and proto-empiricism be regarded as distinct concepts.   
This objection fails to grasp typical reasons a philosopher might have for 
employing an HP concept in the first place. By attending to the typical role of these 
concepts in philosophical discourse, we can develop an individuation criterion that 
will make plain why we ought to regard CIE and proto-empiricism as distinct 
concepts.  
I submit that we often use HP concepts to encapsulate a myriad of issues at 
stake in some specialized discussion. The substantive thesis to which such a concept 
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refers is typically but one note in an entire, complex melody, to speak 
metaphorically. When participating in a specialized community—in a community 
that shares a professional training—we can fill in much of the missing melody by 
evoking a concrete group of philosophers (e.g., the British Empiricists) in the same 
breath that we evoke a substantive thesis (e.g., that knowledge must be justified by 
appeal to experience).  
Suppose one is handed sheet music to a jazz song, and one sees that the key 
signature has no sharps or flats. If one is told that the tonal center of the song is A, 
one can surmise several things. One can surmise the likely key of the song (A 
minor), and perhaps a set of basic scales or triads that will likely harmonize with the 
tune. But if one only knows the tonal center of the song, one still does not know the 
song itself. There are an infinite number of melodies that can be played in the key of 
A minor, after all.  
Similarly, if one is told that an interlocutor holds that knowledge must be 
justified by appeal to experience, there are an infinite number of melodies that 
might be played in this key, to continue the metaphor. For instance, such a claim 
might be made en route to showing that there can be objective aesthetic judgments, 
or that moral facts are natural facts, or that one should reject the prospect of gaining 
metaphysical knowledge through a priori speculation, or that the epistemological 
skeptic can only be refuted if knowledge is reduced to the realm of incorrigible sense 
experience. Or such a claim might be made en route to defending utilitarianism in 
ethics, or naturalism in meta-ethics, or anti-realism in the philosophy of science. And 
so on. 
By specifying a concrete group of philosophers in the same breath that we 
specify some core philosophical position—as we do when we use HP concepts like 
empiricism—we can cut through these bewildering possibilities and evoke a crisp yet 
still-rich narrative about what is at stake in endorsing the core position. Since most 
who have a professional training in philosophy have detailed background knowledge 
of what Locke, Berkeley, and Hume are supposed to have been up to, we can use 
 64  
words like empiricism to communicate efficiently the contours of a whole 
philosophical landscape.  
For instance, what is most commonly at stake for those arguing over 
‘epistemological empiricism’ today is probably the question of how to develop a 
theory of knowledge strong enough to resist the skeptic. We think Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume shared a general approach to developing such a theory, and one who is 
sympathetic to this approach may don the mantle of (CIE-style) empiricism. But one 
who dons the mantle of empiricism is likely to harbor some related philosophical 
attitudes, as well. Such a person is likely to think an empiricist-style epistemology 
helps undercut the notion that we can gain metaphysical insights through a priori 
speculation, for instance. Academic philosophers share certain expectations about 
how Locke, Berkeley, and Hume fit these various positions and attitudes into a 
coherent philosophical project. In virtue of these expectations, HP concepts like 
empiricism can function tacitly to specify such a larger project. In Appendix II, I 
provide a more detailed argument in support of this account of why we use -ism 
words—HP concepts—in philosophy. 
If my account is substantially correct, then a crucial question in individuating 
HP concepts will be whether what is at stake matches, more or less, between two 
given usages.57 In the case at hand, what really divides CIE-style empiricism from 
Green-style proto-empiricism is the different stakes involved in defending each 
concept. True, the reality principle is metaphysical whereas ‘epistemological 
empiricism’ is an epistemological principle. But this is a difference that makes a 
difference precisely because the respective stakes involved in defending the two 
principles concern sharply divergent philosophical projects.  
In the late-19th century, what was at stake in defending the reality principle 
(and thus in espousing or repudiating proto-empiricism) was the viability of 
psychology as a legitimate science, I am claiming. In Chapter Three, we will see in 
                                                 
57 In Appendix II, I show that the word “empiricism” is used with vastly different stakes in 
two distinct sub-communities in contemporary philosophy. This illustrates the way in which 
two HP concepts might appear superficially similar—for example, by bearing the same 
name—but in fact turn out to be distinct, upon closer inspection. 
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more detail how this principle actually figured into philosophical arguments over 
empirical psychology. For now, I only want to register that in contrast, 
‘epistemological empiricism’ (and thus CIE-style empiricism) is a principle that has 
profoundly different stakes for contemporary philosophers.  
So here is my response to the objection at hand. We should not run together CIE 
with proto-empiricism because these HP concepts carried profoundly different 
stakes. Commentators who do run these concepts together—commentators like 
Norton and Brink—miss the crucial fact that Green had entirely different reasons 
than the contemporary epistemologist for grouping Locke, Berkeley, and Hume into 
one tradition. What was at stake for Green was the viability of mental science, not 
how to develop a Skeptic-proof theory of knowledge. 
 
There is another group of culprits who one might think invented the notion of 
British Empiricism. I can only discuss them briefly, here. The concept of “British 
Empiricism” first appeared prominently in English-Language philosophy during the 
1880s. This period witnessed a boom in the publication and distribution of English-
language textbooks in the history of philosophy. Many were translated from German 
originals starting in the early 1870s, and some historians claim that these textbooks 
used the terms “empiricism” and “rationalism” in something like our contemporary 
sense. As such, one set of culprits are authors like Friedrich Üeberweg, whose 
History of Philosophy from Thales to the Present Time was translated in 1871 and 
73 (Üeberweg 1871; Üeberweg 1873); Kuno Fischer, whose Descartes and His 
School was translated in 1887;58 and Wilhelm Windelband, whose History of 
Philosophy was translated in 1893 (Windelband 1893).59 
                                                 
58 It seems likely that when it came to the impact on English-speaking philosophers of 
German historians, Fischer was probably the most influential. (Fischer 1887, 160-161) 
offered the (characteristically Hegelian) claim that epochs in philosophy are marked by 
“antitheses,” and for early modern philosophy the chief antithesis is between two warring 
theories of knowledge. Fischer called one side the “empiricists,” and the other the 
“rationalists.” Empiricism, or “empirical philosophy,” was founded by Bacon, and developed 
by Hobbes and Locke. This school then gave birth to two sibling movements—the French 
enlightenment, especially exemplified by Voltaire; and British sensationalism, especially 
exemplified by Berkeley and Hume. Fischer cites his own (Fischer 1875) as a work that 
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However, despite the popularity of translated German histories during this 
period, English-speaking philosophers were also hard at work at their own histories 
during this period. The late 19th century saw the rise of professors as the most 
influential Anglo-American philosophers. These professors wrote their own lecture 
notes, and published their own textbooks. They were no doubt influenced by 
German histories, but there is evidence of serious departures as well. For example, 
in Croom Robertson’s “Elements of General Philosophy,” he writes of early modern 
philosophy: 
Within this movement we meet early with an opposition in thought that admits of 
greatly varied expression. The German classifications, e.g. Schwegler’s and others, are 
somewhat unsatisfactory. Schwegler, Kuno Fischer, and most of the German 
historians, divide all schools into Realists and Idealists—those who explain thoughts 
from things, and those who explain things from thoughts. But this is a bad use of 
                                                                                                                                       
more fully developed an account of British philosophy. An earlier edition of that work had 
been translated as (Fischer 1857).  
 All three Fischer works I cite in this footnote appear to have been read critically by key 
Mind writers. For example, James’s friend and Scratch Eight co-member Carveth Read 
devoted (Read 1879) to a critique of Fischer’s mature history of British philosophy (Fischer 
1875). Read wrote, “It may be assumed that readers of Mind are not unacquainted with the 
book’s general nature and value. The first edition has long been translated, and it is much to 
be desired that the second edition of 1875, which is more than twice the bulk of the former 
one, should also find a translator” (Read 1879, 347-348). Perhaps Read thought it important 
to respond to Fischer because the latter had been widely read. Read’s article was mildly 
critical of Fischer’s way of carving up history—Fischer’s historical schematisms are found to 
be somewhat artificial, and Fischer too quick to assume that the sequence of history 
proceeds rationally (pp. 347, 351). Read repudiated some of Fischer’s criticisms of British 
philosophy—particularly the claim that “the Baconian method” British philosophy often 
employed is impotent to provide real historical explanations (pp. 349-350). More 
importantly, Read saw Fischer’s history as a subtle attempt to undermine, in Kantian 
fashion, “the deepest and most secret idea of English philosophy.” English philosophy, for 
Read, was to be characterized by the view that “human consciousness, however ancient its 
origin, is a natural growth. To demonstrate the naturalness of the mind was an essential step 
to the justification of positive law, to social science, and to a coherent view of the world” (p. 
359). According to Read, Fischer’s history was couched in terms of the faulty claim that 
Kant showed empirical philosophy, the forerunner to empirical psychology, to be 
unworkable.  
59 On the emergence of textbooks in the history of philosophy, see (Kuklick 1984, 129; Loeb 
1981, 25-32; Van Fraassen 2002, 209-213). Fischer is emphasized as an important architect 
of the modern schematism by (Loeb 1981, 31.n38), who also discusses the impact of Reid 
and Kant in this regard. A valuable source on the history of histories of philosophy is 
(Mandelbaum 1976), especially the first section. Mandelbaum situates Fischer in the 
context of 19th century historians of philosophy at pp. 715 ff.  
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ambiguous, much abused terms. Realist, e.g. has been used both in the question of the 
perception of an external world and also in that of the reality of ‘universals.’ 
(Robertson 1896/1905, 56) 
Robertson claimed that German histories usually divide modern philosophy into two 
groups, realists and idealists. He held this division to be misleading, and so 
developed his own schematism. His schematism divides modern philosophy into 
rationalists and empiricists, and this schematism more clearly comes to play a role in 
English-language philosophy during the 1880s than does the schematism from 
German histories. 
Though the evidence is only suggestive, I find further confirmation of the notion 
that 19th century German histories did not conventionally divide modern philosophy 
into British Empiricism and Continental Rationalism in the following account of 
Carnap’s early philosophical context. Richardson writes, 
Interestingly, [the young] Carnap does not think that empiricism, rationalism, and 
Kantianism are the traditional epistemological schools. Rather he thinks that realism, 
idealism, and phenomenalism are. (Richardson 1998, 23n.32) 
Carnap’s understanding of history resonates with Robertson’s characterization of 
German histories of philosophy in the preceding generation. This provisionally 
suggests that Robertson may have been right that Empiricism and Rationalism were 
not the schools into which German historians most commonly divided modern 
philosophy, at least at the end of the 19th century. A more careful consideration of 
this issue is, however, beyond the scope of my project. 
One subtle account of the history of the concept of empiricism in German 
philosophy comes from Gary Hatfield. Hatfield points out that empiricism can be 
given two different theoretical senses by contrasting it with either nativism or with 
rationalism. He attributes the distinction between empiricism and nativism to 
Helmholtz. In tracing the history of this second usage—the usage with which I am 
more concerned—he offers early cases where 18th century historians employ the 
word “empiricism” as part of various frameworks for organizing the history of 
modern philosophy. But he does not offer early cases where philosophers actually 
espouse ‘epistemological empiricism’ themselves. There are several problems with 
this account, for our purposes. 
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First, not all the historians Hatfield cites actually seem to have used 
“empiricism” in its current, epistemological sense. Hatfield first writes that the 
earliest usage of “empiricism” in this sense owes to an 18th century division of 17th 
century philosophies. He then suggests that the exact origin of the terms is hard to 
pinpoint, but nevertheless it was “well entrenched by the middle of the nineteenth 
century” (Hatfield 1991, 272). Then he provides a selection of 19th century 
German philosophers who allegedly used the empiricism/rationalism distinction—
Wilhelm Gottlieb Tenneman, Hegel, Üeberweg, and Falckenberg. But he notes that 
“empiricism” sometimes appeared in such histories alongside one, some, or all of the 
following: “idealism,” “dogmatism,” “skepticism,” and “criticism.”  
The problem is that Hatfield wants to define his second sense of “empiricism” 
as denoting a position essentially opposed to ‘epistemological rationalism.’ But the 
appearance of “empiricism” in these 18th century German histories alongside such 
a wealth of different distinctions suggests that in these histories we are finding the 
recurrence of a word that does not yet have a stable meaning, at least not as a word 
that contrasts strictly with “rationalism.”  
His portrayal of Falckenberg and Üeberweg’s respective uses of “empiricism” in 
the mid- to late-19th century begins to sound like empiricism qua an epistemological 
position that is at heart opposed to rationalism. If, in fact, ‘epistemological 
empiricism’ became an important category in 19th century German histories of 
philosophy, it would be helpful to know more precisely when this occurred.  
Second, we have seen that at least in English, “empiricism” had pejorative 
overtones through much of the 19th century. We are interested in how such 
overtones were sloughed off, so that philosophers began to self-identify as 
empiricists, particularly in the English-speaking world. All Hatfield’s citations are 
historians characterizing others as empiricists, though. This suggests that in 19th-
century Germany, “empiricism” perhaps still had pejorative overtones as well. I do 
not know of any German philosophers before about Helmholtz’s time who self-
identified as an empiricist.  
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I cannot pursue the history of German historians’ uses of “empiricism” any 
further here. My interest is in how the notion of empiricism came to be embraced by 
English-language philosophers. 
5.  METHODOLOGICAL OBJECTIONS, CONCLUSION 
Where are we?  
I began by developing an account of our contemporary interpretation of 
empiricism (CIE). I characterized CIE as an example of a historical-philosophical 
concept that itself has a history. Some philosophers argue that in his criticism of 
Lockean philosophy, T. H. Green invented the idea of CIE; and virtually all 
philosophers who write about Green claim he understood the Lockean tradition 
much as it is described by CIE. But I showed that Green simply did not write about 
Lockean philosophy as it is portrayed by CIE, and neither did Edward Caird, 
Green’s early prominent ally.  
In the previous section I began my positive account of proto-empiricism, the 
project against which Green and Caird actually understood themselves to be 
arguing. In the following chapter, I will continue my story of how proto-empiricism 
evolved. First though, while I am taking stock, I want to address two possible 
objections to my methodology.  
I am using the label “proto-empiricism” to describe Green and Caird’s actual 
opponents. Whereas “empiricism” is a label philosophers like James applied to 
themselves (as we are about to see), “proto-empiricism” is a label I am applying 
retrospectively. A reader might object that I am not entitled to apply such labels 
retrospectively.  
After all, I have argued against other philosophers’ retrospective application of 
“empiricism.” There are two groups I have targeted. One contains people like 
Norton and Loeb, who point to Green as the inventor of CIE. The other contains 
people like Brink, who are not interested in the origin of CIE, but simply use 
“empiricism” as a shorthand way of describing Green’s opponents. I have suggested 
that both uses of “empiricism” are misleading and should be avoided. 
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Brink, at least, might reply that “Green attacked empiricists” is just harmless 
shorthand for “Green attacked those people we now think of as empiricists.” The 
first statement need carry no implication that Green attacked opponents he thought 
of as empiricists. So if I have a legitimate complaint against Brink’s description of 
Green, it seems my complaint must be based on an in-principle rejection of the 
retrospective application of historical labels. But if this is so, then I have no business 
retrospectively applying post-hoc labels like “proto-empiricist” myself.  
In fact, I have no in-principle objection to the use of retrospective labels. It 
would be folly to insist that one must only classify historical subjects using categories 
that subjects applied to themselves. We typically have a more panoramic view of the 
history to which our subjects belong than they themselves had. For example, I am 
calling Green’s target “proto-empiricism” precisely because Green unwittingly 
played a pivotal role in the evolution of a concept we now call “empiricism.” By the 
time he died in 1882, he could not have guessed that his account of Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume would nourish our evolving notion of empiricism, nor that CIE would 
eventually have such a strong impact on English-language philosophy in the 20th 
century. We should use concepts that help us understand how Green fits into our 
history, ultimately. But what, then, is my objection to Brink?  
What I object to is silently-retroactive classification. There is an instrumental 
danger in using historical categories that are unacknowledgedly post-hoc.  
I began this chapter by suggesting that anyone who thinks history informs 
contemporary philosophy ought to take seriously the possibility that history 
informed bygone philosophy, too. When we employ historical categories that are 
silently post-hoc, we run the risk of tacitly substituting our contemporary 
interpretation of history for our subjects’ interpretation of history—for example, of 
assuming that when he fought against Locke’s legacy, Green saw Locke’s legacy 
much as we do. If there is one thing I hope to establish in this chapter, it is that 17th 
and 18th century philosophy looked very different in the 19th century than it does 
in the 21st. If we want a full-blooded interpretation of 19th century philosophy, we 
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need a full-blooded interpretation of how 19th century philosophers saw their own 
history.  
I will call “the historian’s fallacy” the tacit substitution of a contemporary 
interpretation of history for a historical subjects’ own understanding of that same 
history.60 Again, this move is a fallacy only instrumentally—the use of silently-post-
hoc categories is a mistake because of the risk one runs of obscuring the historical 
facts. So it is true that Brink need not concede that his use of “empiricism” is illicit. 
But the responsibility is his to show that it is not. In general, if a philosopher applies 
a historical category in a way that is demonstrably post-hoc, the responsibility falls, 
in fairness, to that philosopher to justify such a high-risk usage. 
So I have no in-principle objection to calling Hume or Berkeley “empiricists,” 
because I have no problem with the use of post-hoc classificatory schemas in doing 
history. I object to slipping into the historian’s fallacy, to assuming that historical 
actors saw their own history as we see their history. Guarding against this fallacy 
does not mean foregoing new classificatory schemas; it means going back and 
reading what historians working in (not on!) the period in question were writing 
about their past. 
Historians sometimes accuse one another of “presentism,” of portraying history 
through the distorting lens of the present. In itself, I do not think “presentism” must 
be regarded as an offence. What elevates history above mere record-keeping is the 
honest attempt to tell a story—a true story—that sheds light on our current 
                                                 
60 An important precedent—indeed, inspiration—for my idea of a historian’s fallacy comes 
directly from William James:  
‘The Psychologist's Fallacy.’ The great snare of the psychologist is the confusion of his 
own standpoint with that of the mental fact about which he is making his report. I shall 
hereafter call this the ‘psychologist’s fallacy’ par excellence. For some of the mischief, 
here too, language is to blame. The psychologist … stands outside of the mental state he 
speaks of. Both itself and its object are objects for him. Now when it is a cognitive state 
(percept, thought, concept, etc.), he ordinarily has no other way of naming it than as the 
thought, percept, etc., of that object. He himself, meanwhile, knowing the self-same 
object in his way, gets easily led to suppose that the thought, which is of it, knows it in 
the same way in which he knows it, although this is often very far from being the case. 
[fn. omitted] (PP, 195) 
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condition. In this sense, I hope my story rings with presentism. But I hope it is an 
intellectually honest presentism. 
This is a good place to handle a second objection to my methodology, as well. 
Someone might worry that my insistence on studying philosophy’s meta-history will 
lead to an infinite regress. If a proper account of the history of philosophy requires a 
proper account of the history of the history of philosophy, why end there? Wouldn’t 
a sound meta-history then require a meta-meta-history, and so on, ad infinitum?  
The answer is that meta-history is only necessary for doing the history of 
philosophy when, a) the actors under consideration practiced philosophy in a way 
that affected or was affected by their interpretation of history, and b) the actors’ own 
interpretation of history underwent revision, either within the time period studied, 
or between that time period and the present. Since the philosophers I am 
considering did not themselves practice the meta-history of philosophy, it would be 
absurd to insist that I undertake a meta-meta-history of philosophy. Since there was 
no important meta-history in the late 19th century, there would be nothing for a 
meta-meta-history to study. 
We can put criterion b) more generally. Call a meta-historical account a “first-
level history,” a meta-meta-historical account a “second-level history,” and so on. 
Criterion b) asserts that one must positively show that the nth-level historical story 
has changed in order to reasonably demand an n+1st-level history. Notice that this is 
exactly what I demonstrated in Section 4—that the historical story Green told about 
LBH has substantially changed between his era and the present. If I have been 
successful, then the demand for meta-history is legitimate in this instance. 
True, I may be complicating the task of future historians if others now 
incorporate meta-history into their historical research. But even this development 
would not by itself require future historians to practice meta-meta-history. Suppose 
that meta-history came to impact the way some practice philosophy. Historians 
looking back at our era would thereby find criterion a) satisfied. But unless our 
meta-historical narrative about philosophy changes, there will be no need for future 
historians to bump up to the level of meta-meta-history, at least not in any serious 
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way. So one need not worry that my methodology entails an infinitely regressive 
demand for ever higher-level meta-histories. 
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Chapter Two 
The Life of  Mind: Psychologists Take Their Stand 
1.  INTERLUDE: THE ROLE OF PROFESSIONALISM 
In the previous chapter we learned how Idealists constructed an interpretation 
of the history of British philosophy. The canonical figures in this history were Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume. These three were to have successively articulated a 
philosophical view of the mind that would provide a foundation for empirical 
psychology. A main purpose for constructing this history was to demonstrate that the 
foundation was faulty. According to Idealists, late 19th-century psychologists working 
in the Humean tradition of associationism61 were therefore pursuing futile projects. 
Idealists emphasized the most skeptical passages in Hume with the intention of 
showing that the Lockean philosophy of mind logically entails that there can be no 
knowledge at all. Consequently, the Lockean philosophy will not support a science of 
mind, as empirical psychologists hoped. I now turn to psychologists’ view of the 
situation. 
On page 155, above, I quoted passage where Croom Robertson responded to 
Green. The latter’s attack on LBH was ultimately meant to undermine empirical 
psychology, Robertson held. He had a privileged perspective from which to make 
such a judgment. Green published some of the most important versions of his anti-
psychology arguments in Mind, under Robertson’s editorship. Usages from the 
                                                 
61 Note that in contemporary cognitive psychology, what James and his colleagues called 
“associationism” is now more commonly referred to as “structuralism.” In recent textbooks, 
“associationism” usually refers to an approach to psychology that emphasizes learning. This 
movement is typically thought to post-date James—indeed, his student Edward Thorndike is 
often cited as an exemplar of this movement. “Structuralism,” on the other hand, is now 
used to refer to an earlier approach to psychology that emphasized the analysis of perception 
into component sensory atoms. Wundt is often cited as an exemplar. For examples of such 
textbooks, see (Goldstein 2005, 74-76; Sternberg 2006, 5-8). The reader should take care 
not to confuse these terms. When James and his contemporaries wrote about 
“associationism,” they meant what contemporary textbooks call “structuralism.” I will follow 
the older usage, like many historians of psychology—that is, I follow James’s usage. 
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ensuing controversy are among the early examples of English-speaking philosophers 
consistently describing their own views as forms of “empiricism.” “Empiricism” had 
occasionally been used to describe various trends in philosophy. But, as I argued in 
the previous Chapter, the word was rarely contrasted with “rationalism,” and rarely 
(if ever) embraced as a self-description. 
Professionalization62 was an important factor in the early self-application of this 
concept.63 Those participating in the debates in Mind were among the first 
generation of philosophy professors (as opposed to teachers of theology, or 
intellectuals working outside of universities) to set the agenda of English-language 
philosophy. They became advocates for professionalized philosophy.  
Like Green, Robertson had been bothered by the hitherto amateur character of 
British philosophy. Under Robertson’s editorship, Mind would encourage 
professionalization by providing a forum for scholarly, and not amateur, British 
philosophy. Robertson gave a manifesto in the first issue. 
Except in Scotland (and even there Hume was not a professor) few British thinkers 
have been public teachers with philosophy for the business of their lives. Bacon, 
Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the Mills did their philosophical work at 
the beginning or at the end or in the pauses of lives otherwise active, and addressed for 
the most part the common intelligence of their time. It may not have been ill for their 
fame; but their work itself is not what it otherwise might have been, and their manner 
of thinking has affected the whole character and standing of philosophical inquiry in 
England. If their work had been academic, it would probably have been much more 
sustained—better carried out when it did not lack comprehension, more 
comprehensive when it was well and carefully begun. The informality of their thought 
                                                 
62 Following the historian Louis Menand, by “professionalization” I shall mean philosophers’ 
shift towards seeing themselves as accountable solely to one another, not to theologians or 
church leaders, for example (Menand 2001, 100), or to educated amateurs. For the 
generation before Robertson and James, any intellectual could, in principle, publish a 
philosophy article in popular magazines like The Contemporary Review in England, or 
Nation or The Atlantic Monthly in the United States. One’s philosophic writing could in turn 
be criticized in such publications by intellectuals with no particular training in philosophy. 
But the arrival of journals like Mind marked the early days of philosophical professionalism. 
By Robertson’s design, virtually everyone publishing there had made a vocation of either 
academic philosophy or psychology, and their debates were kept strictly amongst 
themselves. As a result, the controversies that raged there were often a step removed from 
the more broadly engaging discussions of popular intellectual magazines. 
63 Kuklick persuasively treats the transition from amateur to professional philosophy in 
America (Kuklick 1977; Kuklick 2001). 
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has undoubtedly prevented philosophy from obtaining the scientific consideration 
which it holds elsewhere. (Robertson 1876, 1) 
From Bacon through Mill, leading British intellectuals had historically not been 
professional philosophers. According to Robertson, their writing might have been 
more rigorous—more scientific—had they devoted their working lives to philosophy.  
Recall from my previous chapter that Green also found traditional British 
philosophy, especially that emanating from Locke, to be too sloppy. Locke was quick 
to sacrifice logical rigor in order that his ideas could be digestible in a public, political 
forum, according to Green. Robertson agreed that traditional British philosophy had 
not been rigorous enough. And he agreed that the way to make philosophy rigorous 
was to encourage professionalization.64 
But he disagreed on what kind of professionalization would be best for British 
philosophy. The quoted passage continues: 
There has not been wanting in England a generally diffused interest in the subject 
[philosophy], such as is fed by discussions, more or less philosophical, mixed up with 
lighter literature in the pages of miscellaneous magazines; but of special interest, like 
that felt in mathematics or physics or chemistry by a multitude of active workers and a 
multitude of trained and continuous learners, there has hitherto been little. Even now 
the notion of a journal being founded to be taken up wholly with metaphysical subjects, 
as they are called, will little commend itself either to those who are in the habit of 
declaring with great confidence that there can be no science in such matters, or to 
those who would only play with them now and again. (Robertson 1876, 1-2) 
Green wanted to remake British philosophy into an academic profession like that 
which flourished in German universities. He wanted British philosophers to become 
professional metaphysicians in the spirit of Hegel, as we saw in Chapter One. In 
                                                 
64 The view of British philosophy as having been hampered by its lack of professionalism 
seems to have been more widespread than just Green and Robertson. For example, the 
British intellectual historian and literary critic David Masson noted that Britain had the 
reputation in Europe of having given up on real philosophy, entirely. He wrote: 
The Germans, in particular, have long pitied us on this account. It is more than forty 
years since one of their greatest thinkers [Hegel] publicly denounced us by pointing out 
that England was the only country in Europe where the word Philosophy had been 
synonymous with natural science, where the barometer and thermometer were spoken 
of as ‘philosophical instruments,’ and where a so-called Philosophical Journal treated of 
agriculture, housekeeping, cookery, and the construction of fire-places. (Masson 1866, 
10) 
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contrast, Robertson held that the way to make British philosophy rigorous was to 
make it more like a science.65 In this passage, Robertson said England showed a 
pronounced, yet unfocused interest in philosophy. The interest was unfocused in that 
it was expressed in popular magazines amidst “lighter literature.” Robertson wanted 
philosophy to be pursued by trained professionals in the manner of math, physics, 
and chemistry, and published in specialized journals of its own. In the former 
passage, Robertson blamed British philosophy’s failure to become rigorous—to 
attract what he called “scientific consideration”—on the amateurism of traditional 
British philosophers.  
Robertson wanted philosophy to come into closer contact with the sciences in 
respect to both methodology and subject matter. First, Robertson suggested in the 
passages just quoted that philosophers should emulate the professional ethos of those 
working in the exact sciences. Second, as we will see below, he thought philosophy 
should draw on results from the nascent science of empirical psychology. But 
psychology had not yet (in 1876) become a legitimate science, in Robertson’s view. 
So he saw the quest to help build a genuine science of mind as an integral part of the 
                                                 
65 Though some English-speaking writers in the 19th century used “science” to mean 
something like the German notion of Wissenschaft, this was not Robertson’s usage. For 
evidence, first consider that Robertson clearly wanted psychology to become a natural 
science. In a follow-up essay to the one I am currently citing, Robertson wrote: 
When Psychology is distinguished from Philosophy and the question is raised whether 
there is any special relation of the one to the other, it is Empirical Psychology that is to 
be understood—the science of mind worked out in the way of the natural sciences, if not 
regarded as itself one of them: Rational Psychology has always been taken as 
philosophical or nothing. (Robertson 1883, 4) 
In this passage, Robertson made clear that when he wrote about a “science” of mind, he did 
not mean merely a Wissenschaft that takes mind as its object. He meant mental studies that 
employ the methods of natural science, presumably in the manner of his teacher, Alexander 
Bain.  
 When Robertson discussed philosophy’s “scientific” status, though, did he use “scientific” 
in the same way? The passages just quoted in the text suggest that he does. In the first of the 
quoted passages, Robertson discussed obstacles to philosophy’s being treated scientifically. In 
the second passage, he gave examples of other fields that got the sort of “scientific” 
treatment he hoped philosophy would soon receive—these included mathematics, physics, 
and chemistry. Thus Robertson wanted philosophical questions to be approached in the 
manner that mathematicians and natural scientists approached questions.  
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quest to make philosophy more professional and scientific. Only when psychology 
becomes genuinely scientific can philosophy hope to live up to its own potential as a 
rigorous field of study.  
Robertson’s allies in the debate over how best to professionalize British 
philosophy came to call themselves “empiricists.” In one sense, Robertson’s side was 
victorious, but the victory had several unexpected consequences.  
First, as mental science matured, it splintered off from philosophy and became 
an independent field.66 But philosophy did not then draw on the new psychology’s 
empirical research, as Robertson had hoped. It consigned empirical research to its 
increasingly-estranged sister field.67 In the wake of empirical psychology’s exodus, 
                                                 
66 This view is commonly accepted among historians of both psychology and philosophy—so 
much so that it is rarely argued for. One deft exception is (Wilson 1990), which discusses the 
relationship between psychology and philosophy in America. One historian capitalizes on 
scholars’ widespread failure to argue positively for the view that psychology is an offspring of 
philosophy (Reed 1997). Reed argues that philosophy as we now know it is descendent from 
psychology, and not vice versa. This view is provocative, but indefensible. Reed argues that 
in American research universities in the late 19th century, psychology managed to get a 
foothold before philosophy did. This is a remarkable fact, but it is not evidence of 
philosophy’s being an offshoot of psychology. Compared to American psychology, American 
philosophy simply had a more difficult transition from intellectual magazines to graduate 
programs (Wilson 1990). But even if one grants Reed’s dubious assumption that there was 
no philosophy before there was academic philosophy, in Germany and Great Britain, for 
example, philosophy had a longer history as an academic field than did psychology.  
 Moreover, one of the key figures in the new psychology, William James, taught his own 
students that psychology was the offspring of philosophy, not vice versa. We know this from 
Ralph Barton Perry’s class notes in Phil 3, which he took with James in 1896-1897. In 
Perry’s notes on 10/8/1896, he wrote— 
Pos. says Phil. has not made any progress, but it is responsible for all the sciences. They 
all started together with Aristotle and as each branch has grown overloaded, it has 
fallen from the tree of Phil.—e.g. Psych is about to do so” (WJP, bMS Am 1092.9 
(4590), Folder 1, page II.3; by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard 
University) 
Perry’s student notes are divided into reading notes and notes on lectures he attended. The 
quoted passage appears in Perry’s notes from James’s lectures. If Reed is right that 
psychology gave birth to philosophy, one would expect late 19th century psychologists to have 
noticed this new-fangled field called “philosophy.” This is not the case, if these notes are any 
indication. Late 19th century psychologists regarded themselves as children of philosophy, 
and not vice versa.  
67 Perry recalled a precise moment when empirical studies of the mind were finally consigned 
to the Psychology faculty at Harvard. He wrote in 1943: 
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English-speaking philosophers began to see their work as confined to non-empirical 
issues. Thus, even as British philosophers of the next generation (led by Russell and 
Moore) abandoned Idealism, the surviving conception of what it was to be a 
philosopher was largely Green’s, by default. Though they abandoned the Hegelian 
vocabulary, philosophers of Russell’s generation became academics whose specialty 
was a priori deliberation. Robertson died in 1892, but he, James, and most other 
Mind empiricists would have lamented this development had they lived to see it 
flourish.  
There was a second unexpected consequence of the drive to professionalize 
philosophy. Professors needed a coherent narrative to teach students about the 
history of their field. Of course, earlier generations of philosophy instructors used 
schematisms to teach the history of philosophy, too (Kuklick 1984). But as 
instructors like James, Robertson, and Green emerged as leading philosophical 
                                                                                                                                       
The to me regrettable chasm between the first and third floors of Emerson Hall, 
Cambridge [where Harvard’s Psychology and Philosophy Departments were housed, 
respectively], is symbolic of a change in the relations between philosophy and 
psychology which has taken place during my own professional life-time. Time was when 
the difference was one of emphasis, but now it is a difference of vocation, profession, 
problems and technique. We came to the parting of the ways when, some years ago, the 
philosophers were asked to sit in judgment on a series of candidates whose doctoral 
dissertations dealt with the a-mazed rodent. Feeling ourselves to be rank amateurs in 
the field, we sat in silence and accepted the expert judgment of our junior colleagues 
who, having been reared in a new age, were as ignorant of philosophy as were we of 
what is now called ‘psychology.’ … William James was at one and the same time one of 
the first of the scientific psychologists and one of the last of the philosophical 
psychologists. (Perry 1943, 122)  
Perry does not say exactly when the dissertation defenses concerning the rodents occurred 
(mazes have long been used to investigate capacities like spatial perception and memory 
among mice and rats). Perry saw James’s Principles (1890) as a pivotal publication in the 
transition from “philosophical” to “scientific” psychology. The defenses must have occurred 
well after this date, because Perry did not begin teaching at Harvard—and thus could not 
have participated in dissertation defenses—until 1902. Harvard formed a separate 
Psychology Department only in 1934; but Perry just refers to the chasm between the first 
and third floors of Emerson Hall, not to a chasm between separate departments. I do not 
know how long more empirically-minded members of the Philosophy Department may have 
been housed on the first floor of Emerson Hall. So it is difficult to narrow the possible date of 
the episode to which Perry refers—and thus of the moment Perry realized philosophers were 
no longer competent judges of empirical psychology—to a time frame any more narrow than 
1902 and 1943.  
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authors, they began importing their teaching schematisms into their original writing. 
Empiricism’s historical connotations seem to have grown up partly for the purposes 
of teaching. But those connotations were subsequently injected into professional 
debates over the viability of a science of mind.68  
I will revisit professionalism at the end of Chapter Five. In this chapter, I aim to 
establish two main theses about the development of empiricism. One thesis is that 
some early philosophers to call themselves “empiricists” had a special purpose in 
allying themselves with the Lockean tradition as conceived by this new teaching 
schematism. The tradition provided philosophical support and intellectual prestige 
(despite Green’s best efforts) for the idea that psychology could become a genuine 
science. And it provided support for the related idea that results from empirical 
studies of the mind could be a foundation for professionalized, rigorous philosophy. 
During the 1880s, both these ideas were under attack from British Idealists, and 
Mind provided a forum for the ensuing debate.  
The second thesis I establish is that William James was an integral player in 
these early debates about empiricism. Not only did he impact these debates, but the 
debates in turn shaped his work, especially in psychology.  
Many of James’s articles published in the 1880s would be incorporated into his 
1890 masterpiece The Principles of Psychology. The journal in which most of this 
work appeared was Mind, and it appeared during a period of intense debate 
between Idealists and psychologists. I survey James’s correspondence and 
publications to show that his work in Mind—even his empirical research—during 
this decade had Idealists as enduring targets, and the viability of psychology as a 
guiding theme. In Chapters Four and Five, I will argue that the very theoretical 
                                                 
68 I should note that the battle lines were not as clearly drawn for American Idealists as they 
were for British Idealists. American Idealists like Josiah Royce, George Ladd, and the early 
Dewey actually wrote treatises that sought to combine experimental methods of the new 
psychology with neo-Kantian (Royce) and neo-Hegelian (Ladd) metaphysics. Nevertheless, 
that did not mean American Idealists saw psychology as a genuine science. Pursuing an 
experimental component of psychology did not, for these Idealists, make psychology into a 
science. Famously, Ladd criticized James’s Principles for its pretensions to build a genuine 
science of mind. See (James 1892; Ladd 1892); for a brief history of the exchange, see 
(Giorgi 1990). 
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backbone of his psychology—the stream of consciousness—was designed to resist 
these Idealist attacks on empirical psychology.69 
In the remaining chapters I will analyze the philosophical details of debates 
between Idealists and psychologists. But the historical work I undertake in this and 
the previous chapter is a necessary preliminary. This is because James’s early work 
is rarely read in the context of debates with Idealists—especially not with British 
Idealists. So before I can analyze James’s role in this conversation, I must first 
establish that James really was an important participant.  
In Sections Four and Ten of this chapter, I show that the impact of British 
Idealism on James’s early thinking is almost universally ignored in the secondary 
literature. Here is a mistaken inference James scholars have been prone to draw. 
They begin with an observation that has long been routine70—that James’s work 
articulated a spirit that was distinctively American. But scholars mistakenly infer 
that the main context needed to understand that work can therefore be found 
largely inside America’s own intellectual life. Thus one typically finds James 
anthologized in volumes with titles like Pragmatism and Classical American 
Philosophy (Stuhr 2000). One gets the impression that James’s work can be 
understood as part of a purely local conversation with figures like Emerson, Peirce, 
Dewey, and Royce. 
If the evidence I present in this chapter is compelling, interpretations of James 
that exclusively focus on his conversations with American peers are deficient. In 
                                                 
69 The stream is the single most important theoretical framework in the principles. James 
spends the first eight chapters of the Principles on methodological and physiological issues. 
He turns to introspection in chapter nine (“We now begin our study of the mind from 
within,” p. 219), at which point he immediately introduces the notion of a stream of thought. 
He then uses the idea of a stream of thought to give theories of the self, attention, 
conception, time, memory, sensation, imagination, space, reality, reasoning, the emotions, 
will, and necessary truth, among other topics. In Chapter Four, I show that James’s idea of a 
stream of thought grows directly out of his early research on space perception.  
70 This claim was routine even when James was alive. Royce said that James captured “the 
spiritual life of his own people.” Santayana wrote that James “had a prophetic sympathy 
with the dawning sentiments of the age, with the moods of the dumb majority” (both quotes 
can be found at Cotkin 1994, 13). See below, Section Ten, for more recent expressions of 
the same sentiment.  
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fact, the shape of James’s thinking was deeply influenced by his direct and sustained 
participation in British intellectual debates, as well.71  
2.   JAMES’S PHILOSOPHY CLUBS  
During his career, James was strongly associated with Harvard in all its 
academic prestige. He held posts in physiology (1872-80), philosophy (1880-1907), 
and psychology (1889-1907), becoming perhaps the most famous academic in the 
United States after the abridgement of his textbook appeared in 1892 (PBC). 
However, he came of age in a time and place where cutting-edge philosophy was 
undergoing a transition. James’s father’s generation pursued philosophy in social 
clubs that freely mixed intellectual deliberating with socializing.72 When they 
published, their work typically appeared in literary or broadly intellectual 
magazines. During much of William James’s own life, the activity of philosophizing 
still centered on social clubs. But these groups were more likely to be populated by 
philosophy (or psychology) professors than clubs of the earlier generation. And the 
papers they discussed were more likely to be published in professional journals than 
those discussed in the older clubs.  
For example, the prestigious Saturday Club was an important philosophical 
venue for William’s father, Henry James, Sr. He was voted a member two years 
after the family moved to Cambridge in the early 1860s (Menand 2001, 204). Other 
members of the Saturday Club included luminaries like Louis Agassiz, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, James Russell 
Lowell, Charles Eliot Norton, and Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr., (Menand 2001, 6). 
Many of these men—Agassiz, Holmes, Longfellow, Lowell, Norton—were professors 
                                                 
71 James was extremely cosmopolitan. He also participated extensively in French 
philosophical debates as well, and this topic stands in need of investigation (see below, fn. 
85). In fact, the Principles is dedicated to François Pillon, who co-published L'Année 
Philosophique and La Critique Philosophique with Charles Renouvier. James frequently 
appeared in the pages of these journals.  
72 On the role of social clubs in American philosophy of this era, see (Fisch 1986a; Kuklick 
1977, 46-62). On the professionalization of American philosophy more generally, see (Cotkin 
1994; Wilson 1990). 
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at one point or another in their careers, to be sure. But they were not philosophy 
professors. Emerson, Hawthorne, and Henry James, Sr. (the latter had inherited his 
own father’s fortune)73 were never professors at all. In clubs like these, intellectuals 
of many stripes gathered to discuss one another’s philosophical ideas and essays.  
Though William James was professionally ensconced at Harvard by 1872, many 
of his publications in psychology and philosophy during the next two decades grew 
out of his participation in clubs he maintained with his own contemporaries, in both 
the United States and abroad. Unlike participants in his father’s clubs, though, 
many of William’s colleagues were philosophy (or psychology) professors.  
It is important to attend to the intellectual climate of these clubs if one wants to 
understand James’s early work in philosophy and psychology. This is because his 
club papers were often published in professional journals like Mind and the Journal 
of Speculative Philosophy,74 and later incorporated into his 1890 opus, the 
Principles of Psychology.  
The American clubs in which James participated included (most famously) the 
Metaphysical Club (1871-75), in which the idea of pragmatism was first hatched.75 
He also participated in several other American clubs: a second incarnation of the 
Metaphysical Club (1876-79), a Hegel Club run by two Illinois businessmen (1880-
81), and another Hegel club (1881-87) run by William Torrey Harris, editor of the 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy (Fisch 1986a, 139). 
                                                 
73 A lovely intellectual biography of Henry Sr. is (Habegger 1994). 
74 This is not to say that James shared Green and Robertson’s views about the need to 
professionalize philosophy. In fact, James came to think professionalism would harm 
philosophy, and this disagreement occasionally surfaced, albeit not acrimoniously, in 
correspondence with Robertson. For example, in a letter to James about an article the latter 
had recently published in the Princeton Review, Robertson wrote: “… pity that Philosophy 
is so hard up that she cannot strive with her own children and keep them from mixing with 
the wicked world of popular-review writers. Ach, wir armen [Oh, we poor]! But you have 
been more virtuous than most” (CWJ, V.226). For a colorful example of James’s worries 
about professionalism, see his “The Ph.D. Octopus,” in (James 1987, 67-74). I will return to 
James’s views on professionalism at the end of Chapter Five. 
75 There has been some scholarly discussion about the actual, historical role of the 
Metaphysical Club in the development of pragmatism (Fisch 1964; Fisch 1981; Menand 
2001, 201-232). 
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James also participated in several British clubs during his travels. For example, 
he went to Europe from August 1882 to March 1883, spending most of his trip in 
England. Perry wrote that the effects of this particular visit on James’s philosophical 
thinking were “the most important in all James’s European adventures …” (RBP, I, 
586). The trip was as important for James’s professional as for his intellectual 
development. He met J. S. Haldane at the recently-formed Aristotelian Society, and 
made connections with another London philosophical club, Leslie Stephen’s 
facetiously-named “Tramps.” A subset of the latter group called themselves the 
“Scratch Eight,” and they accepted James as their ninth (RBP, I.594-596). Perry 
says the Scratch Eight was “the nucleus of James’s ‘philosophic society’” (RBP, 
I.596). 
While the Tramps convened on long walks through the countryside, the Scratch 
Eight more commonly met over dinner at a member’s house. The latter group 
consisted of some important writers for Mind, as James recorded in a letter to his 
wife dated December 16, 1882: Edward Gurney, Shadworth Hodgson, James Sully, 
Carveth Read, Frederick Pollock, Leslie Stephen, Mind’s editor George Croom 
Robertson, “& a certain Maitland, he being, so far as I know, the only one not 
known to fame” (CWJ, V.332). Gurney taught psychology at Cambridge. Sully, 
Read and Robertson were philosophy professors. Hodgson was unaffiliated with any 
institution, but devoted his life to writing philosophy. As we will see below, James’s 
public role as an advocate of empiricism was primarily a function of his publications 
in Mind, and of his participation in this and other clubs.76 We will come back to 
James’s relationship with Mind and its authors, below.  
                                                 
76 For an account of James’s relationship to Croom Robertson, see (RBP, I.596-606). To get 
a sense of how casual, yet at the same time high-powered, these clubs could be, I reproduce 
a poem one member wrote about The Tramps. Note the two references to the fact that club 
members publish articles in the journal Mind—the clubs were equally places to socialize, rub 
elbows, and talk philosophy:  
The Ballade of the Sunday Tramps 
If weary you grow at your books 
Or dyspeptical after you’ve dined, 
If your wife makes remarks on your looks, 
If in short you feel somewhat inclined 
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James had early been acquainted with neo-Kantianism through his own studies 
in philosophy.77 But his face-to-face struggle with the kind of Idealism we have been 
looking at evolved through his participation in the American clubs, particularly in 
the second incarnation of the Metaphysical Club.  
Initial club members included Thomas Davidson, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 
Nicholas St. John Green, John Fiske, F. E. Abbot, Joseph Warner, Francis Bowen, 
C. C. Everett, E. F. Fenollosa, J. E. Cabot, and G. H. Howison (Fisch 1986a, 140). 
                                                                                                                                       
For fresh air and a six hours’ grind 
And good metaphysical talk— 
With a party of writers in Mind 
You should go for a Sabbath day’s walk. 
 
Leave the town by the earliest train 
(In your Bradshaw bedtimes underlined) 
With umbrella in case it should rain, 
Enduring of sun and of wind— 
’T is no harm if they toughen your rind— 
Your boots you’ll remember to caulk, 
Your pockets with sandwiches lined, 
You are good for a twenty-mile walk. 
 
Though surely we all by our rule 
Are as peripatetics defined, 
Yet each philosophical school 
Is here with each other combined: 
Idealists, real ists, find 
Representatives here, as we stalk 
In the breezes, like them unconfined, 
Overhills of clay, gravel, or chalk. 
 
Envoy 
So, Prince, leave your troubles behind, 
And resolving for one day to baulk 
Black care, with the writers in Mind 
Go forth for your Sabbath day’s walk. 
77 Perry notes that an early and profound influence on James’s understanding of the Kantian 
legacy was (Masson 1866); see (RBP, I.573-585). There is no record of Masson’s book in 
the Houghton Library. Perry’s list of books from James’s collection that were sold, at WJP 
bMS Am 1092.9 (4578), make no mention of this volume either. Perry wrote that this was a 
book “belonging to his father’s library,” at (RBP, I.574). No copy of Masson that James 
might have read and annotated survives. Perry’s list is cited by permission of the Houghton 
Library, Harvard University. 
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Howison, Davidson, James, Bowen, and Fenollosa were philosophy professors.78  
Holmes, Green, and Fiske were lawyers. Abbot and Everett were ministers (the 
latter eventually taught religion at Harvard, and served a term as Dean). James’s 
American philosophical clubs thus had a moderately higher proportion of members 
who were philosophy and psychology professors than the clubs of his father’s 
generation. But James’s British clubs of the same period were dominated even more 
exclusively by professors. 
At any rate, this second Metaphysical Club began in 1876 by reading T. H. 
Green’s edition of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, especially its lengthy 
introduction. The group then moved on to the first edition of Edward Caird’s 
Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant in 1877-78 (Fisch 1986a, 144). Fisch 
characterized the respective publications of these two works as “the major 
philosophic events of the decade,” for club members (Fisch 1986a, 146). These two 
works appear to have been especially influential in James’s thinking about Idealism. 
As we have begun to see, both of these works sought to show that proto-empiricism 
was an inconsistent philosophical position, and that consequently, the very idea of an 
empirical psychology was incoherent.  
James’s first paper written expressly for the Principles was an article on space 
perception. He wrote this paper in July 1878 as a response to his friend, J. E. 
Cabot, a Hegelian. In March, earlier that year, Cabot had delivered a club paper 
defending an account of space perception the group would have associated with 
Green and Caird, as I show at the end of Chapter Three. Cabot’s paper was 
published that summer in Harris’ Journal of Speculative Philosophy; James’s 
response was later published in the same journal (see Fisch 1986a, 147-148).  
                                                 
78 In fairness, not all these characters were philosophy scholars in our contemporary sense. 
Bowen was of the older generation, when a philosophy professor was as apt to teach 
theology. Though Fenollosa briefly taught philosophy, he was more of an artist and Japan 
scholar. Thomas Davidson taught philosophy in Scotland and in London, but in the United 
States was more involved in creating experimental schools—notably, a summer school in the 
Adirondacks at which James sometimes lectured, and The Breadwinner’s College in New 
York City for working class students (see Anderson 2004, 240).  
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Less than a month after Cabot delivered his paper, he wrote a letter that sheds 
light on the way battle lines had been drawn among club members. As the group 
turned its attention to Caird, two camps had apparently formed. One camp was 
sympathetic to Green and Caird, and defended a Kantian approach to the mind. 
The other side resisted Green and Caird, taking up the mantle of what I am calling 
“proto-empiricism,” defending an empirical-psychological approach. On March 26th, 
Cabot wrote to Howison (a Cambridge transplant from St. Louis, then a hotbed for 
neo-Hegelian philosophy): 
You shall see my paper & welcome, as soon as I get it back from Mr [G. Stanley] Hall, 
who borrowed it. I regret to say however that I spent most of the available time in 
reading the books wh. Mr James lent me, on the psychological side; & did not succeed 
in putting my thoughts into good shape. . . . 
 We missed you very much: the discussion did not amount to much, partly because 
Dr James had to go away very soon, and partly because nobody except Dr Hedge, who 
was present, cared to look at it from the Kantian side. 
 We were so “demoralized” that we dispersed without fixing upon anything for next 
time. What shall we do? Will you give us the Caird?79 
From this letter it appears that the club was arguing about two conceptions of the 
human mind. We know from the rest of their output that James and Hall would 
have represented the view here called “psychological,” and Cabot, Howison, and 
Thomas Davidson represented the opposed “Kantian” view.  
Since James’s first article on space was a response to Cabot, it is especially 
important that I show this particular figure to have been on “the Kantian side.” I 
will review Cabot’s paper in Chapter Three. For now, I simply note that Cabot 
recorded his admiration for Green in an 1875 letter, written the year after the 
publication of the “Introduction.” Cabot wrote that he “takes great comfort in Mr. 
Green’s Introduction to the new ed. of Hume” (quoted at Fisch 1986a, 138).  
It is not only James’s interactions with neo-Kantians that makes 1878 a crucial 
year for understanding his early thought. For that June, James signed a contract 
with Henry Holt to publish a psychology textbook. After James’s marriage in early 
July, he began to compose the book—his Principles—by penning a response to 
                                                 
79 Quoted in (Fisch 1986a, 147), emphasis mine. “The Caird” refers to a paper Howison had 
in the works on Edward Caird, Fisch claims. 
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Cabot’s club paper on space.80 In this article (which we will investigate at length in 
Chapter Four), James finally sided with a group he called the “empiricists.”81 The 
article was entitled “The Spatial Quale,” and appeared in the Journal of Speculative 
Philosophy in January of 1879. James went on to publish voluminously about space 
perception, and the topic received more attention (measured in number of pages) in 
the Principles than any other topic. Space perception, as we shall see, would 
become a battleground issue for the fight between Idealists and empiricists. 
3.   MIND ,  A NEW REVIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
James engaged in a prolonged and public struggle with Idealists, the contours of 
which shaped much of the work that went into the Principles. The story of this 
struggle begins in earnest soon after the publication of “The Spatial Quale” in 1879. 
James had become miffed at William Torrey Harris, the publisher of the Journal of 
Speculative Philosophy, in part because the latter refused one of James’s 
subsequent submissions. In a letter to Josiah Royce from February, 1880, James 
wrote:  
I will never write again for Harris’s journal.82 He refused an article of mine a year ago 
‘for lack of room,’ and has postponed the printing of 2 admirable original articles by T. 
Davidson and Eliot Cabot for the last 10 months, or more, in order to accommodate 
                                                 
80 He began this work on his own honeymoon, dictating the paper to his new wife, Alice 
Gibbens (Simon 1997, xxv). One wonders how Alice Gibbens James fancied her groom’s 
idea of a honeymoon. 
81 Evidence that James saw “The Spatial Quale” as a defense of something called 
“empiricism” can be found in the concluding paragraph of the essay: 
The mere innateness of the spatial form of sensibility is surely not the essence of the 
Kantian position. Every sensationalist empiricist must admit a wealth of native forms of 
sensibility. The important question is: Do they, or do they not, yield us a priori 
propositions, synthetic judgments? If our “sensation” space does this, we are still 
Kantians in a deeper sense by far than if we merely call the spatial quale a form of 
Anschauung, rather than an Empfindung. But if the new geometry of Helmholtz and 
others has upset the necessity of our axioms (and this appears to be the case …), then 
the Kantian doctrine seems literally left without a leg to stand on. (EPs, 82) 
We will see below, this chapter, what James might have meant by “empiricism.” 
82 In fact, James was to publish one more article for the Journal of Speculative Philosophy. It 
was an article on the perception of time, appearing in 1886 (James 1886).  
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Mr Channing’s verses and Miss -----?s drivel about the school of Athens etc etc. (CWJ, 
V.84) 
“Eliot Cabot,” here, is J. E. Cabot, James’s friend and author of the article to which 
“The Spatial Quale” was a reply. Davidson was another close friend of James’s who 
was an Idealist like Cabot. James was annoyed to have his own work refused. But 
he was also annoyed that Harris refused his friends’ work, especially while 
publishing what James regarded as bad poetry.  
Happily, James found another nascent journal, this one on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Mind was explicitly dedicated to not mixing the publication of poetry and 
philosophy—and its editor proved to have wide open arms for James. 
In 1876, the English associationist Alexander Bain began financing this 
academic publication (to the reported tune of £3,000, by the time he was through).83 
Bain appointed his student Croom Robertson as the first editor. Robertson dubbed 
the journal “Mind,” and edited the publication until 1891, when he retired for 
reasons of ill-health. G. F. Stout then took over as editor, and Henry Sidgwick as 
patron. Robertson died the following year at age 50 (Quinton 1976, 6, 8). 
The journal’s subtitle described its two chief topics: Mind was to be a review 
both of Psychology and Philosophy. Though we now think of it as a philosophy 
publication, the journal was founded as a forum for research that considered these 
two topics, together. In fact, Robertson indicated that the order in which 
“Psychology and Philosophy” appear in the journal’s subtitle was purposeful 
(Robertson 1883, 1). Robertson explained that psychology was listed first because it 
was to provide a kind of neutral, scientific foundation for philosophy.  
He chose a masthead that reflected Mind’s emphasis on both psychology and 
philosophy. The masthead remained virtually unchanged from the journal’s 
inception in 1876 all the way through 1974, when Mind finally dropped 
“psychology” from its subtitle. See Figures 1 and 2. 
                                                 
83 For the fascinating background of the two years leading up to Mind’s first issue, see 
(Neary 2001). 
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Figure 1: Masthead of Mind, 1876 (first issue). Note prominence of “Psychology and 
Philosophy” in subtitle. The journal would keep this layout (and subtitle) until 1974.
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Figure 2: The new Mind masthead, from the 1974 issue in which it first appeared. The new 
masthead came with a new subtitle: Mind is now just a “Review of Philosophy,” not of 
“Psychology and Philosophy.” 
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In Mind’s first issue (January 1876), Robertson explained and defended Mind’s 
outlook. The journal was to be “the first English journal devoted to Psychology and 
Philosophy.” Such a journal was needed, Robertson wrote, because psychology was 
under attack as an imposter science.84 The time had come to settle the question of 
whether psychology was a genuine science, and the journal’s chief aim was to 
provide a forum for scholars to help settle the question.  
Here is how Robertson described Mind’s raison d’être: 
Now, if there were a journal that set itself to record all advances in psychology, and 
gave encouragement to special researches by its readiness to publish them, the 
uncertainty hanging over the subject could hardly fail to be dispelled. Either 
psychology would in time pass with general consent into the company of the sciences, 
or the hollowness of its pretensions would be plainly revealed. Nothing less, in fact, is 
aimed at in the publication of Mind than to procure a decision of this question as to the 
scientific standing of psychology. (Robertson 1876, 3) 
Robertson intended Mind to accomplish two main tasks. He wanted the journal to 
encourage research in psychology by providing a professional forum for the 
publication of its research. And he wanted the journal to help scholars come to a 
consensus on whether psychology should be counted as a genuine science.  
But why, then, is Mind to be a review of psychology and philosophy? To answer 
this question, we need a clearer sense of what sort of activity Robertson took 
psychology to be.  
In Robertson’s view, psychology had an objective and a subjective component. 
On one hand, the field had an objective arm that investigated “the Nervous System 
in man and animals,” a practice which connected the field with biology and the 
physical sciences. Psychology also pursued the “objective study” of language, of 
insanity, of the mental characteristics of “Human Races” and of “lower animals,” 
among other topics (Robertson 1876, 3-4). 
                                                 
84 The only example Robertson gave of an alleged attack on psychology was the Royal 
Commission on Scientific Instruction’s Third Report, an 1873 document (jointly-authored by 
T. H. Huxley and others) that reviewed all aspects of science instruction at Oxford and 
Cambridge. The document explicitly excluded “the Mental and Moral Sciences” from its 
purview. If Robertson did not yet see Idealists as opponents of psychology in 1876, he soon 
would, as we shall see. The founding document of British Idealism for the first generation to 
make their mark in Mind was Green’s “Introduction” to Hume. That been published less 
than two years before Mind’s opening issue appeared. 
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But psychology was not just an objective field of research:  
No such statement, however, can come near to exhausting the matter of psychology. 
Whatever place may be claimed for it among the sciences in respect of its method, 
psychology in respect of its subject must stand for ever apart. Include Mind, as it may 
possibly be included, in the widest conception of Nature, and it is like one half of the 
whole facing all the rest. Oppose it, as more commonly it is opposed, to Nature, and 
again Mind is nothing less than one half of all that exists…. (Robertson 1876, 4) 
Robertson claimed that psychology may be objective in its methodology, but 
psychology’s subject matter was unique among the sciences. This was because 
psychology was about the mind, but the mind cannot be exhaustively described as a 
natural object. The mind is part natural object, but it also stands above nature in 
some important respects. In order to investigate both aspects of the mind, 
psychology needs to employ both objective and subjective methods. 
In what respect, exactly, is the mind supposed to stand above nature? For 
Robertson, when viewed subjectively, the mind stands above nature in the sense 
that its activities are necessary for our apprehension of nature in the first place. The 
passage just quoted continues with the suggestion that the subjective study of the 
mind amounts to something like traditional philosophical reflection: 
… Nay, in a most serious sense, it [“Mind”] extends to all that exists, because that 
which we call Nature, in all its aspects and all its departments, must have an 
expression in terms of thought or subjective experience. It is in this view that 
Psychology may be shown to pass inevitably into Philosophy, but let it suffice here to 
have merely suggested why, although all objective lines of inquiry bearing more or less 
directly on mind will in turn be pursued in these pages, the fundamental consideration 
of mind is and must be subjective. (Robertson 1876, 4) 
Minds are in nature. But minds are also the organs by which we come to represent 
nature to ourselves. Indeed, minds are the organs by which we represent “all that 
exists.” Psychology is continuous with philosophy, therefore, because the thing that it 
studies—the mind—has as its scope all reality. Even the sort of “objective” study of 
mind that Robertson’s journal will publish has as its ultimate concern the mind in 
this subjective capacity—the mind as that through which all reality is apprehended. 
Thus, Robertson praised Germans like Wundt and Helmholtz who started as 
physiologists, but now are doing “some of the best philosophical work” (Robertson 
1876, 2). 
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The long passage I have just quoted claims that there is a continuity between 
the objective and the subjective study of the mind. The suggestion is that the best 
psychology is aided by keeping philosophical considerations in view. But Robertson 
also held that philosophy, in turn, is aided by keeping psychological considerations in 
view.  
This is because empirical psychology can provide a neutral groundwork for 
philosophical reflection, on Robertson’s view.  
With reference to general Philosophy or Metaphysic proper, psychology may be 
viewed as a kind of common ground whereon thinkers of widely different schools may 
meet, and, if they do not forthwith agree, may at least have their differences plainly 
formulated, as a first step towards any agreement that is possible. The new journal 
should thus, while promoting psychological science, help also to compose that secular 
strife which scientific inquirers as well as popular writers are never weary of 
representing as the opprobrium of philosophy. (Robertson 1876, 5) 
Psychology is not just philosophy’s intellectual neighbor. Psychology is a 
propaedeutic for rigorous philosophic work. It provides a neutral set of facts that 
even warring philosophical schools can agree upon. This common ground is to 
provide a basis for transforming philosophy’s characteristic “secular strife,” now 
lampooned by scientists, into more productive disagreement.  
Thus, psychology studies subject matter that leads into philosophy. But 
philosophy’s subject matter leads into psychology as well, according to Robertson. 
Neither psychologists nor philosophers can ultimately make progress unless they 
engage with one another’s work. Thus, psychology and philosophy are to be 
mutually reinforcing enterprises, and Mind is a journal that will help encourage this 
reinforcement.  
4.   JAMES FINDS MIND  
James’s deserved reputation as an American intellectual icon has tended to 
obscure the fact that he was heavily engaged with German, French, and British 
philosophy, particularly during the years he was publishing articles that came to be 
incorporated into the Principles (1878-1890). I will now argue that James’s position 
with respect to British philosophy was more than that of external observer. He was 
participating at the center of important debates in British philosophy as they were 
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happening, especially during the 1880s. And the most important locus for James’s 
participation was Robertson’s Mind.  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 offer an overview of James’s substantive publications in 
English during the run-up to the Principles. By “substantive publications,” I mean 
all his essays on any topic, from psychology to philosophy to psychical research. I 
include reports on conferences, but exclude letters to the editor, notes, and book 
reviews. James published a large number of very short such contributions, which I 
exclude because I want to give a sense of where he was sending his most carefully-
written work during this period.85 
Figure 3 illustrates that Mind was, by a large margin, the journal in which 
James published the most work during this period. Royce, G. Stanley Hall, and 
eventually Dewey were other important American contributors during these years. 
Out of all James’s substantive publications, 47% of his total pages during this period 
were published in Mind, across 14 articles.86 James’s Principles reproduced much of 
this material. Harris’s Journal of Speculative Philosophy came in a distant second, 
with just 17% of his total number of substantive pages during this period.  
I include Figure 4 to show that James’s publications in Mind were not confined 
to a burst of activity during one or two years, but were evenly distributed, more or 
less, across the period. To be sure, 1887 was a particularly productive year for 
James in Mind—that was the year his 4-part essay on space perception appeared. 
But he published more in Robertson’s journal than anywhere else during each of the 
                                                 
85 I should note two important trends in James’s publishing record during these years that  
Figure 3 and Figure 4 do not reflect. First, the inclusion of notes, reviews, and letters has the 
effect of highlighting popular intellectual journals like The Atlantic Monthly and Nation to 
which James was a regular contributor during this period. Also, I have excluded French 
translations of James’s essays during this period. A thorough overview of James’s 
publications during this period would surely have to take account of James’s presence in 
François Pillon and Charles Renouvier’s Critique Philosophique, and related journals. The 
large majority of these articles were translations of pieces that first appeared in English. But 
the articles sparked lively discussion, and rocketed James to intellectual fame in France. In 
many cases, Renouvier published responses, to which James offered rejoinders. This story is 
beyond the scope of my project.    
86 Four of these constitute “The Perception of Space,” which was published in four 
consecutive issues (James 1887a; James 1887b; James 1887c; James 1887d).  
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years 1879, 1882, 1884, 1885, and 1889 as well. Mind was the journal that 
published the bulk of James’s research during the run-up to the Principles. 
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JOURNALS PUBLISHING JAMES’S RESEARCH,  
BY TOTAL PAGES PUBLISHED: 1878-189087 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Label format: [Journal Name], [total number of substantive pages published in journal 
during period], ([number of substantive pages in journal as percentage of total substantive 
pages from WJ during this period]). 
 
Figure 3: Total pages of James’s substantive articles that appeared in various journals over 
the years 1878-1890. Note that the journal publishing the largest volume of James’s 
substantive work during this period is Mind. 
 
 
                                                 
87 I compiled the data for these charts from Ralph Barton Perry’s annotated bibliography. 
The bibliography was edited and republished by John McDermott in (James 1967, 811-
858).  
J. Spec. Phil., 117 (17%)
Unitarian Rev., 60 (9%)
Proc. Am. Soc. Psychical 
Research, 26 (4%)
Am. J. Otology, 16 (2%)
Pop. Sci. Monthly, 63 
(9%)
Mind, 305 (47%)
Atlantic Monthly, 19 
(3%)
Princeton Review, 29 
(4%)
Scribner's Magazine, 35 
(5%)
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JOURNALS PUBLISHING JAMES’S RESEARCH, BY PAGES 
PUBLISHED PER YEAR: 1878-1890 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Total pages of James’s substantive publications per journal, over the years 1878-
1890. Though James was particularly productive in Mind in 1887, notice that he published 
more in this journal than anywhere else during each of the years 1879, 1882, 1884, 1885, 
and 1889, as well. 
 
 
With the exception of (RBP, I.596-606), I can find no major studies of James 
that pursue his relationship to Mind or to its editor Croom Robertson. And none 
pursue James’s relationship to British Idealists like Green and Caird who were 
crucial animators of Mind’s contentious climate during the 1880s, either. 
There are several resources that treat James’s relationship to later Idealists, 
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the issue of intentionality. (Sprigge 1993) extensively compares James’s metaphysics 
to F. H. Bradley’s. (Conant 1997) looks at James’s struggle with Royce over how to 
draw a distinction between truth and error. (Seigfried 1984) looks at James and 
Royce’s diverging interpretations of biological evolution. But these pieces contain no 
mention of Caird, and virtually no mention of Green—the two earlier Idealists I 
write about.  
There are several helpful resources for studying the history of American 
Idealism (see Easton 1966; Flower and Murphey 1977, ch. 8; Good and DeArmey 
2001; Lützeler 2005). A very helpful overview that is short but detailed is (Watson 
1982). Unfortunately, none of these resources shed light on James’s relationship to 
Green and Caird. The literature on Green and British Idealism that I cited in 
Chapter One (on page 37, above) does not discuss James at any length, either.  
One gets a measure of the role Green, Caird, and Cabot play in contemporary 
James scholarship by looking at the end of The Cambridge Companion to James, 
where there are exactly zero references to any of these three figures in either the 
bibliography or index (Putnam 1997). Two older exceptions include (RBP), always 
the reliable source, which has scattered tidbits about each of these important 
characters. And (Thayer 1968, 466-486) has an extensive discussion of Dewey’s 
debt to Green.  
In short, James scholars have paid almost no attention to the impact of British 
Idealists, or of the debates they sparked in Mind during the 1880s. The oversight is 
surprising given that so much of James’s research appeared in that journal during 
the period when he was developing the Principles.  
It turns out that the intellectual climate of Mind was stormy during the 1880s, 
and James sat very much in the eye. Many of the articles James published in that 
journal were incorporated into the Principles. These articles—and ultimately, the 
Principles as an entire work—have a set of philosophical ambitions scholars have 
overlooked. I think one source of this oversight is the general failure to investigate 
James’s role in Mind during this period. In particular, scholars have failed to see that 
James shared Robertson’s concern to develop a framework for empirical psychology 
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that resists Idealist attacks on mental science, and to show how empirical psychology 
stands to edify philosophical discourse—or so I shall argue.  
5.   JAMES AND ROBERTSON 
James was welcomed into the community of core Mind writers by the early 
1880s. I am including details about Robertson’s vision for Mind not just because 
Robertson was at the center of that intellectual community. For our purposes, 
Robertson is also important because he was James’s closest partner in that 
community. He developed a close relationship with James, both personal and 
professional. In this section, I offer evidence of James and Robertson’s growing 
relationship, and of the fact that James shared Robertson’s goal of defending 
empirical psychology from Idealist attacks. To do this, I review some of the James-
Robertson correspondence, with reference to relevant published material. 
 
The sense that sides had been drawn in philosophy infused James and 
Robertson’s entire correspondence (e.g., CWJ, V.38, V.182, V.226, V.484; VI.62, 
VI.262-263, VI.288, VI.429). Perry used that correspondence to show what a 
tender friendship grew between James and Robertson (RBP, I.596-606). But the 
letters also show two professionals coordinating a response to Idealists.  
In late 1881, for example, James submitted to Mind an essay that attacked 
Idealism. The piece was entitled “On Some Hegelisms.” In an important letter 
dated November 11, 1881, Robertson explained that he could not publish James’s 
piece right away: 
… I think it well not to let you have your fling before April. You must know—or rather 
are now to be told—that the Hegelians are to be coming out in force in Mind, at last. 
Green himself opens in Jany., and I would rather not affront him just as he begins to 
speak. He will continue in April, but ought by that time to be more at his ease.—If you 
have seen the last No. of Mind, you will have noted a first plea (in the journal) for 
Hegel from another devotee [Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison]. For some months past 
the youthful members of the brotherhood have been making desperate attempts to get 
up a Hegelian journal all to themselves. They have not succeeded—did not deserve to 
succeed, for reasons too long now to relate—and the whole band give promise now of 
sailing in the ship that has been going these six years [viz., Mind]. We shall see how 
they settle down with you & other shipmates. 
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In this letter, Robertson told James that Mind would finally publish Hegelians. The 
January 1882 issue included their leader, “Green himself,” along with Josiah Royce. 
Green’s article, “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” continued over the next 
two issues, and its publication was a watershed for Mind. Green died later that year, 
but his article was the opening shot in a battle between Idealists and empirical 
psychologists in Mind. Two of his students, Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet, would 
carry on the Idealist cause in Mind, as would Andrew Seth and a host of others.88  
“On Some Hegelisms” did appear in April. As James described it in a letter, the 
piece targeted “points which have been made popular by the teachings of Green, the 
Cairds and Palmer.”89 It opened with the claim that “Hegelism” had become “one of 
the most potent influences of the time.” Hegelians had become so zealous that  
if perchance we essay to do some small bit of psychological detail-work for ourselves, it 
is lucky if someone does not trip us up at every step by reminding us that we forget to 
do homage to the Transcendental Ego which is presupposed in all the words we use. … 
Although the transcendental-ego-business is a good deal like interrupting a geographer 
at his work by telling him every five minutes that he forgets to talk about Space, which 
is nevertheless presupposed in all the distances and latitudes and longitudes he is 
discussing, there can still be no doubt that, as a movement of reaction against the 
traditional British empiricism, the hegelian influence represents expansion and 
freedom, and is doing service of a certain kind.  
 Such service, however, ought not to make us blindly indulgent. Hegel's philosophy 
mingles mountain-loads of corruption with its scanty merits, and must, now that it has 
become quasi official, make ready to defend itself as well as to attack others. (James 
1882, 186) 
Those like James who wanted to practice empirical psychology found they were 
accosted at every turn. Hegelians objected that the mind had properties which 
transcend time and space, and as such could not be studied empirically. In this 
essay, James undertook to strike back. Note that he used “British empiricism” to 
                                                 
88 A curious testament to how thoroughly the climate shifted in Mind after 1882 is (Schiller 
1901). This is an anonymously-published spoof of Mind, widely thought to have been written 
by F. C. S. Schiller. Schiller, very much an empiricist (and Britain’s most vocal champion of 
James’s particular brand of empiricism, by the way), was himself a regular contributor to 
Mind. His faux issue lampooned Idealists who, by 1901, had a very prominent place in the 
journal. Idealists did not have a presence at all in Mind before 1882. 
89 This is from James’s letter to G. H. Howison, dated September 30, 1881 (CWJ, V.180). 
George Herbert Palmer was a friend of James who spent several summers studying 
philosophy with Edward Caird in Scotland, a practice James ridiculed throughout the 
correspondence of this period. 
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denote Idealism’s foes—this was still an uncommon usage in Mind during the early 
1880s.  
This passage shows something important about the impact of these debates on 
James’s own thinking. We see that James wanted to defend empirical psychologists 
from Idealists. But James’s suggestion that Hegelians had done a measure of good in 
their critique of the British tradition was also sincere. James was actually more 
sensitive to the Hegelian critique of empirical psychology than many of his allies in 
Mind. When we turn to the substance of James’s defense of psychology in Chapter 
Four, we will see that his defense actually involved conceding a portion of the 
Hegelian critique of, for example, the simple/complex distinction as it had 
traditionally been used in the British tradition. During the 1880s, much of James’s 
work in Mind sought to show how to salvage “British empiricism,” to be sure. But it 
sought to show how to do this while accepting some (certainly not all) aspects of the 
Hegelian attack.  
“On Some Hegelisms” called forth no response from Idealists. Perhaps James’s 
occasionally mocking tone distracted from his serious criticisms. For example, the 
piece concluded with a long footnote recounting James’s personal experiments with 
nitrous oxide (laughing gas). He claimed the only time he ever felt he understood 
Hegel was when intoxicated by the substance (James 1882, 206-208).90 
                                                 
90 The note may not have been intended to be humorous—perhaps not even to be mocking, 
though it was likely read that way. James regarded nitrous oxide as a tool for exploring the 
possible range of human experience. In The Varieties of Religious Experience, he summed 
up the result of his experiments with nitrous oxide:  
Some years ago I myself made some observations on this aspect of nitrous oxide 
intoxication, and reported them in print. One conclusion was forced upon my mind at 
that time, and my impression of its truth has ever since remained unshaken. It is that 
our normal waking consciousness, rational consciousness as we call it, is but one special 
type of consciousness, whilst all about it, parted from it by the filmiest of screens, there 
lie potential forms of consciousness entirely different. We may go through life without 
suspecting their existence; but apply the requisite stimulus, and at a touch they are 
there in all their completeness, definite types of mentality which probably somewhere 
have their field of application and adaptation. No account of the universe in its totality 
can be final which leaves these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded. (James 
1902/1985, 307-308) 
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James was disappointed by the lack of response. In July, Robertson wrote that 
he was sorry for this outcome, as well— 
… none of the people who had most to learn from it [“On Some Hegelisms”] should 
have set themselves to lay hold of the lesson by making as if they wd. reject it. … You 
must try them another time on a more solemn tack; and they will be compelled to 
answer. …  
 Has anything more come of your Expts. with deaf-mutes? They promised a really 
definite result. And generally don’t let us fall behindhand with anything you are doing. 
The journal has its arms always wide open for you. (CWJ, V.226) 
In the correspondence from this period in general, these two often refer to a struggle 
with Idealists.91 This letter is an example of how enthusiastic Robertson was to have 
James’s work appear in Mind. More importantly, the letter shows that Robertson 
particularly encouraged James’s attacks on Hegelians.  
It had been one thing for Robertson to proclaim, as he did in the first issue, that 
Mind would help settle the question of whether psychology could be a natural 
science. But it was entirely another to have active opponents of empirical 
psychology finally serving up their criticisms in Mind. Robertson had been itching to 
host this debate, and now that he had the leading critics in his pages, he wanted to 
be sure the charges were answered by able psychologists. The last letter I quoted 
gives the impression that Robertson saw James as a worthy respondent.  
This impression is strengthened by looking at further letters. James would go at 
the Hegelians again in the winter of ’83-’84, submitting “On Some Omissions of 
Introspective Psychology,” another attack on Green et. al. Robertson wrote that he 
would print the piece (along with James’s now-famous “What Is an Emotion?”),  
                                                                                                                                       
The first sentence refers, apparently, to the long footnote in “On Some Hegelisms.” This 
latter article was reprinted in The Will to Believe, and the footnote called forth a letter from 
an anonymous British reader who had had similar revelations while using nitrous oxide. 
James published the anonymous reader’s account in (James 1898a). James indicated his 
openness to experimenting with nitrous oxide in an early, friendly review of Benjamin Paul 
Blood’s “Anaesthetic Revelation and the Gist of Philosophy” (James 1874).  
91 The Houghton Library preserves 25 letters from Robertson to James (WJP, bMS Am 
1092.9 (504-528)), and 17 letters from James to Robertson (WJP, bMS Am 1092.9 (3536-
3552))—cited by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University. Many of these 
are reproduced in James’s published correspondence. References to letters that discuss the 
response to Idealism can be found on p. 100, above. Where possible, I give references to 
these letters as published in James’s collected Correspondence. 
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…because I desire nothing better than to keep at them. Your Schlagfertigheit [quick-
wittedness] is altogether admirable, and if, besides the positive value of the stroke 
(which in this case I think not little), it means that you feel yourself in the best of 
intellectual trims, I rejoice in it.… As for the other paper still on the stocks, I am not in 
the least afraid of giving our people a surfeit of you, and if you will let me have it on no 
other terms than that it must appear in July, some one else must just get out of the 
way of your impatience or need; but the some-one-else won’t like it, will think himself 
not too well used &c &c—and, in short, if you can, upon reconsideration, see your way 
to giving me the choice of October (if need be), I should be very glad. … But I say not 
this to make you withhold rather than yield. You must not in any case withhold; but I 
say it to give you a notion of the things I have to consider. (CWJ, V.484) 
The start of the passage shows that Robertson continued to be eager to publish 
James’s work. It also shows that Robertson continued to encourage psychologists—
or James, at least—to respond to Idealists. Omitted sections contain Robertson’s 
hemming and hawing over who he would have to push aside if James insisted on 
appearing in July. The fact that he was so eager to have more work from James, 
despite the apparent inconvenience James’s impatience may cause, shows what a 
favorable impression James’s publications must have made on Mind’s readers, and 
presumably on Robertson’s Scratch Eight philosophy club as well (see page 84, 
above).  
For his part, James’s letters show deep hostility towards Hegelians, as well. To 
take one example, James wrote to Robertson on August 13, 1885:  
Why don’t you have a special “neo-hegelian department” in Mind, like the “Children’s 
department” or the “Agricultural department” in our newspapers, which educated 
readers skip? (CWJ, VI.62) 
The correspondence between the two continued in this fashion until Robertson’s 
death in 1892. References like this to the ongoing argument between Hegelians and 
psychologists can be multiplied throughout.  
I conclude from the evidence in this section that arguments between two camps 
were flaring up in Mind during the 1880s. James was eager to collaborate with 
Robertson’s side in these discussions—the side that wanted to defend empirical 
psychology from Hegelian attacks. Also, Mind’s editor Croom Robertson regarded 
James as an important contributor to the effort to defend psychology in that journal. 
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6.   MIND ,  FROM PARTISAN HAVEN TO OPEN OCEAN 
We can get a broad overview of the kinds of intellectual concerns that 
dominated Mind during the early years by surveying some important publications 
while Robertson was editor. The first six years of Mind’s existence had been 
dominated by those who (like James and Robertson) saw psychology as intimately 
connected with philosophy. For example, in the first issue we find Bain on James 
Mill, Spencer on “The Comparative Psychology of Man,” and Hodgson on 
philosophy of psychology. Hodgson’s piece was continued in the April issue, where 
we heard from G. H. Lewes on sensation, and Wundt on the nervous system and 
consciousness.  
Meanwhile, Green and Idealism had been all the rage among a young group of 
British philosophers since the mid-70s. But the only real Mind discussion of 
Idealism during that decade came in October of 1876, when Sidgwick savaged— 
“mocked” is not too strong—Bradley’s Ethical Studies in a five-page review 
(Sidgwick 1876).  
Thus, I cannot agree with Anthony Quinton’s claim that Robertson “cast his 
net” “widely” (Quinton 1976, 15) during the latter’s entire tenure as editor, a 
misleading and oft-repeated view (e.g., Neary 2001, 63). In fact, Mind’s first six 
years were dominated exclusively by writers who saw a close kinship between 
philosophy and psychology.  
Quinton divides British philosophers during the period a bit too nicely, into six 
schools. His evidence of Robertson’s widely-cast net is that the first issue contained 
articles by representatives from three of these schools—John Venn, from the group 
Quinton calls “logicians and methodologists”; Herbert Spencer, from the 
Evolutionists; and Bain, Lewes, and Sidgwick, whom Quinton characterizes as 
“more or less traditional empiricists.” (Note that none Quinton cites as belonging to 
the school of “empiricists” actually applies that label to himself in Mind’s early 
years.) In fact, all these figures shared the view that psychology and philosophy are 
intimately connected, in roughly the way Robertson had indicated in the opening 
issue.  
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To be sure, there were serious disagreements within the group of philosophers 
who took empirical psychology seriously—Spencer, for example, cared more about 
evolution than Bain. But even Venn, the logician, insisted that his work was 
continuous with empirical psychology (Venn 1876, 51-52). Especially after the 
landmark publication of Green’s “Introduction” to Hume in 1874, Idealism had 
been among the most influential movements in British philosophy. Their absence in 
early issues of Mind would have been glaring. Dividing Idealists’ opponents into 
three categories and then applauding Robertson for publishing representatives of all 
three in Mind’s opening issue seems an odd measure of inclusiveness, therefore. 
In fact, Mind became decidedly more inclusive only in 1882 with the 
publication of several important Idealists (most importantly Green himself). We will 
see below that Robertson himself saw fit to apologize for the narrow philosophical 
band to which Mind’s regular contributors, up to this point, had belonged. So I agree 
with Quinton that Robertson was “too widely read in the history of philosophy to be 
a zealot for one particular point of view” in what he chose to publish (Quinton 1976, 
9). But I disagree that Mind was consistently non-partisan throughout Robertson’s 
tenure. It became non-partisan, but it did not start that way. The story of the journal 
becoming less partisan is crucial for understanding the changing contours of British 
philosophy during the 1880s.  
7.   “EMPIRICISM” IN MIND  BEFORE 1882 
The attentive reader will have noticed that so far, we have seen few explicit 
references to “empiricism” by Robertson or his allies. I now turn to the story of how 
psychologists began to construct their own history to fortify the position they sought 
to defend from Idealists. The word “empiricism” seems to shift meanings very 
roughly around 1882, when Green ignited the debate about psychology with his, 
“Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” In this section, I will review how the 
word “empiricism” was used in Mind during earlier years. In the next section, I will 
show that it is in response to Green’s 1882 that we find among the earliest 
recognizable avatars of the concept of British empiricism. 
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Unfortunately, when Mind contributors used the word “empiricism” in the 
years following that journal’s 1876 inauguration, they typically used it in passing. 
This makes it difficult to glean a precise, intended meaning in each case. However, a 
pattern emerges from the contexts in which the word was most often used during 
this early period. “Empiricism” typically appeared in one of two contexts—either in 
connection with Kant, or in connection with the complaint (reflected in the 
colloquial pejorative) that some other philosopher relies naively on experience. Note 
that in these early issues of Mind, “empiricism” is always a label attached to others, 
not a word expressing the author’s own position. It was not until after Green 
appeared in Mind that “empiricism” came to mark a position anyone cared to 
defend (though this is not, as I argued in the previous chapter, because Green 
himself had used the word). 
Mind offered reviews of foreign philosophy and psychology journals. In the first 
issue, they published overviews of some of the main journals to be covered. An early 
example in Mind of “empiricism” used in connection with Kant comes from R. 
Flint’s 1876 overview of Fichte’s Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophiche 
Kritic. He says the journal’s chief aim is to “do justice to” systems of the past,  
especially those which have issued from the critical investigations of Kant, to mediate 
between speculation and empiricism, to harmonize metaphysical philosophy and 
positivistic science, and to elaborate and establish a comprehensive Theistic theory of 
the universe. (Flint 1876, 136-137)   
It is not clear whether Kant is supposed to have mediated between two separate 
arguments—one between “speculation and empiricism,” the other between 
“metaphysical philosophy and positivistic science”—or whether Kant is supposed to 
have mediated one argument that is being described here with sets of synonyms. In 
the latter case, “empiricism” would be a synonym for “positivistic science.” This is 
the only place in the article where the word “empiricism” appears, so it is hard to 
say with certainty how Flint intended the word. The important point is that in the 
rare early cases where “empiricism” is used in Mind, the usages are often vague 
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(and made in-passing), and are often given in discussions of Kant or post-Kantian 
German philosophy. 
The same issue contained one other appearance of “empiricism.” W. C. 
Coupland used the word, again in connection with Kant, in a review of Friedrich 
Paulsen’s 1875 book, Versuch Entwicklungsgeschichte der Kantischen 
Erkenntnisstheorie. 
Kant professed to adjudicate between contending schools, but really took part with the 
rationalists. His attempt to reach a position superior both to Rationalism and 
Empiricism was a failure, as the author believes similar attempts will always prove to 
be. (Coupland 1876, 155) 
Though this usage is also in passing, it is consistent with our contemporary 
interpretation of empiricism, which I am calling “CIE.” This usage of “empiricism” is 
rare during the early period of Mind. In any case, this is a second example of that 
word appearing in connection with German philosophy. So the English philosophical 
use of “empiricism” likely owes something substantial to Kant (see above, Chapter 
One, fn. 20). In any case, I am more interested in the way certain English-speaking 
philosophers came to construct an empiricist identity for themselves. 
The next substantial example of a philosophical usage of “empiricism”—the 
next example I can find in Mind—does not occur until October 1878.92 R. B. 
Haldane reviewed several German books under the title “Hegelianism and 
Psychology,” and his usage foreshadowed the way “empiricism” would be used in 
the coming debate with Green. Haldane wrote:  
Kant met Hume upon psychological ground in the case of questions arising within the 
sphere of experience, and his philosophy is therefore of great psychological interest. 
But Hegel, in abolishing the psychological side of Kant’s system, abolished, as it 
appears to us, every point of contact with that English empiricism against which the 
latter had directed his attacks, and out of which his theory of knowledge may be said to 
have arisen. Empirical psychology, involving as it does, a distinction between subject 
and object, is for Hegel no doubt a branch of knowledge, falling within that sphere of 
the timed and spaced …. It has no special interest as throwing light on the problem of 
                                                 
92 The January issue of 1878 contains an article that uses “empiricism” (Read 1878, 122, 
124). But these usages are hard to make sense of, because they occur in passing, and in a 
confusing context. The context is Carveth Read’s recounting and criticizing of Francis 
Bowen’s reading of William Hamilton’s reading of something Bowen calls “empiricism” 
(phew).   
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the constitution of experience, towards which it stands in just the same position as any 
other branch of empirical science, and is really no more akin to philosophy proper than 
is, for example, physiology. (Haldane 1878, 570-571) 
On Haldane’s usage, one cannot be engaged with “English empiricism” unless one is 
engaged with empirical psychology. Whatever are meant to be the sufficient 
conditions for being an English empiricist—Haldane does not elaborate—he clearly 
thinks a necessary condition is that one take account of empirical psychology in 
one’s philosophizing. This usage would become much more popular, but only after 
Idealists came out in force in Mind.  
In that same issue, Arthur Balfour (the same Balfour who would become Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, by the way) referred to “the difficulty Kant and 
Kant’s successors saw in the empiricism of Hume …” (Balfour 1878, 33). It is 
interesting that Balfour here referred to Hume’s “empiricism,” because Balfour 
went on to say that this topic had been adequately dealt with by “Mr. Green and 
Mr. Caird.” Thus, here we do find an example where Green is characterized as 
presenting a Kantian criticism of Hume’s “empiricism.”93 Presumably, this usage is 
an echo of Kuno Fischer’s terminology (Fischer is cited at pp. 503-504 of this article, 
albeit not in connection with empiricism; see above, Chapter One, fn. 58, for more 
on Fischer). 
At this time, “empiricism” also continued to be used in the colloquial, pejorative 
sense as well. One example is (Bain 1876, 187), which charges that one is “obliged 
to conclude” that Sidgwick’s method in ethics amounts to “simple empiricism.” And 
C. H. Lake asks whether one can form general principles in the philosophy of 
education, thereby raising philosophy of education into a respectable intellectual 
pursuit. The author phrases the question by asking whether the philosophy of 
education is capable “of being lifted out of the region of empiricism” (Lake 1876, 
572). 
                                                 
93 Balfour’s article appears before Green’s “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” 
Balfour is clearly thinking of Green’s “Introduction” to Hume, and Caird’s A Critical 
Account of the Philosophy of Kant (Caird 1877). Balfour’s usage of “empiricism” suggests 
that philosophers had begun by 1878 to use “empiricism” as shorthand for the school that 
culminates in Hume, and that Green sought to show Kant had overcome.  
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8.   ROBERTSON’S VISION OF EMPIRICISM 
Green’s “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” appeared in 1882, and 
defenses of (and references to) the British “empiricist” tradition become more 
common thereafter. Among the most important defenders of this “empiricism” was 
Mind’s editor, Croom Robertson. 
Robertson wrote a response to Green in January 1883 (though Green had 
passed away the year before). It was Robertson who best articulated the notion of 
empiricism psychologists would espouse in response to Green, during the 1880s. 
The evidence in this section suggests that those who invented (or at least 
popularized) the idea of empiricism did so as a way to mark off the philosophical 
territory they intended to protect from the likes of Green. I now turn to Robertson’s 
notion of empiricism. 
Robertson began his response to Green by reviewing Mind’s first seven years, 
immediately seeing fit to apologize for the early appearance of partisanship. Mind, 
Robertson insists, has  
given a representation that cannot be called other than impartial of the manifold 
currents of thought running among the English-speaking race here and in America. If 
at times some forms of opinion have seemed to assert themselves more than others, 
the fault lay with the others that chose to assert themselves less. It became clear from 
the beginning that the number of English thinkers, at the present day, who cared to 
have a clearly defined psychological basis was very small: not that any can be without 
their psychology, but that most are of opinion either that it supplies no basis for 
philosophical consideration or that they can get on very well without thought of it. All 
who had anything serious to say have, therefore, from the first been encouraged to 
deliver themselves of their message, whatever it might be; and while I reflect with 
satisfaction that the chief opponent, in this generation, of the English philosophical 
tradition was using the Journal for the exposition of his matured conclusions when a 
cruel fate snapt on a sudden the thread of his life, I can truly say that no philosophical 
contribution offered has ever been declined on the ground of its being of one cast of 
thought rather than of another. (Robertson 1883, 3) 
This passage illustrates two important points. First, contra Quinton and Neary, 
Mind’s own editor acknowledged the appearance that the journal seemed not to give 
a balanced reflection of British philosophical currents before 1882. Robertson 
claimed that the journal was “impartial,” but went on to explain that it was 
“impartial” in the sense that its editor never rejected any worthy submission for 
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partisan reasons. Robertson may have wanted to publish writers representing a 
broad range of the British philosophical spectrum. But he was unable to attract 
authors who doubted that psychology could be a basis for philosophy—that is, until 
Green finally appeared. Second, the letter shows, once again, that Robertson saw 
Green to be the “chief opponent … of the English philosophical tradition.” As we 
are about to see, Robertson claimed that a reliance on psychology was the essence of 
this tradition Green had attacked. 
Robertson went on to co-opt some aspects of the proto-empiricist tradition, as 
Green had conceived it. In particular, Robertson also conceived of that tradition as 
laying a philosophical groundwork for empirical psychology. Robertson, of course, 
had a higher estimation of this tradition than Green. It will pay to investigate the 
details of that tradition as Robertson conceived it.  
Robertson wrote: 
It is certainly to Locke that we must go back to find the beginnings of the opinion that 
philosophy should start from what is now called (though Locke did not call it) 
psychological inquiry. There is in Hobbes, in the previous generation, more express 
inquiry of the psychological sort, but not pursued with any such directly philosophical 
purpose. Locke, with the definite aim of furnishing a theory of the validity and limits of 
knowledge, elects to proceed by what he calls the “plain historical way” of a 
consideration of its origin; in other words, he seeks to solve the philosophical question 
of the import of knowledge by reference to the psychological question of its coming-to-
pass. (Robertson 1883, 5) 
Locke was the first to propose that if we want to investigate the limits of knowledge, 
we must begin by giving an empirical account of how the mind actually acquires its 
ideas. In other words, epistemology must begin with what Robertson called 
“psychological inquiry.”  
The passage continued this way: 
The idea worked so powerfully that, in the next generation, we find Berkeley solving 
the religious question of the relation of the creature to the Creator through a 
philosophical theory of knowing and being suggested by a special inquiry in the 
psychology of vision; and Hume, in turn, declaring that, while even such sciences as 
mathematics are in a manner dependent on the science of man, this is still more true of 
properly “philosophical researches,” which can be conducted only after a scientific 
understanding of human nature, to be attained by the same way of “experience and 
observation” as had been found effective in other sciences. When Hume thus wrote, 
Locke’s idea of psychological inquiry had been caught up in a still more positive spirit 
by Hartley, and through Hartley more than Hume it has worked upon those who in 
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this century have advanced farther upon the way of thinking that has become stamped 
as characteristically English. Even the reaction against Hume's philosophical 
conclusions, in Scotland, started from a not less emphatic assertion of the need of 
resting philosophy upon an inductive science of mind …. (Robertson 1883, 5) 
This passage suggests an answer to a question that has long puzzled historians of 
British philosophy—namely, why is Berkeley included among Locke and Hume as 
an exemplar of British philosophy?94 Berkeley was then read as an ‘idealist’ in the 
sense that he did not believe material objects existed independently of a 
representing mind. Why should historians lump Berkeley together in one tradition 
with Locke and Hume, who both had realist sympathies? The passage I have just 
quoted suggests that it was Berkeley’s work in psychology—particularly in the New 
Theory of Vision—which earned his place in the canon. Berkeley, like Locke, is here 
portrayed as someone who saw empirical psychology as providing a groundwork for 
philosophy. He tried to understand the human relationship to God by applying a 
philosophical theory that was first gleaned from his work in the psychology of vision.  
In footnote 45, above, I noted that a recurring theme in Hume scholarship has 
been the question of how to reconcile Hume’s stated goal of building a “Science of 
Man” with his apparent skeptical conclusions in the Treatise. While 20th century 
Hume scholars long tipped toward the view that no reconciliation was possible—that 
Hume’s skepticism succeeded, while his science of man failed—Robertson read the 
situation in reverse. Robertson saw Hume as one who, like Locke and Berkeley 
before him, sought to ground philosophy in a study of mind that employed the 
methods of natural science. It is not clear what Robertson made of the more 
skeptical aspects of Hume.  
One thing that contrasts with Green’s reading of the British tradition is that, for 
Robertson, David Hartley was to have been even more influential than Hume in 
influencing the scientific study of mind, at least as that study had developed in 19th-
century Britain. In any case, what ties together the British tradition is clearly the 
                                                 
94 Loeb sets out reasons to wonder why Berkeley should be included as a member of British 
Empiricism, at  (Loeb 1981, 59-62). Loeb argues that “Berkeley was not much interested in 
systematic epistemology” (p. 62); and if we try to reconstruct a Berkeleyan epistemology we 
get a view closer to Descartes’ than Locke’s.  
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emphasis on psychology as a foundation for philosophy. Even the Scottish common 
sense school, a group typically regarded as an enemy of Hume, is to have carried on 
the tradition of starting philosophy with an inductive study of the mind. Robertson 
acknowledged that German psychologists like Herbart and Beneke also advanced 
the tradition Locke founded (Robertson 1883, 5-6).  
So perhaps even more explicitly than Green, Robertson constructed a tradition 
of thinkers who had seen psychology as a foundation for philosophy. The tradition 
started with Locke, and wove its way through Berkeley, Hume, and Hartley—then 
it was carried on in the 19th century by English associationist psychologists as well as 
by German psychologists like Herbart and Beneke. Robertson went on to articulate 
a specific vision of philosophy that this tradition defended.  
What is, then, the exact import of the idea thus introduced by Locke into the stream of 
philosophical thought? It is (so far as philosophy turns upon the problems of 
knowledge) that, before attempting to determine what can be known ultimately of 
things, investigation shall be made of the human faculty of knowing by the same 
method that has been found effective in the region of the positive sciences. Locke was 
deeply impressed by the scientific achievements of his century, culminating in the 
work of Newton, and, while declaring that for himself philosophy is turned from direct 
speculation about things into general theory of knowledge as complementary to the 
special sciences, he is most of all decided on the point that such philosophical theory 
can be wrought out only after scientific account has been rendered of mind. This is his 
really characteristic idea; for the conception of philosophy as theory of knowledge in 
relation to the sciences is equally proclaimed by Kant later and had already been 
shadowed out earlier by Descartes. To arrive at philosophical conclusions that might 
the more readily command assent because drawn from a basis of properly scientific 
results about mind, which could no more be contested than any results of 
mathematical or physical science—such is the idea of Locke and his followers. 
(Robertson 1883, 6) 
Philosophers like Descartes and Kant agreed that philosophy should center around 
an epistemological investigation of the sciences. Locke’s contribution—the English 
contribution (a pinch of national pride is unmistakable in the article)—is that 
philosophy should not just study science from the outside. Philosophy should itself 
apply Newtonian methods to the study of mind. Epistemological results drawn from 
a genuine mental science could no more be challenged than could the results of 
Newtonian physics, or other branches of natural science.  
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But Robertson quickly acknowledged that Locke’s vision could not be carried 
out, in the end. I excerpted the following passage in Chapter One, but it bears 
reprinting now that we have a richer account of its original context:  
Locke and his followers to the present day have proceeded in a manner that has laid 
them open to a kind of criticism that apparently makes an end of their pretensions to 
rank as a serious philosophical school. The criticism directed by Green against Locke 
and Hume tells also, as it was plainly meant to tell, against Mill and others in this 
generation who, working at philosophy from the standing-ground of psychology and 
making whatever progress in either department, have been hardly more careful than 
Hume or Locke to draw a clear line between natural science of mind (or man) and the 
ulterior consideration of things in relation to mind. The point of the criticism urged by 
Green (after Kant), with a massive persistence that stamps it as an original 
philosophical achievement, is too well-known—repeated as the argument has lately 
been in these pages—to need more than general indication. Locke and the others are 
charged with assuming for the explanation of mental experience that which is itself 
unintelligible except as the result of a mental function. They would account for mental 
experience, including thought, by supposing a world of ‘objects’ acting upon a mind or 
a multitude of minds, when it can be shown that the very things or objects assumed are 
themselves mental constructions dependent on the activity of that thought which is in 
this way to be explained. The moral is that in no such way as the English school has 
trodden can the work of philosophy be performed, but only by a path at least as 
different as that which Kant had in view, when he scouted the notion that the least 
philosophical importance could be attached to psychological (or anthropological) 
science.  (Robertson 1883, 7) 
Green had rejected the Lockean tradition of seeing empirical psychology as a 
starting point for philosophy. Robertson only recounted the gist of Green’s argument, 
because it had been recently elaborated in Mind (in “Can There Be a Natural 
Science of Man?”).  
Green charged that psychology gave a circular account of the mind. Psychology 
proposed to answer the question of how the mind functions. In order to answer this 
question, it first assumed a certain metaphysical picture to be true. On this picture, 
the mind is embedded in a physical world, where it is impacted by physical objects. 
Mental functioning is then understood as the mind’s law-governed manipulation of 
the impressions made (in part) by these physical objects. Green argued that this 
metaphysical picture was ultimately incoherent. According to Green, we cannot give 
an account of physical objects unless we admit that those objects are themselves 
constructed by the mind. Mental construction, however, is itself one variety of 
mental functioning. So in order for psychologists to begin explaining mental 
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functioning, they have to assume the existence of objects that have already been 
constructed by some hitherto unexplained act of mind.  
Robertson went on to propose a solution to Green’s problem, one that is hinted 
at in the passage above. In brief, the solution was to enforce a strict separation 
between the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. The two disciplines were to 
reinforce one another, to be sure. But the kinds of metaphysical questions with 
which philosophy is principally concerned are not to be imported into psychology. 
Psychology assumes a certain metaphysical picture at the outset, as must any 
science. Philosophy vindicates that metaphysical picture; but philosophy also 
imports results from empirical psychology. This was the point of Robertson’s 
acknowledgement, in the passage above, that Green’s attack targeted late 19th-
century empirical psychologists who had been “hardly more careful than Hume or 
Locke to draw a clear line between natural science of mind (or man) and the ulterior 
consideration of things in relation to mind.”  
We will not see in detail how this solution of separating philosophy and 
psychology is supposed to work until Chapter Five. What I hope to have established 
in this section is that Green’s work was not received as an antiquarian analysis of 
long-dead philosophers. Contemporaries read Green’s attack as a direct challenge to 
the philosophical foundation of empirical psychology.  
At any rate, Robertson certainly read Green this way; and his description was 
little-enough idiosyncratic that it called forth no published complaints from either 
Idealists or psychologists. The essay I have been considering is signed “Editor,” like 
all Robertson’s essays in Mind. Though he did not hesitate to offer original 
philosophical analysis in these essays, Robertson took special pains in his role as 
editor to describe the philosophical debates of Mind in as neutral a manner as 
possible.  
I also take myself to have shown that the psychologists themselves sought to 
rehabilitate the historical tradition Green had tried to undermine. Robertson did not 
just offer a theoretical response to Green. He tried to show how the discredited 
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English tradition of empirical philosophy could be repaired. Why, though, did 
Robertson bother with the historical side of his response to Green?  
 
The tradition Robertson presented in this essay was a tradition he seems to 
have developed more fully in the classroom. After Robertson died, his lecture notes 
from philosophy and psychology classes were edited and published. The philosophy 
lecture notes came from classes given over the period 1870-1892 at University 
College, where Robertson had held the Grote Professorship. His lectures reflect a 
similar, if more nuanced picture of the history of Western philosophy to that we have 
just seen. 
He began by discussing how to divide the main trends of modern philosophy. He 
rejects what he portrays as the main schematism used in German histories, between 
Realists and Idealists (he names two German historians, Schwegler and Fischer). 
Instead, he chooses a division which would become standard in the 20th century. On 
the one side were “rationalists” like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz. On the other 
were “experientialists” or “empiricists” like Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (Robertson 
1896/1905, 60).  
There are thus two main lines to be distinguished—those who say that knowledge is 
explicable from reason,95 and those who hold it is explicable from experience—and 
these hold good up to Kant, when we begin to get approximations from one line to 
another …. (Robertson 1896/1905, 58)  
Rationalists hold that all knowledge is “explicable” from reason (Robertson did not 
here distinguish between explanations of how knowledge is to be justified from 
descriptions of the causal antecedents of knowledge). Empiricists hold that 
knowledge is to be explained by appeal to experience.  
                                                 
95 Robertson added a footnote here that reads:  
the student must distinguish between the narrower peculiarly German connotation of 
Rationalism used here, and its wider meaning, common in this country, of the revolt of 
individual reason or judgment against authority in all ultimate questions. Ed. 
This note is another clue that the concept of “rationalism” that came to be opposed to 
“empiricism” is a concept English-speaking philosophers culled from earlier German 
philosophy—probably largely from German histories of philosophy. 
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Unlike David Masson (more on whom, below), who saw the distinction between 
what he called “empiricism” and “transcendentalism” as just one way to carve 
modern philosophy, Robertson sees this as the essential distinction. Thus, the 
“empiricist” side of Robertson’s story looks very much like CIE, particularly when 
we note that Kant is supposed to begin blurring the distinction between these two 
schools. 
However, there is a very important difference between the sense of 
“empiricism” in Robertson’s writing and the sense expressed by CIE. The difference 
is captured in the following passage. 
Although he was a general philosopher and not a psychologist, he [Locke] nevertheless 
worked out his philosophy in a psychological spirit. He started from the psychologist’s 
point of view, with the notion of investigating the mind in the same scientific way as 
Newton was investigating nature. This departure had an effect in the very next 
generation through Berkeley, who carried out special psychological investigation with 
surprising acuteness in his New Theory of Vision. Hume also, without putting forward 
any system of psychology, worked in a psychological spirit, and discussed particular 
psychological questions in a notable way, especially the laws of association as 
containing an explanation of knowledge. (Robertson 1896/1905, 65) 
We need not be concerned with the richer historical detail into which Robertson’s 
textbook delved. It suffices for our purposes to see that there is something different 
at stake in what Robertson calls “empiricism” than what is at stake in CIE. 
Robertson’s “empiricism” is a historical-philosophical concept. As in the case of CIE, 
Robertson would fill in step 1 of the HP concept-schema with the thesis that 
knowledge is to be accounted for by appeal to experience. And he would fill in step 2 
with a history whose canonical figures are Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. But it is 
important to notice that the stakes are different in Robertson’s history. Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume have a chief goal, a reason for espousing ‘epistemological 
empiricism’: they want to bring Newtonian methods to the study of mind; in turn, 
they want to use data from the resulting mental science as a firm foundation for 
epistemological deliberation.  
I leave the stakes of HP concepts without explicit expression in my HP concept-
schema. This is because the stakes in our actual use of HP concepts are typically 
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expressed tacitly. Thus, Robertson would fill in the HP concept-schema for 
empiricism much the same way I have filled in that schema in the case of CIE: 
ROBERTSONIAN EMPIRICISM: 
(1) Thesis: ‘empiricism’ is an epistemological thesis emphasizing the role of 
experience in knowledge, a thesis affirmed by the philosophers 
mentioned in (2).  
(2) History: The Empiricists were a set of 17th and 18th century 
philosophers—Locke, Berkeley, and Hume—who should be 
grouped together in virtue of their commitment to the thesis 
mentioned in (1).  
One chief function of associating a philosophical position with a historical tradition—
as we do in the case of empiricism—is that the tradition specifies in rich detail the 
intended stakes of using the concept in question. Thus, for Robertson and for many 
of his Mind allies, empiricism was worth associating with Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume precisely because these figures illustrate what it might look like to found 
philosophy on a Newtonian science of mind. 
Robertson’s notion is the earliest example I am comfortable treating as an 
avatar of empiricism. Unlike Green, who attached a significantly different historical 
narrative to Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, Robertson operates with a concept of 
empiricism that bears close resemblance to our contemporary notion.96  
 
I close this section with several conjectures. The fact that Robertson’s history of 
modern philosophy was both a philosophical and a teaching tool suggests the 
following. Philosophy’s professionalization in the late 19th century may have had a 
deeper impact than we now recognize on the substantive details of our 
contemporary interpretation of our own history. I mean that the specific history 
Robertson taught his students plainly served the struggles Robertson was engaged in 
                                                 
96 The line is not sharp between early, genuine incarnations of the empiricist concept (like 
Robertson’s) and older usages that are merely precursors (like Green’s). On Green’s usage, 
neither the core thesis of proto-empiricism nor the stakes involved in endorsing that concept 
match CIE. The canonical historical group does match. In contrast, both the core thesis and 
the canonical group of Robertson’s empiricism do match CIE. Only the implicit stakes in 
endorsing these respective concepts do not match. So Robertson’s empiricism does match 
CIE more closely than does Green’s concept of proto-empiricism. But the difference is one of 
degree, not kind.  
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with his professional interlocutors. By suggesting that the Lockean tradition was one 
of the two great pillars of modern Western philosophy, Robertson infused his own 
position—the position that held that empirical psychology could provide a scientific 
foundation for philosophy—with historical gravitas.  
More than that, the tradition also infused the position with the kind of richly-
articulated intellectual detail that is only possible when one stands, so to speak, on 
the shoulders of giants. Robertson did not have to invent from scratch examples of 
how mental science might bolster philosophy. He could cite volumes of work by 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume as examples, even if those examples were not always 
successful.  
Though I do not take the point to be established beyond doubt, I am suggesting 
that what became the standard classroom outline of modern philosophy has its roots 
in 19th century scholarly arguments over the viability of psychology, and over 
psychology’s relationship to philosophy. Since earlier philosophy professors had not 
been engaged in scholarly debates (because they were not scholars at all), this 
injecting of professional concerns into classroom narratives would have been a new 
development, and one (apparently) with lasting consequences.  
Also, our standard narrative about modern philosophy may have been impacted 
by professionalism in another way. Professional instructors like Robertson had a 
greater responsibility to develop a concise account of the history of philosophy than 
did earlier generations of philosophers. Earlier philosophers like Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume did not themselves take teaching as an occupation. The pressure to 
develop a coherent historical narrative for the purposes of instruction may have left 
Robertson and his professional peers in a better position to bring an interpretation of 
history to bear on their own philosophical writing. Though I will not argue for this 
point, I conjecture that 19th-century professional philosophers’ incorporation of 
historical-philosophical concepts (like empiricism) into original research may have 
been a byproduct of their new responsibilities as public instructors.  
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9.   JAMES AND EMPIRICISM 
I shall have reason to refer back to Robertson’s conception of empiricism. It was 
Robertson who articulated philosophical commitments that united Mind 
psychologists in their response to Idealists. But in this section, I want to look at how 
James wielded this concept himself.  
Ignas Skrupskelis offers a fairly standard view of James’s relationship to British 
philosophy. He writes: 
From the mid-1880s he [James] came to view himself as heir to the whole tradition of 
British philosophy, including in his extensive reading even minor figures. (Skrupskelis 
1988, xlviii) 
This view is not uncommon in James scholarship. This is a central thesis of the most 
influential study of James (RBP), and there have been no shortage of adherents to 
the view. 
I agree that James came to see himself as the heir to British philosophy. 
However, from our contemporary vantage, I do not think it is easy to glean how 
James interpreted the tradition of British philosophy to which he saw himself heir. 
In this section I will review evidence of how James understood the legacy of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume. 
 
From his published work, we know that James associated empiricism with 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. For example, in his 1895 entry on “Person and 
Personality,” from Johnson’s Universal Cyclopaedia, James wrote that  
In Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding the great revolution toward 
empiricism begins. Personality is now explained as a result, and not assumed as a 
principle. It is not something which, by simply being, gives rise to consequences, but 
something which is made from moment to moment by a cause which can be assigned. . 
. . “Consciousness” is what makes a person, when it remembers past experiences, as 
having been also its own. … Hume went beyond Locke in discarding substances, 
whether spiritual or material, altogether. … Locke’s and Hume’s views have been 
carried out both in Germany and England by the associationist psychology, which in 
consequence has been dubbed a “psychology without a soul.” 
. . . 
Recent psychology has, in the main, elaborated itself on Lockean lines. (EPs, 317-318) 
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Here James characterized Locke as having shifted philosophy towards 
“empiricism.” On this usage, “empiricism” apparently denotes a tendency to reject 
a priori principles (in this case, a principle of personal identity) as furnishing genuine 
knowledge about the mind. Instead, empiricists investigate—presumably 
empirically—the causal factors of the mind’s development. Locke and Hume 
exemplified this new empirical turn in philosophy, and the tradition they started was 
carried on in James’s day by associationist psychologists in Germany and England.  
Unlike in the case of Green, Caird, and Robertson, James did not publish 
detailed analyses of Locke, Berkeley, or Hume. So it is difficult to reconstruct 
James’s historical views from published writing. The best available resources for 
learning how James viewed the British tradition are unpublished materials related 
to his teaching. One especially helpful document is Ralph Waldo Black’s student 
notes from Philosophy 5, which he took with James during the academic year 1884-
1885. This was Harvard’s course on Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. James’s own 
lecture notes from that year are not preserved.  
We know that in 1880-1881, the section of Philosophy 5 James taught was 
entitled “Psychology” (ML, 177-178). It is not clear whether James taught Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume in this version of the course. When Black took the course on 
LBH, Skrupskelis says the title was “English Philosophy” (Skrupskelis 1988, xlviii). 
However closely the content of these courses did or did not match, it is suggestive 
that Harvard’s basic courses in psychology and in English philosophy during this 
period were taught under the same course number, Philosophy 5. 
A copy of Black’s lecture notes are preserved (at WJP, bMS Am 1092.9 
(4583a)).97 At 64 pages, they are too detailed to do full justice to here. However, I 
will identify several trends in these notes relevant to our question of how James 
understood the empiricist tradition. We will see that first, attacks on the tradition 
from idealists like Green and Royce loomed large. Second, the question of whether 
various theories of space perception support idealism was a major issue. Third, 
                                                 
97 All passages from Black’s notes I cite or quote are used by permission of the Houghton 
Library, Harvard University. 
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James broached empirical issues about the mind more often than one would now 
expect to find in a class entitled “English Philosophy.” Fourth, another frequent 
topic in the class was whether there is synthetic a priori knowledge. Black’s lecture 
notes use the word “empiricism” mostly in connection with this latter debate. 
Philosophy 5 lasted for two semesters. James spent the first third of the course 
on Locke, the second third on Berkeley, and the final third on Hume. The notes 
contain detailed discussions of philosophical and psychological issues, often recording 
views on varied topics consistent with James’s published positions. The notes are 
also full of references to specific passages in Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, as well as 
to a dizzying array of secondary sources. Though James is known to have felt 
inadequate as a teacher, Black’s notes show a truly diligent professor who came to 
class prepared for a detailed presentation of each day’s topic. A second set of 
student notes preserved at Houghton show a similar diligence.98  
Early in the course, James gave a list of potentially fruitful thesis subjects for 
students in Phil 5. That he presented the list to students studying Locke, Berkeley, 
and Hume suggests that James saw the listed topics as relevant to students of the 
British tradition. I reproduce the list in full because there are several points it will 
help me draw out. 
Any one of the following works will furnish a capital thesis subject. 
Descartes’  Meditations etc. 
Spinoza’s  Ethics 
Leibnitz’  Nouveaux Essais This criticizes Locke p by p 
Thomas Reid Essays These [a vertical line is drawn next to Reid,  
Dugald Stewart, Elements Stewart, Brown, and Hamilton] succeeded one  
Thomas Brown Lectures another and refuted Locke, Hume, and 
Berkeley 
Sir William Hamilton 
James Mill,  Analysis 
John Stuart Mill  Logic 
Bossuet and Condillac 
T. H. Green’s  Introduction 
Immanuel Kant 
A. T. Lange,  History of Materialism [sic—should be F. A. Lange]  
                                                 
98 The notes were taken by Ralph Barton Perry in Phil 3, 1896-1897. They are preserved at 
(WJP, bMS Am 1092.9 (4590))—cited by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard 
University. 
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G. H. Lewes,  Problems of Life and Mind 
Herbert Spencer’s  Psychology 
F. H. Bradley’s  Logic 
The following are subjects for Theses in Psychology 
1. Sleep and Dreams 
2. Sensory Functions of Spinal Chord (Unconscious cerebration) 
3. Phrenology 
4. The Conscious Automaton Theory 
5. Aphasia 
6. Localization of Functions in the Brain 
7. The Psycho-physical Law 
8. Time required by Mental and Nervous Actions 
9. The Perception of Space 
10. The Eternal World of Idealism 
11. Sensation versus Perception 
12. Illusions, Hallucinations, etc. 
13. Spencer Versus Darwin     
14. Spencer’s Definition of Mind and Law of Intelligence,--Are they adequate? 
15. Spencer’s Attempt to evolve the Function of Casuition. 
16. Can Axioms be derived from Experience? Spencer, Mill etc. versus Kant 
17. Imaginary Geometry. 
18. The Association of Ideas. Will it explain all mental processes and products? 
19. Nominalism, Conceptualism & Realism. 
20. Reason and Reasoning; The Brute and the Human Mind. 
21. The Effect of Attention. 
22. The Ego and Personal Identity. 
23. Freewill 
24. Origin of Moral Sense 
25. What is Materialism? 
26. Analysis of Types of Character. (p. 3) 
First, note that neo-Kantian idealism is prominent on this list. James mentioned 
both figures and issues that were associated with such idealism. In addition to 
mentioning Kant explicitly, James also mentioned Green’s “Introduction” as a good 
thesis topic. James would discuss Green on several occasions throughout the 1884-
85 year with his Phil 5 class (see pp. 6, 16, 18, 19, 60).99 James also listed Friedrich 
Albert Lange’s History of Materialism. Though the work is almost forgotten today, 
this founding document of the Marburg school of neo-Kantianism contained a 
critical discussion of Locke (see Hussain 2005). And James mentioned Bradley’s 
Logic, as well.  
                                                 
99 The reference on page 6 in the lecture notes is implicit, while all others are explicit.   
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The issues James listed that were important in discussions with idealists 
included “The Eternal World of Idealism” (item 10); “Can Axioms be derived from 
Experience? Spencer, Mill etc. versus Kant” (item 16); “Imaginary Geometry [i.e., 
non-Euclidean geometry]” (item 17); “The Ego and Personal Identity” (item 22); 
and the “Origin of Moral Sense” (item 24). In Chapters Three through Five, below, 
we will see how James took up in his scholarship issues like those mentioned in 
items 10, 17, 22, and to a lesser extent 24. 
Throughout the year, James would discuss the challenges of idealism, 
particularly the challenges coming from Kant, Green, Renouvier, and Royce. Two 
paragraphs above I cited pages where James discussed Green. Kantian idealism also 
came up for discussion on pp. 12-15, 49-54, 59, 63-64. Indeed, the last sentence 
Black recorded from James’s final lecture was this: “Humian philosophy useful as a 
protest against the Hegelian spirit” (p. 64). So in his class on the British tradition, 
James taught that empiricists were engaged in a dialectic with Idealists. As I have 
been arguing, James was also participating in this dialectic professionally during the 
1880s, not just teaching about it. 
In class, James also discussed Berkeley’s idealism at length, though here the 
focus had little to do with Kant, of course. James discussed how Berkeley used 
empirical evidence, particularly in the New Theory of Vision, to support a unique 
brand of idealism.100  
A chief emphasis was Berkeley’s theory of space perception (pp. 33-39). The 
first full lecture on Berkeley occurred on January 8th. Black’s notes from that day 
begin this way.  
Berkeley’s chief interest in his theory of vision was as a support to his (theological) 
idealism. If he can prove that distance, an apparent object of perception, is really an 
idea in the mind, he opens way to proving idealism. (p. 33) 
Berkeley had advanced a theory of distance perception that would prove profoundly 
influential in 18th and 19th-century psychology. His view was that distance 
perception arises when a subject learns to coordinate various muscular feelings with 
                                                 
100 An Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision first appeared in 1709 and went through 
several editions before Berkeley died in 1753 (see Berkeley 1975). 
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certain visual images. In particular, when the subject focuses on a moving object, the 
muscles in her eyes will feel relatively more or less tensed according to how far away 
the object is. She then learns to associate this muscular tension with visual images of 
objects that are relatively closer to the subject. James taught his students that 
Berkeley’s theory thus made the perception of distance a mental construction rather 
than a matter of directly-perceived properties in the external world. This is why the 
theory of vision was supposed to provide a measure of support for Berkeley’s 
idealism—it purported to show that distance “is really an idea in the mind.” Space 
perception was an important topic in Philosophy 5. It came up in discussions of 
Locke as well (pp. 6, 8-11,101 18—the latter passage also discusses Green).  
Black’s notes on space perception, especially in connection with Berkeley, are 
remarkable because they show how much empirical evidence James brought into 
the philosophy classroom. For instance, in discussing Berkeley’s theory James 
provided several anatomical sketches of the eye (on pp. 34-35). He also discussed 
case studies of blind patients, notably those with cataracts, who had their eyesight 
restored in operations. Although in the 18th and 19th-centuries such cases were more 
often thought to support Berkeley’s theory (Degenaar and Lokhorst 2005), James 
took the opposite position (p. 36).102 
                                                 
101 Pp. 8-11 discuss the metaphysics of space rather than space perception.  
102 In a 1688 letter to Locke, Molyneux had asked whether someone born blind who had 
learned to distinguish a globe from a cube by touch would, if sight were surgically restored, 
then be able to distinguish the globe from the cube using vision only. This came to be known 
as “Molyneux’s problem,” and Berkeley answered in the negative. This problem was an 
important topic of psychological and philosophical discussion in the 18th and 19th centuries, 
especially when accounts of the first real cases of surgically-restored sight began to be 
published. Some accounts supported an affirmative answer to the question, some supported 
a negative answer (Degenaar and Lokhorst 2005). James’s discussion of surgically-restored 
sight came in connection with his discussion of Molyneux’s problem. James wrote that “too 
much has been made of” cases where eyesight has been restored, “but so far as they go, they 
go against Berkeley” (p. 36). As we will see in Chapter Four, a cornerstone of James’s 
theory of space perception is that we have an innate ability to perceive distance—so he 
sharply disagreed with Berkeley. In Philosophy 5, James seems to have taught that those 
cases where newly-sighted patients could not recognize shapes visually—those cases that 
would support Berkeley’s view—are to be dismissed, because such patients “are mostly 
young, or ignorant, & even unable to express themselves” (p. 36). I should note that the 
context of this last remark is somewhat opaque in Black’s notes; I have provided context on 
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Similarly, James’s list of suggested thesis topics is also remarkable for the way 
he co-mingled empirical issues with (what we are now likely to regard as) 
straightforwardly philosophical ones. He apparently thought the student of Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume might naturally write a thesis on sleep and dreams, on the 
spinal chord, on phrenology, on aphasia, on the question of which areas of the brain 
control which psychological functions, on Fechner’s psycho-physical law, on the 
amount of time taken by various mental processes (the study of which was 
popularized by so-called “brass-instrument” psychologists like Wundt), on space 
perception, on the difference between sensation and perception, on illusions and 
hallucinations, on the association of ideas, on animal cognition, and on the analysis of 
character types. Like Robertson, James apparently regarded LBH as paving the way 
for a new empirical philosophy in which psychology—the scientific study of mind—
was to play a starring role. 
A potential objection arises here. Perhaps James saw this list of thesis topics as 
relevant to Philosophy 5 students not so much because they were studying Locke, 
Berkeley, and Hume per se, but because many may have been philosophy majors 
expected to write a thesis on something of philosophical interest, eventually. If this 
is the case, then we should not read the list as a summary of issues in which James 
thought students of LBH might be interested. 
This objection cannot be decisively refuted, but it can be minimized. James 
went on in his Phil 5 lectures to discuss many of the topics in this list, including 
many of the proposed “Psychology” thesis topics. To be sure, not all topics were 
taken up. He did not, at least according to Black’s record (note that Black missed 
several lectures), discuss sleep and dreams, or the sensory functions of the spinal 
cord, or phrenology, for example. However he did discuss the perception of space 
repeatedly and at length (pp. 6, 8-11, 18, 33-40, as I have mentioned). He also 
discussed “the eternal world of idealism” (pp. 33, 47, 52-53), sensation versus 
perception (p. 7), nominalism, conceptualism, and realism (pp. 3-4, 40-41, 45), and 
                                                                                                                                       
the basis of historically-common nativist responses to such cases (for more on which, see 
Degenaar and Lokhorst 2005). 
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the question of whether mathematical and geometric axioms can be derived from 
experience (pp. 10, 32), for example. 
There is one final issue we must glean from these student notes. One issue 
James continually took up was whether the mind has a native structure, and if so 
whether that structure furnishes necessary truth about reality. Or, to use the 
Kantian phrase, James often sought to mark differences over the question of 
synthetic a priori knowledge. For example, on the third class meeting, James used 
this issue to situate Locke with respect to other philosophers and historical 
movements. The following table appears in Black’s notes (p. 4): 
 Lockean 
Pre-
Kantian 
Apriorist 
Kant Spencer 
Has the 
mind a 
structure? 
Not a 
native 
Yes, 
native 
Yes, 
native 
Yes, native 
If so, 
whence is it 
derived? 
After birth 
from 
experience 
God God 
Ancestral 
experience 
Does it 
thereby 
foretell truth? 
partially Yes Yes Yes 
If so, 
what truth? 
Probable 
particular 
future 
experiences 
Eternal 
necessary 
truth 
Our 
necessary 
phenomenal 
experiences 
Only our 
own 
phenomenal 
experiences 
The bottom row of this table will prove important for understanding James’s 
thinking about the English tradition. In James’s published work, a key commitment 
of what he called “empiricism” was the denial that the mind had a structure from 
which we can glean truth about “our necessary phenomenal experiences,” as Kant 
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held (James 1879b, 87; James 1983, 82). In other words, the essence of empiricism 
(at least in some of James’s moods) is the denial of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
James presented this conception of empiricism to his class, as well. Black’s 
notes from early December show that James lectured on “the dispute between 
Empiricist and Apriorist” over whether the mind has a native structure that 
furnishes necessary truths. On James’s view, everyone must admit that “the mind 
has some structure.” Even the empiricist admits this point. What distinguishes the 
empiricist is that he or she rejects the further claim that the mind has “innate 
propositions or principles” that furnish necessary truth. He used Kant as the chief 
example of an a priorist (pp. 27-29).  
Unlike on our contemporary interpretation of empiricism, James taught that 
“the question of Innate Ideas” is “not important” for understanding Locke’s legacy. 
This question is misleading because whatever Locke’s intentions, he was in the end 
forced to accept a native structure for the mind (Green made a similar point in the 
“Introduction”). James cited Locke’s Essay, IV.7 as “full of admissions that the 
mind does have a structure….” What really distinguished Locke was his view that 
the mind only perceives “particulars,” never “generals” (p. 4).  
James revisited the issue of the mind’s native structure once again in January. 
He compared different philosophers in their views on what binds all our various 
experiences together into a perception of one stable reality. The Scholastics, Kant, 
Berkeley, Hume and Mill, Neo-Kantians, and Rosmini were contrasted. Rosmini 
and Kant agreed that the “mortar” of reality is some native mental form (38).   
To conclude my observations about Black’s class notes, James lectured on topics 
ranging from synthetic a priori knowledge to the concept of infinity to the viability of 
nominalism. Certainly, James’s interpretation of the British philosophical tradition is 
far more complex than simply taking Locke, Berkeley, and Hume to be characters 
only important for the way they connected philosophical speculation with the 
empirical study of mind, or for the way they provide a “protest” against 19th-century 
Idealism. However, it is clear from these notes that one reason James held LBH to be 
historically important is that they undertook philosophy from an empirical starting 
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point. This sentiment comes through particularly clearly in James’s discussion of 
Berkeley. Though he rejected Berkeley’s idealism, James greatly admired 
philosophers who brought empirical results to bear on philosophical issues.  
How accurate are these notes as a record of what James was actually teaching? 
Might these notes reflect merely the whims of their author, a college student at the 
time? There are two pieces of evidence that suggest these student notes give a 
reliable record of James’s lectures. First, consider the following. On one page of 
Black’s notes, the main ideas of an earlier lecture are repeated. When Black later 
typed these notes for inclusion in the Houghton Archive, he appended a short 
explanation to the repeated passage:  
The repetition in the above notes are probably due to the fact that James would 
occasionally dictate a restatement of matters which he wished put down in the precise 
wording in which he gave them. R.W.B. (p. 59) 
James expected his students to take down his lectures with precision. Of course, 
Black wrote that James only “occasionally” gave exact dictations for his students. 
Still, a professor who occasionally gave exact dictations is a professor who probably 
held his students responsible for learning the material about which he was lecturing 
in close detail. So this suggests that Black would have been expected to take down 
in notes an accurate record of James’s lectures. 
One might still wonder whether Black was a strong enough student to fulfill that 
expectation. There is evidence that he was. James actually footnoted Black in the 
Principles (PP, 964-965.n), which was published five years after Black’s notes were 
written. In the footnote, James quoted approvingly and at length from one of Black’s 
student essays. That James thought Black a competent enough student to warrant 
this reference suggests that Black would have been one of James’s very strong 
pupils. This vote of confidence does not mean Black’s notes give us a perfect 
transcript of James’s lectures; but it suggests the notes were at least taken by a 
competent student.  
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In any case, James’s own lecture notes are not preserved from any class in 
which the main texts were Locke, Berkeley, and Hume.103 So we simply have no 
better resource than Black’s notes if we want insight into how James taught about 
the British tradition.  
 
Although James did not publish histories of the British tradition, he did use the 
word “empiricism” throughout his career. I will now investigate these usages. In this 
subsection, I ask what connotation the word had when James first learned it. 
The word “empiricism” perhaps had more currency among American 
philosophers during the 1870s than among British philosophers (see Section Seven, 
this chapter, above). James used the word in his own notebooks and writings during 
this period—but he used the word freely, in association with many different 
philosophic positions and historic figures. 
Perry convincingly argued that an important source of James’s use of 
“empiricism” to classify philosophers is David Masson (RBP, I.497, 574). Masson 
was known as an essayist and historian of literature. He gave a series of public 
lectures at the Royal Institute in 1865 on British philosophy, and these were 
published in America the following year. For James, who never had a formal 
education in philosophy, this book was one of his early introductory texts.  
James found the book in his father’s personal library. Perry wrote that in 
James’s notes from the early 1870s,  
Masson’s classifications constantly appear: his use of terms such as ‘experientialism’ 
and ‘nihilism’; [and] his recognition of the ‘psychological difference’ that divides an 
empiricist like Mill from a transcendentalist like Carlyle or Hamilton, over the 
question of the nature of mind and the source of its ideas …. (RBP, I.574) 
Though Perry did not put “empiricist” and “transcendentalist” in quotes, these were 
Masson’s actual terms. Masson used those two words to denote a fundamental split 
in the history of philosophy. The split actually does line up with that between LBH 
and DSL. I will now look at Masson’s usage. 
                                                 
103 See (ML, 177-178) for James’s lecture notes from Phil 5: Psychology (1880-1881). The 
notes span less than a page, and do not mention Locke, Berkeley, or Hume. 
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Masson began by arguing that philosophers may be divided according to their 
Psychological Theory, their Cosmology, or their Ontology. Masson saw the main 
Psychological disagreement as concerning the source of ideas (Masson 1866, 36). 
“Empiricists,” such as Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume (Masson 1866, 40-41), 
held that the source of all ideas is experience. This group held that since it is a 
contingent matter which experiences (and thus ideas) one actually has, there are no 
necessary truths.   
Masson called the opponents of this group “transcendentalists” or 
“intuitionalists,” such as Clarke, Butler, Descartes, Spinoza, Malebranche, and 
Leibnitz (Masson 1866, 43). This side held that there are ideas “the origin or reason 
of which transcends or lies beyond the horizon of historical conditions” (Masson 
1866, 39-40).  
This division seems not to have been standard in 1865. When introducing the 
word “Empiricism,” Masson acknowledged that the word was imperfect, because it 
“unfortunately has opprobrious connotations,” but used it anyway to characterize 
LBH (Masson 1866, 38). I cannot find an earlier English-language philosopher who 
used “empiricism” this way.  However, the meaning of the term did not become 
standard with Masson. We saw in my previous chapter that Green and Caird 
seemed oblivious to Masson’s classificatory scheme.  
Masson’s classification seems very much like CIE, except for one thing. The 
division of philosophers into groups with different “psychological theories” (viz., into 
“empiricists” and “intuitionalists”) was not the only, or even the most important way 
Masson had for dividing philosophers. He also divided philosophers according to 
their cosmologies and according to their ontologies. Compared to the division 
according to psychological theories, the perennial differences in cosmology were 
more important. This was because having a theory of psychology was a “luxury,” 
while everyone had a theory of cosmology, even if not fully articulated (Masson 
1866, 53-54). Masson spent the most space discussing ontology, because it was the 
most encompassing area of philosophy (Masson 1866, 70-141). 
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James puzzled over Masson’s terminology—especially “transcendentalist” and 
“empiricist”—in a notebook entitled “Miscellanea I: Mostly Concerning 
Empiricism,” dated 1870-1873. The chief issue separating these schools on James’s 
reading was the question of whether experience had a necessary structure—a 
departure from Masson’s own description of these two traditions. The only historical 
figures James named were Mill and Hamilton. Presumably, Mill would have been 
the empiricist, Hamilton the transcendentalist, though James’s view is not explicitly 
given (MEN, 133-135). The notebook continued with James associating with “the 
Empiricist” the rejection of the principle of sufficient reason (MEN, 136). James 
also wrote that empiricists deny that words like “Nothing,” “Absolute,” “Infinite,” 
“Noumenon,” and “Unknowable” represent anything real, because they are “never 
immediately found in Experience” (MEN, 139). This sounds like he attributed 
something like the reality principle to those he called “empiricists”—only ideas 
drawn directly from experience are real. 
James’s surviving notebooks written during the 1870s show continual use of 
“empiricism,” though many of James’s musings there were unfocused. He rarely 
named particular philosophers when he used the word in his published writings 
during this decade.104 At the end of the decade, James published “The Sentiment of 
Rationality” in Mind, and used “English empiricism” in connection with 
nominalism, and with the denial that there are any necessary truths about nature. 
He there connected the word to Bain, J. S. Mill, and Renouvier. 
In short, James borrowed Masson’s word “empiricism” during the 1870s. But 
James used the word in connection with a variety of figures and topics. The figures 
included Bain, Mill, and Renouvier. The topics included nominalism, the causal 
source of ideas of reality, and the question of whether experience has a necessary 
structure. 
 
                                                 
104 He did refer to Chauncey Wright as an “empiricist” (MEN, 300). Wright was “a worker 
on the path opened by Hume, and a treatise on psychology written by him … would 
probably have been the last and most accomplished utterance of what he liked to call the 
British school” (James 1875).  
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James also used the phrase “empiricism” in publications as well (for examples, 
the earliest dating to 1873, see James 1987, 266, 300, 313, 322). In this subsection, 
I will review James’s published usages that echo Masson’s definition. More 
importantly, I will also show that James adapted Masson’s notion of “empiricism” to 
characterize the position or school Green had sought to discredit.  
First, consider one striking example of James echoing Masson’s terminology. 
The example comes in “Absolutism and Empiricism,” an 1884 response to J. S. 
Haldane in Mind.105 Haldane’s article was an idealist-flavored piece published in 
January 1884, in the wake of Green’s “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?” 
James opened the article by using Masson’s distinction between “empiricism” and 
“transcendentalism” to characterize the fight that had finally broken out in earnest 
in Mind: 
No seeker of truth can fail to rejoice at the terre-à-terre sort of discussion of the issues 
between Empiricism and Transcendentalism (or, as the champions of the latter would 
probably prefer to say, between Irrationalism and Rationalism) that seems to have 
begun in Mind. It would seem as if, over concrete examples like Mr. J. S. Haldane, 
both parties ought inevitably to come to a better understanding. As a reader with a 
strong bias toward Irrationalism, I have studied his article … with the liveliest 
admiration ….  (James 1884a, 281) 
In this example, we see that James used “Empiricism” and “Transcendentalism” to 
mark the two camps involved in a debate in Mind. This example is interesting 
because James was still using Masson’s distinction after Green’s arrival in Mind.  
Is there evidence that James interpreted Green’s attack in terms of this 
Massonian distinction? James did characterize Green’s targets as “empiricists,” 
though it is not clear to what extent he had Masson’s distinction in mind (EPs, 162).  
There is an interesting piece of marginalia where James used the word 
“empiricism” in connection with Green. It suggests that James also associated the 
word with Green’s targets, though in perhaps a surprising way. “Empiricism” also 
meant, for James, a philosophical method of giving parts explanatory priority over 
wholes. The marginalia is found in the third installment of Green’s “Can There Be a 
                                                 
105 At this point, James has already published two attacks on Green in Mind—“On Some 
Omissions of Introspective Psychology,” and “On Some Hegelisms.” 
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Natural Science of Man?” James simply wrote “empiricism” next to a passage 
where Green suggests that the individual facts of the world can only be explained in 
virtue of their position in the Absolute. James did not mean that Green was an 
empiricist, but that this passage speaks to the issue of empiricism.106 James later 
gave a similar definition of “empiricism” in (James 1911/1979, 24). 
There are several instances later in James’s career when he would reflect on the 
importance of the debates Green sparked in Mind, particularly those about space, 
for his own intellectual development. Towards the end of his life, James recalled that 
the revived Metaphysical Club “almost invariably wound up with a quarrel about 
space perception” (quoted at Fisch 1986a, 138). In 1909, James reflected on his 
early struggles with Green:  
Years ago, when T. H. Green’s ideas were most influential, I was much troubled by his 
criticisms of english [sic] sensationalism. One of his disciples in particular [Fisch claims 
James is talking about J. E. Cabot, here] would always say to me, “Yes! terms may 
indeed be possibly sensational in origin; but relations, what are they but pure acts of 
the intellect coming upon the sensations from above, and of a higher nature?” Well, I 
remember the sudden relief it gave me to perceive one day that space-relations at any 
rate were homogeneous with the terms between which they mediated. The terms were 
spaces, and the relations were other intervening spaces. (James 1909/1978, 79)107 
There is no mystery about the period to which James is alluding, when Green’s 
influence was at its height. Green achieved international fame in 1874, with his 
“Introduction”, and he died in 1882. So it was during this period that James was 
grappling with Green’s attack on English “sensationalism.” Note that James’s 
                                                 
106 The passage can be found at (Green and Bradley 1882, 333-334):  
Human action is only explicable by the action of an eternal consciousness, which uses 
them as its organs and reproduces itself through them. The question why there should 
be this reproduction, is indeed as unanswerable as every form of the question, why the 
world as a whole should be what it is. Why any detail of the world is what it is, we can 
explain by reference to other details which determine it; but why the whole should be 
what it is, why the mind which the world implies should exhibit itself in a world at all, 
why it should make certain processes of that world organic to a reproduction of itself 
under limitations which the use of such organs involves--these are questions which, 
owing perhaps to those very limitations, we are equally unable to avoid asking and to 
answer. 
James’s marginalia is found on p. 333. See WJP Phil 22.4.6*—cited by permission of the 
Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
107 Fisch’s claim that James is referring to Cabot can be found at (Fisch 1986a, 149).  
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breakthrough—the breakthrough we will explore in Chapter Four—came in thinking 
about space perception. 
Also, when James presented his philosophy as a form of “revised empiricism,” 
he typically cited Green’s role as the leader of Idealism, the school with which 
empiricism is to be contrasted:  
By the time T. H. Green began at Oxford, the generation seemed to feel as if it had fed 
on the chopped straw of psychology and of associationism long enough …. Green’s 
great point of attack was the disconnectedness of the reigning english [sic] 
sensationalism. Relating was the great intellectual activity for him, and the key to this 
relating was believed by him to lodge itself at last in what most of you know as Kant’s 
unity of apperception, transformed into a living spirit of the world. … Hence a great 
disdain for empiricism of the sensationalist sort has always characterized this school of 
thought …. But now there are signs of its giving way to a wave of revised empiricism. I 
confess that I should be glad to see this latest wave prevail; so—the sooner I am frank 
about it the better—I hope to have my voice counted in its favor as one of the results of 
this lecture-course.” (James 1909/1977, 8-9, my emphasis on “revised empiricism”) 
The fact that much of A Pluralistic Universe—published in 1909—is dedicated to 
refuting Idealism shows what an enduring theme this was in James’s career.  
10.  TENSIONS WITH SECONDARY LITERATURE 
One of my claims about James—that the attempt to resist Idealists like Green 
and Caird shaped James’s own work in philosophy and psychology—stands in 
tension with three themes in the James literature. For one thing, James is often read 
as making a clean break from modern philosophy, not as someone who sought to 
carry that tradition forward by responding to criticisms of it. For another, much of 
the literature on James is preoccupied by a struggle to give a “one world” reading 
that systematizes all of James’s work on disparate topics. I deliberately resist giving 
an over-arching view of James, so I might be accused of presenting a view that 
cannot be sustained on a more systematic reading. Finally, scholars who do attend to 
James’s early work vis à vis neo-Kantian and -Hegelian philosophy actually present 
James as himself some variety of Kantian. I will take each objection in turn. 
The first trend in James scholarship with which my work is in tension is a trend 
created largely by Richard Rorty. Rorty is responsible for a dominant view of classic 
American philosophy. This view holds that James and Dewey were, above all, 
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philosophical radicals. They are supposed to have been critics who taught us to 
abandon modern philosophy, not to repair it. They allegedly refused to engage with 
central problems of modern philosophy—especially with the problem of finding what 
Rorty calls “a general theory of representation” (Rorty 1979, 3). 
Rorty thinks pragmatists see modern philosophy as a dead-end literary genre 
invented by Plato. This genre has  
outlived its usefulness. This does not mean that [pragmatists] … have a new, non-
Platonic set of answers to Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they do not think 
we should ask those questions anymore (Rorty 1987, 27). 
Rorty’s favorite pragmatists are James and Dewey (Rorty 1987, 31). The suggestion 
is that these trailblazers did not try to solve modern philosophical problems, 
particularly those concerning representation; they rejected those problems as not 
worthy of attention.  
According to Rorty, logical positivists unfortunately wrested control from 
pragmatists in the 1940s and 50s (Rorty 1982a, 160, 214-215). This plunged 
American philosophy back to the bad old days of taking questions about 
representation seriously—especially questions about scientific representation (Rorty 
1987, 29).  
Rorty’s view is truly dominant. For example, in the introduction to a leading 
anthology, John Stuhr refers to classic American philosophers’ 
wholesale rejection of the central problems of modern philosophy…. Classical 
American philosophers, that is, did not attempt to provide better answers to traditional 
problems … as much as they sought to dissolve, dismiss, and undercut these problems 
altogether …. (Stuhr 2000, 3) 
Again, pragmatists are portrayed as having been radicals more interested in turning 
their back on traditional philosophical problems than in solving them. 
Stuhr’s view echoes a theme from Cornel West: 
… American pragmatism is less a philosophical tradition putting forward solutions to 
perennial problems in the Western philosophical conversation initiated by Plato and 
more a continuous cultural commentary or set of interpretations that attempt to 
explain America to itself at a particular historical moment. (West 1989, 5)  
Stuhr and West agree that pragmatists did not try to solve traditional problems. 
Stuhr suggests that pragmatists attempted to “dissolve, dismiss, or undercut” those 
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problems. West holds that pragmatism’s positive project was really to give a cultural 
commentary on America. For a similar narrative, see (Seigfried 1990, 21).108 
I think this view of classic pragmatism is misleading. It is true that James and 
Dewey were both radical in their own ways. But James, at least, was considerably 
less radical than the prevailing view would have it. Far from abandoning the 
Lockean tradition, or ignoring Green’s polemic against it, James developed an 
interesting and detailed defense. To be sure, James wanted to revise Lockean 
philosophy. But against Rorty, James wanted to salvage what he saw as the 
legitimate core of the Lockean project—the goal of building a science of mind that 
would enrich philosophical discourse. 
Rorty’s view is not entirely indefensible, admittedly. One certainly finds rhetoric 
in some of Dewey’s work (e.g., Dewey 1920) that suggests a radical break with 
tradition. And even in James, one occasionally finds such rhetoric.109 For example, 
James characterized Papini’s pragmatism—approvingly—as a project that cried 
“farewell to the past of philosophy” (James 1906, 338).  
But we must guard against reading James through the lens of Dewey—and 
through a selective reading of Dewey at that. Indeed, when one looks past the 
quotable lines in James, one often finds far more constructive ambitions to engage 
traditional philosophy than people like Rorty imagine. For instance, when one 
pursues James’s reference to Papini, one finds that bidding “farewell” to past 
philosophy only meant that Papini endorsed a decidedly traditional commitment—
nominalism. Papini bid farewell, it seems, only to Platonism about universals.  
I doubt there is any single piece of evidence that could adjudicate my 
disagreement with Rorty. However, I can say this much. Surely, Rorty would not 
accuse Green or Bradley of being philosophical radicals in the sense of being people 
                                                 
108 One rarely finds Peirce, James, and Dewey read alongside the modern philosophical 
tradition with which, in my view, they were actually engaged. But c.f. pre-Rorty works like 
(RBP ;Thayer 1968). 
109 One does not find such rhetoric in Peirce, though. Misak emphasizes that Rorty is 
pursuing a strand of pragmatism that owes primarily to James. In fact, she argues that Rorty 
sometimes pursues ideas James’s critics read into Pragmatism, ideas from which James 
actually distanced himself (Misak Forthcoming). 
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who abandoned the questions of modern philosophy. I will argue that James’s own 
philosophy and psychology were directly shaped by his wrestling with Idealist 
arguments. So Rorty’s view will be relatively undermined to whatever degree I 
succeed in establishing this dialectical connection between James and Idealists. 
The second trend in James scholarship with which my work is in tension has 
been an ongoing argument about how to find a consistent, “one-world 
interpretation” that makes James’s main published writing come out as articulating 
one systematic doctrine. For literature on the unity of James’s thought, see for 
example (Cooper 1990; Cooper 2002; Gale 2004; Gale 2005; Gale and Myers 
1999; Pawelski 2003; Schlecht 2001).110 The search for a one-world interpretation 
has resulted in an excessively internalistic view (in the historian’s sense) of James, 
where the goal is to show how all the very different things James wrote about 
philosophy, psychology, religion, and even parapsychology relate systematically to 
one another.  
This trend is pernicious because James never took himself to be creating a 
system—he preferred to approach problems in a piecemeal way, like the scientist he 
was. Of course James was interested in consistency. But he tended to solve 
particular problems, and then to worry about how his views on diverse topics fit 
together only later. So the search for an overarching Jamesean system can be an 
interesting excursus; but it does not reflect James’s own intentions. 
Moreover, for those interested in James’s actual historical impact, the question 
of how to reconcile all his diverse views is not very important, except insofar as those 
he influenced were engaged in such a reconciling project themselves. But in the 
pantheon of those influenced by James, the reconcilers came to dominate James 
scholarship only recently. For example, the mania for new forms of realism in the 
1910s and 1920s took off largely from the popularity of just one of James’s essays 
(James 1904)—see (De Waal 2001, xxiv). Of course, one need not read James with 
                                                 
110 The phrase “one-world interpretation” is due to Gale’s 1999, a valuable work despite its 
reconciling ambitions. 
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the goal of understanding his historical impact. But then we must be careful not to 
substitute our own, rationally-reconstructed James for James the historical actor. 
Here is the third trend in James scholarship with which my work stands in 
tension. James’s early work is rarely read as a response to neo-Kantian or -Hegelian 
Idealism. While James’s later struggle with Royce’s brand of ‘idealism’ is well 
known, there are no available studies that show how James’s psychology and 
philosophy were seriously influenced by his early interactions with British 
Idealism.111 However, two historians do situate James’s early thought with respect to 
neo-Kantian philosophy, but they actually portray James himself as a Kantian 
(Kuklick 1977, 161, 272-164, 313n, 316-119; Kuklick 2001, 129-178; Murphey 
1968). Though this claim is now well known in American philosophy circles, its basis 
is actually very thin. Perhaps because neither Murphey nor Kuklick are primarily 
trained as philosophers, they end up with a conception of what it is to be a Kantian 
that is too simple. They both seem to hold that anyone who thinks the mind plays an 
active role in constructing perception deserves to be called a Kantian. As such, both 
Murphey and Kuklick regard the Kantian influence on James as established simply 
by the fact that the Jamesean mind is an active agent in constructing perception, not 
a tabula rasa as earlier empiricists had held.112  
                                                 
111 There is an important study of James’s relation to Bradley, but this book focuses 
primarily on James’s later work (Sprigge 1993). When Sprigge does write about the 
Principles, the focus is on the latter’s metaphysics, including his views on personal identity, 
free will, and the relationship between brain and mind (pp. 67-107)—topics I do not broach 
in this dissertation.   
112 Murphey claims that “…it was Kant who was the dominant influence upon the 
pragmatists” (Murphey 1968, 9). When it came to James, that influence is to be found in his 
psychology. On pp. 15-16, Murphey describes the Jamesean stream of consciousness in a 
long paragraph. He emphasizes that according to James’s view, when a subject parses the 
chaotic, raw data of sensation, “it is the mind which selects and chooses ….” The entire 
paragraph discusses James’s notion of a stream of thought, and then concludes with this 
cryptic remark: “James’s debt to idealism could not be clearer.” Without further argument, 
Murphey proceeds to treat James’s Kantianism as fully established. He later writes, 
presumably on the strength of the earlier paragraph: “…James … emphasize[d] the activity 
and constructive action of the mind in a manner which is profoundly indebted to Kant and 
the idealists.” Kuklick offers more historical details to bear out the claim that James was a 
Kantian, but these details appear to be irrelevant. “It is a sign of the Kantian orientation of 
much of James’s philosophizing that he began reading the Critique [of Pure Reason] at the 
time he was pouring over Renouvier” (Kuklick 1977, 161). True, James was deeply engaged 
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There are several reasons this view is not satisfactory. First, these historians are 
mistaken in thinking that Kant was the only philosopher who gave the mind an 
active role in constructing perception. For example, Thomas Reid—a philosopher 
well respected by James—also emphasized the constructive role of the mind.113 But 
Reid began publishing such theories in 1764—almost two decades before Kant’s 
critical turn. Reid should surely not be considered a Kantian. Similarly, although he 
was writing well after Kant, James developed a model of mind that happened also to 
emphasize constructive activity. But James also developed this model independently 
of any deep Kantian influence.  
Second, to bear out the claim that James was one of “Kant’s Children,” as 
Murphey puts it, one must have an account of the essence of Kant’s actual legacy. 
But we nowhere get such an account from the historians. One can find agreement 
between almost any two philosophers on some topic, if one really searches. This is 
not enough to show that two philosophers belong to the same school or tradition. At 
very least, establishing that two figures belong to the same tradition requires the 
following. One should show that a) the more recent philosopher had a view about 
the essence or central aspects of the older philosopher’s legacy, and b) that the more 
recent philosopher was actually sympathetic to that legacy. 
In point of fact, we do have a record of what James held to be the essence of the 
Kantian position. Unfortunately for the historians, by James’s own criterion, he is 
clearly not a Kantian. In a passage we will have cause to consider in greater detail 
(see below p. 278), James wrote: 
                                                                                                                                       
with Renouvier’s philosophy. But the fact that James read Kant at the same time he read 
Renouvier really shows nothing about James’s judgments about Kant. Later in the book, 
Kuklick claims that it is late in James’s career that his latent Kantianism really blooms (pp. 
273-274). There, the “Kantianism” ascribed to James has two components. The first 
component mirrors Murphey’s view. James gave the mind an active role in constructing our 
perception of reality. The second component is that Kuklick infers that James believed in a 
“Ding an sich” about which we could know nothing. The evidence seems sketchy to me, but 
in any case my main criticism still holds. James held the essence of Kantianism to be a 
positive answer to the question, is there synthetic a priori knowledge. James expressly 
denies that there is such knowledge (EPs, 82), as we will see below, in Chapter Four.  
113 Thomas Reid argued that the mind plays an active role in constructing perception in 
(Reid 1764/1997; Reid 1785/2002). See (Wolterstorff 2001, 74-76). 
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The mere innateness of the spatial form of sensibility is surely not the essence of the 
Kantian position. Every sensationalist empiricist must admit a wealth of native forms 
of sensibility. The important question is: Do they, or do they not, yield us a priori 
propositions, synthetic judgments? (EPs, 82) 
This passage says that the “essence of the Kantian position” is not the view that the 
mind has native categories—categories it uses to construct perception. The essence 
of Kantianism is one’s answer to the question, is there or is there not synthetic a 
priori knowledge? As we will see in Chapter Four, James answered with a 
resounding negative.  
If there remains any doubt about whether James took himself to be a Kantian, 
one should note that James constantly discouraged his peers even from taking Kant 
seriously. For example, he wrote: 
The true line of philosophic progress lies, in short, it seems to me, not so much through 
Kant as round him to the point where now we stand. … Kant’s mind is the rarest and 
most intricate of all possible antique bric-a-brac museums, and connoisseurs and 
dilettanti will always wish to visit it and see the wondrous and racy contents. The 
temper of the dear old man about his work is perfectly delectable. And yet he is really 
… at bottom a mere curio, a ‘specimen.’ (James 1907/1975, 269) 
Here is another colorful example: 
The whole lesson of Kantian and post-Kantian speculation is, it seems to me, the 
lesson of simplicity. With Kant, complication both of thought and statement was an 
inborn infirmity, enhanced by the musty academicism of his Königsberg existence. 
With Hegel it was a raging fever. Terribly, therefore, do the sour grapes which these 
fathers of philosophy have eaten set our teeth on edge. (PP, 346) 
The Kantian reading must contend with James’s own plentiful and unequivocal 
repudiations of Kant. It will require an ingenious argument to show that despite 
these protests, James ought nevertheless to be called a Kantian himself. I do not 
think any such argument can be proffered.114 
Kuklick does acknowledge passages like these (at Kuklick 1977, 316-319). In 
response, he adduces three reasons why James should nevertheless be counted as a 
Kantian. First, though James repudiated Kant’s notion that one can neatly separate 
thought’s content from its form, this repudiation was consistent with 
                                                 
114 I note that Perry called Kantian idealism James’s “favorite philosophical enemy,” (RBP 
I.711). I will have more to say about James and the Kantian tradition in Chapters Four and 
Five.  
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transcendentalists like Royce and Bradley, who are clear followers of Kant (P. 318). 
Second, James allegedly acted like a Kantian, in the following sense. He presented 
his own pragmatism as a way to mediate between “rationalism” and “empiricism”—
“and this was exactly Kant’s historic role” (p. 317). James allegedly sought to 
“answer … Hume’s skepticism” by combine empiricism’s epistemology with 
rationalism’s religious tendencies, thereby attempting to perform “a Kantian task a 
hundred years after Kant” (p. 318). Third, the “Continental rationalists were more 
interested in science and mathematics than were the British empiricists[.] … Kant 
carried on this interest” (p. 319). Thus, to be a philosopher interested in science is, 
for Kuklick, to be a Kantian.  
The first argument mistakenly assumes that being part of a particular 
philosophical tradition is a matter of holding some view or other that is consistent 
with the views of people who work in the tradition in question. This cannot be 
correct. It would be difficult to find a philosopher in the late 19th century who did not 
hold some view that, taken by itself, is consistent with views held by unequivocal 
Kantians like Royce and Bradley. Kuklick would need to specify some core 
commitment of the Kantian tradition that James endorsed—and even then, 
Kuklick’s view would contradict James’s own judgment about the essence of 
Kantianism, as we have seen. The second argument rests on a similar mistake. 
Unless the essence of being a Kantian were that one attempts to mediate between 
empiricism and rationalism, this is not a good basis on which to class James as a 
Kantian. Again, James clearly did not recognize this as the essence of Kantian 
philosophy. The third argument contradicts a view I’ve argued for at length in this 
chapter—that the very idea of a British Empiricist tradition is itself the product of 
arguments over a science of mind. Those hopeful about mental science allied 
themselves with Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, after Green had gathered these three 
together as totems for psychology. Those who saw themselves as carrying the 
Kantian torch, indeed, opposed psychology—the science for which James became 
famous. Although Kuklick provides invaluable insights on the role of professionalism 
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in the development of American philosophy, we must reject his claim that James 
was fundamentally working in the tradition of Kant. 
 
Some of the best work on James over the last half-century has come from 
philosophically-minded historians, and historians of science. Much of this work has 
placed James in a social or institutional context.115 But the philosophers who have 
treated William James have, almost without exception, failed to write about him 
with enough historical nuance, in my view. The result is an odd, composite portrait 
of James. The historians often portray him as a man with his finger on the pulse of 
America, a philosopher who exquisitely reflects his social circumstances;116 but the 
philosophers portray him as a man whose work seems not to be embedded in any 
distinctive context, except perhaps in the context of Peirce and Dewey’s respective 
pragmatisms. (As we have seen, West’s reading stands in a middle ground, 
presenting James and Dewey as cultural critics.)  
Is this oversight justified? Or ought we to read James as the sort of philosopher 
who responded to a wide range of work, not just to cultural currents of Late 
Victorian America? And more specifically, ought we to read James as having been 
engaged with the Idealists I focus on in this dissertation?  
                                                 
115 Some good examples include (Cotkin 1994; Menand 2001; Wilson 1990). Excellent work 
on James in the context of the history of psychology include (Croce 1995; Leary 1990; Leary 
1995; Leary 1997; Leary 2002; Leary 2003; Reed 1997, chapter 11; Richards 1987, Capter 
Nine). Also see fn. 194, below, for a broader review of literature on James from historians of 
psychology, much of it very good. Among my favorite philosophically-minded historians is 
Bruce Kuklick, whose (Kuklick 1977) remains among the finest history available of the 
“golden era” of American philosophy—even despite the mistakes about Kant’s legacy. Ignas 
Skrupskelis must be mentioned, who probably knows more than anyone about James’s 
surviving manuscripts. He has worked as an editor on the Works of William James, and as 
such the modest length of the list of his James scholarship understates his impact on the field. 
I cite several of his articles where relevant, in this dissertation. Finally, an older generation 
of historians set high standards for such research—one must mention Murray Murphey, 
Philip Wiener (Murphey 1968; Wiener 1949), and above all Max Fisch (Ketner and Kloesel 
1986), especially (Fisch 1986a; Fisch 1986b).  
116 The passage I quoted from West, above, is an example of this view. Also see (Hollinger 
1980). 
 144  
One factor that has prevented philosophers from paying serious attention to the 
context in which James worked is that on just about any page James ever wrote, one 
finds so many references to other intellectuals. Most of these intellectuals are now 
forgotten, and they worked in fields ranging from poetry to biology to psychical 
research. Contemporary scholars seem to react by not chasing down any of the 
references. This is actually not as bad a strategy as it sounds. Who was Edward 
Gurney or Mary Baker Eddy or Fitz-James Stephen? Since James’ writing is 
littered with references to forgotten intellectuals, it is difficult to choose any one set 
of interlocutors that stand to shed light on the central thrust of James’s philosophy. 
For example, many (e.g., Hollinger 1985, ch. 1; Kitcher 2004) rest content with 
recasting the entirety of the Varieties and the “Will to Believe” as a polemic against 
Clifford and Huxley. These are easy interlocutors to pluck from the “Will to 
Believe,” but they are two interlocutors among many who spurred James’s thought. 
Perhaps these figures have been cherry-picked because their reputations have 
survived for independent reasons. In any case, the result is the same—James is 
portrayed as a philosopher who wrestled with questions that come from a very 
narrow band of acquaintances, most of them American.  
If philosophers would give up the urge to find systematic readings that make 
sense of all of James’s thought in one swoop, they might free themselves to 
investigate his detailed responses to particular interlocutors on individual topics.117 
My goal is more modest. I am interested specifically in James’s empiricism. I 
hope to have convinced the reader that to understand James’s empiricism, one must 
investigate his reaction to early British Idealists like T. H. Green and Edward Caird. 
I do not claim that James’s entire career should be read as single-mindedly devoted 
to refuting Green and Caird.  
                                                 
117 Here and there, one finds welcome exceptions, often from historians of psychology. (Viney 
1997) investigates James’s debt to Lequyer and Renouvier on the topic of free will; (Conant 
1997) is a philosophical piece on James’s argument with Royce over absolute idealism; (High 
1981; High 1982; Pastore 1981) is a helpful debate over the relationship between James and 
Shadworth Hodgson on space, to offer a few examples. 
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In any case, it is to the British Idealists’ substantive criticisms to which I now 
turn. 
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Chapter Three 
Green against Hume:  
Space Perception and the Intelligibility of  Sensations 
1.  INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO 
What part of our spatial perceptions comes directly from sensation, and what 
part is contributed by the mind itself? Green argued that a crucial flaw in proto-
empiricism was that it could not give an intelligible answer. The difficulty stems from 
two of proto-empiricism’s core commitments. First, Berkeley and Hume maintained 
that perceptions are ultimately made up of sensory atoms. Second, they also held 
that the distinction between illusion and reality matches the distinction between 
what the mind receives from sensation and what it creates in thought. This puts 
proto-empiricists in a bind concerning perceived spatial relations. If our perceptions 
are fundamentally atomic, then spatial relations between those atoms must be 
added, somehow, by the mind. But by proto-empiricists’ own lights, this would make 
spatial relations (like being to the left or right of, above or below) nothing but 
mental fictions—an embarrassment, especially given the robust role of observable 
spatial properties in many scientific theories. 
In this chapter, I turn to the philosophical details of Idealist attacks on proto-
empiricism, and thereby on empirical psychology. The above argument was a 
centerpiece of the 1874 “Introduction” to Hume, in which Green hoped to 
demonstrate why Lockean philosophy, and the empirical psychology subsequently 
built upon it, had to be abandoned in favor a Kant-flavored alternative. In Section 
Two, I explain why space perception should have emerged as a central topic of the 
“Introduction.” In Section Three, I analyze Green’s attack on Hume’s account of 
the perception of spatial relations. This section is the heart of the chapter, because it 
lays out the most important arguments among those we will see James responding to 
in the next two chapters. In Section Four, I show that Green’s attack on Humean 
spatial perception was an instance of a general argument to the effect that no atomic 
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sensation could ever be intelligible to a subject, given basic commitments of proto-
empiricism. I focus on the general account of ideas first laid out by Locke.  
Note that in Section Three, I begin with Green’s attack on the more recent 
figure (Hume rather than Locke) and on the more specific criticism (of spatial ideas, 
rather than of ideas in general). I look at Locke and Green’s general criticism of the 
way of ideas only in Section Four. I use this strategy because I want to emphasize 
that Green’s attack on the proto-empiricist account of space stands on its own 
ground. One does not need to reject the entire proto-empiricist account of ideas in 
order to be persuaded that Green’s argument against Hume on space is troubling.  
In Section Five, I present another of Green’s important arguments, one central 
to his 1882 attack in Mind, “Can There Be a Natural Science of Man.” This 
argument sought to show that empirical psychologists could not make sense of their 
own scientific practice, because they had no way to distinguish between accurate 
and inaccurate perceptions. In other words, Green argued that proto-empiricists 
could not make sense of the normative component of scientific theories.  
I then turn from criticism of proto-empiricism to positive Idealist accounts of the 
mind, in order to give a sense of the alternative to empirical psychology on offer. In 
Section Six, I look at one such account from Edward Caird, another account with 
which James and his colleagues were also engaged. I conclude the chapter with a 
brief exposition of J. E. Cabot’s adaptation of Idealist criticisms. James’s own early 
work on space—the work to which I turn in Chapter Four—was written in direct 
response to Cabot.  
 
It has become a commonplace that the status of relations was a key element in 
Russell and Moore’s eventual break with Idealism. In particular, Russell and Moore 
rejected the claim that, since relational properties belong to an object’s essence, 
there are no entities short of the Absolute that are truly metaphysically 
independent.118  
                                                 
118 For two recent discussions on this topic, see (Fortier 1996; Hylton 1990, 106-116, 120-
127). 
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In this chapter, we will see that Green argued that relations were part of the 
basic fabric of reality, but could be supplied only by intellectual acts of perceivers. 
The result was that reality was supposed to be, in some deep sense, mental.  
Like Russell and Moore after the turn-of-the-century, James also responded to 
such claims. However, while Russell and Moore developed alternatives to both 
idealism and empiricism (Hylton 1990, 9, 130-132), James defended empiricism. 
And where Russell’s battleground on these issues was primarily that of logic and the 
nature of propositions, James carried out his reply in the realm of perceptual 
psychology. In this chapter, we will see in close detail why early mental scientists like 
James had to address Green’s influential arguments. 
2.  THE GOALS OF GREEN’S “INTRODUCTION” 119 
2.1 Goal: Show That There Can Be No Scientific Account of Science 
Green and his colleague Thomas Hodge Grose edited and reprinted Hume’s 
Treatise of Human Nature. The reprint (Hume 1739/1874) appeared in two 
volumes in 1874, with Green’s 373-page “Introduction” split between the two. If 
Green retains a reputation today, it is principally for his moral and political 
philosophy.120 However, he first achieved international fame with his lengthy 
“Introduction” to Hume, which was disproportionately focused on the latter’s 
psychology, epistemology, and metaphysics. To demonstrate that Green’s 
“Introduction” was focused on these subjects, I now offer a summary of the contents 
of each volume.  
The first volume of Green and Grose’s edition of the Treatise contained only 
Book I (“Of the Understanding”), along with over 80% of Green’s “Introduction.” 
This first installment of the “Introduction” placed Book I in the philosophical 
                                                 
119 The pagination of Green’s first “Introduction” is identical in Volume I of the Green and 
Grose edition of the Treatise, and in Volume I of Green’s Collected Works. Thus, where the 
context makes clear that I am citing Green’s first “Introduction,” I simply give a paragraph 
and page range. 
120 Witness the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy’s entry on Green, which is devoted to 
the latter’s social and political thought (Tyler 2003). The “Introduction” receives only one 
passing reference in this long entry. 
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context of Lockean philosophy. The second volume contained the Treatise’s Books 
II and III (“Of the Passions,” and “Of Morals”), the entire Dialogues Concerning 
Natural Religion, and the remaining 20% of Green’s introductory remarks, these 
devoted to Hume’s moral philosophy. The entire “Introduction” was reprinted 
posthumously in Green’s Collected Works, in 1894. 
The first “Introduction,” devoted to Book I, is where one finds Green’s most 
detailed criticism of Hume. True, Hume himself did not receive sustained discussion 
until page 161 of 299, more than halfway into the endeavor. That first half had been 
devoted to Locke and Berkeley. But the second “Introduction” also began by 
considering other figures—principally Locke, but Hobbes, Butler, and Hutcheson 
appear as well, among others—so that only about 39 pages (INT, 331-370) are 
there devoted principally to Hume’s moral philosophy. Even if one subtracts out the 
extended discussions of other philosophers, Green devoted almost four times as 
much space in his “Introduction” to Book I (138 pages, or 78%) than to Books II 
and III (39 pages, or 22%).  
 
I claimed in Chapter One (above) that a main goal of the “Introduction” was to 
attack the philosophical foundations of empirical psychology. In this section and the 
next, I will provide more detailed evidence in support of my reading.  
Commentators typically look to §§1-5 for a quick overview of Green’s intentions 
in the “Introduction.” The picture drawn from those opening paragraphs is 
distorted. The opening suggests that Green was interested primarily in the theory of 
knowledge, and that he aimed to show that Lockean “empiricism” dead-ended in 
Humean skepticism. Thus, Hylton thinks 
An important characteristic of Green’s philosophy is that it presents a picture of the 
history of philosophy.... According to this picture, Empiricism forms a single school of 
thought…. Hume’s great genius lay in the rigour with which he argued from Locke’s 
fundamental principles, resolutely ignoring common sense, and arriving at absurdity. 
For empiricist [sic] philosophers after Hume, Green has very little respect, for he sees 
in their work a series of attempts to evade or disguise the bankruptcy of Empiricism 
which Hume had demonstrated (see Works, i.1-5). 
 …The problem that the Empiricists set themselves was that of ‘the origin of “ideas” 
in the individual man, and their connection as constituting knowledge’ (Works, i.6). 
This enquiry into the origin of our ideas and knowledge is an enquiry into our 
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capacities as knowers, i.e. into the question, what things are possible objects of 
knowledge for us. (Hylton 1990, 22) 
This is a standard story about Green’s view of history, and I concur with some of it 
(for a similar view also drawn from §§1-5, see Brink 2003, 9). Green did think that 
Hume reduced Locke’s philosophy to absurdity, and that contemporary philosophers 
had ignored or tried to disguise this result. But the emphasis on epistemology in this 
story is misleading.  
Indeed, from our contemporary vantage these sections make it look as though 
Green saw the Lockean tradition as primarily interested in epistemology. But this is 
a case of the historian’s fallacy—of substituting our own interpretation of modern 
philosophy for Green’s. First, I will offer an alternative account of the opening 
passage of Green’s “Introduction” in order to explain how contemporary 
philosophers easily slip into this fallacious reading. Second, I will suggest a different 
passage that more accurately captures Green’s understanding of what was at stake 
in defending or attacking Lockean philosophy. 
Prima facie, the opening passage of any work is a sensible place to look for a 
summary announcement of the author’s intentions. But the opening of Green’s 
“Introduction” is an exception. The first five sections of that work were a kind of 
preamble that discussed Green’s proposed methodology. The preamble did not seek 
to make major interpretive claims about the Lockean tradition. Since the actual 
history sketched in these opening sections is so thin, it is easy to read our own 
contemporary historical views into Green’s scanty remarks.  
In the opening passage Green was concerned to establish that a history of 
philosophy had to employ different methodology than a history of literature. He 
began by arguing that a certain, general view of human history ought to be applied 
to the history of philosophy. The general view is that human history is a story of 
progress carried on by “great men” across the ages. Green argued that the history of 
philosophy, as well, ought to be interpreted as a progressive history advanced by 
great men (§§1-2). Thus: 
There is a view of the history of mankind … which detaches from the chaos of events a 
connected series of ruling actions and beliefs—the achievements of great men and 
great epochs, and assigns to these in a special sense the term ‘historical.’ … (§1, 1) 
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 A corresponding theory may with some confidence be applied to simplify the history 
of philosophical opinion. … (§2, 1) 
Green then explained that he rejected the methods of those who tell philosophical 
history by surveying many works all together. Perhaps he had in mind recently-
translated blockbuster histories like Üeberweg’s, which bore the title History of 
Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time.121 Instead of picking one or a few 
“great men” to study in depth, these compendious histories group together 
philosophers according to the time in which they lived and the relative popularity 
they continued to enjoy. Such works tangle together so many competing views that 
they obscure progress, according to Green, that philosophy has made over the 
centuries. 
Green then announced that he intended to treat Hume as one such great man. 
Hume was supposed to have advanced the tradition Locke began and Kant (in some 
sense) continued (§3, 2-3).  
If Hume was a great man advancing a theoretical project, Green argued, then 
Hume scholars should not employ the methods of literary history. Literary history 
explores the personal peculiarities that made some author great. In contrast, 
legitimate history of philosophy had to treat thinkers as “vehicles of a system of 
thought,” not as mere literary sensations (§4, 4). Green branded as “sceptic[s]” 
those who studied philosophy in a literary mode, writing as though philosophy made 
no progress. 
We must be careful when we read Green’s comments about what sort of system 
Hume is supposed to have advanced. In this opening passage, Green wrote: 
The value of that system of thought, which found its clearest expression in Hume, lies 
in its being an effort to think to their logical issue certain notions which since then have 
become commonplaces with educated Englishmen, but which, for that reason, we must 
detatch ourselves from popular controversy to appreciate rightly. (§5) 
Green did claim that Hume pushed “certain notions” to their logical conclusion. But 
in this early passage, he did not specify what those “notions” were supposed to be, 
                                                 
121 The first, translated volume of Üeberweg’s work appeared in 1871, and the second 
volume in 1873 (Üeberweg 1871; Üeberweg 1873). Green’s “Introduction” appeared in 
1874. 
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save that they were “commonplaces with educated Englishmen.” Because our 
contemporary interpretation of empiricism features Hume pushing Locke’s basic 
epistemology to its logical conclusion, it is tempting to assume that this is the story 
Green had in mind, as well. This is not accurate, as we will see when we look at 
more substantive passages. 
For now, I only want to point out that §§1-5 of the “Introduction” do not give a 
programmatic statement of Green’s view of history, as commentators like Hylton 
and Brink assume. Instead, Green here made a point about his own methodology—
that historians ought to focus squarely on how a great philosopher advanced the 
theoretical project of his predecessors. The nature of the theoretical project Hume 
was supposed to have advanced is not given any serious characterization in these 
opening sections. 
What about the passage Hylton cited from §6? Recall that he quoted Green in a 
way that suggested the following view of English philosophy. The “Empiricists” are 
to have set themselves an epistemological task—that of exploring “the origin of 
‘ideas’ in the individual man, and their connection as constituting knowledge 
(Works, i.6)” (Hylton 1990, 22). There are two reasons to be suspicious of Hylton’s 
characterization of this passage. 
First, §6 marks the start of Green’s investigation specifically of Locke. The 
quoted comment was actually not meant to describe a tradition that ran through 
Berkeley or Hume—it was only a description of Locke’s philosophy. Second, the 
quoted sentence may be read in several different ways. Let us look at the full 
context of this passage: 
About Locke, as about every other philosopher, the essential questions are, What was 
his problem, and what was his method? . . . His problem was the origin of ‘ideas’ in the 
individual man, and their connection as constituting knowledge: his method that of 
simply ‘looking into his own understanding and seeing how it wrought.’ These answers 
commend themselves to common sense, and still form the text of popular psychology. 
… Our concern at present is merely to show their precise meaning, and the difficulties 
which according to this meaning they involve. (INT, §5, 5-6) 
Locke’s question about “the origin of ‘ideas’” is ambiguous. Did Green mean that 
Locke was interested in the question of how ideas are justified? Or did he mean 
Locke was interested in the causal origin of ideas? There is not much in this scanty 
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passage to help us. On one hand, Green did say that Locke was interested in how 
the “connections” between ideas “constitut[e] knowledge.” So Locke was clearly to 
have had at least some interest in epistemological issues. But on the other hand, the 
very next sentence characterized Locke’s project as commending itself to common 
sense and to “popular psychology.” The reference to psychology suggests that Locke 
himself was interested in the “origin of ideas” as an empirical problem, not (just) as 
an epistemological problem. 
By “popular psychology,” Green presumably meant the brand of associationism 
found in J. S. Mill, Alexander Bain, Herbert Spencer, and other influential 
psychologists of the era. Green used the phrases “popular psychology” and 
“empirical psychology” interchangeably in the “Introduction.” For instance, see the 
quoted passage immediately below (from INT, §200) where Green characterized 
“‘empirical psychology’” as fundamentally interested in the origin of ideas, just as 
“popular psychology” had been portrayed in §6. 
So by themselves, the opening remarks leave us with only a vague suggestion 
about the significance of Locke’s question about the origin of ideas. We are supposed 
to see this question as important to empirical psychology, but we do not yet know 
why.  
We will find that Green consistently portrayed the Lockean tradition as sharing 
a pretension to using natural science—especially empirical psychology—as a 
substitute for traditional metaphysical speculation. Green did think proto-empiricists 
were interested in epistemological questions. But contra the standard reading, 
Green did not portray any substantive epistemology as what was essential to the 
Lockean tradition. Instead, as I will now show, one important commitment that tied 
this tradition together was the use of scientific techniques to answer questions that 
had traditionally been left to a priori metaphysics. 
 
I have just argued that the opening passage of Green’s “Introduction” was 
intended to present Green’s historical methodology, not to announce anything 
substantial about his reading of history. To get a more substantial, yet still concise 
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statement of Green’s reading of history, one must look to the middle of the 
“Introduction.”  
Hume did not come in for detailed criticism until p. 161 of this work. The 
passage where Green (in my view) did explain his intentions spans the following 
seven pages (at INT, §§195-202, 161-169).  
This passage actually holds a prominent position in Green’s “Introduction.” The 
work is, after all, an introduction to Hume. After enduring 161 pages on Locke and 
Berkeley, the reader is quite ready for an explanation of what all this has to do with 
the author of the Treatise. Here is the explanation we find. 
The passage began mildly, with the first two pages dealing with Hume’s 
perceptual psychology. Green gave a basic account of Hume’s conception of ideas, 
and of a certain “rule” Hume employed (INT, §§195-196). We now call the rule in 
question the “copy principle,” and I shall have more to say about it in Section 
Three, below.  
Green then launched into a critical account of the significance of Hume’s 
philosophy, and of Hume’s fundamental philosophic failure (INT, §§197-202—
henceforth the “pivotal passage”). In this passage, Green argued that a critical 
treatment of Hume was needed to give empirical psychologists their comeuppance. 
This, in my view, was the primary aim of Green’s “Introduction.” 
It was not that Green was an enemy of science. He actually saw science as one 
of the two most important forms of knowledge, the other being religion. But he did 
not think one could finally explain the way either scientific or religious knowledge 
was possible unless one undertook a deeper, metaphysical examination of the 
conscious subject. With Brink (Brink 2003, 8-9), I see Green’s notion of a subject as 
indebted to Kant’s transcendental ego of apperception. The very fact that we have 
knowledge cannot be explained, Green thought, unless there is a subject that binds 
all our changing ideas into one unified conscious life (see below, p. 201). The 
examination of such a subject had to be metaphysical because for Green, the subject 
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exists outside of space and time, and one can only glean facts about it through 
transcendental reasoning.122 
In contrast, empirical psychologists thought they had learned the following 
lesson from Hume, according to Green: that one could gain a legitimate explanation 
of scientific knowledge from inside science itself. In particular, one could get an 
account of scientific knowledge from the emerging science of empirical psychology, or 
from the related science of physiology. One did not need to resort to metaphysics. 
Green was most interested in correcting this allegedly mistaken view about science’s 
prospects for helping philosophers to do without metaphysics. 
I will quote Green at length here, because his work is so little known, and 
because these passages explain the aim of the entire “Introduction.” 
 The quarrel of the physiologist with the metaphysician is, in fact, due to an 
ignorantia elenchi,123 on the part of the former, for which the behaviour of English 
‘metaphysicians,’ in attempting to assimilate their own procedure to that of the natural 
philosophers, and thus to win the popular acceptance which these alone can fairly look 
for, has afforded too much excuse. The question really at issue is not between two 
coordinate sciences, as if the theory of the human body were claiming also to be a 
theory of the human soul, and theory of the soul were resisting the aggression. The 
question is, whether the conceptions which all the departmental sciences alike 
presuppose shall have an account given of them or no. For dispensing with such an 
account altogether (life being short) there is much to be said, if only men would or 
could dispense with it; but the physiologist, when he claims that his science should 
supersede metaphysic, is not dispensing with it, but rendering it in a preposterous way. 
He accounts for the formal conceptions in question, in other words for thought as it is 
common to all the sciences, as sequent upon the antecedent facts which his science 
ascertains—the facts of the animal organisation. But these conceptions—the relations 
of cause and effect, &c.—are necessary to constitute the facts. They are not an ex post 
facto interpretation of them, but an interpretation without which there would be no 
ascertainable facts at all. To account for them, therefore, as the result of the facts is to 
proceed as a geologist would do, who should treat the present conformation of the 
earth as the result of a certain series of past events, and yet, in describing these, should 
assume the present conformation as a determining element in each. (INT, §199, 164-
165; my italics on the full sentence) 
The physiologist pretends that “his science should supersede metaphysic” in 
answering a crucial question. The crucial question is how to give an account of the 
                                                 
122 For a discussion of Green’s aspiration to use metaphysics to reconcile religion and science, 
see (Vincent 1986, 5-10). 
123 This phrase roughly means irrelevant argument. This is the fallacy of establishing a 
conclusion that is actually irrelevant to the issue at hand. 
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basic concepts used in science. The physiologist argues that such an account can be 
built from inside science itself—in particular, from the results of physiology. But 
Green here argued that any physiological account of ideas is irrelevant to an account 
of scientific concepts like “the relations of cause and effect.” This is because 
physiology itself relies on these concepts, and so cannot be used to criticize them. 
Note that the crucial question of modern philosophy, according to Green, is not 
what contemporary readers might have expected. The question is not how to specify 
necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, or how to give an epistemological 
account strong enough to resist the skeptic. Instead, the crucial question is how to 
account for the existence of “ascertainable” scientific “facts.” Green’s chief 
complaint against proto-empiricists is that the latter were supposed to hold that such 
an account can come from inside science itself. 
In the next paragraph, Green made a similar case against “empirical 
psychologists,” and explained what Locke, Berkeley, and Hume had to do with the 
controversy: 
 ‘Empirical psychology,’ however, claims to have a way of its own for explaining 
thought, distinct from that of the physiologist, but yet founded on observation, though 
it is admitted that the observation takes place under difficulties. Its method consists in 
a history of consciousness, as a series of events or successive states observed in the 
individual by himself. By tracing such a chain of de facto sequence it undertakes to 
account for the elements common to all knowledge. Its first concern, then, must be, as 
we have previously put it, to ascertain what consciousness is to itself at its beginning. 
No one with Berkeley before him, and accepting Berkeley’s negative results, could 
answer this question in Locke’s simple way by making the primitive consciousness 
report itself as an effect of the operation of body. To do so is to transfer a later and 
highly complex form of consciousness, whose growth has to be traced, into the earlier 
and simple form from which the growth is supposed to begin. This, upon the 
supposition that the process of consciousness by which conceptions are formed is a 
series of psychical events—a supposition on which the whole method of empirical 
psychology rests—is in principle the same false procedure as that which we have 
imagined in the case of a geologist above. But the question is whether, by any 
procedure not open to this condemnation, the theory could seem to do what it 
professes to do—explain thought or ‘cognition by means of conceptions’ as something 
which happens in sequence upon previous psychical events. … No one has pursued it 
with stricter promises, or made a fairer show of being faithful to them, than Hume. He 
will begin with simple feeling, as first experienced by the individual—unqualified by 
complex conceptions, physical or metaphysical, of matter or of mind—and trace the 
process by which it generates the ‘ideas of philosophical relation.’ …We believe … 
some suspicion may perhaps be created that a natural history of self-consciousness, 
and of the conception by which it makes the world its own, is impossible, since such a 
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history must be of events, and self-consciousness is not reducible to a series of events; 
being already at its beginning formally, or potentially, or implicitly all that it becomes 
actually or explicitly in developed knowledge. (INT, §200, 165-166) 
This passage suggests that “‘empirical psychology’” has a method of accounting for 
scientific cognition that is similar to physiology’s method. Empirical psychology also 
attempts a scientific account of ideas. However, the psychologist does not observe 
“animal physiology,” but rather the sequence of his own ideas. In so doing, he hopes 
to arrive at “a natural history of self-consciousness.” That is, psychologists assume 
that the causal history of ideas can provide an account of “the elements common to 
all knowledge.”  
True, this last statement seems to support the received view, on which Green 
saw the Lockean tradition as tied together by a particular epistemology. But this 
passage follows immediately on §199, which I quoted in its entirety. In context, it is 
clear that empirical psychology attempted the same basic task as physiology—
psychology simply “claims to have a way of its own” for showing how science can 
supersede metaphysics. Thus, Green did not portray the Lockean tradition as tied 
together by an epistemology. Rather, this tradition is to have sought to give an 
account of science from inside science itself. In other words, Locke and his followers 
wanted to give a theory of science that was not drawn from speculative metaphysics, 
but rather was drawn from empirical psychology. This is the crucial point to draw 
from these long quotes.  
In the remainder of the pivotal passage, Green argued that psychologists were 
mistaken not just in thinking science could supersede metaphysics. They were 
mistaken in their interpretation of Hume. A careful reading of the Treatise would 
therefore show two things, Green promised. First, it would show that Hume, the 
hero of 19th-century empirical (read: “physiological”) psychologists, had in fact given 
up Locke’s aspiration to base philosophy on an empirical study of the mind. Second, 
it would show that Hume nevertheless tried to salvage Locke’s disavowal of 
metaphysics. He did this by substituting a strict ‘phenomenalism’124 for Locke’s 
                                                 
124 I use “‘phenomenalism’” in its usual way, to denote the view that physical objects can be 
reduced to experiences. 
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allegedly empirically-based philosophy. But Green promised to show that Hume’s 
‘phenomenalism’ was itself a philosophical failure. I will now examine each of these 
claims in turn.  
2.2  Goal: Show that Hume Rejected Physiology as a Basis for Metaphysics 
The next part of the pivotal passage argued as follows. Hume is to have held 
that an account of ideas must not make philosophically basic Locke’s notion of 
physical bodies that “impress” the mind. In Section Three, below, I will explain why 
Hume is supposed to have held this view. The notion of physical bodies that impress 
the mind constituted a rotten apple in the bushel of Lockean philosophy, Hume was 
supposed to have seen, and if the entire Lockean bushel was to be salvaged, the 
rotten apple had to be eliminated. So Hume held himself to a strict 
‘phenomenalism.’  
His ‘phenomenalism’ entailed drawing all distinctions between types of ideas 
according to introspectively available criteria, not according to the supposed causes 
of those ideas (INT, §197, 163). For example, it was experienced force or liveliness 
that was to distinguish ideas and impressions. Hume’s denial that external bodies 
were philosophically basic meant our conception of external bodies had to be 
phenomenologically constructed, according to Green. To put it simply, external 
bodies had to be constructed from ideas, and not vice versa. 
Green held that this move quietly severed Humean psychology from physiology, 
in the following sense. Like Locke, Hume’s epistemology was a ‘sensationalism.’125 
But sensations, as empirical psychologists understood them, could not be building 
blocks of knowledge of external bodies, given the claims of my previous paragraph. 
Empirical psychologists (following physiologists) understood sensations to be 
themselves physical modifications of a certain type of external body, viz., the brain 
and nervous system of the human organism. Since Green’s Hume held that 
knowledge of external bodies had to be constructed phenomenologically, he saw he 
                                                 
125 I use “‘sensationalism’” to denote the view that all non-trivial knowledge is in some sense 
derived from sensations. People who hold this view—like Locke and Hume—typically deny 
that there are innate ideas. 
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could not appeal to the physiologist’s notion of sensation at the start, as Locke had 
(INT, §198, 163).  
Green regarded the quiet severance of Humean psychology from physiology as 
a scandal, for two reasons.  
He [Hume] thus logically cuts off his psychology from the support which, according to 
popular conceptions, its primary truths derive from physiology. (§198)  
First, Hume’s philosophy was supposed to derive its plausibility and good reputation 
not just from its use of any old psychology, but from its use of physiological 
psychology. In forming an alliance between philosophy and physiological psychology, 
Hume was supposed to have followed Locke, according to the popular imagination. 
For it was Locke who originally tried to explain the nature of consciousness from the 
point of view of the “natural philosopher” (§198, 163). Thus, “Locke and his 
followers” had only managed to “win popular acceptance” by “assimilat[ing] their 
own procedure to that of the natural philosophers …” (§198, 164). 
So the first scandal was that Locke, Hume, and their followers won popular 
acclaim precisely by allying themselves with the science of physiology, which had a 
much longer and more distinguished history than the young field of empirical 
psychology. But in practice, Hume quietly betrayed this alliance. The popular 
appeal of Locke and Hume’s philosophy (and of proto-empiricist anti-metaphysics in 
general) would be undercut if Green could show that Hume did not, in fact, base his 
philosophy on empirical science. 
Second, the revelation that Hume rejected physiology as a basis for philosophy 
was supposed to be scandalous not just to the popular reputation of Lockean 
thought, but to its reputation among English philosophers as well. Green’s 
professional colleagues purported to have learned from Locke and Hume to quit 
trying to give an account of scientific knowledge from a metaphysical point of view. 
Green’s contemporaries allegedly thought Locke and Hume’s lesson had been that 
scientific knowledge can be understood from inside science itself.  
Most English philosophers sought to use one of two sciences to give an account 
of scientific thought—physiology or “‘empirical psychology’” (tellingly, Green liked 
to use scare quotes around that latter phrase). Philosophers failed to understand 
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Hume’s skepticism about the uses of science in philosophy, and they failed to 
understand the underlying reasons that drove Hume to that skepticism.  
In the pivotal passage, Hume was portrayed as having seen a crucial reason 
why physiological science could not be used to account for scientific thought. Green 
wrote:  
… However certain may be the correlation between the brain and thought, in the 
sense that the individual would be incapable of the processes of thought unless he had 
brain and nerves of a particular sort, yet it is equally certain that every theory of the 
correlation must presuppose a knowledge of the processes, and leave that knowledge 
exactly where it was before; [and] … thus their science [viz., physiology], valuable like 
every other science within its own department, takes for granted just what metaphysic, 
as a theory of knowledge, seeks to explain. When the origin, for instance, of the 
conception of body or of that of an organic structure is in question, it is in the strictest 
sense preposterous to be told that body makes the conception of body, and that unless 
the brain were organic to thought I should not now be thinking. (INT, §198, 164) 
Again, Lockean philosophers could not account for how scientific knowledge was 
possible in the first place. They drew on physiology and psychology to offer scientific 
accounts of scientific knowledge. But this could only result in question-begging 
explanations. It may be true, Green granted, that brain activity is necessary for 
there to be any thought at all. It may also be true that physiology and empirical 
psychology may one day come to understand how such brain activity is correlated 
with thought. But in order to specify which brain processes are correlated with 
which types of thought, one needs to have already in place scientific knowledge both 
of some brain process and of some thought. The possibility of these bits of scientific 
knowledge must be assumed at the outset. Hence, philosophers who think 
physiological psychology can explain the nature of scientific thought are begging the 
question.  
Hume is supposed to have seen this problem (among others) with the prospect 
of a scientific account of science, and thereby been driven to espouse 
‘phenomenalism.’ Compared with more contemporary versions, Hume’s psychology 
was supposed to have been attenuated. Unlike contemporary physiological 
psychology, Hume’s psychology was to have relied on pure introspection. Green’s 
contemporaries allegedly read Hume badly, and thus did not understand the 
skeptical upshot of the latter’s work. And even if this misreading were corrected, 
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Hume’s attenuated, purely introspective psychology could not eliminate the need for 
a metaphysical account of science—could not eliminate this need any more than 
physiological psychology could (§200, 166). 
2.3  Space Perception and the Failure of Phenomenalist Anti-Metaphysics 
In the last section, I showed that for Green, empirical psychologists had blithely 
ignored the real skeptical lesson of Hume. Hume did not base (and did not think he 
could base) his philosophy on physiological psychology. Green further argued that 
Hume’s actual project did constitute an attempt to salvage Locke’s disavowal of 
metaphysics.126 Hume’s real modus operandi was to substitute a strict 
‘phenomenalism’ for Locke’s philosophical reliance on the empirical study of the 
mind.  
Green sought to show that Hume’s more austere ‘phenomenalism’ was no more 
able than Locke’s psychology to replace metaphysics in philosophy. Hume’s 
philosophy collapses, Green argued, when we try to use it to account for the nature 
of scientific knowledge. The lesson was that empirical psychologists could not find in 
Hume a justification for banning metaphysics. 
Space perception then emerged as an important illustration of Hume’s failed 
attempt to save Lockean anti-metaphysics.127 First, what were the specific 
shortcomings in Locke’s philosophy Hume thought he had to remedy? 
                                                 
126 Van Fraassen’s most recent account of empiricism is very different from mine (Van 
Fraassen 2002), but here I note an important overlap. For van Fraassen, empiricism is not a 
position, but a stance. The stance involves a general opposition to metaphysics. I agree that 
opposition to metaphysics has been common to many who have thought of themselves as 
empiricists. Certainly, in this sense Green saw Hume as an empiricist. However, where I 
differ from van Fraassen is that I do not think empiricism is properly understood in isolation 
from either a specific thesis or from the history the concept evokes. That is to say that I 
regard empiricism as a historical-philosophical concept. Van Fraassen seems to think that 
because the theses to which “empiricism” have referred have changed so much over time, 
one must not think of the word as denoting a concept at all. In contrast, I think we should 
see empiricism as a substantive concept, just one that has evolved.   
127 Locke, and to a greater extent Berkeley and Mill’s respective accounts of space are all 
given serious consideration, as well, but I shall confine myself to Green’s critique of Hume. 
See (GWR I.26-27, I.140-147, II.238-251). 
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According to Green, Hume was supposed to have seen128 a problem concerning 
Locke’s conception of the relationship between external bodies and sensation. Locke 
allegedly had reasoned in a circle, sometimes explaining simple ideas of sensation by 
evoking solid bodies that imprint themselves on our minds, at other times explaining 
solid bodies as complex ideas built from simple ideas of sensation (INT, §228, 
189).129 (These are the reasons referred to above, on p. 159, why Hume was 
supposed to have rejected any philosophically basic notion of external body.) 
Those who wanted to defend Locke had to choose between these two directions 
of explanation—they had either to stick strictly to the view that complex ideas, 
including ideas of extended bodies, are always to be explained in terms of simple 
ideas; or they had to grant that sometimes simple ideas can only be explained with 
reference to complex ideas. Or so Hume’s criticism of Locke goes, on Green’s 
reading (INT, §230, 191).  
Hume had made plain that both choices were untenable. Green wrote: 
… Having come to suppose that there are solid bodies, we explain our feeling as due to 
their solidity; but we may not at once interpret feeling as the result of solidity, and 
treat solidity as itself a feeling. … Hume tears off the disguise, and in effect gives him 
[Locke] the choice of being convicted either of reasoning in a circle or of explaining the 
simple idea by reference to the complex. (INT, §230, 191) 
Consistent Lockeans could not accept the Essay’s circular reasoning, whereby 
sensations are explained as mental effects of external bodies, and external bodies 
explained as products of sensation. Two choices remain. One is to give up the 
insistence of always explaining complex ideas in terms of simple ideas. This choice 
was not acceptable, for Hume. Allowing that simple ideas can be explained by 
reference to the complex meant accepting a form of reasoning that could be used to 
draw metaphysical conclusions. This left one option. The notion of solid body had to 
be derived from simple ideas. 
At this point in the “Introduction,” Green had just (at INT, §§225-226) 
returned to the issue he first broached in the pivotal passage—viz., to the point that 
                                                 
128 Green cited (THN, I.iv.4). 
129 Green took himself to have demonstrated this circularity in Locke, as well. Green cited 
his own discussion of the matter at (INT, §99 ff.). 
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one of Hume’s chief goals was to defend Locke’s attempt at purging philosophy of all 
metaphysics. Preserving this goal meant that Hume must not allow explanations of 
simple ideas of sensation that proceed by reference to prior, complex ideas like our 
idea of body. Hume had to repudiate, in other words, any metaphysical assumption 
about external bodies imprinting themselves on our minds.  
On Green’s reading, this repudiation is what drove Hume to a strict 
‘phenomenalism.’ Our ideas of bodies, or of what Hume called “distinct and 
continued existences,” could amount to nothing but a “propensity to feign.”  
Hence Hume’s attempt, reversing Locke’s derivation of ideas of sense from primary 
qualities of body, to derive what with Locke had been primary qualities, as compound 
impressions of sense, from simple impressions and to reduce body itself to a name not 
for any ‘just and consistent idea,’ but for a ‘propensity to feign,’ the gradual product of 
custom and imagination. (INT, §231, 192) 
This long sentence asserts the following: Hume gave up Locke’s attempt to explain 
ideas of sensation by appeal to external bodies. Instead, Hume tried to explain what 
Locke had called primary qualities—features of bodies like solidity and shape130—in 
terms of simple impressions. Hume thus came to treat our ideas of external bodies 
that endure in the absence of anyone’s experience as nothing but “propensities to 
feign,” in Hume’s phrase.131  
                                                 
130 For a careful treatment of Locke’s primary qualities, see (Wilson 2002).  
131 The view Green endorses, that Hume thinks external objects are mere “fictions” that 
must be constructed from impressions, has been challenged by a new reading that emerged 
in the last twenty years or so. Kenneth Winkler dubbed this “The New Hume” (Winkler 
1991). On one side of the debate are those like Winkler who defend a more traditional 
reading of Hume. For example, David Owen also holds (with Green and Winkler) that 
according to Hume, an investigation into the causes of impressions is ruled out by Hume’s 
claim (at THN I.i.1, 7) that impressions “arise … from unknown causes.” Green cites this 
passage as well, at (INT, §195, 161). He also cites (THN, I.iii.5, 84), where Hume wrote of 
any impression that its “ultimate cause is, in my opinion, perfectly inexplicable by human 
reason, and ’twill always be impossible to decide with certainty, whether they arise 
immediately from the object, or are produc'd by the creative power of the mind, or are 
deriv'd from the author of our being” (see Owen 1999, 71-72). Among the most notable 
works defending the New Hume is (Strawson 1989). A helpful volume that collects some 
important work in this new scholarship is (Read and Richman 2000). In conversation, Fred 
Schmitt defends a New Hume reading. He rejects Owen’s way of reading the Hume 
passages just quoted—Owen’s reading is similar to Green’s. For Schmitt, Hume only 
intended to argue that we cannot know with certainty the causes of our impressions, at least 
not by purely rational means. But this is not to say that Hume thought we cannot have 
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Since Green was trying to show that Locke and Hume’s banishment of 
metaphysics was not sustainable, it was crucially important to probe Hume’s anti-
metaphysical reduction of external bodies to perceptions. But when he explained the 
need to investigate Hume’s reduction, Green’s immediate, first step was not to 
criticize or even interpret this reduction in any detail, directly.  
His first step (announced at INT, §232, 193) was to argue that because Hume 
purged any “just and consistent” idea of body from his philosophy, Hume’s accounts 
of the perception of both space and extension could therefore not succeed. Green 
saw the perception of space and of extension as the Achilles heel, in other words, of 
Hume’s ‘phenomenalist’ attempt to rescue Locke’s anti-metaphysical philosophy.  
Green had two reasons for seeing space perception as the Achilles heel of 
Hume’s ‘phenomenalism,’ apparently. First, he argued that Hume had to treat ideas 
of spatial and temporal relations as real if he wanted to account for ideas of body and 
of necessary connection as “fictions.” This is because such fictitious ideas had 
nevertheless to be composed of real compound sensations which were first 
experienced in space and time. If there can be no real ideas of space and time, there 
are no real (read: actual) ideas from which to derive fictions about bodies and 
necessity (INT, §253). And second, Green thought Hume’s ‘phenomenalism’ had 
driven him to espouse a particularly austere account of the perception of space, 
whereby spatial ideas must themselves be derived “solely from the senses of sight 
and feeling” (INT, §233). Green thought such a derivation, necessitated by Hume’s 
radical attempt to save Locke’s anti-metaphysics, was impossible. In the next 
section, I will examine Green’s arguments that purport to establish the impossibility 
of a coherent, Humean account of spatial perception.  
Here is a summary of what I take myself to have established in Sections 2.1-
2.3. First, I argued that Green’s first “Introduction,” which focused on Book I of the 
                                                                                                                                       
justified beliefs about the sources of our impressions. Similarly, Norton argues that Hume 
meant only to claim that an explanation of the origins of impressions is a task to be left to 
others, such as anatomists and natural philosophers (Norton 1993, 6-7). He cites a passage 
at (THN, II.i.1, 275-276). For more on this topic, also see below, fn. 148 1, though I cannot 
do justice to this rich and heated issue in contemporary Hume scholarship.  
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Treatise, is where Green offered his most sustained criticism of Hume. I argued that 
the pivotal passage for understanding Green’s chief aim in that first “Introduction” 
did not come at §§1-5, as most commentators assume, but at §§195-202, where 
Green began his discussion of Hume. Next, I showed that in this pivotal passage, 
Green argued that a proper reading of Hume revealed that the latter had not 
claimed (and could not consistently claim) to eliminate metaphysics in favor of 
physiological psychology, as his followers believed. Green hoped this revelation 
would undercut both the popular and professional appeal of Hume’s thought. I also 
argued that Hume’s strategy for salvaging Lockean anti-metaphysics (that is, to 
salvage a philosophy that helps explain scientific knowledge without relying on 
metaphysics) was to develop a radical ‘phenomenalism,’ on Green’s reading. Space 
perception emerged as a test case for that ‘phenomenalism’ because ideas of 
extension had to be the foundations from which our complex, “feigned” ideas of 
body were to be built. 
I will now analyze Green’s argument against Hume’s account of the perception 
of spatial relations. He sought to show that by Hume’s own anti-metaphysical 
strictures, ideas of space had to be as unreal as our ideas of body.  
3.   SPACE IS FANTASY: GREEN’S ATTACK ON HUMEAN SPACE 
PERCEPTION 
3.1  Locke, Berkeley, and Hume’s ‘Psychological Atomism’ 
To understand Hume’s account of space perception (and Green’s criticism of it), 
we need to begin with an account of proto-empiricist perceptual psychology. 
Hume classed perceptions using three sets of distinctions. First, all perceptions 
are either lively impressions, or fainter ideas. Ideas are always exact copies of 
impressions (THN, I.i.1, 1-2). For Hume, “perception” was a term of art that 
covered both impressions and ideas. 
Second, all perceptions must be either simple or complex. Simple perceptions 
“admit of no distinction nor separation,” whereas complex perceptions may be 
analyzed into constituent parts (THN, I.i.1, 2). Third, Hume divided impressions 
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into those derived from sensation, and those from reflection. Impressions of 
sensation appear in the mind from “from unknown causes,” while impressions of 
reflection arise when the mind considers its own ideas (THN, I.i.2, 7-8).132  
The simple/complex distinction is worth looking at more closely. Commitment to 
this distinction is sometimes called “psychological atomism,” as by Michael Ayers in 
connection with Locke (Ayers 1991/1993, 18).133 More precisely, a ‘psychological 
atomist’ holds that all perceptions are either simple or complex, and that all 
complex perceptions can be analyzed into the simple impressions of which they are 
composed. Hume and (mutatis mutandis) Locke were both ‘psychological atomists’ 
in this sense, as Ayers and Don Garrett both note.134 Berkeley was an atomist in 
roughly this sense, as well.  
However, there are important differences between the nature of Lockean 
psychological atoms, on the one hand, and Berkeleyan and Humean atoms, on the 
other. Green’s argument—the one under consideration presently—targets Berkeley 
and Hume’s shared brand of ‘atomism.’ So I will now distinguish Berkeley and 
Hume’s view from Locke’s.  
Garrett convincingly argues that Hume drew the distinction between simple 
and complex ideas differently from Locke. When Locke introduced his notion of a 
simple idea, his chief examples included ideas of primary qualities, such as the 
coldness and hardness of a piece of ice, the fragrance and color of a lily, the taste of 
sugar, and so on. Each such simple idea counts as such because it has a uniform 
appearance, and cannot be analyzed into any constituent ideas (ECHU, II.ii.1). The 
Lockean simple ideas that compose a perception of, say, an apple might include 
properties like red, existence, spatial extension, unity, and so on. 
                                                 
132 Green’s first account of Humean perceptual psychology can be found at (INT, §§195-
196). See above, fn. 131, for a discussion of what to make of Hume’s claim that impressions 
come “from unknown causes.” 
133 Ayers sometimes uses the phrase “compositionalism” as a synonym, as at (Ayers 
1991/1993, 41). Don Garrett uses the related phrase “simple/complex distinction,” for 
example at (Garrett 1997, 21-22). I take both these phrases to refer to the view I mention in 
the text. 
134 For more on Locke’s conception of ideas, see (Ayers 1991/1993, 13-69, especially 36-43). 
On the relationship between Hume and Locke’s respective ‘atomisms,’ see (Traiger 1997). 
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In contrast, were Hume citing the simple impressions that compose a visual 
perception of a red apple, he would only have cited a collection of red, extensionless, 
colored points. These colored points are sometimes called “minima sensibilia.” 
Garrett cites good evidence in support of this reading of Hume from Treatise I.ii and 
I.iv.4 (Garrett 1997, 60-62), along with evidence about how the view fits with other 
aspects of Hume’s broader project.135 
Garrett’s reading of Hume, on which ideas deriving from impressions of sight 
and touch are composed always and only of minima sensibilia, is today unusual, but 
it is not new. Green also emphasized that Humean impressions of sight and touch—
those out of which perceptions of spatial extension are to be built—are always 
collections of minima sensibilia in just Garrett’s sense (see, e.g., INT, 201).  
I should note briefly that Hume’s conception of simple ideas is similar to 
Berkeley’s. Berkeleyan psychological atoms were also minima sensibilia. There is 
some debate among scholars over whether Berkeleyan sensibilia are extensionless, 
like Humean sensibilia, or whether they are extended. Raynor argues that 
Berkeley’s minima sensibilia are extensionless (Raynor 1980), though Bracken, for 
example, takes the position that they are extended, albeit very small (Bracken 
1984, 95). However, I will be focusing on Green’s attack on Hume, not Berkeley, so 
nothing I have to say will turn on this disagreement.  
                                                 
135 Another bit of evidence Garrett might have cited is that Hume explicitly distanced himself 
from Locke’s use of the word “idea.” Hume called Locke’s usage “too broad” (see, THN, 
I.i.1, 2; index, 699). 
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3.2  Space Perception and the Copy Principle 
Here is Hume’s account of space perception.136 We have seen that for Hume, 
visual and tactile perceptions are composed of perceptual atoms, or “minima 
sensibilia.” Hume claimed that when we have a perception of space or extension,137 
we are perceiving nothing but a collection of minima sensibilia. The shape of an 
extended object and the relations between points in a spatial area are given by the 
manner in which such visual and tactile sensibilia are organized with respect to one 
another (INT, 194; THN, I.ii.3, 33-39, I.iv.5, 235;Garrett 1997, 53). Hume often 
repeated this account, consistently maintaining that impressions of spatial extension 
are not just bare collections of colored points, but colored points “disposed” or 
organized “in a certain order” (e.g., THN, I.ii.5, 62, and II.iii.7, 429). 
How does the mind form ideas of such organization, though? At (INT, §234, 
194-195) Green noted that for Hume, “the idea of space, like every other idea, must 
be a ‘copy of an impression,’” citing (Hume 1748/2000, I.ii.3).138 But if our ideas of 
                                                 
136 There is also a disagreement about Berkeley’s view of space perception. The debate is 
whether Berkeley believed we intuit a spatially-organized, two-dimensional visual field that 
must be transformed by the mind into a three-dimensional field, or whether even the two-
dimensional visual field must be actively constructed. (Falkenstein 1994) offers a penetrating 
treatment, adjudicating this debate between historians of psychology and historians of 
philosophy. This distinction helps clarify Green’s reading. When one searches the 
“Introduction,” one does not find Green distinguishing between the view that only the third 
dimension of visual space must be constructed by the mind, and the more strict view that 
both the second and third need to be constructed. Green seems to have assumed that both 
Berkeley and Hume sought to show how both the second and third dimensions of visual 
space could be constructed from minima sensibilia. Falkenstein calls the view that even two-
dimensional space must be constructed “strict constructionism.” Later advocates of strict 
constructionism included Steinbuch, Bain, Lotze, and Wundt (Falkenstein 1994, 65). Bain 
was the first financier of Mind, and Wundt was an early contributor. Both were leading 
exponents of empirical psychology, in Green’s generation. So if Falkenstein’s reading of 
these latter two is correct, it may be that Green read his contemporaries’ views about spatial 
construction back onto Berkeley. Or of course, it may just be that the distinction simply did 
not occur to Green. Also see the discussion of Steinbuch at (Hatfield 1991, 131-143). 
137 Garrett claims that for Hume, when we perceive any collection of minima sensibilia, we 
perceive a spatial area. But we only perceive extension in cases where the perceived 
sensibilia are contiguous (Garrett 1997, 247n.245). He does not cite textual evidence. 
138 Green had an irksome habit of putting quotation marks around phrases that were not 
quotations of Hume, but paraphrases. Here, Green’s quotation marks suggest that Hume 
wrote that every idea must be a “copy of an impression.” But at the cited location, Hume’s 
actual words were: “every idea is derived from some impression.” In this case, no grave 
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extension are copied from the manner in which visual impressions are disposed, 
then these ideas are not copied from any impression, or even collection of 
impressions. Rather, they are copied from relations between impressions. After all, 
the manner in which impressions are arranged is not itself an impression.  
To understand the full force of Green’s argument, we need to consider a 
cornerstone principle of Hume’s philosophy. It is conventionally called the “copy 
principle,” and Hume articulated it in several different passages: 
… all our simple ideas in their first appearance are deriv’d from simple impressions, 
which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent. (THN, I.i.1, 4) 
… every idea, with which the imagination is furnish’d, first makes its appearance in a 
correspondent impression. (THN, I.ii.3, 33) 
… all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively 
ones. (Hume 1748/2000, Section 2, p. 14) 
The copy principle says that all ideas are exact copies of either one simple 
impression, or of collections of simple impressions. There can be no idea that was 
not originally either a simple impression, or a collection of simple impressions 
(Green presented the copy principle at the very start of his discussion of Hume; see 
INT, §195, 162). 
I should pause to note that at this point in Green’s “Introduction,” there are 
interesting marginalia in James’s personal copy of the book. On page 162, next to 
Green’s initial presentation of the copy principle, there is a cross-reference in the 
margin to page 167. On page 167, where Green offered a short criticism of that 
principle,139 James wrote “162,” followed by a short response on Hume’s behalf.  
                                                                                                                                       
harm is done—“copy” is a reasonable paraphrase of “derive,” in context. However, readers 
need to be careful not to assume that Green’s quotes of Hume are always accurate. Green’s 
practice of using quotation marks when actually paraphrasing was not rare. Also, even when 
Green’s quotes were accurate, he sometimes misrepresented the original context of the 
quote. For example, on p. 195 (half a page later), Green reproduced a lengthy quote from 
Hume on the perception of extension, subsequently treating the passage as Hume’s 
articulate view on the subject. But the passage comes from I.iv.5 of the Treatise, which is 
devoted to the immateriality of the soul, not to the perception of space or extension. Though 
Hume presumably would stand by the account of the perception of extension given in this 
section, it is a peculiar choice from which to take Hume’s official view on spatial perception, 
especially since Hume devoted much of Book I, Part ii to the topic.  
139 Among the most important of Green’s arguments against the copy principle is that 
Hume’s account of space perception requires a violation of that principle. Note that Green 
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Green’s criticism was that the copy principle was supposed to provide a test for 
telling when an idea has reality. The test is that ideas have reality140 just in case one 
can point to an impression from which the idea is derived. In Green’s words, the 
copy principle was supposed to test whether “a phrase, purporting to express an 
‘abstract conception,’ expresses any actual idea or not …” (§201, 167). Green 
objected that if ideas were nothing but impressions grown fainter, then “the force of 
the test would be gone.” This is because a person who is pressed to find an 
impression corresponding to a dubious idea could simply say that he or she had 
never experienced the idea in question in a more lively manner—and that should 
suffice to make the idea count as an impression, by the lights of the copy principle.  
James was reading closely. He wrote the following response in the margin of his 
copy:  
Its being an idea need not be supposed to depend on itself having once been more 
lively, but on accompanying impressions being more lively. An imagined apple on the 
near table before me is [doubtful: reduced] by the table as well as by previous 
[doubtful: real] apples. 
The two doubtful words make it hard to be certain of James’s response. But his idea 
seems to have been something like this. We can determine that a perception is an 
idea rather than an impression by comparing the liveliness of different, co-occurring 
perceptions. For example, if I stand before a real table and imagine that there is an 
apple on it, my perception of the apple will seem fainter than my perception of the 
table. This is a good way to identify the perception of the table as an impression and 
the perception of the apple as an idea. I need not rely on my judgment that a 
particular perception was once livelier in order to identify that perception as an idea. 
                                                                                                                                       
has other arguments against this principle, as well. I am focusing only on the argument from 
space perception.  
140 When Green wrote about ideas having reality, he meant what Descartes (drawing on 
medieval philosophy) called “objective reality,” not “formal reality.” Recall that an 
intentional object, like an idea or a painting, has objective reality in virtue of what it 
represents. An idea of a unicorn has less objective reality than an idea of my puppy 
Cookiepuss, since Cookiepuss actually exists. In contrast, all objects have formal reality in 
virtue of their own level of perfection. An idea of a unicorn and an idea of Cookiepuss both 
have the same formal reality, because both are ideas. When I attribute to Green talk about 
reality of ideas, I always mean objective reality.   
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Thus, a perception may count as an idea even though the subject has no memory of 
the perception in a more lively state, and Green’s objection fails.141  
In any case, this is one of Green’s passing criticisms of the copy principle. Let us 
turn to a deeper account of Green’s reading and criticism of this principle. 
 
It is crucial to note that Green saw the copy principle as a Humean twist on 
Locke’s (as I have called it) reality principle. An attack on the copy principle was 
not just an attack on Hume, but an instance of a broader attack on the entire proto-
empiricist tradition. 
Green relied on a particular Treatise excerpt that articulated the copy principle 
with a distinct slant, as we will see again in Section 3.3, below. The excerpt made 
more obvious the close connection between the copy principle and Locke’s reality 
principle than do the now-standard passages I quoted two pages back. The passage 
on which Green relied read this way: “It must be some one impression, that gives 
rise to every real idea” (THN, I.iv.6, 251; INT, §§ 205, 209). 
Notice that in this passage, Hume did not claim that every idea is derived from 
an impression—only that every “real” idea is thus derived. I argued in Chapter 
One, above, that Green saw the reality principle as the core commitment of the 
Lockean tradition, a tradition Hume supposedly wanted to carry forward.142 This 
passage suggested to Green that for Hume, as for Locke and Berkeley, reality was 
still to be associated with what the mind receives passively in sensation, and illusion 
to be associated with the mind’s manipulation of sensations. In short, Green saw the 
copy principle as the reality principle redecorated with Humean mental furniture, 
impressions and ideas. 
Hume himself regarded the copy principle as vitally important, of course. Early 
in the Treatise, Hume wrote that the copy principle is “the first principle I establish 
                                                 
141 James’s copy of Green’s “Introduction” (his copy was not from Green’s 1894 Collected 
Works, but from the 1874, Green and Grose edition of Hume’s Treatise) can be found at 
(WJP, WJ 540.54.2)—cited by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University. 
142 Again, the core Lockean commitment was the reality principle. The core goal Hume 
supposedly tried to salvage, as we saw above in Section Two, this chapter, was to account for 
scientific knowledge without resorting to metaphysics.  
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in the science of human nature …” (Hume 1748/2000, I.i.1, 7). He used the 
principle to establish as unreal important metaphysical ideas, like those of 
substance, vacuum, and necessary connections in nature.143 Thus, the charge of a 
serious violation of the copy principle strikes at the heart of Hume’s philosophical 
project. If he does not consistently apply the copy principle, this undermines his 
justification for using this principle to eliminate metaphysical concepts. 
We can now state more precisely Green’s main argument against Humean 
spatial perception. Every idea must be copied from some simple impression, or 
collection of simple impressions, according to the copy principle. We clearly do have 
ideas of spatial relations. But ideas of spatial relations cannot be copied from any 
simple impression. An idea of spatial relation cannot even be copied from a complex 
impression, which is just a bundle of simple impressions. Ideas of spatial relations 
must be copies of (or compounds formed from copies of) the organization of 
collections of simple impressions. But this means that not all our ideas come from 
simple impressions alone, as the copy principle requires.144 Green summarized his 
complaint this way: Hume “…implies that space is a relation, and a relation which is 
not a possible impression.”145 If there is no possible impression from which our ideas 
of space could have been copied, then either the copy principle has been seriously 
breached, or our ideas of space are nothing but “propensities to feign,” as Hume 
calls our ideas of bodies that exist independently of our perceptions. 
                                                 
143 For a helpful discussion, see (Garrett 1997, Chapter 2). 
144 An extremely useful essay on problems with Hume’s views on space is (Falkenstein 
1997). See especially 179-181, which gives an exhaustive summary of prior scholarship on 
the matter. A helpful piece that puts Hume’s theory of space into historical context is 
(Frasca-Spada 1990).  
145 Green gives a running, paragraph-by-paragraph summary of his own arguments in the 
“Introduction.” As was common in publications during this period, the summary appears in 
the margins throughout the work (thus, these were called “marginal analyses”), and is 
collected in the analytical table of contents. The quoted sentence to which this footnote is 
appended appears in the margins at (INT, §250, 207-208). The editor of Green’s Collected 
Works notes that the marginal analysis of the “Introduction” was written by Green himself 
though marginal analyses in the rest of the Collected Works were added by editors; see 
GWR, vi). 
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Green argued that if Hume was to be consistent, he had to accept that spatial 
relations, like ideas of independent bodies, amount to nothing but mental fictions. 
Hume must hold that spatial properties like being to the left or right of are merely 
relations the mind imposes on minima sensibilia.  
 
I will now present a further illustration of Green’s charge, so that we can fairly 
contemplate some potential responses.  
Consider the collection of white and black minima sensibilia out of which the 
visual perception of a black globe and white cube would have to be built.146 These 
sensibilia could be arranged in an infinite number of ways—now as a black globe and 
white cube, now as a black cube and a white globe, now as a black and white 
portrait of Hume’s favorite uncle.147 So our perception of the globe and cube must 
be determined by more than just bare collections of minima sensibilia—it must be 
determined by information about the organization of those perceptual simples, as 
well. Green is asking where this information comes from. Hume wanted to say that a 
complex impression of a globe may be constituted by one set of simple impressions 
that, as a group, conveys both color and spatial information. The question is whether 
he can consistently allow this—whether his account is consistent with the view that 
we get perceptual information not just from the matter of impressions, as it were, 
but from their form as well.148 
                                                 
146 Hume considers the perception of a black and white globe, at (THN, I.i.7, 25). He does 
not offer an exhaustive list, though, of simple impressions out of which such complex ideas 
must be built. 
147 In their discussion of James, (Madden and Madden 1978) set up the problem of spatial 
relations in a similar way. However, they see the problem of relations as a problem internal 
to empirical psychology. I hold that the chief reason the perception of relations preoccupied 
James was that this problem is the cornerstone of attacks from Idealists like Green. These 
attacks are supposed to show not just that empiricism is untenable, but that the entire 
project of using empirical psychology for philosophical purposes is incoherent. See Chapter 
One, Section Four, above.  
148 In correspondence, Garrett suggests that impressions are spatially organized from the 
start, and they get their organization from the spatial relations of the external objects (or 
“continued and distinct existences,” in Hume’s language) that cause our perceptions (Garrett 
2005). Garrett also makes this suggestion in print (Frasca-Spada and Garrett 2001, 463). 
Green, at least, would reject this as an accurate account of Hume’s view. For Green, Hume’s 
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Here is one possible solution. Perhaps the organizational information somehow 
is contained in each minima sensibilium.  
Hume explicitly rejected this possibility. He wrote that we can divide 
philosophical relations149 in terms of those that are fully parasitic on the character of 
the ideas related, and those that are not. Spatial relations like distance and 
contiguity fall into the second category, because one can shift the spatial relations 
two sensibilia bear to one another without thereby altering the sensibilia themselves, 
or the ideas that copy them (THN, I.iii.1, 69). For example, consider two minima 
sensibilia in the visual field. These will be just extensionless colored points. Suppose 
one point is red, and lies to the right of the other point, which is green. Changing the 
position of the two sensibilia with respect to one another does nothing to the 
character of each moved sensibilia. That the red sensibilia now has the property of 
lying-to-the-left-of-the-green-sensibilia does not change the intrinsic character of the 
red sensibilia. Thus, minima sensibilia do not contain information about their own 
spatial position, Hume held. It follows that the organizational component of complex 
ideas of extension cannot be intrinsic to any simple impressions from which they are 
copied. The copy principle is still in jeopardy. 
                                                                                                                                       
chief philosophical advance over Locke is to have rejected the appeal to external objects to 
explain anything about the character of ideas, as we have seen; rather, Hume appeals to 
ideas to explain the appearance of external objects (INT, §232, 192-193). So, Green would 
deny that Hume could cite external objects as the ultimate suppliers of spatial information in 
our complex ideas of extension. This is not to say that Garrett has no reply—he reads 
Hume’s discussion of distinct existences not as a repudiation of bodies that exist 
independently of our minds, but as an explanation of why we believe (and why Hume 
himself believes) in independent external bodies, despite that such judgment “involves our 
making conflations,” in Garrett’s words. Green would have insisted that in any case, 
continued and distinct existences must be constructed from experience; they cannot be 
turned around to explain the character of experience. This disagreement about whether 
Hume believed in the existence of external bodies again raises the specter of the New Hume 
(see above, fn. 131). I cannot adequately delve into this interpretive debate here. Even if 
Hume believed in external bodies, the question I am dealing with here is not how those 
bodies could imprint themselves on our minds. The question is how the ordered sets of 
impressions, whatever their origins, could be copied into ideas, on Hume’s view. It seems to 
me this is as difficult a question for the New Hume as for the Old Hume.  
149 See my next paragraph for more on Hume’s distinction between natural and 
philosophical relations. 
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Let us consider another potential solution. Perhaps Hume could draw on his 
own, general account of either “natural” or “philosophical” relations between ideas 
(THN, I.i.5, 13-15) to respond to Green—a solution considered at (INT, §206, 170-
171). Hume tells us that two ideas are naturally related just in case the appearance 
of one idea “naturally introduces” the other—i.e., just in case the appearance of one 
idea sparks the appearance of another, and this sparking is governed by any of the 
three principles of association that Hume proposes (at THN, I.i.5, 10-13). 
Philosophical relations between ideas involve the subject’s bringing two ideas 
together in thought in an arbitrary rather than a law-like manner. 
Certain types of relations, such as spatial relations, can cut across the two 
categories. Some spatial relations are natural, for example when we perceive two 
objects that stand in close proximity. But other spatial relations are philosophical, as 
when we contemplate the spatial relation between very distant objects. 
Now, does Hume’s account of spatial relations as either natural or philosophical 
help him explain space perception? Green’s answer was a resounding no, and for 
reasons that went to the heart of his complaint with Hume. Green claimed that for 
Hume, even a natural relation must, if Hume was to remain consistent, amount to 
nothing but what the latter philosopher calls, in another context, a “propensity to 
feign” (THN, I.iv.2, 209). Green again fixed on Hume’s insistence that “it must be 
some one impression that gives rise to every real idea” (INT, 174; THN, I.iv.6, 
251), demanding to know from what impression a real idea of a spatial relation (or 
of any other relation, natural or philosophical) could possibly be copied. For spatial 
relations, as for ideas of causal relations, relations in time, relations between subject 
and object, and many others, Green insisted no cluster of impressions can be cited. 
Hume failed to recognize that no relation can be traced back to an impression, 
according to Green. Hume tried to admit certain relations—natural relations—as 
legitimately derived from impressions. He then sought to use those real relations 
(especially resemblance and contiguity) to account for all the other “propensities to 
feign,” starting with personal identity and causation (INT, §210, 174-175). Green’s 
objection was that even natural relations cannot derive from any impressions. For 
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example, he attacked Hume’s claim that resemblance is a natural relation that could 
be derived from impressions. Green argued that two impressions may resemble one 
another, but that is not the same as saying that one can have an idea of the 
resemblance between two impressions. In other words, an idea of resemblance is not 
the same as a resemblance between ideas. Hume needed the former, but his copy 
principle could only countenance the latter (INT, §212-213, 175-177). 
In short, Hume must treat all relations, natural and philosophical, as unreal—
including causal relations, relations of identity, contiguity, cause and effect, and even 
time and spatial relations—if he is not to violate the copy principle. 
3.3  Space Perception and the Separability Principle 
Garrett responds to such criticism (without discussing Green). The copy 
principle only seems in trouble, Garrett suggests, given the assumption that complex 
ideas of space must be derived from separate spatial impressions. If we assume that 
our complex impression of a black globe must include a collection of minima 
sensibilia that conveys color information, plus a separate set that conveys 
information about shape, then Hume may have a problem. But this is not an 
assumption Hume need accept.  
On Garrett’s reading, impressions of a black globe’s color just are impressions of 
the black globe’s shape. This is because for Hume, one compound perception may 
exhibit more than one quality. Thus, compound perceptions (that is, perceptions 
composed of or copied from two or more minima sensibilia) derived from visual 
impressions are at once impressions of both color and shape. There are no separate 
impressions devoted strictly to conveying shape or other spatial information. Since 
there is no need to cite a separate impression that only portrays shape, Garrett 
argues, there really is no threat to the copy principle.   
Garrett seems to recognize that this solution leads to new problems for Hume. 
Chiefly, the solution stands in tension with perhaps the second most important 
principle in Hume’s philosophy. This is sometimes called the “separability 
principle,” and Hume defined it this way: 
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We have observ’d, that whatever objects are different are distinguishable, and that 
whatever objects are distinguishable are separable by the thought and imagination. 
(THN, I.i.7, 18) 
The separability principle asserts that all objects (including perceptions) that are 
different can be separated, and that all objects that can be separated are different. 
Now here is the trouble. Garrett rightly claims that when we have a perception 
of a white globe, an idea of the globe’s color just is an idea of the globe’s shape, on 
Hume’s view. There are not two separate ideas, one of color, the other of shape. But 
by the separability principle, the fact that we can distinguish color and shape (and 
we can—we just did!)150 should suffice to establish that color and shape are two 
different ideas. But if the globe’s color and shape are two different ideas, then we 
are back to Green’s worry—there are no separate impressions for our ideas of shape 
to copy. Again, it seems Hume either has to admit that spatial extension constitutes 
a major exception to the copy principle, or he has to give up the copy principle all 
together.  
Some may suspect that I am misrepresenting the separability principle by 
applying it to ideas. The separability principle states that objects that are different 
are distinguishable, and vice versa. Did Hume really mean to include ideas under 
“objects”? There is good evidence that he did. At the end of this section, Hume 
referred back to “…the principle above explain’d, that all ideas, which are different, 
are separable” (THN, I.i.7, 24, his italics). Although this passage only restates the 
first conjunct of the principle, the use of “idea” here suggests that by “object” Hume 
meant to include objects of the mind, or in other words, perceptions. 
In any case, Garrett’s reading may well capture Hume’s own intentions, for 
Hume himself tried to address the complaint of a violation of the separability 
principle. The complaint is worth investigating further. 
Hume’s acknowledgement that the distinction between shape and color appears 
to violate the separability principle came at the end of (THN, I.i.7). He claimed that 
figure and color may be distinguishable in some intuitive sense, but they are not 
distinguishable in the sense required by the separability principle. Instead, Hume 
                                                 
150 I borrow this quip from Garrett himself (Garrett 1997, 59). 
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wrote, figure and color are two different aspects of one and the same idea. It is only 
by drawing what he called a “distinction of reason” that we come to notice these 
different aspects of our idea of, say, a white cube. 
There is an extended passage (at THN,I.i.7, 25) in which Hume developed his 
solution. I will break the passage down into four manageable chunks, in order to 
present my reading. Hume began this way:  
’Tis certain that the mind wou’d never have dream’d of distinguishing a figure from the 
body figur’d, as being in reality neither distinguishable, nor different, nor separable; 
did it not observe, that even in this simplicity there might be contain’d many different 
resemblances and relations.  
By “figure” and “body figur’d,” Hume apparently meant something like the form 
and matter of a perception, as will become clear immediately below. Here, he wrote 
that the shape and color of a visual perception are not really different or 
distinguishable. It would never have occurred to anyone to separate the shape and 
color of one visual perception unless that person first noticed that one perception 
may resemble different objects in different respects.  
The passage continued this way: 
Thus when a globe of white marble is presented, we receive only the impression of a 
white colour dispos’d in a certain form, nor are we able to separate and distinguish the 
colour from the form. But observing afterwards a globe of black marble and a cube of 
white, and comparing them with our former object, we find two separate resemblances, 
in what formerly seem’d, and really is, perfectly inseparable.  
Consider my perception of a white globe. Hume claimed that if I have no other store 
of perceptions from which to draw, I will be unable to distinguish the shape of the 
globe from its color. I will have one, inseparable impression composed of a set of 
white minima sensibilia arranged in my visual field in the shape of a globe. Suppose 
I later have an experience of a black globe and of a white cube. I notice that the 
ideas I form from these two new perceptions afford comparisons with two different 
aspects of my one original perception—viz., the white cube resembles the original 
white globe in color, but not shape, and the black globe resembles the original white 
globe in shape, but not color.  
Practice, Hume continued, then helps us use a “distinction of reason” to 
separate aspects of visual perceptions, such as shape and color.  
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… That is, we consider the figure and colour together, since they are in effect the same 
and undistinguishable; but still view them in different aspects, according to the 
resemblances, of which they are susceptible.  
Figure and color must always be “consider[ed]” together, since they are 
undistinguishable. But practice helps us “view them” as different aspects of one 
perception. Hume concluded by repeating that we can never really “consider” figure 
and color separately:  
… A person, who desires us to consider the figure of a globe of white marble without 
thinking on its colour, desires an impossibility; but his meaning is, that we shou’d 
consider the colour and figure together, but still keep in our eye the resemblance to the 
globe of black marble, or that to any other globe of whatever colour or substance. 
(THN, I.i.7, 25) 
In short, the figure and color of any visual perception are not distinguishable in 
the sense required by the separability principle. Shape and color are thus not 
different perceptions, but two aspects of one perception. Since there is no separate 
idea of space, Hume thought he was free from the need to find any separate 
impression from which spatial ideas are copied. Garrett thinks Hume is out of 
trouble (Garrett 1997, 58-64). 
Green, however, was not satisfied. Hume repeated this account of how we use 
distinctions of reason to isolate figure from color, which are always given as two 
“aspects” of one perception (THN, I.ii.3, 34). Green quoted this latter passage at 
(INT, §249, 207). He had three main reasons for resisting Hume’s refined position.  
Green’s first objection seems the least convincing. Hume’s attempt to save the 
separability principle forced him to accept something about ideas Green found odd. 
Consider the mind’s awareness of the shape of a white globe. Shape in this case is 
not itself an independent perception, but a quality of a perception. But this means 
that perceptions have qualities that are perceptible, yet are not perceptions. If they 
were perceptions, remember, they would be either ideas, in which case they must 
have been copied from simple impressions, or they would be impressions 
themselves. Green asserted that “feeling” and “perception” are supposed to be 
synonyms in Hume’s project. The mind was supposed to be furnished with nothing 
but ideas and impressions, all of which are ultimately copied from simple 
impressions. If Hume starts saying that some perceptions have felt qualities, and 
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that these qualities are yet not composed of simple impressions themselves, he 
compromises his own ‘psychological atomism.’ The mind would then not exclusively 
be populated by perceptions that all either derive from simple impressions or are 
themselves simple impressions (INT, §238, 197-198).  
However, Green’s charge is not very strong, in my view. Green often asserted 
that Hume was committed to the view that all we are aware of are perceptions. But 
Green never provided textual evidence for this reading, that I can find. Indeed, I do 
not believe any such evidence exists. I do not see how Hume contradicts himself by 
claiming that the objects that populate the mind are, in all cases, perceptions, but 
that perceptions can themselves have felt qualities which are not themselves 
composed ultimately of simple impressions. 
Green’s second reason for resisting Hume’s detailed account of space perception 
is that the account allegedly cannot support a coherent theory of geometry. This 
charge is much stronger. Hume’s account entails that strictly speaking, there are no 
independent perceptions either of figure or of spatial area. Every perception of a 
figure or spatial area must have some determinate color (and, less controversially, 
every perception of color must have some determinate properties of figure or spatial 
extension). But this would make geometry a “science of color,”151 in Green’s words. 
Because there are no independent ideas of shape that could be the subject of 
geometry, Green thinks Hume’s account entails that geometers must be in the 
business of studying the nature of color as well as of shape. Green thought this 
result, if squarely faced, would have been unacceptable to Hume himself, because 
… Hume, though ready enough to outrage ‘Metaphysics and School Divinity,’ always 
stops reverently short of direct offence to the mathematical sciences. (INT, §249, 207) 
Green thought Hume’s view on spatial perception rendered geometry 
unrecognizable. Here, again, Hume was presented as one whose reputation 
depended on a close affinity with—even a willingness to defer to—the natural 
sciences.  
                                                 
151 In the 19th century, the science of color focused on the physical and physiological 
conditions of color perception. Hering and Helmholtz were leaders in this field.  
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This second criticism may at first have a whiff of rhetorical ploy. What 
difference does it makes whether geometry is thought to deal with independent ideas 
of figure, or (as Hume held) with aspects of composite ideas of both figure and color? 
Green expanded on the objection elsewhere in the “Introduction.” He had 
something like the following in mind. 
Hume’s psychology requires that all geometric figures be constructed out of sets 
of minima sensibilia. On Hume’s view, every line we can picture must be composed 
of some definite, whole number of minima sensibilia. The number of sensibilia must 
be whole because sensibilia are, by definition, not divisible. But in Euclidean 
geometry, one can prove theorems about figures with the following property: they 
cannot be constructed out of lines whose length can be divided into n units, where n 
is any whole number. It seems Hume’s view requires that strictly speaking, we can 
have no idea of such figures.  
Consider the diagonal of a unit square, for example. A unit square is a square 
each side of which is one unit in length. It is easy to show, using the Pythagorean 
Theorem, that the diagonal of a unit square is √2 units long. But √2 is irrational, 
and thus cannot be represented by any whole number (worse, it cannot even be 
represented as a fraction of whole numbers). Humean psychology entails that we 
can have no idea of the length of the diagonal of a unit square, because that length 
would have to be composed of some irrational number of minima sensibilia.152 This 
is a serious problem.  
Hume did take up some objections that dealt with geometry. In one notorious 
passage, he considered definitions of Euclidean notions like equality and 
straightness. He argued that to the extent geometers’ definitions clash with actual 
human notions, we must reject the geometers’ definitions. In the case of equality 
and straightness, the chief tension is that our everyday notions of equality and 
straightness are always approximate, whereas geometers purport to give exact 
definitions. In everyday life, we learn such concepts by correcting ourselves over 
                                                 
152 Garrett presents a similar example, acknowledging that Hume’s view “provides at best a 
problematic basis for geometry,” (Garrett 1997, 74-75). 
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time, Hume wrote. For example, we may judge two lines to be equal in length, but 
find upon closer inspection that we are mistaken. By correcting our original 
judgment, we become more refined at our ability to deploy the notion of equality 
(THN, I.ii.4, 47-48).  
Hume made a similar point about straightness, offering a concrete example 
where our everyday notion of straightness ought to be preferred over our exact, 
mathematical notion. In Euclidean geometry, two non-parallel straight lines in the 
same plane will (by the Euclidean definition of “straight line”) intersect at exactly 
one point. But Hume argued that mathematicians only “pretend” to “give an exact 
definition of a right [straight] line” (THN, I.ii.4, 50). In reality, our notion of 
straightness is approximate, like our notion of equality. Hume asked us to consider 
two lines that “approach at the rate of an inch in twenty leagues.” He thinks in 
everyday life, we would (and should) judge such lines as sharing more than one 
point as they converge (THN, I.ii.4, 51). See Figure 5, below. 
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Figure 5: Look closely! Two lines approach very gradually, and appear to overlap for an 
extended length (towards the bottom left corner of the figure). Such lines satisfy our 
everyday, approximate notion of “straightness,” which Hume preferred over the strict, 
Euclidean definition according to which straight lines can intersect at one and only one point.  
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Green was surely right when he replied that this “is not mathematical science 
as it exists” (INT, §275, 232). Hume’s view entails that Euclidean geometry is 
almost never precisely true. Euclidean geometry purports to demonstrate facts 
about ideas we could never, according to Hume’s psychology, entertain—ideas such 
as the ideally straight line or the √2-lengthed diagonal. Instead, Euclidean geometry 
must itself be treated as dealing with approximations of our everyday notions of 
figure and spatial relations.  
That is quite a bullet to bite, especially for someone who purported to be a 
friend of science. As we have seen, Green held that the chief failure of Lockean 
philosophy (including Hume’s revision of Locke) was that it could not make sense of 
the possibility of scientific knowledge. Green very reasonably regarded geometry as 
essential to scientific knowledge,153 so Hume’s failure to make sense of this branch of 
mathematics was not trivial.  
Thus, Green concluded that Hume had to “adjust the exact sciences to his 
theory of space and time” (INT, §263, 221),154 instead of adjusting his theory of 
space and time to account for scientific knowledge as it genuinely exists. The 
“adjustment” was that Hume’s view of space required him to hold the following. 
Given any measured quantity that appears in a scientific theory, if the quantity 
cannot be reduced to whole numbers of minima sensibilia, the quantity must be 
regarded as a “fictitious denomination,” in Hume’s own words (THN, I.ii.2, 30; 
INT, §264, 223). Green took this result to be a flat failure to understand real science 
as it is actually practiced (INT, §264-266, 222-225). 
Green had a third criticism that seems most damaging, for my purposes. He 
pointed out that Hume used the copy principle as a razor for banishing metaphysical 
                                                 
153 The mid- to late-19th century saw an explosion of astronomical discovery, some of which 
relied on Euclidean geometry. For example, Ulpian J. J. Leverrier and John Couch Adams 
had used geometry to predict the existence of Neptune, which in 1846 was confirmed by 
Johann Friedrich Galle using telescopic observation. So by Green’s day, despite the 
concurrent emergence of non-Euclidean geometry in pure mathematics, Euclidean geometry 
still seemed an essential tool of astronomic prediction. Hume’s view that Euclidean geometry 
only arrived at approximate truths appeared obviously wrong, to Green. 
154 This quote comes from Green’s marginal analysis, not from the text. 
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concepts, like the concept of substance. If Hume now allowed that figure and spatial 
relations are separable aspects of some perceptions, but aspects that do not copy 
any separate impression, what ground remains for rejecting the notion of substance? 
Green thought there remained none.  
Green made his case by quoting a particular passage from the Treatise that 
dismissed metaphysical concepts, such as substance and mode, as unreal. Hume had 
asked whether the idea of substance was  
… deriv’d from the impressions of sensation or reflexion? If it be convey’d to us by our 
senses, I ask, which of them; and after what manner? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes, it 
must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other 
senses. …. (THN, I.i.6, 15-16; INT, §208, 173) 
Hume concluded that since no one could cite an impression of color, sound, etc., that 
could serve as the source impression for the idea of substance to copy, the idea of 
substance must be unreal. The argument obviously relies on the copy principle, 
which banishes concepts not derived from impressions.  
Green  first excerpted this passage in the context of his discussion of Hume on 
relations. Green argued that by the same reasoning, Hume should admit that all 
relations, even natural relations, are also unreal. Green argued that given 
‘psychological atomism,’ there can be no impression of any relation, spatial or 
otherwise. Here, Green also cited the Hume quotation to which I first alluded on 
page 170, above, that expressed a version of the copy principle: 
‘It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea.’ What, then, is the 
one impression from which the idea of relation is derived? ‘If it be perceived by the 
eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the 
other senses.’ (INT, §209, 174) 
Of course, Green thought this question has no good answer—there is no impression 
from which any idea of relation can have been derived. 
Thirty pages later, Green used the same strategy to focus on spatial relations. 
He wrote that “if words have any meaning,” Hume’s account of spatial relations 
(plus the separability principle)  
must imply that the disposition of points is at least a different idea from either colour 
or tangibility, however impossible it may be for us to experience it without one or other 
of the latter. … Is this ‘disposition,’ then, an impression of sensation? If so, ‘through 
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which of the senses is it received? If it be perceived by the eyes, it must be a colour, 
&c. &c [fn. to  §208] …. (INT, §250, 208) 
In short, if Hume was to use the copy principle to deem metaphysical concepts like 
substance to be unreal, this commits him to treating all relations—including and 
especially spatial relations—as unreal, as well.  
Here is how this objection involved the separability principle. Hume wrote that 
if one is asked to consider an idea of the shape of a globe, then strictly speaking, one 
is being asked to perform an impossible task (see above, page 179). However, Hume 
admitted, we understand such a request anyway. We are being asked to consider an 
idea with both a color and a shape, but to keep in front of our mind’s eye only the 
shaped aspect of that idea. Green’s third objection was that Hume was determining 
ad hoc which apparently separable ideas counted as truly Separable, and thus could 
be assumed to have been copied from some independent impression. This willy nilly 
use of the separability principle undermined Hume’s justification both for 
demanding the original impression from which metaphysical concepts like substance 
might have been copied, and for ignoring the demand for an original impression 
from which ideas of spatial relation might have been copied.  
Those sympathetic with Hume might reply this way. Suppose one grants that it 
is ad hoc to claim that there are separable aspects of ideas (like figure and color) 
that need not have been copied from separate impressions. This would only be a 
problem, for Hume, if there were some consistent way to use distinctions of reason 
to support metaphysical ideas that, by Hume’s lights, should count as real. But 
Green produces no such story, and the burden is on him to do so. 
It is true that Green produced no such story, but he might easily have. Though 
a metaphysician who asks us to think about substance is, strictly speaking, asking us 
to perform an impossible task, we know what she means (Green might have written, 
parroting Hume on ideas of figure). She is asking us to consider an aspect of a 
perception. Consider the perception, for example, of a white globe. The 
metaphysician who wants us to entertain an idea of substance is really asking us to 
keep in front of our mind’s eye only that aspect of the perception of the white globe 
that resembles a perception of a yellow pyramid and a perception of a blue cube, but 
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does not resemble a perception of injustice or of filial love. In the name of 
consistency, Hume should have admitted that we can use distinctions of reason to 
identify a real idea of substance in this way, too. There is no one impression from 
which that idea could have been copied, but then neither is there some one 
impression from which we copy our real ideas of shape.155 
Or conversely, since Hume demands to know the color of the impression from 
which our idea of substance was copied (if it was copied from sight, and so on for 
other sensory modalities), he should also demand what color our idea of space is (for 
a similar argument, see INT, §250, 208). J. E. Cabot, the man who wrote the article 
on space perception to which we will see William James responding in the next 
chapter, may have been drawing from Green when he wrote the following: 
It is natural for us to say that we see the place, distance, direction, and extent of 
bodies—that the separateness of the letters on this page, for example, is visible …. 
Evidently, this is a figurative way of speaking; for it is not meant, I suppose, that 
Extension is an affection of the optic nerve; in other words, that it is a color. If this is 
meant, then we are entitle [sic] to ask, What color? Some one, I forget who, has 
suggested that Space is of a bluish tint …. (Cabot 1878, 225-226)  
Cabot, like Green, insisted that we should be able to specify which sensations—
which colors, if spatial impressions—we derive our notion of space from, if our ideas 
of space are purely sensory. I will return to Cabot below.  
                                                 
155 The only book-length account I know of that is devoted entirely to Hume on space is 
(Frasca-Spada 1998). She deals in her second chapter with the objection Green raises, that 
spatial ideas violate the copy principle. Her solution is that the copy principle is not a hard 
and fast rule, but a “maxim” designed to guide experimental inquiry into the nature of the 
mind (p. 64). Spatial ideas are not a violation of this maxim, for Frasca-Spada. Rather, the 
maxim successfully guides us to identify elements of experience not supplied by impressions. 
She writes that the copy principle “has made it possible to discover and to bracket the 
mental contents—the elementary perceptions of sight and touch—involved in the origin of 
the idea of space, and thus to single out the act of the mind as a residue” (p. 75). The 
product of the “act of the mind,” apparently, is supposed to be ideas of spatial relations. 
Though Frasca-Spada’s work is often ingenious (I particularly admire her analyses of 
Hume’s rhetoric), this solution is unsatisfactory. Green would reply that this response cedes 
to Kant the point that ideas of space are forms imposed by the mind’s native structure on our 
sensations. This is not a point Hume can grant without radically curtailing his own 
philosophical ambitions. For Frasca-Spada’s solution requires Hume to give up the claim 
that all “real ideas” are copied from impressions. But that, in turn, means giving up the copy 
principle as a basis for showing that metaphysical concepts like substance and necessary 
connection are illusory.  
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In this section, I take myself to have established that Green put forward 
persuasive arguments against Hume’s account of space perception. The arguments 
can be summed up this way. Proto-empiricists consistently held some form of both 
the reality principle (in Hume’s case, the copy principle), along with ‘psychological 
atomism.’ Hume’s copy principle requires that all real ideas be copies of 
impressions. His separability principle tells us how to find the ideas of which we can 
expect to find an original impression—viz., any idea that is separable in thought can 
be assumed to have been copied from a separate impression. But there is no 
separate impression from which an idea of a spatial relation could ever have been 
copied. Hume tried to claim that ideas of spatial relations are not really separable 
from impressions of color, in the sense required by the separability principle. An idea 
of spatial relation is an aspect of a complex visual or tactile perception, not a 
Separable component. Ideas of spatial relations, therefore, cannot be expected to 
have been copied from any separate impression. But Green replied that this solution 
was unsatisfactory for several reasons. The most important problem with this 
solution is that Hume’s introduction of “distinctions of reason”—the intellectual 
method for isolating aspects of complex perceptions—opens the ballpark to a host of 
unsavory metaphysical concepts the copy principle was originally designed to keep 
out, such as substance and body. So the cost of giving a coherent account of space 
perception, Green argued, was finally the reintroduction of metaphysics. Since one 
of Hume’s chief concerns was to preserve Locke’s ban on metaphysics, Green saw 
this result as tantamount to a demonstration that Hume’s entire project was a 
failure. 
Recall from Section Two that Green’s main purpose in criticizing Locke and 
Hume was to convince contemporaries that they could not use empirical psychology 
as a scientific substitute for metaphysical criticism. Unbeknownst to proto-
empiricists in Green’s day, Hume had already shown that physiology could not be a 
starting point for philosophy, Green argued. And if empirical psychologists tried to 
follow Hume’s actual scientific phenomenalism by keeping purely to introspective 
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rather than physiological psychology, that project would fail as well. The chief 
respect in which Hume’s ‘phenomenalism’ was a philosophical failure was that it 
could not account for scientific knowledge, allegedly. In Section Three, we saw one 
crucial respect in which Hume’s ‘phenomenalism’ was supposed to fail at this task. 
Green showed that Hume could not account for the perception of spatial 
properties—crucial components of many scientific theories—while using the copy 
principle to banish metaphysical concepts. 
Green did not hold that ideas of spatial relations are the only Humean ideas 
that collapse into fictions. Green would go on to argue that all ideas must amount to 
fictions if one adopts any variety of proto-empiricism’s reality principle. Green’s 
attacks on proto-empiricist accounts of space perception would have been enough, in 
my view, to show that proto-empiricism was deeply flawed. But for good measure, 
he went on to attack the very conception of ideas on which proto-empiricist 
philosophy of mind, and in turn empirical psychology, rested. I now turn to that 
broad attack. 
4.  ALL IS FANTASY: GREEN’S GENERAL ATTACK ON ‘PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ATOMISM’ 
Locke’s conception of ideas, according to Green, was an important source of 
many philosophical shortcomings in proto-empiricism. Berkeley and Hume had 
tried to carry forward two important characteristics of Locke’s conception of ideas, 
but nevertheless failed to avoid trouble. First, both Berkeley and Hume retained 
altered forms of Locke’s ‘psychological atomism’ (as we have seen on pp. 167 ff., 
above). They also retained a commitment to their own respective versions of the 
reality principle.156  
In this section, I present Green’s critique of the proto-empiricist conception of 
ideas, especially as Locke originally articulated it. I begin by situating Green’s 
interpretation of Lockean ideas with respect to views in contemporary Locke 
                                                 
156  For evidence that Green saddled LBH with the reality principle, see above, Chapter One, 
pp. 58-61, and this chapter, above, pp. 172 ff. 
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scholarship. I then show Green holds, not unreasonably, that the reality principle is 
woven into the fabric of Locke’s conception of ideas. I finish the section by 
considering Green’s general criticism of Lockean ideas. Green contends that if proto-
empiricists consistently apply the reality principle, they cannot hold that there are 
any real ideas at all. 
 
Lockean simple ideas, when they refer to objects or properties outside of us, 
come from unprocessed sensation.157 These ideas refer naturally to whatever 
generally causes us to have such an idea. Since it has been notoriously difficult to 
give a consistent interpretation of the nature of Lockean ideas, it may be helpful for 
contemporary readers to have Green’s interpretation of Locke situated with respect 
to contemporary views. 
John Yolton claimed that Thomas Reid pioneered a reading of Locke that is still 
popular today—that Lockean ideas are images with some robust ontological status in 
the mind. On this view, Lockean ideas refer to natural objects in virtue of some sort 
of resembling relation, and knowledge just amounts to perceiving this resemblance 
(Yolton 1984, 5). Yolton offered an alternative reading which has Locke taking sides 
in a debate between Arnaud and Malebranche over the nature of ideas. Arnauld’s 
view (and Locke’s, according to Yolton) is a variety of direct realism, where ideas 
are identical to perceptions. To have an idea-perception is not to have a proxy for an 
external object physically inside of one’s head; it is just for the mind to cognitively 
take hold of that object (Yolton 1984, 61-68, 88-113).  
Michael Ayers rejects Yolton’s reading, after considering it sympathetically 
(Ayers 1991/1993, 56-59). Ayers maintains that Lockean ideas are images or 
“intentional objects” in the mind. Ideas represent whatever natural objects are their 
causes (Ayers 1991/1993, 38-39, 44-51, 60-66). Siding with Ayers on this issue is 
(Chappell 1994, 28, 32-35).  
                                                 
157 Locke posited two sources of ideas—sensation and reflection. But ideas of external objects 
come from ideas of sensation. 
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Green saw Lockean ideas much as Ayers and Chappell now do—Lockean ideas 
are images in the head that are supposed to be naturally suited to stand in thought 
for whatever real property is generally responsible for causing ideas of their type 
(INT, §20, 15). Ayers nicely sums up this view by saying that a Lockean idea is a 
“natural sign” for its own cause.  
Green emphasized that for Locke, simple ideas have (objective) reality 
precisely because they are formed passively, by external objects imprinting 
themselves on our sensory apparatuses (INT, §27, 22). Simple ideas thereby 
acquire all their information from the external bodies that imprint our sensory 
apparatuses. Since the mind does not add any information to simple sensory ideas, 
we can take such ideas as accurate records of their own causes. Thus, simple ideas 
of sensation are real.  
Green’s view of Locke is not unfair. For example, Locke himself wrote: 
And thus our simple ideas are all real and true, because they answer and agree to 
those powers of things which produce them in our minds, that being all that is requisite 
to make them real, and not fictions at pleasure. For in simple ideas (as has been 
shown), the mind is wholly confined to the operation of things upon it, and can make to 
itself no simple idea, more than what it has received. (ECHU, II.xxx.1-2) 
Since the mind cannot manufacture simple ideas of sensation, Locke thought, these 
ideas had to agree with (represent) their own causes.  
For Locke, the mind sometimes forms complex ideas too. It does this by joining 
or juxtaposing simple ideas.158 Such mental activity amounts to a kind of processing 
that involves adding information (concerning relations, for example)159 to simple 
ideas. Since this information was not originally stamped on our sensory apparatuses 
from without, complex ideas can be tainted by information that does not correspond 
with any external reality. Therefore, error or fantasy may be present in complex 
ideas. After all, the mind is capable of constructing complex ideas by adding 
                                                 
158 In some cases, our sensations do give us complex ideas directly, with no mental 
processing. For example, when I look an orange, I get a complex idea of a round, orange 
object with a determinate size, shape, etc., for Locke. 
159 Locke wrote that relations have “no other reality, but what they have in the Minds of 
Men” (ECHU, II.xxx.4). 
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information to collections of simple ideas. The reality principle is thus built into 
Locke’s basic ‘psychological atomism.’  
Hume did not give the same rationale for maintaining the reality principle. For 
Hume, all we mean by “real ideas” are ideas marked by their “force and settled 
order” (THN, I.iii.9). Hume did not argue that forceful perceptions (viz., 
impressions) must correspond to their causes, and a fortiori did not argue that 
impressions must correspond to their causes because they were formed passively. In 
fact, he held that sensory impressions come from “unknown causes” (THN, I.i.2, 7-
8). But he nevertheless insisted that reality was to be associated with raw 
impressions.  
Thus, Green criticized Locke and Hume’s shared assumption that the 
distinction between fantasy and reality matches the distinction between what is 
received in sensation and what is produced by imagination (see fn. 156, above). 
Green’s criticism of both Locke and Hume was that given their respective 
combinations of ‘psychological atomism’ with the reality principle, all ideas and 
impressions, simple or complex, must amount to fantasy. Thus, Green wrote: 
In short, the admission of the antithesis between the real and the work of the mind, 
and the admission that relation is the work of the mind, put together, involve the 
conclusion that nothing is real of which anything can be said. (PRL, §20, 25) 
‘Psychological atomism’ assumes that sensory ideas and impressions are separate, 
independent entities. Relations between those atoms must be the work of the mind. 
Green argued that when combined with the reality principle, ‘atomism’ entails that 
all ideas are fantastical (also see INT, §§309-310, 261-263). In fact, one of the good 
consequences of Hume’s logical rigor was to have “force[d] these questions”—
questions about whether there can be any real ideas at all—“to the front” (INT, 
§114, 94).  
Now how does this argument work, in detail? Green was widely associated with 
a catch phrase: “a consistent sensationalism must be speechless” (INT, §45, 36). 
The phrase reflected his most general charge against proto-empiricism: that no 
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simple idea could be intelligible without the mind’s adding relations to it.160 If this 
charge is correct, then by the reality principle, proto-empiricists must accept that all 
ideas are tainted by ingredients supplied by the mind, and all must be fantasy.161 
The key to understanding Green’s argument is, therefore, to see how he sought 
to establish the speechlessness of all atomic sensations. Green had a myriad of 
arguments for establishing this. The arguments were tailored variously to Locke, 
Berkeley, or Hume. We can catch the gist of these arguments by looking at the 
version Green applied to Locke.  
The argument sought to establish that single ideas cannot be (objectively) real 
except when placed in relation to a network of other perceptions. Consider, for 
example, the idea of yellow in the judgment this is yellow. Green argued that this 
idea only applies to a yellow item when a subject classes that item—puts the item in 
relation—with the community of all yellow things we might experience (INT, §37-
38, 47). But putting an object into relation with other objects is a clear case of the 
mind adding information not inherent in the simple idea of sensation, by Locke’s 
lights. Locke really held relations to be inventions of the mind (ECHU, II.xxv.8; 
INT, §44, 35). So if all ideas of the color yellow are inherently relational, no idea of 
yellow could ever be real, by Locke’s lights. The idea, by itself, is not of yellow until 
                                                 
160 Again Hume is a special case, because he allowed that some relations can furnish real 
knowledge. But Green thought Hume’s conception of relations violated the copy principle, as 
we have seen. 
161 The phrase, “a consistent sensationalism must be speechless” became something of a 
gauntlet for both neo-Kantians and those like James who wanted to defend proto-empiricism. 
James’s annotated copy of Green’s Introduction (which can be found at WJP, WJ 
540.54.2—cited by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University) contains a 
loose scrap of paper with an index written in James’s hand. The index gives a sense of 
James’s attentiveness to this neo-Kantian objection: 
not names but noises 
consistent sensationalism 
16, 19 21 
must be speechless, 36 
79, 93, 143, 149 
150  relations are universal,  
feelings not, 151, 153 
166, 176, 196 
259 
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the idea is placed into relation with other ideas of yellow objects—that is, until the 
intellect adds relational information to the idea.162 Green used a similar strategy 
here as he used in his arguments concerning space perception—the mind would 
need to be active in constructing meaningful ideas of predicates, just as it would 
need to be active in constructing spatial ideas. 
Green went on to argue that no simple idea can be meaningful without the 
mind’s adding relations to it. It follows that all thought is tainted by ingredients 
supplied by the mind, and all must be fantasy, for Locke. In effect, this means Locke 
cannot draw a distinction between fantasy and reality at all.163  
So far, we have only looked at Green’s argument that one cannot perceive an 
object to have any property unless we put the idea of the object into relation with 
other ideas. Green had several other arguments that, combined, sought to establish 
the sweeping claim that all simple ideas are unintelligible until placed into various 
relations. His strategy was to show that a subject must grasp a myriad of relations 
before various types of simple ideas can be made intelligible.  
Here, briefly, are two such arguments, both purporting to show (independently) 
that for Locke, the sphere of reality is empty. First, for any of our ideas to constitute 
knowledge of the external world, they or at least one of their constituents must 
succeed in referring to things in the external world. But to understand an idea as 
referring to stuff outside us, we must employ some pre-existing, abstract idea of 
substance. If Green is right that a subject could not refer simple ideas to external 
objects without making use of abstractions like substance and property, then given a 
commitment to the reality principle, proto-empiricists cannot claim that simple 
ideas are realistic indicators of external objects (INT, §34, 27-28). 
Second, Green argued that for a subject to understand a simple idea as referring 
to something in the external world, that subject must already grasp causal relations. 
                                                 
162 James attributes to Plato’s “latest followers ... the neo-hegelian writers” the view that 
“the only reals ... appear to be relations, relations without terms, or whose terms are only 
speciously such and really consist in knots, or snarls of relations finer still in infinitum.” He 
goes on to quote the Prolegomena and the “Introduction” to show that Green is an example 
of such a writer (PP, 658-659, ff.). 
163 For a neat statement of this attack, see (PRL, §20). 
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This is because the very idea of an external object can only be cashed out, according 
to Locke himself, in terms of that which causes a sensation. But causation is a 
relational concept, and thus, for a proto-empiricist, the epitome of a property 
supplied by the human mind rather than found directly in nature (on this point, also 
see Hylton 1990, 25). Green concluded, 
But this means no less than that he is finding there [“in any act that is to be the 
beginning of knowledge at all”] already the conceptions of substance and relation. 
Hence ... a contradiction between the primariness in knowledge of the ideas of 
substance and relation, and the seemingly gradual attainment of these ‘abstractions’ by 
the individual intellect. (INT, §16, 12) 
Green’s charge, in short, was that Locke does not tell us how the subject can jump 
from the bare experience of a sensation to an intelligible judgment that there is 
something to which the sensation corresponds. Green calls this “the fundamental 
confusion, on which all empirical psychology rests” (INT, §24, 19).  
Again, these two arguments were supposed to establish the speechlessness of 
bare sensations. Sensations can only become intelligible when a subject brings 
abstract, formal conceptions to bear on raw sensation, on Green’s view. But if this is 
so, then even simple ideas must be unreal, given the reality principle. In other 
words, Green charges that Locke must admit an absurdity, that the sphere of reality 
is empty. 
Here is how Green’s criticisms of Locke and Hume were continuous. In addition 
to the specific breach we have seen above, Green went on to target Hume’s copy 
principle—the notion that all real ideas must be copies of some impression—in a 
similar manner to the way he targeted Locke’s reality principle. Among Green’s 
most persistent complaints against Hume was that the latter had to treat all our 
ideas as “fictions,” and all our beliefs as mere “propensities to feign.” At the start of 
his discussion of Hume, Green wrote: 
It was just with the distinction between the ‘real and fantastic,’ as Locke had left it, 
that he [Hume] had to deal; and, as will appear, it is finally by a ‘propensity to feign,’ 
not by a uniform order of natural phenomena, that he replaces the real which Locke, 
according to his first mind, had found in archetypal things and their operations on us. 
(INT, §203, 169) 
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Locke had called external bodies “archetypes,” and the simple ideas that copied 
them “ectypes” (see ECHU, II.xxxi.13, 383; ECHU, II.xxx.1, 372; INT §§23, 52, 
81, 117). In the above passage, Green claimed that where Locke treated ectypical 
ideas, which were received passively from sensation, as “real” and “adequate” 
(Locke’s words), Hume would be driven to reduce all ideas to fictions, and all beliefs 
to mere “propensities to feign.” As Green elaborated this argument, it became clear 
that he saw this reduction as a rational requirement for anyone (like Hume) who 
affirmed the copy principle. 
Hume had used the phrase “propensity to feign” to describe our belief only in 
the “continu’d existence of all sensible objects” (THN, I.iv.2, 209). Green argued 
that Hume could not restrict the set of beliefs that count as “propensities to feign” 
only to belief in persisting external bodies. Strictly speaking, no idea was simply a 
copy of a sensory impression. That made all ideas, for anyone who accepted the 
copy principle, nothing but a “fiction,” and all belief nothing but “propensity to 
feign.”164 
Green’s strategy for supporting this bold claim against Hume was similar to the 
strategy used against Locke. In Hume’s case, Green inspected our various ideas and 
tried to show that in each case, none can have been copied merely from simple 
impressions. Green thus argued that Hume first transformed Locke’s reality 
principle into the copy principle. But modifying the reality principle did not protect 
Hume from being committed, like Locke, to the view that there are no real ideas, 
and that all beliefs are just “propensities to feign.” Green employed this strategy at, 
for example, (INT, §§210, 240, 242, 245, 247, 250, 253, 258, 262, 301, 305, 310, 
336, 343). 
 
                                                 
164 Green was adapting Hume’s own use of the word “fiction,” as it appears at, for example 
(THN, I.ii.4, 48-49). Recall that for Green, the notion that all beliefs are “propensities to 
feign” is an absurdity, because there must be some genuine belief in real ideas. Otherwise, 
there are no ideas from which to derive ideas that Hume officially counts as propensities to 
feign, ideas like substance and necessary connection. See above, p. 165.   
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I began this Chapter by writing that Green thought proto-empiricists could not 
explain the nature of scientific knowledge without resorting to metaphysics. We have 
so far seen two Greenian strategies for establishing this claim.  
First, we considered in detail Green’s argument that all ideas of space must be 
unreal, if Hume consistently adhered to his own principles. Green held that all 
proto-empiricists had to regard our representations of space and figure as fictions. 
Since all natural phenomena occur in space and time, this admission would seriously 
undercut any proto-empiricist claim to be able to make sense of science. Second, we 
considered more quickly Green’s broader argument that no idea could have reality, 
given core commitments of proto-empiricism. If there could be no real ideas, then a 
fortiori there could be no real scientific ideas. In the philosophical context of late-
19th century England, ideas (rather than propositions or sentences, say) were the 
ultimate vehicles of facts. Thus, if all ideas are illusory, it follows that all scientific 
facts are illusory as well—an unacceptable result for proto-empiricists. 
This concludes my discussion of Green’s attack on proto-empiricist conceptions 
of ideas. I now turn to Green’s claim that proto-empiricists could not make sense of 
the normative force of scientific knowledge. 
5.  GREEN ON THE NORMATIVITY OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 165 
The criticisms we have inspected so far largely turned on two proto-empiricist 
commitments: ‘psychological atomism,’ and the reality principle. Green attacked 
another proto-empiricist commitment that retains perhaps a more current interest. 
Proto-empiricists held that the human mind exists inside the same natural world 
that science discloses. Robertson’s view was a good representative of the position 
(see above, pp. 93 ff.). Though the mind is the organ through which we represent 
nature to ourselves, he held, the mind is also a part of nature, and like other natural 
objects should be studied scientifically.  
                                                 
165 In this section I confine myself to a narrow issue that arises in Green’s ostensibly ethical 
work—namely, the issue of whether proto-empiricists can account for the normative force of 
scientific knowledge. Readers interested in gaining a broader appreciation for Green’s moral 
thought are advised to consult (Brink 2003). 
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I will call “‘strong mental naturalism’” the view that all coherent questions one 
might ask about the mind can only be answered through scientific investigation. 
Neither Robertson nor James actually held this strong a view, but nevertheless this 
is a view Green was concerned to attack (PRL, §2, 4).166 
Green had two connected concerns about strong mental naturalism. First, he 
thought the view was prevalent among “the multitude of the educated” (PRL, §1, 
1). Second, the view entailed that morality could be understood through natural 
scientific investigation. I will call ‘strong moral naturalism’ the view that all coherent 
questions about morality can only be answered through scientific investigation.167 At 
the start of the Prolegomena to Ethics, Green described the view he was concerned 
to refute this way: 
That a physical science of Ethics is not intrinsically impossible, however difficult it may 
be rendered by the complexity, and inaccessibility to direct experiment, of its subject-
matter; that there are no intelligible questions—no questions worth asking—as to 
human life which would be beyond the reach of such a science; this would seem to be 
the general opinion of modern English ‘culture,’ so far as it is independent of 
theological prepossessions. … Ethics, so understood, becomes to all intents and 
purposes a science of health, and the true moralist will be the physiologist who, making 
                                                 
166 Robertson and James both held a weaker view, that some important questions one might 
ask about the mind can only be answered through scientific investigation. For these 
empiricists, there actually were questions that outstripped science, and were more properly 
dealt with philosophically. Despite how Green framed the debate, the real disagreement over 
the relation between science and philosophy came to whether a scientific investigation of the 
mind was a sound starting point for philosophy, or whether philosophers should feel free to 
propose theories that contradicted mental science. Green and his allies saw science as issuing 
only partial truths, insisting that only transcendental criticism could give us ultimate truth 
about reality. For his part, James also described science as only giving us partial truth (e.g., 
in Mind, James 1879a, 319, 339). That is because James did not think there was such a 
thing as ultimate truth. For James, what facts we find depends on the questions with which 
we start our inquiry. The real disagreement with Green was that the intellectual questions 
philosophers and scientists ask about the mind were supposed to be continuous, according to 
James and Robertson (as we saw in Chapter Two), so the two groups could safely draw on 
one another’s work. Green, on the other hand, did not see any safe passage from scientific 
investigation to philosophical investigation. Those on James and Robertson’s side saw 
psychology as a powerful starting point for philosophy; Green and his allies saw psychology 
as a red-herring for philosophical investigation.  
167 For a history of Hume, Smith, and Bentham’s roles in advancing secular, scientific 
approaches to the mind, approaches that were also supposed to have salubrious moral and 
political consequences, see (Long 1990). J. S. Mill, that other proto-empiricist whom Green 
loved to hate, may be placed squarely in this tradition as well.  
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the human physique his specialty, takes a sufficiently wide view of his subject …. 
(PRL, §2, 4-5) 
Educated English opinion (save among those with a religious bent) held that ethics, 
like all aspects of human life, could be understood through natural science. In 
principle (though not yet in practice), ethical questions could be reduced to 
physiological questions about human health, where “health” is taken broadly.  
In contrast, Green held that we can approach that which ultimately grounds 
ethics only by investigating that which ultimately grounds science. Green thought 
that both moral and scientific facts presuppose the existence of an eternal, 
unchanging “principle.” The “ego,” as he sometimes called this principle, must exist 
outside space and time in order to make possible all experiences of related objects in 
space and time.168  
In a preface to the fifth edition of Green’s Prolegomena, Edward Caird 
described Green’s project this way: 
The problem from which Green, like Kant, starts is the apparent opposition between 
the ordinary conception of the world, as a system of causally connected objects in space 
and time, which is presupposed by physical science, and what seem to be the 
fundamental ideas of morality and religion, the ideas of God, freedom, and 
immortality. If man, like all other objects of our empirical knowledge, is merely one 
part of the world of objects which act and react upon each other, according to fixed 
general laws, what room is left for the assertion of his moral freedom, or for any higher 
destiny which distinguishes him from the other creatures? … 
 Now Green, like Kant, endeavours to show that in ordinary experience and in 
physical science we usually ignore or abstract from a principle which, nevertheless, is 
always present in all our knowledge, and that therefore such science does not deal with 
the ultimate reality of things, but only with phenomena; i.e. with things partially 
understood, or not apprehended in their whole reality. When, however, we detect this 
principle in relation to which all phenomena exist and are known, the result is both to 
vindicate the ways of knowing that characterise science and ordinary experience within 
their proper sphere, and at the same time to establish our right to apply the principles 
of morality and religion to the absolute reality. (PRL, iii-iv) 
Caird here characterized Green as having started from the problem of how to 
reconcile our scientific conception of the world with the fundamental conceptions of 
                                                 
168 For a neat summary of Green’s strategy, see Edward Caird’s “Preface to the Fifth 
Edition” of the Prolegomena, especially p. iv. On the “principles” that all experience 
presupposes, see especially PRL, Book I, Chapter 1. I find §§ 27, 32-34, and 52 to give 
helpful summaries of Green’s project. 
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morality and religion. This passage elliptically refers to a “principle” that is “always 
present” in scientific knowledge. Exploration of this mysterious principle promises to 
“vindicate” science, morality, and religion all at once. What is the Greenian 
“principle” Caird had in mind? 
Green often emphasized the philosophical importance of a “principle” that he 
likened to Kant’s notion of the synthetic unity of apperception, or simply 
“transcendental apperception” (PRL, §§33, 38). This is the principle Caird had in 
mind. Kant’s notion of transcendental apperception is that of a “pure original 
unchangeable consciousness” (CPR, A107) that stands behind all our experiences in 
the following sense. For Kant, all necessary facts have transcendental conditions that 
can only be gleaned through a priori reflection. Apperception is the transcendental 
condition of a certain necessary fact about all conscious experience. The necessary 
fact in question is that all our varied experiences (in Kant’s language, the “manifold 
of all our intuitions,” A 106) are bound together in the conscious life of one unified 
self. My experiences, varied as they are, are all mine. There must be some 
transcendental ground of this necessary “synthesis” (A 106). “Apperception” is the 
name of Kant’s transcendental ground of the necessary synthesis of the manifold of 
all intuition in one unified consciousness. Green seems to have used “apperception” 
and “understanding” more or less interchangeably (see his remark at PRL, §33, 
40).  
When Green wrote about knowledge gained through the “understanding,” he 
followed Kant in postulating a “principle” that did not exist in space and time, and 
that made possible all experience in space and time. Green held that a purely 
empirical self amounted to nothing but changing feelings. But as he liked to repeat, 
changing feelings do not amount to feelings of change. Only an unchanging subject—
a subject outside of space and time—could consciously register perceptions as 
changing in space and time (e.g., INT, §§132, 314). 
Now this unchanging subject makes possible more than just experiences of 
objects in space and time (and thus scientific knowledge). It also makes possible “the 
consciousness of a moral ideal and the determination of human action thereby” 
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(PRL, §8, 13). So an ultimate investigation into the ground of moral facts—just like 
an ultimate investigation of the ground of scientific facts—will require a 
metaphysical account of the transcendental ego. 
However, if Green was to convince his readers that ultimate moral facts could 
only be grasped through transcendental metaphysics, he first had to launch an 
attack on ‘strong mental naturalism.’ This is because ‘strong mental naturalism’ was 
the actual foundation for the widespread view that moral facts can be understood 
through scientific investigation. 
Green might be accused of the fallacy of denying the antecedent, since a 
refutation of ‘strong mental naturalism’ does not entail a refutation of ‘strong moral 
naturalism.’ This objection misses Green’s real intentions. One of his ultimate goals, 
as I have repeatedly argued, was to attack those who saw empirical psychology as a 
foundation for philosophy. He apparently understood his targets, including 
contemporaries like Mill and Spencer, all actually to have grounded ‘moral 
naturalism’ in some form of ‘mental naturalism.’ Thus, he could undermine his 
actual opponents—and whom else might he hope to attack?—by undermining the 
actual foundation they maintained for ‘moral naturalism.’ 
His attack on ‘strong mental naturalism’ did bear a kinship in one important 
respect to his eventual criticism of ‘strong moral naturalism.’ He argued that neither 
position could make sense of norms—of cognitive norms in the former case, of moral 
norms in the latter.  
I will focus on the former charge, which Green developed mainly in his three-
part Mind article entitled “Can there be a Natural Science of Man?” (Green 1882a; 
Green 1882b; Green and Bradley 1882). This was the article Robertson wrote 
eagerly to James about (see above, p. 100). Green’s Mind article was incorporated 
into the Prolegomena, constituting about the first quarter of that longer work (see 
PRL, §§3-100). I concur with Perry that the three parts of the Mind piece “appear 
to have stimulated” James’s thinking, particularly in “On Some Omissions of 
Introspective Psychology” (RBP, I.565, James 1884b).  
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Green regarded both ‘strong mental naturalism’ and ‘strong moral naturalism’ 
as component parts of the proto-empiricist project. In fact, the idea of a “Natural 
Science of Man,” as Green attacked it in his Mind piece, came from Hume.169 
Green opened his piece by citing Hume as having given “the most consistent theory 
on the subject” of naturalist accounts of morality (Green 1882a, 1). 
Green argued that the cognitive skills required to practice science would not be 
available to a creature that was nothing but a product of natural forces. One 
important such skill involved recognizing and using epistemic norms or standards. 
For example, in order to gain genuine scientific knowledge one must correctly 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate perceptions, and discern which claims really 
are justified. But science discloses a material world apparently devoid of cognitive 
norms like accuracy and justification (and devoid as well of moral norms like 
goodness or justice). So if the mind is just one more object in the natural world—the 
natural world as disclosed by science—there could exist no norms to which such a 
mind could hew. 
To see why a natural mind could not, in Green’s view, take the kind of epistemic 
responsibility required for genuine knowledge, we must first unpack the notion of 
“science” at play in Green’s construal of ‘mental naturalism.’  
Introspection was to be a methodological bond holding the entire proto-
empiricist tradition together, from LBH through late 19th-century empirical 
psychologists. Introspection was also to transform the investigation of the mind into 
a scientific enterprise.170 Physicists and chemists test hypotheses via outer 
                                                 
169 “There is no question of importance, whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of 
man; and there is none, which can be decided with any certainty, before we become 
acquainted with that science. In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human 
nature, we in effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost 
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any security” (THN, 
“Introduction,” xx). 
170 On the emergence of introspection in psychology, see (Danziger 1990, 18-24). Danziger 
claims that it was not until the 19th century that introspection became a distinct 
methodology. The idea of introspection has philosophical roots in Locke’s distinction 
between sensation and reflection, Danziger thinks, and in Kant’s subsequent attempt to 
clarify what it would be to have a science of mind. But in order for introspection to become a 
genuine methodology in psychology, there needed to be an actual academic discipline 
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observation, observation of the external world. In contrast, empirical psychologists 
(at least, the British associationist and evolutionary psychologists Green had in 
view) purported to test hypotheses about the mind via inner observation, or 
introspection. Green wrote: 
As an observation of the ‘thinking thing,’ the ‘philosophy of mind’ seems to assume the 
character of a natural science, and thus at once acquires definiteness, and if not 
certainty, at least plausibility. To deny the possibility of such observation, in any 
proper sense of the word, is for most men to tamper with the unquestioned heritage of 
all educated intelligence. Hence … the general conviction that the Hegelian reduction 
of Psychology to Metaphysics is either an intellectual juggle, or a wilful return of the 
philosophy, which psychologists had washed, to the mire of scholasticism. (INT, §9, 7) 
There are two important points to draw from this passage. First, for Green, 
psychologists were widely viewed as having purged philosophy of scholastic 
metaphysics by recasting philosophy of mind as a natural science. Second, notice 
how psychologists transform philosophy of mind into a genuine science—they 
employ a methodology of observation of the “thinking thing.”171  
Green’s strategy in the Mind piece, then, was to argue for the truth of the 
following conditional: if the human mind is a natural object explainable by scientific 
methods—by “an observation of the ‘thinking thing’”—then the mind is not the sort 
of thing that could ever have genuine knowledge. If the conditional is true, then the 
very idea of psychology entails a contradiction. The project of psychology gets off the 
                                                                                                                                       
purporting to use this tool, for Danziger. He points to the emergence of psychology in 19th 
century German universities as the locus where introspection was elevated to method-hood. 
Also see (Danziger 1980), which contrasts views of introspection in English- and German-
language thought. Green may be read as bringing German views about the limitations of 
introspection to bear on British associationist and evolutionary psychology. By Danziger’s 
account, the latter had historically been much more optimistic about the use of introspection 
in a science of mind.  
171 It is not clear to me how much Green was influenced by Kant’s famous claim that 
empirical psychology could never achieve the status of a natural science (Kant 1786/2004, 7-
8 [4: 471]). See (Hatfield 1992) for a helpful discussion of Kant. Readers interested in 
Hegel’s critique of empirical psychology as well as Kant’s should consult (Tolman 2001). 
Danziger argues that for Kant, putting psychology on empirical footing was necessary, but 
not sufficient to make psychology into a science. The data with which psychology dealt—
experience—had to be mathematizable in order for psychology to achieve the status of a 
science, according to Kant (Danziger 1990, 20). Kant had argued that this was not possible, 
in his own day. Green did not, that I can find, emphasize that experience cannot be 
mathematized. 
  205  
ground precisely by assuming that the antecedent of this conditional is true. 
Psychologists, in other words, construe the human mind as a natural object. 
However, psychologists also assume their own minds do grasp genuine knowledge—
otherwise they cannot claim to be practicing science. This means psychologists 
affirm the antecedent and deny the consequent of this conditional, a problem if 
Green can show the conditional is true. I will now examine Green’s argument for the 
truth of the conditional.  
 
You’ll have guessed that Green’s answer to the question posed by his Mind 
title—“Can There Be a Natural Science of Man?”—was a resounding “No.” He 
began his piece by criticizing attempts to show that we can account for morality 
using nothing more than the resources of natural science. Two chief difficulties 
immediately present themselves—how to account for the existence of free will, and 
how to account for the existence of “a moral sense.” Green meant by “moral sense” 
the ability to appreciate what is morally praiseworthy or repugnant.  
The second was the more difficult problem. To see why, consider the following 
question. What qualities in human action excite or depress our moral sense? 
Empirical psychology places severe constraints on the range of acceptable answers. 
Since psychologists purported only to employ observational methods, Green thought 
it followed that the subject psychology studied must not have robust faculties of 
reason. He thought this placed the following constraint on how a naturalizer can 
answer the above question. Whatever quality in human action excites our moral 
sense, that quality cannot be something we need reason to discover. We must be 
able to take pleasure in the “‘mere survey’” of the quality in question, 
“independently of any consequences of the act to the person contemplating it…” 
(Green 1882a, 2). The emphasis in that last clause should be on contemplating—
the moral naturalizer cannot cite qualities in human action it requires rational 
contemplation to appreciate.  
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Now the leading ethical naturalizer was Hume, as far as Green was concerned. 
Hume posited a tendency to take pleasure in actions that generally increase 
pleasure or decrease pain in others. But a mystery remained. 
The problem which Hume bequeathed to a successor who adopted his principles was 
mainly to account for the two-fold fact, that the mere survey of actions as tending to 
produce pleasures, in which the contemplator will have no share, is yet a source of 
pleasure to him; and that among the pleasures taken into account in that estimate of 
the tendency of an action which determines the moral sentiment are such as have no 
direct connexion with the satisfaction of animal wants. (Green 1882a, 2)  
How, Green asked, can the “mere survey” of an act from which I am not to benefit 
nevertheless cause me pleasure? And how can I be caused pleasure by observing 
more rarified moral acts, right acts that make no difference to anyone’s “animal 
wants”? If we can answer this two-fold question, we will “have given to our national 
system of ethics … the solid foundation of a natural science” (Green 1882a, 3). 
But Green thought naturalizers could never provide a satisfactory answer. The 
naturalizer could only answer with descriptions of what we in fact find pleasurable, 
not with judgments about what we ought to find pleasurable. To give up on 
explaining the normative force of ought-judgments is to shuck the entire project of 
ethics, for Green. 
It has generally been expected of a moralist, however, that he should explain not only 
how men do act, but how they should act: and as a matter of fact we find … 
[naturalists] are as forward as any to propound rules of living to which they conceive 
that, according to their view of the influences which make him what he is, man ought 
to conform. (Green 1882a, 5)   
Naturalists try to define what is desirable, what we ought to do, in terms of what we 
actually desire. If they are to be consistent, they must forego any pretension to give 
a theory that has normative force. They can explain the origin of the phrases 
“ought” and “ought not,” and of the belief that some things are better than others. 
But insofar as they restrict themselves merely to observing the mind, they cannot 
derive any conclusions about what people really ought to do (Green 1882a, 5-6). 
Green’s argument continued this way: 
Now it is obvious that to a being who is simply a result of natural forces an injunction 
to conform to their laws is unmeaning. It implies that there is something in him 
independent of those forces, which may determine the relation in which he shall stand 
to them. (Green 1882a, 5) 
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The naturalist cannot 1) say that moral laws reduce to laws of nature, 2) say that 
human subjects, including their moral sentiments, are nothing but the outgrowth of 
natural processes, and 3) recommend that human subjects conform to moral laws. 
The problem is that one who is nothing but a product of natural laws cannot also 
choose to conform to those laws, unless there is some part of the person above or 
outside nature. But that is exactly what is denied by ‘strong mental naturalism’ and 
‘strong moral naturalism’—that there is any trans-empirical subject standing behind 
human mental life.  
Green then considered whether naturalists can do without an idea of morality 
all together. Perhaps when anyone talks about what ought to be done, the ‘moral 
naturalist’ might simply think of this as, in Green’s words, “at best making use of a 
serviceable illusion” (Green 1882a, 6). Green argued that the ‘moral naturalist’ 
should get uncomfortable at this point, because this elimination of the concept of 
obligation puts into jeopardy the ‘strong mental naturalism’ her position 
presupposes. He wrote:  
We cannot but inquire whether a being that was merely a result of natural forces could 
form a theory of those forces as explaining himself. … 
 Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature in that sense of 
nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge? … If [this question] is 
answered in the negative, we shall at least have satisfied ourselves that man, in respect 
of the function called knowledge, is not merely a child of nature. (Green 1882a, 6-7) 
This passage is put in the form of a rhetorical question, but we can readily anticipate 
Green’s answer. The question is whether the kind of human subject postulated by 
‘strong mental naturalists’ could also be the sort of subject that is able to practice 
psychology. The implied answer is negative. A being for whom the notion of 
obligation is merely a “serviceable illusion” could not have the capacity to treat a 
theory as explaining herself. The problem is not to do with a natural creature 
explaining herself in particular. The problem has to do with a natural creature 
having the capacity to treat any theory as an explanation.  
A natural creature cannot grasp an explanation as such because she can form no 
conception of the difference between accurate and inaccurate representations, for 
Green. To grasp an explanation, one must take a string of words as capturing or 
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failing to capture reality. But a merely feeling consciousness—the only sort of 
consciousness Green thinks is visible to empirical psychological investigation—could 
not possibly accomplish this task.  
To illustrate why not, Green asks us to consider a train engineer who “sees a 
signal wrong.” That engineer must have the capacity to make normative judgments 
about his own perceptions. He must take his perceptions as standing for external 
objects; and he must then judge some representations to be better or more accurate 
than others. But these acts of normative discernment are not available to the purely 
feeling consciousness, Green wrote. 
… Is a feeling, which is undoubtedly felt, really related as some one thinking about it 
takes it to be ? If an engine-driver, under certain conditions, … ‘sees a signal wrong,’ 
his disordered vision has its own reality just as much as if he saw right.172 There are 
relations between combinations of moving particles on the one side and his visual 
organs on the other … as full and definite … as in any case of normal vision. There is 
as much reality in the one case as in the other, but it is not the same reality: i.e., it 
does not consist in the same relations. The engine-driver mistakes the effect of one set 
of relations for that of another, one reality for another, and hence his error in action. 
He may be quite innocent of a scientific theory of vision, but he objectifies his 
sensations. He interprets them … as signs of objects from which he distinguishes his 
feelings and by which he explains them. Were this not the case, his vision might be 
normal or abnormal, but he would be incapable of mistaking one kind of reality for 
another, since he would have no conception of reality at all. (Green 1882a, 10) 
Here is the question Green thinks it is impossible for ‘strong mental naturalists’ to 
answer adequately: what makes possible a subject’s normative judgments about his 
own perceptions? The engineer is able to question what relation his perception of 
the signal stands to the signal in the external world. This kind of judgment is not 
possible, Green thought, for the purely feeling consciousness the naturalist 
postulates, for several reasons. First, the purely feeling consciousness cannot take 
any relations as real, as we saw in Section Four, above. All the feeling consciousness 
has to work with is passing, atomic feelings. Such a consciousness could perhaps 
conceive of two different signal-perceptions, each standing in different relations to 
some imagined reality. But since she must regard all relations as fictions, she cannot 
have any reason to think one relation is preferable to the other.  
                                                 
172 Note that here Green intends formal reality, not objective reality as was most often the 
case in INT.  
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Green specifies one necessary condition any creature must satisfy if it is to be 
capable of normative judgments. Green held that when we judge a perception to 
correspond with reality, the notion of “reality” at play is one where events are 
subsumed under natural laws. But we cannot form ideas of natural laws except 
through the “understanding,” which must exist outside of space and time. Thus, he 
wrote:  
The terms ‘real’ and ‘objective,’ then, have no meaning except for a consciousness 
which presents its experiences to itself as determined by relations, and at the same 
time conceives a single and unalterable order of relations determining them, with 
which its temporary presentation, as each experience occurs, of the relations 
determining it may be contrasted. (Green 1882a, 10) 
One must have an idea of events in reality obeying universal laws—this is what 
Green means by a “single and unalterable order of relations” determining our 
perceptions. One must then be able to contrast one’s fleeting perceptions, perhaps 
made in sub-par circumstances (a foggy day on the train line, say) with reality as 
viewed from an absolute standpoint. The merely feeling consciousness has only 
fleeting perceptions and no faculty of reason. Green thinks it requires reason, not 
mere sensation, to form such a perspective. In short, the merely feeling 
consciousness studied by psychologists lacks the cognitive resources to form an idea 
of a God’s-eye view, so to speak, on Reality.  
Green’s argument was that knowledge requires the use of standards—there has 
to be a difference between correct and incorrect observations to enable us ever to 
have legitimate knowledge of the natural world. Science cannot be built by stringing 
together simple reports on our experiences, like “I see a dot in my telescope.” To 
count as having knowledge we must be prepared to endorse some of those 
experiences as correct—to employ standards. We need to be able to endorse claims 
like “I see a dot in my telescope, and that dot is Neptune.”  
According to Green, we cannot keep eliminating normative notions from our 
theoretical toolbox forever—for at some point, we will have to make sense of the 
notion not just of how we ought to act, but also of what we ought to believe.  
 
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Finally, contemporary readers will find such charges against the Lockean 
tradition familiar. In the 1950s, Wilfrid Sellars accused empiricists like Price of 
making a mistake akin to the naturalistic fallacy in ethics. 
Now the idea that epistemic facts can be analyzed without remainder—even “in 
principle”—into non-epistemic facts … is, I believe, a radical mistake—a mistake of a 
piece with the so-called “naturalistic fallacy” in ethics.” (Sellars 1956/1997, 19) 
It was Moore who made the naturalistic fallacy famous in his 1903 Principia Ethica. 
He charged that it was a fallacy to define “good” in terms of natural properties like 
desire. The charge was that words like “good” have normative force, whereas words 
that describe natural properties do not have such force.  
Sellars presented his own attack on empiricist epistemology as a modification of 
Moore’s argument in ethics. Ironically, Moore is very likely to have learned the 
argument from Green—or at least from Green’s student F. H. Bradley, who himself 
is likely to have learned the argument from Green. In other words, the argument I 
have been considering in this section does not just bear a coincidental resemblance 
to Sellars’s attack on traditional empiricism. Green’s argument is a historical 
ancestor of that argument. 
Moore cited J. S. Mill as the paradigmatic example of one who committed the 
naturalistic fallacy, charging that the latter defined “desirable” as what we in fact 
desire, rather than as what we ought to desire (citing Mill 1863, Ch. IV, Parag. 3). 
Recently, Steve Gerrard has both defended Mill173 and traced the history of Moore’s 
charge (Gerrard 2002, 37).  
Gerrard’s defense portrays Moore as having misread Mill in a distinctive way. 
Gerrard then traces Moore’s alleged misreading through Sidgwick back to F. H. 
Bradley. Gerrard does not mention Green, but since Bradley was Green’s student, it 
stands to reason that Green was involved in the transmission of this criticism. There 
is textual evidence from Green to support my contention.  
                                                 
173 Gerrard first argues that Mill meant to define “desirable” as what an “educated person 
under proper conditions” desires. Hence “desire” was already a normative notion, and Mill 
was not guilty of the naturalistic fallacy (p. 45). 
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Although the last passage I cited from Green does not bear any obvious link to 
Moore’s way of putting the argument, other passages in Green bear a more striking 
resemblance to Moore. In his Lectures on Kant, for example, Green’s argument is 
more clearly directed at the notorious passage from Mill:  
hedonistic moralists are always contradicting themselves by trying to represent 
pleasure, through an equivocation between the desired and the desirable, as at once 
the unconditioned good (because that which alone we actually desire), and an object 
we should desire. (GWR, II.110) 
Notice Green’s use of “desire” and “desirable,” the two words Moore accused Mill 
of misusing in the latter’s notorious passage from Utilitarianism. We do not know 
when this passage was written, as they come from posthumously published lecture 
notes. I surmise from (GWR, II.1) that the notes were likely written in the early 
1870s. Moore was deeply influenced by Bradley (Hylton 1990, 44), and Bradley 
was a student of Green’s at Balliol College, Oxford.  
It is surprising to see that Sellars’s attack on empiricism—fresh as it still seems 
today—actually traces all the way back to T. H. Green. In the next chapter, I will 
suggest that James had a response to this argument. Whether James has resources 
for responding to Sellars’s specific version of the argument is an issue I must leave to 
future research. 
 
To summarize this section, here is a brief reconstruction of Green’s Mind 
argument, which was supposed to establish the conditional I laid out above, on p. 
204. The conditional states that if the human mind is a natural object explainable by 
scientific methods—by “an observation of the ‘thinking thing’”—then the mind is 
not the sort of thing that could ever have genuine knowledge.  
‘Strong mental naturalism,’ the view that the mind is in principle fully 
explicable by scientific methods, entails ‘strong moral naturalism,’ the view that 
moral properties are explicable by scientific methods. But ‘strong moral naturalism’ 
entails that normative notions are nothing but “serviceable illusions.” Thus, the 
‘strong mental naturalist’ must also hold that normative notions are illusions. But 
then the ‘strong mental naturalist’ cannot answer an important question about 
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human life, viz., how is scientific knowledge itself possible? Any adequate answer to 
this question, Green argued, must be able to show how a subject can make 
legitimate normative judgments about her own perceptions. One cannot have 
scientific knowledge—one cannot do psychology at all—unless one can discern which 
perceptions are accurate, and which amount to “seeing the signal wrong.” Thus, if 
the human mind is a natural object explainable purely by scientific methods, then it 
is impossible to have scientific knowledge.  
I now turn to Edward Caird’s own work. I give a brief review of Caird’s version 
of proto-empiricist history, and of his positive account of space. James had been 
reading Caird around the same time he had been working through Green, as we saw 
in Chapter Two. I cannot consider Caird’s views in as much detail as Green’s, but I 
explore his work just enough so that we will be able to understand James’s reaction 
to Idealists. 
6.   EDWARD CAIRD: A KANTIAN ACCOUNT OF SPACE 
Edward Caird was another prominent British exponent of Kant and German 
idealism. He was a Scotsman in the first generation after Mill and Bain of those who 
looked to Germany for ideas about how to repair or recast the common-sense 
philosophy that had died with Mill’s examination of Hamilton.174  
Caird was perhaps more thoroughly influenced by Hegel than Green had 
been,175  though in Caird’s own attack on proto-empiricism he continually deferred 
to Green’s influential work.176 However, certain unique features of Caird’s argument 
                                                 
174 Hamilton had also been influenced by Kant and German philosophy, but where 
Hamilton’s generation had been interested in surpassing Kant, Caird’s was more focused on 
recovering what they regarded as Kant and Hegel’s true, lost philosophical insights. 
175 In addition to his thorough 1877 account of Kant’s philosophy, which sprouted a second 
significantly revised edition in 1889, Caird also published a similarly influential volume on 
Hegel in 1883 (Caird 1883).  
176 For some examples, see (Caird 1877, 58, 62 fn., 64, 64  fn., 71). He adapted Green’s 
idea that sensations are speechless, as follows: “Or how, without bringing in conceptions of 
relations, not given in sensations themselves, can we bind these sensations together, and 
refer them to a  permanent self? If the Baconian rule of taking facts as they are, be 
interpreted on the hypothesis, that pure sensations are the only facts, then reality is 
something, which we may feel, but of which we can neither think or speak. ‘A consistent 
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also surfaced in James’ response to Idealists, so it is important to introduce them 
here. 
Caird followed Hegel in seeing the history of philosophy as evolving through 
broad, dialectical advances. Descartes was supposed to have been “the philosophical 
counterpart of the Protestant Reformation,” which meant that Descartes was to be 
treated as the earliest philosopher to raise forcefully the question of how an 
individual mind can know about the world. Although the Cartesian philosophy “was 
immediately corrected by the thought, that the consciousness of self is secondary to 
the consciousness of God,” nevertheless, Caird thought Descartes failed fully to 
understand the epistemology of individual consciousness. Once Descartes broached 
the topic of how an individual mind can have genuine knowledge, it had as a matter 
of historical necessity to be fully explored (Caird 1877, 52).  
Thus, while Cartesians quickly made recourse to God in their accounts of the 
epistemology of individuals, Locke’s contribution was to keep more consistently to 
the individual perspective in probing this issue. But he did not quite succeed, in 
Caird’s view; Locke ended up quietly switching between two incompatible 
perspectives from which he philosophized about the foundation of knowledge. This 
will seem familiar from Green. Locke sometimes asked what can be known from the 
perspective of an individual mind, in which case the only plausible answer is 
collections of ideas, and not any outer object in itself. At other times, Locke took on 
a “God’s eye view” of the universe as containing both material objects and the 
thinking things they impinge. But when he worked from this latter perspective, 
argued Caird, Locke could give no account of how the physical material of the world 
could ever be translated into mental signals to which minds have access. Let us look 
at this argument in more detail.  
Caird thought Locke faced a dilemma: either give up the prospect of a 
materialistic psychology for the sake of a coherent, naturalistic ontology; or give up 
                                                                                                                                       
sensationalism must be speechless’ [fn: “Green's Introduction to Hume, § 45.”]” (Caird 
1877, 61-62). 
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the prospect of a naturalistic ontology for the sake of materialistic psychology. The 
ontology-instead-of-psychology horn is not tenable, for Locke: 
…The philosophy of Locke reduces itself to an attempted synthesis of two 
contradictory theories. For one of two things is inevitable. Either consciousness must 
be conceived as transcending the individuality of the human animal, as embracing in 
one thought the duality of subject and object, which then can have no existence in 
themselves apart from the unity in which they are known. In this way we may save, if 
not the ontology of Locke, at least some kind of ontology at the expense of his 
psychology. (Caird 1877, 60) 
Caird held that a subject can come to know an object in itself only if the subject and 
object of the relevant perceptions are both conceptually and ontologically part of one 
higher “thought” or unified perception. For example, consciousness (note that I 
don’t write “my” or “one’s” consciousness, and that Caird here avoids those 
locutions as well) may transcend the limited perspective of an individual animal and 
have real knowledge of, say, the columbine flower in Lisa’s garden, but only if the 
flower and the viewer are both dependent parts carved from one higher, unified 
thought. But such a perception cannot correspond to anything but a fiction for 
anyone who accepts ‘psychological atomism’ and the reality principle. Thus if Locke 
wanted a defensible ontology, he must sacrifice his psychology.  
The second horn of the dilemma is to retain a materialistic psychology, but to 
give up on a naturalistic ontology: 
Or if, on the other hand, the individual consciousness is not to be conceived as 
transcending itself, then we must be in earnest about its limits. We must give up all 
pretence of knowing things in themselves, or construing out of our own affections a 
reality not included in them. We must surrender all that part of Locke’s philosophy 
which deals with things as opposed to ideas, with real material substance defined by 
the primary qualities, as opposed to the secondary qualities which exist only in the 
mind. It is impossible to preserve both the sensationalist view of the development of 
knowledge, and the materialistic account of the origin of sensation. (Caird 1877, 60) 
In other words, Locke may keep his sensationalist psychology, but only at the 
expense of the accompanying view that the mind can ever come to know objects as 
they exist in nature, independent of their ever being perceived.  
For Caird the method of introspection and the individual perspective it requires 
are essential to proto-empiricism, and so Locke and his followers were forced to 
choose this second horn, accepting the “substitution of psychology for ontology” 
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(Caird 1877, 64). This is exactly what Hume in particular had tried to do, according 
to Caird. 
The philosophy of Locke and Berkeley had been developed partly from the point of 
view of an individual mind, whose immediate knowledge was confined to its own 
feelings, but partly also from the universal point of view of a spectator, who could 
observe both the mind and its object, first in their separateness, and then in their 
action upon each other. Seeing clearly the inconsistency of this double procedure, 
Hume made at least a vigorous effort to avoid it, and to confine himself to the 
observation of his own consciousness. (Caird 1877, 64) 
Caird here suggested that any “individualism,” as he elsewhere called it, will be 
impotent to show how humans can have genuine knowledge of the external world. 
Hume recognized this, the story goes, and thus abandoned Locke’s aspirations to 
ontology. With Hume, the question was no longer how the mind can know 
independently-existing things in the world, but rather “how a series of isolated and 
transitory sensations should ever come to have for us the appearance of a connected 
world of objects” (Caird 1877, 65).  
But this project raised two new difficulties, for Caird’s Hume. 
In the first place, he has to explain how isolated and transitory feelings can be in any 
way related or combined with each other. And, in the second place, he has to explain, 
how combinations of impressions and ideas in certain cases come to be regarded as real 
and objective existences independent of the mind. (Caird 1877, 66) 
The first problem Caird posed for Hume was to explain how psychological atoms can 
be combined with one another. As I have mentioned, Caird thought Locke’s 
‘psychological atomism’ prevented him from forming an “ontology”—by which he 
meant a robust conception of reality. The second problem was to show how the 
combination of psychological atoms can constitute a perception of reality.  
Caird read Hume as having been sensitive to these problems, and as proposing 
that there are “natural relations” already inherent “in the very data of sensation” to 
try to skirt them (Caird 1877, 67). Natural relations are whatever in one idea calls 
up another idea according to psychological laws (Caird 1877, 67, citing THN, 
I.61.64). The first problem was supposed to be answered in part by putting 
relational properties into the impressions and simple ideas themselves.  
Recall that for Hume there were three sets of relations inherent in ideas: 
resemblance, contiguity (which include some space and time relations), and 
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sequence (which is what explains the appearance of causation). Hume then was 
supposed to account for the second of the two challenges (to show how some 
combinations of impressions come to seem real) by showing how causality and 
identity are derived from natural relations between ideas. Causality and identity are 
categories at the foundation of our conception of a real, objective world. But these 
categories—or what remains of these categories after they are reduced to natural 
relations—could be “explain[ed] away” as “propensities to feign” (Caird 1877, 68-
69).  
Caird’s main response was that the idea of natural relations which is supposed 
to be at the foundation of our conception of an external world “presupposes the very 
categories [of causality and identity] in question” by assuming that a series of 
changing sensations can constitute or refer to one object through time. In other 
words, the very assumption that we have a stock of ideas in our heads that persist 
through time presupposes that we already have a grasp of the “category” of identity. 
Hume thus is guilty of trying to explain away “categories” of causation and identity 
via an experience whose coherence requires that we already have those very 
categories in place to begin with. 
 
But Caird puts much of his attack against proto-empiricism, particularly on the 
topic of space, in the mouth of Kant. Just before his so-called “critical period,” Kant 
had come to reject the Leibnizian view that relations between substances are all 
unreal—and in particular, that for space to exist, there had by definition to be a 
collection of objects related to one another (Caird 1877, 160-161). Caird wrote: 
In a short essay on The first ground for the distinction of regions in space, Kant 
maintains that the idea of space in general is not acquired, … but that, on the contrary, 
the idea of the one absolute space is presupposed in the determination of all particular 
spaces, and things in space. In asserting this doctrine, Kant, in principle, declares war 
against … Individualism: for Individualism cannot regard the whole as prior to the 
parts. To Locke as to Leibnitz, space is an idea of the relations of objects, and, 
therefore, logically posterior to the ideas of the objects themselves. But Kant here 
contends that when we examine carefully the ‘judgments of perception’ regarding the 
extension of objects, we find … we cannot determine matter as extended, or as having 
its parts definitely situated in regard to each other, except in relation to absolute space, 
as a unity in which every particular extension is included. (Caird 1877, 165) 
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Thus Kant’s break with both Locke and Leibniz comes in his break with 
“individualism.” “Individualism” seems to be the methodological approach of 
explaining parts in terms of their function in wholes—we might term the reverse 
approach “methodological holism.” Thus, Caird saw Kant’s early critical-period 
insight to have been the abandonment of individualism in favor of a holism about 
space. Kant began to see space not as built out of individual objects or positions, but 
as an absolute unity out of which positions or objects, if it contains any, are to be 
analyzed.  
For Caird, Kant’s argument for the priority of a unified space is that in every 
distinction between right and left, up and down, front or back, there is an implied 
relation of parts of the body not just to one another, but to absolute space. If space 
were just relations between bodies, then if we properly inverted a relationship 
between two objects, their relations to one another may not change, but their 
position in (absolute) space does. So, “while ... we cannot immediately perceive 
absolute space, we perceive distinctions of body which presuppose it, and which 
could not exist without it” (Caird 1877, 167). 
In short, Kant’s early critical period is marked by his arrival at the  
conviction that absolute space is an idea which is not given in outward experience, yet 
which is the very condition of its possibility. Hence, he [Kant] could no longer conceive 
material substances as monads or exclusive individuals. The unity of such substances 
as in one space is given before their isolated existence, and they must therefore 
conform to the nature of space. Hence, also, the synthesis of geometry, which, at an 
earlier period, Kant had treated as an arbitrary process of construction, acquires a real 
and objective value. (Caird 1877, 167-168) 
For Caird’s critical-period Kant, Euclidean geometry gives the principles that 
govern possible relations in which objects of experience may stand. The Euclidean 
“principle of synthesis,” in Caird’s phrase, comes from the mind itself, and cannot be 
derived from experience (Caird 1877, 168).  
Helmholtz had also pointed out (in an article James attacked in “The Spatial 
Quale”) that Kant thought that the mind was unable to conceive of any other spatial 
relations than those given by Euclid’s geometry. But Euclid’s (synthetic) axioms are 
discovered a priori, not empirically. So there must be an a priori constraint on all our 
space perceptions, and space perception cannot be grounded purely in experience 
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(Helmholtz 1878, 212-213). Moreover, Kant had (and thus Caird and Green 
presumably both have, as well) a positive account in Euclidean geometry for the 
nature of the spatial constraint the mind places on possible experiences of the 
external world. The challenge for proto-empiricism was to offer a similarly 
principled explanation of what makes space perception possible. 
Caird seems to have regarded this challenge as insurmountable. He took Green 
to have established that Hume had failed to show how spatial perception could be 
the result of any synthesis of minima sensibilia. In contrast, Kant had succeeded not 
just in explaining space perception as a capacity that presupposes a prior concept of 
absolute space. Kant had also shown (Caird held) that Euclid’s axioms spell out 
precisely what constraints this prior concept of absolute space places on our spatial 
perceptions. All this strongly suggested to Caird that spatial perception simply could 
not be convincingly explained as any bare experiential synthesis. Thus he allowed 
himself some triumphant language: 
Is it not clear that Empiricism177 must be altogether rejected as an explanation of 
knowledge. Take away from experience the ideas of time, space, causation, and the 
like, and what remains? Only a series of sensations without connexion, and therefore 
without intelligible meaning. If, therefore, there is connection and intelligible meaning 
in the empirical consciousness; if it sets before us a world of definitely related objects, 
the reason must be found in the a priori forms by which the matter of causation is 
organised and combined. And it will be the business of philosophy to discover and 
enumerate the a priori elements of knowledge, and to determine their relations to each 
other. (Caird 1877, 168-169) 
Notice that for Caird, as for Green, the crucial disagreement with proto-empiricists 
is over the proper relation between science and philosophy. With Green, Caird 
concluded that it is “the business of philosophy” to undertake an a priori analysis of 
knowledge, not to undertake any empirical study of the mind.  
 
So far we have seen in Green a collection of arguments to the effect that proto-
empiricists cannot account for how the mind could come to know relations in 
general, and spatial relations in particular. Caird diagnosed the source the proto-
empiricist failure. The source was a foolhardy insistence that the individual 
                                                 
177 For more on Caird’s use of “Empiricism,” see above, pp. 48-50. 
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perspective of introspection can be used to yield a defensible, naturalistic ontology. 
Knowledge of the external world requires that the subject perceive both the object 
and the subject of particular perceptions at once. One cannot make theoretical sense 
of this absolute perspective using introspection alone. Also, Caird argued for a 
Kantian account of space perception. Against proto-empiricists, Caird held that a 
formal, Euclidean conception of absolute space was presupposed by all experiences 
of the external world.  
Against this background, I conclude this chapter with a brief review of J. E. 
Cabot’s article on space.   
7.   J.  E. CABOT: TAKING THE FIGHT TO PSYCHOLOGISTS 
James Elliot Cabot (1821-1903) was James’s senior by two decades, and a 
member of the Boston elite. He was a Harvard graduate who went on to study 
under Schelling in Berlin, eventually becoming editor of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s 
collected papers, published in 1883.  
As I have mentioned, Cabot’s article was written for and delivered to the 
revived Metaphysical Club when they were reading Green and Caird. Though he 
did not refer explicitly to those two authors, he shared their Kant-flavored outlook 
on space perception. Cabot focused his attention on those like J. S. Mill who try to 
show that one or another variety of sensation can be used to build, piecemeal, a 
consciousness of extension (Cabot 1878, 229). 
One feature of Cabot’s article immediately distinguishes it from Green and 
Caird’s work. Green and Caird both tended to write in general terms about 
“empirical psychologists” and their flawed philosophical commitments, but often 
failed to wrestle with empirical psychology in any detail. In contrast, Cabot’s paper 
is peppered with direct references to empirical work in psychology. The paper is 
short (10 pages), but includes footnotes to Carl Stumpf, Joseph Delboeuf (a Belgian 
psychologist and hypnotist), Wundt, Lotze, and Helmholtz. Cabot also offered direct 
discussion of J. S. Mill’s theory of space perception. So whereas Caird and Cabot 
sought to attack empirical psychology by way of its historical-philosophical 
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foundation in proto-empiricism, Cabot adapted such arguments directly to 
contemporary empirical psychologists.  
Cabot’s central argument was that “a most violent paradox” arises from the 
assumption that we have an idea of space drawn from sensory perception alone. On 
the one hand, our perceptions of objects are all fleeting. I turn my head to the right 
and see my lamp; to my left I see my guitar. Though these two perceptions are not 
in front of my mind’s eye at once, my experience is nevertheless such that the 
objects of those perceptions—my lamp and my guitar—seem to coexist in space and 
time. Cabot claimed that something is needed to explain this inference we seem 
habitually to make from fleeting perceptions, themselves only appearing to us in a 
temporal succession, to the idea that objects of those perceptions coexist in space 
and time. 
In order to admit such a conclusion he [“a purely sentient being, having no knowledge 
of Extension”] must first have come, not merely to distrust his senses, but to the 
implicit assumption that their informations are of no value whatever; that their value 
lies in what they prove, not in what they are—in short, he must have begun to think, 
instead of merely to feel. (Cabot 1878, 231) 
Thus, the “most violent paradox” is the suggestion to someone with no a priori 
conception of extension and no mental faculties other than sensory ones, that his 
fleeting experiences correspond to objects that persist in space even when he is not 
looking, listening, or whatever. The only way to mitigate this “paradox” is to admit 
that awareness of space presupposes an intellectual faculty that makes sense of such 
bare sensations. 
This argument shows echoes of Caird and Green. Caird claimed (see page 216, 
above) that Hume ultimately failed to offer a coherent account of “natural relations” 
because the Humean subject must make use of a native category of identity. Cabot 
makes a similar charge against Mill. The psychologist’s imagined subject must also 
make use of some intellectual principle of identity before he can come to treat 
fleeting sensations as having stable objects. Moreover, Cabot claimed that rational 
thought is what lets us discover what our experiences “signify, or what hypothesis 
they oblige us to adopt.” As with Green, Cabot’s sensations are meaningless; only a 
  221  
separate intellectual faculty could accomplish the task of interpreting them (Cabot 
1878, 231). 
Cabot rejected the proto-empiricist view that we have discrete sensations which 
are then glued into a composite whole by a unifying intellectual faculty. Rather, he 
allied himself with Caird’s Kant (see page 217, above) by claiming that our intellect 
natively has a conception of unified space. Individual sensations are then interpreted 
as referring to objects that exist in space. We could never refer sensations to objects 
in space unless we already understood this universal conception of space.  
To see why the intellect as a faculty that glues together independent sensations 
will not work, for Cabot, assume for a moment that we form a conception of space 
by grasping relations between sensations. Cabot objected that sensations unaided by 
the intellect are always particular; thus one who claims that the intellect constructs 
an understanding of space from bare sensations must be able to specify the 
particular sensations whose relations constitute our conception of space. Or, such a 
person must show how a subject can abstract the particular visual or tactile 
properties away from those sensations. The first horn of this dilemma will not work. 
It is impossible to specify some one type of sensation that our conception of space 
relates, Cabot wrote.  
Evidently, however, this is a figurative way of speaking [that “we see the place, 
distance, direction, and extent of bodies”]; for it is not meant, I suppose, that 
Extension is an affection of the optic nerve; in other words, that it is a color. If this is 
meant, then we are entitled to ask, What color? Someone, I forget who, has suggested 
that Space is of a bluish tint …. (Cabot 1878, 225-226) 
Claiming that space perception is a matter of relations between particular sensations 
requires a willingness to specify which sensations are thus related. Cabot ridiculed 
the prospect of being able to specify such sensations. In the case of a visual 
perception of space, this would entail that every perception of extension is also a 
perception of some particular color. This echoes a familiar argument from Green, 
that by Hume’s own lights geometry must be concerned with the science of color 
perception.  
But those who hold that our knowledge of space is acquired also have trouble 
claiming that the mind places abstract visual or tactile perceptions into relation with 
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one another. For this would require that space is somehow a relation between “blank 
perceptions,” and one is left with nothing but 
the picture of a relation without related terms. Our sensations, when we have 
abstracted from them their special qualities, are simply nothing at all, and cannot be 
brought into relations with each other or with anything else; and we have to fill out 
their empty forms with an occult quality of localization, which really signifies only the 
exigencies of our theory. (Cabot 1878, 232) 
Instead, Cabot proposed a definition of extension as “...the negation of any 
reality in the sensible qualities taken by themselves” (Cabot 1878, 232). He meant 
that extension is not a relation between self-standing perceptual objects or qualities. 
Instead, extension is the very concept, supplied by our intellect, that affirms (or 
constitutes) the formal reality of our scattered sensations of the physical world. In 
other words, external perceptions only become meaningful when they are united by 
an a priori, absolute conception of space.  
So Cabot, like Green, insisted that psychologists cannot give an empirical 
account of space perception because sensations by themselves cannot give us an idea 
of real space relations. Careful consideration shows, Cabot thought, that a 
conception of space would be impossible to build out of such meaningless sensations. 
Instead, the existence of any real sensations—sensations that refer to an external 
world, in particular—presupposes an a priori conception of absolute space.
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Chapter Four 
Space Perception and the Stream of  Thought 
1. INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE 
As we have seen, Idealists purported to attack the very idea of an empirical 
science of mind. William James took it upon himself to respond. He saw that many 
Idealist arguments targeted the constitutive framework on which associationism,178 
then the dominant school of British psychology, was built. James would rescue 
empirical psychology, and in turn empiricist philosophy, by replacing the old 
framework of ‘psychological atomism’ with something new.  
Michael Friedman has developed a conception of constitutive scientific 
principles on which I rely in this chapter and the next. For Friedman, a sentence P 
constitutes (or is presupposed by) a sentence Q just in case Q is meaningless unless 
P is true (Friedman 2001, 74). The classic example concerns the sentence “The 
present King of France is bald.” This sentence presupposes that there exists exactly 
one present King of France. Since, in fact, there exists no present King of France, 
we do not know how to assign a truth value either to this statement or to its 
negation179—in other words, the statement is meaningless. Thus, for Friedman, 
“There exists exactly one present King of France” is a constitutive condition of the 
sentence “The present King of France is bald.”180 
                                                 
178 There is a tension between contemporary and Victorian usages of the word 
“associationism.” I use the word in its older sense. For more on this tension, see fn. 61 6, 
above.  
179 When I write that we do not know how to assign a truth value to the negation of “The 
present King of France is bald,” I am assuming what is controversial—that the proper 
negation of this statement is “The present King of France is not bald,” rather than “It is not 
the case that the present King of France is bald.” I offer a more detailed discussion of 
presuppositions, and of Friedman’s views on this topic, in Chapter Five, Section Four, 
below. 
180 Not every constitutive condition of an empirical statement is a constitutive scientific 
principle, for Friedman.  
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In this sense, ‘psychological atomism’ played a constitutive role with respect to 
many associationist theories of cognition and perception. Associationist theories 
typically presupposed that experience was given in atomic units. Then, they sought 
to explain diverse facets of cognition and perception by postulating natural laws 
governing the combination of these atoms. For example, recall from our previous 
chapter Hume’s theory of shape-perception.181 Hume held that when we perceive 
the shape of a yellow triangle, we are perceiving the triangular manner in which a 
set of yellow minima sensibilia are arranged with respect to one another. If it turns 
out that there are no such things as minima sensibilia—that is, if one of 
associationism’s presuppositions turns out to be false—then theories concerning 
which groups of sensibilia yield which experiences become misplaced or even 
meaningless.  
In contrast, James’s own specific theories, as I shall call them (e.g., his theories 
of space and time perception, of the self, of cognition), rested on a constitutive thesis 
that was inconsistent with the ‘psychological atomism’ presupposed by 
associationism. James’s constitutive thesis was that experience is given in a 
continuous stream rather than in discrete atoms. By using this thesis as a 
framework for a new, non-associationist psychology, James avoided important 
problems Idealists had exposed concerning the very idea of a science of mind—or so 
I shall argue.  
I have two chief goals in this final part of the dissertation. One is to show exactly 
how James’s notion of a stream of thought provided a framework for his psychology. 
The other is to show how this new framework enabled James to rehabilitate 
empirical psychology, and in turn empiricist philosophy, in the face of the sort of 
Idealist attacks we investigated in Chapter Three, above. I will approach these tasks 
in reverse order because, as I will argue, James’s notion of a stream of thought 
emerged out of his response to Idealists, not vice versa.  
                                                 
181 For two helpful overviews of the history of associationism, see (Young 1968; Young 1970, 
94-100); both portray Hume as an influential, early member of this tradition. 
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It is a commonplace to call James’s notion of a stream of thought a “framework” 
for his psychology. But little serious work has been done to show exactly what kind 
of framework the stream is supposed to provide, or why James should even need a 
“framework” at all. So I start by showing that leading accounts of James get 
themselves into trouble on this score.  
I then argue that our failure to understand the epistemic standing of the stream 
of thought is a serious shortcoming in our estimation of James’s role in philosophic 
history. The stream was not just a tool important for his work in psychology. The 
notion of a stream of thought had a profound impact on the development of 
empiricism. Students and colleagues like C. I. Lewis, Ralph Barton Perry, and 
especially John Dewey (on whom I focus) saw the stream as providing an account of 
experience that was both philosophically fruitful, yet genuinely scientific as well.182  
Next, I begin my own account of the Principles’s framework (that is, the stream 
of thought) by examining “The Spatial Quale,” James’s early essay on space 
perception (James 1879b). The piece offered empirical evidence that sensations are 
spatially continuous, not granular. I show that James’s evidence against 
‘psychological atomism’ underwrote a persuasive response to Idealists.  
Idealists had charged that by proto-empiricists’ own lights, there could be no 
real ideas of space. Such ideas could not be formed in the first place until the mind 
added extra-sensational relations to simple ideas. Since these relations were extra-
sensational, they could not be taken to correspond to anything real in the external 
world.  
James managed to avoid these problems by denying that spatial perception 
begins with atomic sensations that must be actively knit together, as it were, by the 
mind. He provided empirical evidence that raw sensation is actually chaotic and 
                                                 
182 The influence of the stream of thought on Lewis’s empiricism can be seen in his 
description of what is “given in experience” at (Lewis 1929/1956, 58 ff.). He characterized 
what is given as a Jamesean “stream of consciousness.” For a similar account, see (Lewis 
1946, 439-440). For his part, Perry characterized James’s fundamental philosophical 
orientation as that of empiricism, in (RBP, Chs. XXVI ff, esp. I.466). In this connection, also 
see (Perry 1931). I will explore the significance of the stream of thought for Dewey in 
Section Three, below. 
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continuous, not neat and discrete. The mind only need act to subtract from 
sensation what is useless. This means that no distorting mental additives are 
involved in spatial ideas, on James’s view.  
If James’s view is defensible, then contra Green, psychologists can account for 
real ideas of space, after all. Thus, James presented his work not just as a new 
psychological theory about space, but as a defense of empiricism too. 
I then provide textual evidence that links James’s work on space perception 
with his stream-of-thought hypothesis. At the end of the chapter, I take a short 
interlude to revisit a topic I first broached at the end of Chapter One—viz., the 
various readings that characterize James as a Kantian. We will have enough under 
our belt to show, decisively I think, that these readings are mistaken.  
At this point in the dissertation, we will have achieved a basic understanding of 
the empirical evidence that supports James’s hypothesis that raw sensation is a 
stream of thought. We will also have seen how James used this evidence to respond 
to Idealists. In Chapter Five, I ask whether and in what sense the stream provided a 
framework for James’s general psychology. I revisit Friedman’s notion of constitutive 
scientific principles, and show that his account needs to be modified if it is to fit the 
Principles.  
I replace Friedman’s Kantian conception of the a priori with more pragmatic 
conception drawn from the work of C. I. Lewis. I buttress this account by adapting 
H. P. Grice’s work on presuppositions. Here is a sketch of the new account I 
develop. 
Friedman’s work on constitutive principles in science is designed to make sense 
of mature, exact sciences—particularly mathematical physics since Newton. An 
entire, physics-oriented literature has grown up around this notion of constitutive 
principles (DiSalle 2002; Friedman 1997; Friedman 1999; Friedman 2001; 
Richardson 2002b; Stump 2003). But these accounts are not easy to apply to an 
immature, special science like Jamesean psychology. On Friedman’s account, 
physicists like Newton need a priori, constitutive principles because their theories 
employ highly abstract mathematical models that must be coordinated with 
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experience if the theories are to be testable. The same problem does not arise for 
James’s psychology. His framework and his specific theories are all cast in natural 
language, not formalisms that need to be given empirical content.  
But James faced a different problem. The boundary between metaphysics and 
psychology was hotly contested, as we have seen throughout this dissertation. So 
James’s framework for psychology had to provide a basic account of sensation, but 
not “basic” in the sense that the account had to confer meaningfulness on the 
specific theories of the Principles. Instead, James’s account of sensation was “basic” 
in the sense that it specified a legitimate end-point for the scientific analysis of 
experience. In other words, it functioned as a stipulated boundary between 
metaphysics and psychology.  
It achieved this by defining certain features of experience as, in James’s words, 
“ultimate facts” for psychology’s purposes. Any further questions about these 
features were to be relegated to metaphysics. Thus, Green had charged that 
psychologists cannot study the mind without resorting to metaphysics. James 
responded by cordoning off a set of data that the psychologist is not obligated to 
explain. I will call this variety of constitutive principle a “demarcation principle.”  
Demarcation principles have the following interesting property—they are both 
open to empirical evaluation, and play a constitutive role with respect to the rest of 
the theory. Consider the stream of thought. Qua description of sensation, the account 
had direct empirical support (from the early work on space perception, as we will 
see in this chapter). But qua demarcation principle, the stream account simply 
stipulates, on grounds that are both pragmatic and a priori in Lewis’s sense, a 
boundary between psychology and philosophy. 
2.   THE STREAM THESIS—ACCOUNTS IN THE JAMES LITERATURE 
For now, I will use “the stream thesis” to refer to the following claim: 
experience, at its most basic level, is given as a continuous and chaotic “stream” that 
must be parsed to be made intelligible. This is a first approximation of the thesis 
that, I claim, provided the theoretical backbone for the Principles. 
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One of the two main tasks I have set myself is to clarify the sense in which the 
stream thesis provides support for certain theories of the Principles. Now James 
scholars often claim that the stream thesis provided a framework for the Principles. 
But they rarely explain what kind of support, exactly, the thesis is supposed to 
provide. Worse, I can find no workable accounts of what evidence (if any) was 
supposed to support the thesis in the first place.183  
Thus, clarifying the sense in which the stream thesis provided a framework for 
the Principles naturally breaks into two smaller tasks itself. First, on what evidence 
does the stream thesis rest? Second, in what way does the thesis support James’s 
various theories in the Principles?  
These questions are surprisingly difficult to answer. An important source of the 
trouble is that it is unclear just what was supposed to be the epistemic status of the 
stream thesis. Was the thesis meant to be a priori, or a posteriori? Did James think 
some purely rational analysis showed that the 18th-century notion of ‘psychological 
atomism’ was mistaken? Or did he think he had empirical reasons for holding that 
experience is a continuous stream? A third option is that the evidence for the stream 
thesis may have been rather less direct. For example, maybe the notion that 
consciousness is a stream was meant as a rhetorical device, not a contentful 
hypothesis. If so, it should be evaluated in terms of its success or failure as a guiding 
metaphor.  
I will now extract some potential answers from leading accounts of James. None 
of these answers are workable, but reviewing them will help highlight some pitfalls 
around which my own account will have to steer. 
 
                                                 
183 For example, Seigfried discusses the thesis that for James, thought is a stream that must 
be parsed according to “selective interest” (Seigfried 1990, 85-92). She claims that the role 
of this notion as an organizing framework is evident in the Principles, chapters 1-2, 9, 11-14, 
17, 19, 21-22, 26, and 28 (p. 86). But she does not adequately explain what kind of support 
the thesis is supposed to provide the various theories of the Principles. Neither does she 
adequately explain what sort of evidence the thesis has to recommend itself. I will explore 
Seigfried’s account in more detail in this section. 
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The evidence for the stream thesis is often held to come from introspection.184 
James is supposed to have had superior powers of self-observation, and to have used 
these powers to discover that experience is really not composed of discrete atoms at 
all. For example, Andrew Reck claims that James  
employed introspection in a more thoroughgoing fashion than ever before, uncovering 
features of consciousness which his predecessors had omitted. In brief, James 
discovered that consciousness is a field, or in his word, a stream. (Reck 1979, 216) 
Reck claims that James’s evidence for the stream is introspective. He praises 
James’s use of introspection as more “thoroughgoing” than earlier introspectionists. 
But Reck gives no argument for why we should regard James’s introspective power 
as any more “thoroughgoing” than Locke or Hume’s. 
Indeed, such commentators immediately run into a problem they rarely 
acknowledge: James rejected the infallibility of introspection. One of the general 
lessons of the Principles, according to James himself, was that introspection can be 
fruitful, but only when we realize that it is also difficult and fallible.185 Since James 
held introspection to be fallible, it behooved him to offer more in support of the 
stream thesis than bald introspective assertions. But commentators like Reck 
provide scant explanation of what other evidence James offered for the stream 
thesis.  
Another leading account comes from (Myers 1986), who agrees that the 
evidence for the stream thesis was meant to be introspective.186 Myers cites a 
                                                 
184 In addition to the examples I discuss in the text, (Goodman 2004, 138) asserts that 
James’s evidence for the stream thesis was introspective, though the point is made in 
passing. Goodman goes on to focus on James’s late-career views of what we now call 
“nonconceptual content,” especially as articulated in A Pluralistic Universe and Some 
Problems of Philosophy. The first section of Goodman’s piece grounds these later views in 
passages from the Principles. Readers interested in how James thought we conceptualize our 
experiences are well advised to consult Goodman’s provocative piece. 
185 Thus, James wrote: “But, since the rest of this volume will be little more than a collection 
of illustrations of the difficulty of discovering by direct introspection exactly what our feelings 
and their relations are, we need not anticipate our own future details, but just state our 
general conclusion that introspection is difficult and fallible; and that the difficulty is simply 
that of all observation of whatever kind” (PP, 191). James also discussed the fallibility of 
introspection in (James 1884b). 
186 Technically, Myers thinks James eschewed “introspection” altogether (Myers 1997). 
James did claim that what we usually call “introspection” is never a matter of one mental 
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passage from “The Stream of Thought” chapter where James did write that rigorous 
introspection reveals that consciousness is continuous, not atomistic. The contrary 
proto-empiricist view, that mental states are composed of discrete entities, is an 
illusion that arises from failing to separate the objects of experience from experience 
itself, according to James. Objects of experience (like thunderclaps and thimbles) are 
often discreet, but experience itself never is. James claimed that the apparent 
plausibility of ‘psychological atomism’ derives from a failure to distinguish 
experience from its objects. I will quote this passage at length: 
Does not every sudden shock, appearance of a new object, or change in a sensation, 
create a real interruption, sensibly felt as such, which cuts the conscious stream across 
at the moment at which it appears? Do not such interruptions smite us every hour of 
our lives, and have we the right, in their presence, still to call our consciousness a 
continuous stream?  
 This objection is based partly on a confusion and partly on a superficial 
introspective view.  
 The confusion is between the thoughts themselves, taken as subjective facts, and 
the things of which they are aware. It is natural to make this confusion, but easy to 
avoid it when once put on one's guard. The things are discrete and discontinuous; they 
do pass before us in a train or chain, making often explosive appearances and rending 
each other in twain. But their comings and goings and contrasts no more break the 
flow of the thought that thinks them than they break the time and the space in which 
they lie. (PP, 233)  
In this passage at least, it sounds as though the chief evidence for the continuity of 
thought is of an introspective character. By looking inwards, we can tell that only the 
objects of consciousness appear jointed, whereas consciousness itself appears in a 
continuous stream.  
Now Myers is the rare commentator who does ask why we should trust James’s 
introspective reports about experience (Myers 1986, 75-76). In fact, Myers shows 
that the alleged introspective report of the above excerpt stands in tension with what 
James wrote elsewhere.  
Here is how the conflict arises. Consider the following question (a question by 
which James was increasingly troubled). When we, for example, see a blue sky, 
                                                                                                                                       
state observing itself. Present mental states can only observe prior mental states through 
memory, for James. Thus, Myers proposes the term “retrospection” to describe James’s 
view. I think Myers is right, but to avoid cumbersome terminology I keep to the phrase 
“introspection” in the text.  
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there is no doubt that we have perceptual access to the object of our experience—
namely, blueness. But do we have introspective access to something other than the 
blueness? In particular, do we also have access to the conscious state itself, the state 
that “grasps” or “perceives” this blueness?  
Myers takes note of one passage in the Principles (1890) where James 
appeared to doubt that we can really observe our own mental states separately from 
the objects of those mental states. Myers could have cited (though did not cite) 
several other passages that raised this doubt more clearly in the Briefer Course, two 
years later.187 James’s doubt crystallized in the (1904) essay “Does Consciousness 
Exist,” according to Myers, where James flatly rejected the view that when we 
introspect, we can “see” mental states themselves, above and beyond the objects of 
those states. James categorically denied that experience has any such “inner 
duplicity.”  
Myers is astute to point out that this move undercuts the aforementioned, 
introspective refutation of ‘psychological atomism.’ Suppose we cannot 
introspectively separate a thought from a thought’s object. Further, suppose the 
objects of thought (thunderclaps and thimbles) appear discrete. It follows that James 
has no remaining ground to assert that thoughts of discrete objects nevertheless 
appear continuous (Myers 1986, 76-79).  
                                                 
187 Here is the passage Myers does cite: “…In everyone, at an early age, the distinction 
between thought as such, and what it is ‘of’ or ‘about,’ has become familiar to the mind. The 
deeper grounds for this discrimination may possibly be hard to find; but superficial grounds 
are plenty and near at hand” (PP, 284). Myers could also have cited passages in the Briefer 
Course, where James raised this doubt more forcefully. There, James conspicuously omitted 
one of the five ultimate features the Principles ascribed to the stream of thought. The earlier 
work claimed thought “always appears to deal with objects independent of itself” (PP, 220). 
Without explanation, this basic law is omitted in the abridgement (see PBC, 140). 
Moreover, in the chapter entitled “Epilogue,” James actively voiced a doubt that explains 
the omission. “Everyone assumes that we have direct introspective acquaintance with our 
thinking activity as such, with our consciousness as something inward and contrasted with 
the outer objects which it knows. Yet I must confess that for my part I cannot feel sure of this 
conclusion” (PBC, 400). In Chapter Five, I will return to these two passages from the 
Briefer Course, as the so-called “proto-phenomenological” interpretation of the Principles 
rests almost entirely on their shoulders. 
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Myers does not have a solution to this problem, which only underscores what a 
serious tangle this standard reading gets James into (the standard reading, namely, 
that portrays the evidence for the stream thesis as straightforwardly introspective). 
The tangle is particularly troubling given that James’s doubts about our 
introspective access to consciousness as such clearly appear in the Briefer Course, 
and are even hinted at in the Principles itself (see fn. 187, above)—the very same 
works that give the official defense of the stream thesis, in the first place. 
In my view, this weakness is fatal to the standard reading. I agree (with both 
Myers and Reck) that the evidence in question was meant to be empirical. But I 
will argue that when one looks at the actual evolution of the stream thesis, one finds 
that the evidence was more sophisticated than scholars have yet recognized—it was 
actively experimental, not just baldly introspective. One virtue of my reading is that 
it helps avoid the tangle Myers has exposed in the standard reading.  
I read the lengthy excerpt quoted above as a misbegotten attempt to explain the 
cause of ‘atomists’’ alleged mistakes. The passage is not an attempt—and does not 
purport to be an attempt—to spell out the full evidence in favor of the stream thesis.  
 
It is also common for James scholars simply to assert that the stream thesis 
provides a framework of some kind for James’s psychology, but then to fail to think 
through what this might mean. For example, Charlene Seigfried accounts for the 
stream thesis in a way that (unwittingly) portrays the Principles as a colossal petitio 
principii.  
On one hand, she calls the notion that we use subjective attention to parse the 
stream of consciousness the “Organizing Principle of the Principles” (Seigfried 1990, 
85). A page later she uses the similar phrase “structural framework of the 
Principles” (p. 86). This language suggests that James’s specific theories in the 
Principles are in some way supported by the stream thesis. The suggestion is that in 
some respect, without the principle in place the theories could not stand on their 
own.  
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But she simultaneously claims that the entire body of the Principles is an 
argument that seeks to establish the stream thesis. She writes that the book “is 
largely a sustained argument, drawing on all the psychological experimental 
evidence available, to prove this claim,” viz., the claim that experience comes in a 
stream that must be actively parsed (Seigfried 1990, 85). In other words, Seigfried 
seems to think the stream thesis is what supports the various arguments of the 
Principles, yet also that it is these very arguments taken in their entirety that 
support the stream thesis. This would make the Principles into a viciously circular 
affair. 
Her subsequent discussion does not clear up the matter. Despite her claim that 
the stream thesis is supposed to be “proved” by empirical evidence, she does not tell 
us what that evidence is, nor in what respect the thesis is supposed to “support” 
James’s several theories.  
Here is what she does say. The stream thesis constitutes an attack on Humean 
“sense data theories” that hold experience to be atomic, for Seigfried. James grants 
that  
all claims must be experientially grounded. But what these experiential findings 
disclose is that ‘no one ever had a simple sensation by itself. Consciousness, from our 
natal day, is of a teeming multiplicity of objects and relations, and what we call simple 
sensations are results of discriminative attention, pushed often to a very high degree.’ 
(Seigfried 1990, 86, quoting PP, 219) 
It is not clear what “experiential findings” she is referring to, nor how they all 
conspire to disclose that no one ever experienced a psychological atom. Perhaps the 
reason Seigfried quotes James at length, here, is that she thinks his poetic language 
constitutes some sort of proof for the stream thesis.188 In one place, it looks like she’s 
                                                 
188 I propose this reading of Seigfried because her book includes a lengthy discussion of 
James’s “hermeneutic methods” (Seigfried 1990, 171-259), in which she argues that  
William James’s use of analogy and metaphor is more than a rhetorical device. It is 
integral to his hermeneutics and reflects his concrete analysis of human thinking…. 
Minds fertile with analogies, whether artistic or scientific, will be able to recognize 
many more aspects of experience than those whose senses are dulled by convention…. 
Analogy, the recognition of similarity despite appearances, is the basis for the 
distinctively human creativity which characterizes and unifies both poetic and 
conceptual thinking. (Seigfried 1990, 209) 
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suggesting that the stream thesis somehow rests on James’s claim that no experience 
can ever be exactly repeated. But this just pushes the problem back. James claimed 
there were no repeatables in experience; Locke and Hume claimed that there were. 
Seigfried does not explain why we should prefer James’s view. 
 
I have now canvassed some leading views concerning the epistemic status of the 
stream thesis. None of these are satisfactory. Below, I argue that James did offer 
empirical evidence in support of this thesis, but the most important evidence was 
experimental, not baldly introspective.  
As I have said, I agree that the stream thesis provided a framework for the 
Principles. So I will need to explain why, unlike Seigfried, my view does not saddle 
James with a grand petitio. How can the thesis both rest on empirical evidence, and 
yet provide constitutive support for other theories? The reason is that the primary 
empirical evidence for the stream is not to be found in the theories of the Principles 
taken as a whole (nor, contra Reck and Myers, in pure introspection). The stream is 
supported by an independent, narrow set of experimental data. Those data were 
first set out in James’s early work on space. 
Before I look at James’s work on space, I want to pause to explain in more 
detail why the stream of thought is important to the overarching story of this 
dissertation, about the rise of empiricism.  
                                                                                                                                       
In light of her discussion of Jamesean hermeneutics, perhaps what she had in mind in the 
earlier passage is that the stream thesis is really a poetic metaphor or analogy, and that it is 
in virtue of James’s graceful use of such linguistic devices that he is able to express the true, 
stream-like nature of conscious experience. I agree that the stream thesis helps James 
develop a rhetoric in which to discuss experience. But I do not think this rhetorical role for 
the stream constitutes its main evidence. Moreover, this reading would contradict Seigfried’s 
earlier claim that the stream thesis rests on empirical evidence. 
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3.   THE STREAM OF THOUGHT AND JAMES’S EMPIRICIST LEGACY 
In 1942 John Dewey published an article entitled “William James as 
Empiricist.” James had been dead for over three decades. Pragmatism,189 the 
philosophy James made famous, had long been an important topic of American 
philosophical discussion. Dewey was American philosophy’s single most dominant 
figure,190 and pragmatism’s elder statesman. It is therefore surprising to see how 
Dewey described James’s most important philosophical legacy.  
Dewey proclaimed that it was not the project outlined in Pragmatism, but the 
scientific conception of experience developed in the Principles that was James’s 
most ingenious and historically important contribution. In fact, Pragmatism had to 
be read in light of the Principles’s account of experience, wherein James used 
“scientific resources … not available to his predecessors” to reconceive empiricism. 
Dewey named the “predecessors” he had in mind: Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, 
and J. S. Mill (Dewey 1942, 52).  
Dewey complained that even half a decade after the Principles was published, 
critics continued to ignore the scientific details of James’s reconception of 
experience. According to Dewey, critics continued to attack empiricism as though it 
were still based on an 18th century account of the mind.  
The virtual revolution effected by James in traditional beliefs about experience has 
provided those who would base the conclusions of philosophy upon the analysis of 
experience with a new and effective intellectual strategy and set of tactics. We find 
even today European critics of empiricism engaging in elaborate refutation of 
empiricism upon the basis of identification of empiricism with outmoded 
sensationalism. In our country, critics who have presumably read James, still criticize 
empirical doctrines, even those of James himself, as if an empiricist must hold that 
ideas are copies of compounds of sensations and hence all lacking in original and 
productive significance.  
                                                 
189 I will use “pragmatism” to denote an HP concept, the thesis of which is that the meaning 
of an idea consists in the way the idea is used, and the canonical figures who held the thesis 
were Peirce, James, and Dewey.   
190 In 1950, the historian Henry Commager wrote: “So faithfully did Dewey live up to his 
own philosophical creed that he became the guide, the mentor, and the conscience of the 
American people; it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that for a generation no issue was 
clarified until Dewey had spoken” (Commager 1950, 100). This has become a standard way 
to describe Dewey’s influence, though the line is typically left unattributed. 
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 I take it for granted that the Principles of Psychology is the greatest among the 
great works of James. … The work of James replaced a dialectic analysis of experience 
with one based upon scientific knowledge …. (Dewey 1942, 49-50) 
Here as elsewhere,191 Dewey cited the Principles as James’s best and most 
influential work. The Principles recalibrated empiricism so that this doctrine no 
longer relied on a “dialectic analysis of experience.” By this phrase Dewey meant 
that early modern empiricists had used a form of pre-scientific analysis to portray 
experience as composed of ideas that were passive copies of impressions. Dewey 
held that James discarded this speculative view, which owed to Locke and Hume. 
Instead, the Principles developed a genuinely scientific account of experience, and 
did so in a way that provided new methods and new data not just for psychologists, 
but for empiricist philosophers as well.  
The claim that James reconceived empiricism—particularly in the Principles—
was a Deweyan refrain. He elsewhere wrote: “One will understand the philosophy of 
James better if one considers it in its totality as a revision of English empiricism …” 
(Dewey 1925, 366). Dewey’s message about the nature of that revision was 
consistent, too. Dewey writes that in the Principles,  
James denies that sensations, images and ideas are discreet and … he replaces them 
by a continuous stream which he calls “the stream of consciousness.” This conception 
necessitates a consideration of relations as an immediate part of the field of 
consciousness…. And throughout his “Psychology” James … [criticizes] the atomism 
of Locke and of Hume as well as the a-priorism of the synthesis of rational principles 
by Kant and his successors, among whom should be mentioned in England, Thomas 
Hill Green, who was then at the height of his influence. (Dewey 1925, 369) 
James is supposed to have revised empiricism by discarding the “atomism of Locke 
and Hume” without resorting to the “a-priorism” of Green and the British Idealists. 
The most important theoretical tool James developed for revising empiricism was 
the notion that “thought,” James’s generic word for any conscious state (PP, 186, 
219), was not given as a collection of discreet ideas, impressions, or minima 
                                                 
191 E.g., see (Dewey 1930, 23-24; Dewey 1935, 30-31; Dewey 1943). For example, Dewey 
wrote: “…For whatever be thought about its contents from the standpoint of present-day 
psychology, the book [the Principles] takes rank as a permanent classic, like Locke’s Essay 
and Hume’s Treatise” (Dewey 1943, 121). 
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sensibilia. Instead, James proposed that consciousness was a continuous “stream” 
out of which discreet objects and relations had to be actively carved.  
If this hypothesis was right, it had an important implication for philosophers 
who conceive their task to be the analysis of experience. Such philosophers could no 
longer operate by purporting to disentangle compounds of passively received, atomic 
ideas. They now had to conceive of distinct ideas as entities that are actively carved 
out of the stream of consciousness on the basis of the organism’s interests, interests 
that the philosopher and psychologist must seek to understand. This is the 
“productive significance” of Jamesean ideas that Dewey mentioned in the first 
indented quotation, above. 
These passages suggest that James’s use of the stream of consciousness to revise 
empiricism192 was among his most influential philosophical contributions, for leading 
supporters like Dewey.193 The stream was pivotal because of its role in James’s 
scientific reconception of experience in the Principles (a book which has been very 
influential in the history of psychology as well, I should mention).194  
                                                 
192 Strictly speaking, I should write “revise proto-empiricism.” That construction is 
cumbersome, so I will drop the “proto-” when writing in connection with James. This should 
cause no interpretive trouble, since I take proto-empiricism to be an early version of one 
continuously-evolving HP concept, empiricism. Recall that James referred to his own work 
as a form of “revised empiricism”; see above, p. 135. 
193 For a similar view of James’s philosophic legacy from another important admirer, see 
Perry’s “The Place of William James in the History of Empiricism” (Perry 1931). Perry 
developed an extensive reading of James as an empiricist. See RBP I.449-473, I.543-585. 
For James’s opposition to neo-Kantian, Hegelian, and Schopenhaueran idealism, see I.711-
730. 
194 An assessment of the legacy of the stream in contemporary psychology, especially in 
experimental psychology and psychoanalysis, as well as in literature, music, and philosophy, 
is (Pollio 1990). Two helpful, article-length assessments of James’s impact on psychology 
more generally are (Leary 2003; Taylor 1995). Both conclude that James had a profound 
effect on psychology. Leary argues that James helped clarify key problems for the discipline 
to work out. He argues that several aspects of James’s positive theories were influential, as 
well. Functionalists and behaviorists took over James’s emphasis on the role of habit in 
experience. Gestalt psychologists (for more on which, see Henle 1990; Woody 1999), 
philosophical and psychological phenomenologists, and even behaviorists (via Dewey’s 
“reflex arc”) were all impacted by James’s notion of a stream of thought. Leary also 
discusses the influence of James’s view of selfhood, and mentions in a footnote (fn. 4) the 
influence of James’s theory of emotion. Leary also has a closer analysis of the legacy in 
psychology of James’s interpretation of the self (Leary 1990). Taylor identifies four 
characteristics of American psychology that trace back to James. The leading American 
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I now propose to investigate the epistemic status of the stream thesis, as well as 
its role in James’s psychology, by tracing the thesis’s historical genesis.195 Among the 
earliest, detailed articulations of the thesis came in James’s first article on space 
perception. The article appeared in 1879, and was entitled “The Spatial Quale.” It 
was partly a response to the kind of criticisms we have seen in my previous chapter 
on Green. 
4.   “THE SPATIAL QUALE” 
4.1 Summary of Previous Chapters; Aim of “The Spatial Quale” 
I have already done much of the historical work needed to defend my claim of 
what was at stake in James’s early articulation of the stream thesis. So let us sum up 
our progress from previous chapters.  
We began in Chapter One with an account of Idealist attacks on empirical 
psychology. Idealists sought to show that psychologists built their projects on 
premises that actually entail skepticism. To demonstrate that the premises entail 
skepticism, Idealists constructed an interpretation of the history of British 
philosophy. They tried to show that Hume carried to their skeptical conclusion 
certain Lockean premises. These Lockean premises allegedly undergirded not just 
Hume’s philosophy, but the empirical psychology of contemporaries like Herbert 
Spencer and J. S. Mill as well. So by showing how Hume reduced Lockean premises 
to absurdity, Idealists advanced an interpretation of philosophical history that also 
functioned as a not-so-veiled attack on empirical psychology. 
                                                                                                                                       
psychologists who typify commitment to these Jamesean characteristics, according to Taylor, 
were Gardner Murphy, Henry Murray, and Gordon Allport. Taylor also discusses a 
significant faction of American anti-Jameseans, many of whom trace intellectual ancestry to 
Wundt’s laboratory (Boring and Tichener are the most famous examples). The centenary of 
James’s Principles sparked several collections of articles that assess various aspects of 
James’s influence on psychology, including (Donnelly 1992; Johnson and Henley 1990). 
Other resources that assess the historical legacy of the Principles include a special issue of 
History of the Human Sciences devoted to James. One useful article contained there is 
(Skrupskelis 1995). One helpful collection that assessed the significance of the Principles for 
philosophy is (DeArmey and Skousgaard 1986). 
195 In Appendix II, I take up the objection that my method involves a confusion between the 
context of discovery and the context of justification. 
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In Chapter Two, I showed that James participated in various philosophical 
communities that grappled with such Idealist attacks. I highlighted two groups that 
provide especially important context. We met the group most relevant to James’s 
early work on space on pp. 85-88, above. There, we saw that James wrote “The 
Spatial Quale” (James 1879b) as a response to a piece Cabot delivered to the 
second incarnation of the famed Metaphysical Club.  
Since both Cabot’s and James’s paper cite mostly empirical psychologists, not 
philosophical Idealists, it is important to remember the following. Their club had 
been reading Green’s “Introduction” to Hume, along with Edward Caird’s book on 
Kant. It was in the context of discussions about these two books that the club argued 
over what they characterized as Kantian versus empirical-psychological views of the 
mind, as we saw. Cabot’s paper proposed a theory of space perception from the 
Kantian side, the side Green and Caird were defending in print. James’s “The 
Spatial Quale” was a response on behalf of the psychological side, which he termed 
“empiricism.” 
Soon after “The Spatial Quale” was published, James began to gain stature in 
international circles, and began participating particularly in an English intellectual 
community that was engaged in its own responses to Idealists, as we saw above on 
pp. 84 and 94-104. The community centered on a British club called “The Scratch 
Eight.” During the early 1880s, James became a member of the prestigious group. 
It consisted of key contributors to Mind, as well as the journal’s first editor Croom 
Robertson. Especially after Green himself appeared in Mind throughout the year of 
1882, Robertson encouraged responses to Idealism on behalf of empirical 
psychology. James developed his account of the stream of thought in several 
subsequent articles in Mind, such as “On Some Omissions of Introspective 
Psychology” (James 1884b), which was the published version of a talk delivered at a 
Scratch Eight meeting (RBP, II.38-39).  
I will now explain exactly how James’s early work on space, the work he began 
in the second Metaphysical club, functioned as a response to Idealists.  
 
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In my view, the most important paper in James’s early defense of empiricism is 
“The Spatial Quale” (EPs, 62-82). Though this essay is not anthologized in any 
contemporary collections of James’s philosophy (save for the Works), its historical 
importance can hardly be overemphasized. The article marks the beginning of 
James’s serious attempt to develop an empirical psychology based on a stream of 
thought, rather than on associations of atomic ideas.196  
Let us begin our discussion by asking what “The Spatial Quale” was supposed 
to accomplish. We find our answer by looking at how James opened and closed the 
essay. 
“The Spatial Quale” was written in July of 1878 (see above, p. 88), and 
published in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy the following January. Cabot’s 
club paper had appeared in the July 1878 number of the same journal. So James 
began his piece by discussing Cabot’s “hegelian” (sic) view of space perception. 
Cabot’s view is made to sound remarkably like Green’s. Here is how James began 
his essay. 
Mr. Cabot, in his acute and suggestive article on the notion of space in the July 
number of this journal, argues that, as it forms a system of relations, it cannot be given 
in any one sensation, and concludes that it is a symbol of the general relatedness of 
objects constructed by thought from data which lie below consciousness. …  
 Mr. Cabot begins his article with the hegelian thesis that extension has only 
negative predicates; that it signifies only the indefinite “otherness” of all objects of 
perception to each other. (EPs, 62)  
Both the critical and the constructive parts of Cabot’s view sound like they come 
straight from the pages of Green, on James’s description. The critical part was that 
space is “fundamentally” (EPs, 62) a network of related spatial positions; since we 
cannot have direct sensory access to relations, we cannot have direct sensory access 
to spatial areas or extended objects, Cabot held. This critical view echoes Green’s 
attack on proto-empiricism.  
Cabot’s positive view, as James saw it, was that space must therefore be a 
product of the mind’s rational interpretation of its own sensations. Specifically, the 
                                                 
196 Perry also holds that this early work on space was important in the development of 
James’s empiricism (RBP, I.564-565).  
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mind tends to interpret its sensations as signs of objects existing in the external 
world. Spatial perception stems from our judging contemporaneous sensations to be 
(literally) outside of one another. For example, my perception that the ruler on my 
desk is extended stems from my judgment that my mental image of the ruler is 
composed of a set of minima sensibilia that are all separate from, or outside of, one 
another.197  
Cabot called his targets “psychologists,” citing people like Joseph Delboeuf, 
Thomas Brown, and J. S. Mill, (Cabot 1878, 226, 228-229). According to James, 
though, Cabot shared a pernicious assumption with those whom he criticized. The 
pernicious assumption was that space is necessarily composed of a network of 
related positions. James explained: 
Almost all those who have written on the subject [space perception] hitherto have 
seemed to regard it as axiomatic that our consciousness of the whole of space is formed 
by adding together our perceptions of particular spaces; that there can be no 
perception of any extent at all without a perception of particular positions within that 
extent, and of their distances and directions from each other. 
The common assumption was that spatial perception is impossible unless one comes 
to perceive a network of positions standing in exact, definable relations to one 
another. James’s project in “The Spatial Quale” was to undercut this common 
assumption. 
In insisting that collections of sensory corpuscles must be actively “added” 
together to form a perception of space, Cabot was effectively granting ‘perceptual 
atomism’ at the outset. Thus James portrayed Idealists like Cabot as sharing this 
empiricist commitment. Crucially though, the two groups disagreed on whether 
reality is to be associated solely with those corpuscles—that is, they disagreed about 
whether to accept the reality principle. 
                                                 
197 Cabot’s words: space is created by the mind, qua “… Self-consciousness …  returning 
upon itself and its impressions, and qualifying these as true or false, real or unreal, through 
their rational interpretation as signs of something ulterior …” (Cabot 1878, 235-236). When 
he uses the phrase in this manner, Cabot capitalizes “Self-consciousness” whether or not it is 
the first phrase of a sentence. Green presented a similar view of space, treating existence in 
space as a condition that is equivalent to the mutual “outwardness” of different points 
(GWR, II.240-241). 
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When we turn to the end of James’s essay, we find that he meant his attack on 
‘psychological atomism’ to count decisively against Hegelians (or “Kantians,” by the 
end of the article) like Cabot, but actually to bolster “empiricists.”198 Leading 
representatives, like Mill, of the latter group had “gone astray, like lost sheep,” and 
James intended to shepherd them back to pasture (EPs, 79-82).  
For now, I will baldly assert that the notion of empiricism at play here is an HP 
concept, and indeed an ancestor of our contemporary interpretation of empiricism 
(CIE). I will argue for these claims, later. For now, the important point is that James 
sided with empiricists in the argument over space perception. And the last phrase of 
the essay triumphantly declared that “the Kantian doctrine seems literally left 
without a leg to stand upon” (EPs, 82).  
The essence of the dispute between empiricists and Kantians, we are there told, 
was a disagreement over synthetic a priori knowledge. Empiricists deny that we can 
have such knowledge, Kantians affirm it (EPs, 82). Thus, the claim that Kantians 
are left legless at the end of the article is based on James’s judgment that synthetic a 
priori knowledge has been placed in serious jeopardy.  
In fact, one of James’s most important moves in this early paper was implicitly 
to reject Green’s way of characterizing empiricism. For James, it was not the reality 
principle that divided empiricism from other philosophies. James thought certain 
empiricists (he named J. S. Mill, Bain, and Spencer) had misunderstood the essence 
of their own position. Some sort of native mental processing was certainly required 
for coherent perception of reality. What was really at issue was Kant’s question, is 
there synthetic a priori knowledge? To count as an empiricist, it was necessary to 
                                                 
198 James apparently regarded the group he referred to at the beginning of the article as 
“hegelians” to be a subset of the group he later called “Kantians.” James included 
Helmholtz, for example, under the latter category, but presumably would not have included 
him under the former. Green or Cabot, by contrast, would have easily fit under either 
category.  
 What ought we to make of the fact that James often left “hegelian” uncapitalized, while 
he capitalized “Kantian” and “Kantist”? Perhaps James meant to suggest that Idealists took 
their inspiration from only a loose reading of Hegel. James was no admirer of Hegel, either, 
so this issue should not have an impact on my reading.  
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deny the prospect of such knowledge, according to James (EPs, 82).199 Accordingly, 
we will examine how James’s anti-hegelian/Kantian account of space perception 
affects the plausibility of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
Since denying synthetic a priori knowledge was a necessary condition for being 
an empiricist, let us remind ourselves to what this knowledge amounts. Recall that 
Kant divided judgments into those that are analytic, and those that are synthetic. 
Analytic judgments have predicates that are wholly contained in their subjects, and 
so are always a priori. Synthetic judgments are those whose predicates add 
information not contained in the subject. A chief burden of Kant’s first Critique was 
to show that in addition to synthetic a posteriori judgments, there are also synthetic 
a priori judgments. 
Why would James care so much about synthetic a priori knowledge? Synthetic 
a priori knowledge was supposed to be necessary, unchanging, and universal, like 
analytic a priori knowledge. But unlike analytic a priori knowledge, synthetic a 
priori knowledge was also supposed to give nontrivial information about the 
structure of reality.  
Paradigmatically, the axioms of Euclidean geometry were supposed to be 
synthetic a priori. On the one hand, the axioms were supposed to be a priori and 
necessary (CPR, A24, B39). This is because it was impossible even to conceive of a 
representation of space that violated Euclidean axioms, according to Kant (CPR, 
A24, B39 ff.). But on the other, the axioms went beyond analytic truths—they were 
not statements true in virtue of their predicates being contained in their subjects 
(CPR, B16-17). The axioms were thought to be synthetic statements that describe 
the (necessary) structure of phenomenal space, at least for creatures with minds like 
ours. 
Kant introduced the idea of a “transcendental exposition” in the first Critique 
precisely in his discussion of space perception. For Kant, the allegedly synthetic a 
                                                 
199 This is a view James would come to share with some logical positivists, who came to 
wrestle (as did James, to a lesser extent—more on this below) with the implications of the 
new non-Euclidean geometries for Kant’s conception of synthetic a priori knowledge 
(Friedman 1992, xii-xiii; Friedman 1999, xv, 2). 
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priori character of Euclid’s axioms could only be accounted for by supposing that 
space is a pure form of outer intuition.200 This is an example of a transcendental 
exposition, in which we establish one proposition to be necessary by showing it to be 
a necessary precondition for some synthetic a priori truth already in hand. 
Although neo-Kantians like Green and Caird rejected major portions of Kant’s 
metaphysics (in particular, they rejected the notion of a noumenal world standing 
“behind” the phenomenal; e.g., GWR, II.9), they retained Kant’s idea that Euclid’s 
axioms were synthetic a priori, in that the axioms were held to describe conditions of 
any possible outer experience (e.g., GWR, II.246, 248).201 In other words, what 
explains the necessity of Euclid’s axioms was to be that these axioms described 
constraints on any possible perception of space or extension. Space was still to be a 
pure form of intuition, a fact to be gleaned only by transcendental exposition, not 
empirical investigation. 
Recall from Chapter Three that one of Green’s chief criticisms of proto-
empiricism was that the combination of its core premises—the reality principle and 
‘perceptual atomism’—entails an absurdity. The absurdity was that the sphere of 
                                                 
200 The argument went roughly like this. The judgment, a straight line between two points is 
the shortest is necessary. But the necessary connection between the subject and predicate 
cannot owe to the meaning of words, because the notion of shortest is not contained in the 
notion of straight line between two points. Some “pure” or a priori element had to be added 
for these concepts to get glued together with the force of necessity (B16). The element had 
to be pure because a proposition that can only be conceived as necessary, such as this 
geometric judgment, must be a priori (B3). 
 Kant argued that since all objects we perceive through the “outer sense” necessarily 
conform to basic Euclidean judgments like the sentence under consideration, these 
judgments must describe the pure, necessary form of all outer intuition. Thus, space turns 
out to be nothing but this pure form of outer intuition—in other words, space is the “form” 
the mind imposes on the “matter” of outer sense. This argument exemplifies Kant’s notion of 
a transcendental exposition because it is only insofar as one supposes that space is a pure 
form of outer intuition that one can account for the synthetic a priori character of geometry 
(CPR, B40-41). 
201 I am papering over some complications, here, because Green denied that there is a sharp 
boundary between analytic and synthetic propositions (GWR, II.5-6). However, Green 
explicitly accepted the notion that the axioms are synthetic a priori in the sense relevant to 
my discussion. Green says that “Kant was quite right in saying that the judgment ‘a straight 
line is the shortest way between two points’ is synthetic and a priori, in the sense that” the 
statement is non-trivial, non-empirical, and “valid for all possible objects of experience” 
(GWR, II.246). 
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reality must be empty. Green also argued that Hume’s account of space perception 
contradicts the copy principle (Hume’s version of the reality principle). The only 
way to remedy such problems, allegedly, was to replace the reality principle with a 
full-blown, transcendental metaphysics.  
That is the significance of synthetic a priori knowledge to this discussion. Those 
who hold that there is synthetic a priori knowledge of space (via Euclidean 
geometry) cannot be satisfied with an empirical account of the mind—they will insist 
that the synthetic a priori character of such knowledge cannot be accounted for 
without postulating that experience has a necessary, transcendental structure, for 
creatures like us. 
This is why James held that empiricists must reject the view that we have 
synthetic a priori knowledge. If experience has a necessary structure, that structure 
could only be gleaned a priori, not through the kind of empirical investigations 
psychologists purported to undertake.  
One final caveat is in order. ‘Psychological atomism’ was a thesis much more 
naturally ascribed to associationists than to Idealists like Cabot and Green. True, 
Cabot published a response to “The Spatial Quale,” and did not take issue with the 
characterization. In that response, one might make the case that he tacitly espoused 
the commitment (Cabot 1879, 201-202). But I do not see why Idealists need to 
have been committed to ‘psychological atomism.’  
Indeed, Green typically wrote that space was a set of relations thought imposed 
on “sensible objects” (GWR, II.243), not on raw sensations or minima sensibilia. 
Perhaps one might argue that somehow, it was only in virtue of operating on raw 
sensation that thought was able to order these “sensible objects.” But Green held 
that the mind could have no access to raw sensations that were not already 
“constituted” by thought (recall his catchphrase: “a consistent sensationalism must 
be speechless”). So it is hard to see what evidence Green could ever have had for 
the existence of raw, minima sensibilia in the first place. Thus, I suspect he would 
have rejected ‘psychological atomism’ outright. Green died suddenly in 1883 
without having responded to such characterizations of Idealism, though. 
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In my view, James would have been on more firm ground had he only saddled 
associationist psychologists, not Idealists, with ‘atomism.’ This would not have 
required him to compromise his own argument. James’s project in “The Spatial 
Quale” was not to refute Idealism, but to refigure empiricism so as to evade Idealist 
attacks. Rejecting ‘psychological atomism’ was at the center of his explanation of 
how empiricism could be rebuilt to withstand the Idealist critique. James was 
overreaching, I think, when he further suggested that the evidence against 
‘psychological atomism’ also provided a refutation of Idealism as well. He need not, 
and should not have gone so far. 
I hasten to make a similar point about what kind of impact we should take 
James’s arguments to have on the alleged existence of synthetic a priori knowledge. 
His burden in “The Spatial Quale” was not to show it to be impossible that humans 
can have synthetic a priori knowledge. The challenge from Green, remember, was 
weaker. The challenge was merely to come up with a consistent account of space 
perception that did not support synthetic a priori knowledge of space. After all, 
Green did not work out his own constructive proof that space is a necessary form of 
intuition—at least not in much detail. Instead, his most famous and most 
sophisticated arguments for Idealism (those in the “Introduction”) had the form of a 
reductio ad absurdum.  
The chief targets of the reductio were Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Green 
regarded the latter as having articulated the strongest empirical accounts available 
of space perception (and of many other difficult phenomena as well). Indeed, when 
Green finally developed his own Kantian account of space perception, his argument 
was that such a theory was established purely by Hume’s failure.202 Thus, if James 
could rescue Hume, he could avoid Green’s argument for Idealism. 
True, in a sense there were two routes to establishing the truth of Idealism, for 
Green. The first and most detailed was the reductio route. But I have also reviewed 
                                                 
202 “So far Kant’s doctrine [of space perception] seems irrefragable. It is the logical result of 
the failure of Hume’s attempt to treat space as an aggregate of feelings” (GWR, II.242). The 
sense of “logic” here is Hegelian—Green often treated Kant as the necessary next stage, 
after Hume, in the dialectic of history. This much can safely be gleaned from (INT, §§1-5). 
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Kant’s constructive argument for an Idealist account of space perception, an 
argument Green recounted, buried though this recounting was in his relatively 
obscure Lectures on Logic. According to this account, one can only explain the 
alleged synthetic a priori character of geometry by treating space as a necessary 
form of intuition. Did not this argument place a stronger burden on James than 
simply to develop a consistent, empirical account of space perception?  
Here James had a neat response: Helmholtz’s development of a consistent non-
Euclidean geometry shows that Euclid’s axioms cannot be synthetic a priori, after 
all (EPs, 82). They cannot be synthetic a priori because they cannot be necessary—
Helmholtz’s work shows that we can conceive of non-Euclidean space. Indeed, we 
can even demonstrate that the axioms describing this new space are themselves 
consistent.  
So there is no longer any need, James seemed to think, to respond to this 
second argument for an Idealist account of space perception. Accordingly, his task 
(vis a vis Idealists) is merely to develop a consistent, empirical account of space. 
 
So James’s goal in “The Spatial Quale” was to provide a consistent account of 
the mind that does not concede space to be a necessary form of intuition—does not 
concede that the mind necessarily imposes a Euclidean structure onto perceptual 
experience. If spatial perception comes equipped with a necessary form, this would 
open the door to the Kantian demand for a metaphysical (read: a priori) explanation 
of such necessity. Anyone, like James, who wanted to rescue empiricism had to show 
how there could be a coherent empirical study of the mind that was intelligible in 
the absence of any such metaphysical analysis. 
James’s argument can be divided into two steps. His first step was to 
demonstrate, on grounds empirical psychologists could themselves accept, that their 
core commitment to ‘psychological atomism’ was not empirically defensible. James 
cited experimental evidence against the existence of minima sensibilia. Our 
perceptions of extended spatial areas are demonstrably not built out of atomic 
sensory units, he showed.  
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James’s second step was to rebuild empiricism without relying on ‘psychological 
atomism,’ and without conceding that spatial perception has a necessary structure. 
James did this by postulating an early version of the stream thesis, where all 
sensation comes to us as a chaotic stream with a native “feeling of extensity.” James 
argued that the perception of distinct positions had to be explained by the prior 
perception of whole spatial areas, not vice versa. The mind perceives distinct spatial 
positions when it uses strokes of attention to focus on individual positions inside the 
stream that hold some emotional interest.  
Since James’s theory only requires the mind to subtract information, not to add 
any distorting relations, he thought he could preserve realism about space. 
Moreover, we can reflect all we like on the ways minds actually parse their 
respective streams of thought—this will never lead us to necessary, a priori 
knowledge, on James’s view. How we come to discriminate or compare parts of our 
stream of consciousness is a matter of the organism’s ever-changing interests and 
(perhaps evolutionary) needs. Thus, no present regime for parsing the stream of 
consciousness is universal or necessary. 
I will now examine each step in detail.  
4.2  Empirical Evidence Against ‘Psychological Atomism’ in “The Spatial 
Quale” 
I begin with the first step, wherein James sought to undermine the proto-
empiricist commitment to ‘psychological atomism’ on empirical grounds.  
His strategy was to demonstrate that any account of space perception premised 
on this thesis entails two empirical predictions, both of which contradict available 
data. First, if perceiving space (and extension) amounts to perceiving relations 
between sensibilia, one would expect to find that every perception of a spatial area 
(and every perception of an extended object) involves a perception of at least two 
minima sensibilia. Second, suppose one’s ability to perceive relations between 
spatial positions in some area is inhibited. One would expect to find that our 
perception of that area as extended would also be inhibited. Surprisingly, both 
predictions are violated by experimental evidence. 
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Consider the first prediction. James identified patches of the visual and tactile 
fields that we perceive as extended yet not as composed of any distinct positions or 
points. This violates the first prediction, and thereby suggests that ‘psychological-
atomistic’ accounts of space must be incorrect. We do not perceive space and 
extension in virtue of perceiving (or imposing) relations between distinctly-perceived 
positions.  
James used both informal experiments readers can perform on themselves, and 
published data from other experimental psychologists,203 to make his case. He began 
with informal evidence: 
If the reader will fix his eye steadily on a distant point, and bring his hand gradually 
into the field of view, he will first see the hand, and see it as extended and possessing 
parts, but will be wholly unable to count the fingers. He will see objects on the same 
portions of the retina without recognizing what they are. In like manner if he turn his 
head upside down, or get into some unnatural position, the spatial relations of what he 
sees—distances, directions, and so forth—will be very uncertain, positions and 
measurements vague; but who will pretend that the picture, in losing its order, has 
become any the less spatial? (James 1983, 69) 
There are two bits of evidence here. First, James pointed out that when we move 
our hand into the periphery of our visual field, we perceive the hand to be extended, 
yet we do not clearly perceive individual fingers. This is an example of an object we 
perceive as extended without perceiving any distinct spatial positions that compose 
the perceived object. This violates the first prediction of ‘psychological atomism.’  
                                                 
203 A common but misguided view is that since James did not produce many experimental 
results of his own, and indeed hated working in his own laboratory, he was “led to reject 
experimental psychology” (Evans 1990, 440). Evans, for example, offers pages of evidence 
establishing that James did not like to perform experiments. Evans then proceeds to explain 
why James rejected experiment as a valuable tool for psychology, as though the two claims 
were equivalent. Evans finally wonders why American psychologists have been so impressed 
by James, given the latter’s supposed rejection of experiment. Though I cannot undertake a 
study of James’s multifaceted uses of experimental evidence here, I note that his work on 
space perception alone shows real interest and ingenuity at bringing to bear experimental 
evidence for theoretical needs. True, there were aspects of much “brass instrument 
psychology” (e.g., the psychology emanating from Wundt’s lab) that James rejected, 
particularly when experimental techniques were premised on ‘psychological atomism’ (as is 
rightly noted at Evans 1990, 441-442). But again, one should not infer that it was 
experiment per se that James rejected. James commonly put experimental results to use, 
often to devastating use, in the Principles. 
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If there is any doubt that we perceive the hand to be extended, a page later 
James suggested we try the same experiment while wiggling the fingers. We now 
perceive motion, which indisputably involves the perception of spatial area, for 
James. But we still will not perceive the individual fingers distinctly (EPs, 70).  
The second bit of evidence in the passage just quoted works as follows. James 
pointed out that when we move our head into odd positions we seem to lose the 
ability to measure relations like distance, direction, and so on, in a spatial area. But 
we do not thereby suffer a disruption in our perception that what we are looking at 
is spatially extended. This is an example of a perceived area that violates the second 
prediction of ‘psychological atomism.’ Our perception of relations in the visual field 
is disrupted, but there is no effect on our perception that the visual field looks to be 
extended.  
As I noted in Chapter Three, most psychologists followed Berkeley and Hume 
in maintaining that both the visual and tactile fields were built from minima 
sensibilia. Accordingly, James provided experimental evidence that neither sensory 
modality is, in fact, composed of minima sensibilia. 
We have just seen some of his evidence concerning the visual field. Here is an 
important sample of his tactile evidence:  
If the reader will find a portion of his skin—the arm, for example—where a pair of 
compass-points an inch apart are felt as one impression, and if he will then trace lines 
a tenth of an inch long on that spot with a pencil-point, he will be distinctly aware of 
the point’s motion and vaguely aware of the direction of the motion. The perception of 
the motion here is certainly not derived from a pre-existing knowledge that its starting 
and ending points are separate positions in space, because positions in space ten times 
wider apart fail to be discriminated as such when excited by the dividers. (EPs, 69-70)  
James asked us to consider the smallest area on a subject’s skin that, when 
stimulated, feels to the subject to be extended. Let us call this the “smallest 
extended area.” Now consider the smallest patch on the subject’s skin inside which 
she will be able to perceive two distinct points or positions. Let us call this the 
“smallest pointillistic area.” The first prediction of ‘psychological atomism’ requires 
that the smallest pointillistic area be smaller than or equal in size to the smallest 
extended area. In fact, the reverse is true. The smallest extended area is smaller—
ten times smaller, it turns out—than the smallest pointillistic area. 
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Why is any ‘atomist’ committed to the smallest pointillistic area being equal to, 
or smaller than, the smallest extended area? An ‘atomist’ holds that we perceive 
extension in virtue of perceiving relations between minima sensibilia. This means 
that all ‘atomists’ must hold that if there are zero or one sensibilia contained in some 
perception, that perception will not be of extension. However, ‘atomists’ may differ 
on the precise, smallest number of related sensibilia required for a perception of 
extension. Some ‘atomists’ might hold that only two related sensibilia are required 
for such a perception. In that case, one would expect the smallest pointillistic area 
(the smallest area inside which one can identify two distinct points) to be equal in 
size to the smallest extended area. But other ‘atomists’ might reasonably hold that 
at least three, perhaps, or four sensibilia, or whatever, must be drawn together in 
order to perceive extension. In all such cases, one would expect the smallest 
pointillistic area to be smaller than the smallest extended area. After all, the 
smallest extended area will now contain at least three sensibilia, or four, or 
whatever; but the smallest pointillistic area, by definition, contains exactly two 
sensibilia. In short, all ‘atomists’ must hold that the smallest pointillistic area should 
be smaller or equal in size to the smallest extended area.  
Quite the opposite turns out to be true. According to James, the smallest 
extended area is about ten times smaller than the smallest pointillistic area, given 
that both measurements are taken on the same portion of skin. If true, the smallest 
pointillistic area would be another example of a perceptibly extended patch that 
does not contain at least two sensibilia, another violation of the first prediction of 
‘psychological atomism.’ James showed how to use a simple compass to make the 
relevant measurements, for the case of tactile perception. How does his 
demonstration work?  
James took the fact that we can perceive motion across a patch of skin as 
evidence that we feel that patch of skin as extended. So he measured the smallest 
extended area by measuring the shortest distance of skin across which we can feel 
motion. James then made another measurement on the same patch of skin. When 
the skin is stimulated by two compass points that are sufficiently close together, 
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blindfolded subjects report feeling only one impression. James measured the 
smallest distance at which subjects can reliably distinguish between a dual and a 
single impression. He took this distance to give the size of the smallest area inside 
which we can identify at least two separate points or positions—in my language, he 
took this distance to be a measurement of the smallest pointillistic area.  
But when one actually takes this second measurement, one finds that such an 
area will be ten times larger than the smallest extended area—quite the opposite of 
what ‘psychological atomism’ predicts. Thus, the tactile perception of extension 
cannot be built from relations between minima sensibilia. James though Green, 
Cabot, and associationists were mistaken in their shared commitment to 
‘psychological atomism.’204 
James held that the perception of motion also entailed the perception of 
temporal duration. He cited an experiment by the Austrian physiologist Sigmund 
Exner (a Helmholtz student). The experiment shows that our perception of motion 
through time is measurably more acute than our perception of distinct moments. 
Therefore, time perception cannot be broken into the perception of a collection of 
temporal atoms, James concluded. Thus, though the focus of “The Spatial Quale” is 
obviously spatial perception, James also included evidence that ‘psychological 
atomism’ cannot constitute a successful theory of temporal perception, either.  
Exner had conducted a stroboscopic experiment. He demonstrated that we 
cannot distinguish which of two sparks has flashed first when their time interval is 
reduced to .045 seconds. James took this as an approximate measure of how fine-
grained our ability is to perceive distinct moments, the best candidate for temporal 
atoms. Now, if the sparks are moved so that their respective circles of irradiation 
overlap for the viewer, the two events will be perceived as motion—as one spark 
moving from the location of the first spark’s flash to the location of the second. 
James noted that the interval between the flashes can then be reduced all the way 
to .014 seconds before the viewer fails to perceive the motion. James thought this 
                                                 
204 Again, I worry that it was unfair to saddle Idealists with ‘psychological atomism.’ See my 
discussion of this point, above, at pp. 246 ff. 
  254  
result shows that our perception of a continuous temporal duration (in this case, the 
time lapse between the start and end of the apparent motion in the second 
measurement) is over three times more refined than our ability to distinguish 
disconnected temporal moments (EPs 70-71). James concluded that our temporal 
experiences cannot be built out of a perception of distinct, passing moments.  
In the Principles, James included these latter results in both the chapters on the 
“Perception of Space” and on the “Perception of Time.” In both chapters, he 
supplemented these results with accounts of similar experiments (PP, 578, 811). I 
include the time experiment here to reinforce my claim that James’s early work on 
space included a set of evidence against ‘psychological atomism’ in general, and thus 
provided early support for the stream thesis. 
The point I want to emphasize is that James’s rejection of ‘psychological 
atomism’ was based on a rich collection of empirical evidence. Since the rejection of 
‘psychological atomism’ entails the stream thesis, this means the stream thesis is 
supported by empirical evidence.  
 
How does James’s criticism of minima sensibilia fare with respect to Hume? 
Hume did not baldly assert that our visual perceptions are composed of minima 
sensibilia. He offered quasi-empirical evidence of his own:205 
’Tis therefore certain, that the imagination reaches a minimum, and may raise up to 
itself an idea, of which it cannot conceive any sub-division, and which cannot be 
diminished without a total annihilation. … 
 ’Tis the same case with the impressions of the senses as with the ideas of the 
imagination. Put a spot of ink upon paper, fix your eye upon that spot, and retire to 
such a distance, that at last you lose sight of it; ’tis plain, that the moment before it 
vanish’d the image or impression was perfectly indivisible.  
 …Nothing can be more minute, than some ideas, which we form in the fancy; and 
images, which appear to the senses; since there are ideas and images perfectly simple 
and indivisible. (THN, I.ii.1, 27-28) 
In the above passage, Hume offered evidence that our visual perceptions are atomic. 
He directed the reader to put an ink spot on a blank sheet of paper. The reader was 
to move away from the paper, slowly, until the ink spot disappeared from the visual 
                                                 
205 I thank James Mattingly for calling my attention to this passage.  
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field. At the moment before the spot disappeared, Hume wrote, that spot must have 
been perceptually indivisible. The entire visual field was supposed to be made up of 
tiny, perceived spots, or minima sensibilia, each of which is the size of the smallest-
perceivable ink spot. 
James’s data are fatal, it seems to me, to Hume’s account of space, insofar as 
Hume’s account relies on the kind of minima sensibilia we allegedly isolate using 
this ink-spot procedure. For Hume, it is only in virtue of perceiving relations 
between these ‘perfectly indivisible” areas that we are supposed to perceive space 
or extension. But James’s results show that when one isolates a patch of skin 
“perfectly indivisible” into distinct points (Hume’s phrase—non-pointillistic areas, in 
my language), that patch will still appear to be extended. If it be doubted that such 
a patch still appears to be extended, James would have noted that we can still 
perceive motion inside such patches. We can experimentally isolate non-pointillistic 
areas in the periphery of the visual field that do appear to the subject to be 
extended. Similar results, I expect, could easily be reproduced in the center of the 
visual field.206 
However, James’s results concerning the periphery of the visual field by 
themselves provide enough empirical evidence to refute Hume. Hume claimed we 
perceive extension in virtue of perceiving the “manner” in which multiple minima 
sensibilia are arranged in our perceptual fields. James has given counter examples, 
showing that there exist some tactual and visual areas that we perceive as extended, 
though those areas do not contain multiple minima sensibilia. It does not matter 
whether these areas are in the periphery of the visual field or on the skin. Since they 
amount to cases of spatial perception without the perception of two or more distinct 
positions, the are counter-examples to Hume’s view.  
                                                 
206 Here is an experiment one could run to establish this. Instead of using an ink spot on 
paper, one could use a white board with a hole in it, set against a black background. One 
could then follow Hume’s suggestion and find the greatest distance at which the hole can be 
reliably identified by a subject. Then one could fashion a moving piece that fits inside the 
hole. James’s view predicts that subjects will be able to perceive motion inside this hole at 
even greater distances—distances where a hole fit with no moving parts would be invisible to 
the subject. I do not have the resources to run such an experiment properly. 
  256  
This concludes my review of James’s empirical evidence against ‘psychological 
atomism’ in his early work on space. Let us now turn to the positive, stream-based 
account of space perception advanced in “The Spatial Quale.” 
4.3  The Stream-Based Account of Space Perception in “The Spatial Quale” 
Now on to step two—James’s positive account of space perception. The data I 
reviewed in the last section suggested to James that our perception of extended 
spatial areas is direct, and involves no juxtaposition of alleged atoms of experience.  
Instead, James claimed that extension was a basic property of all sensation. Just 
as we speak of a sensation’s “intensity,” we should also speak of a sensation’s 
“extensity” or “voluminousness.” James wrote:  
Why should we hesitate to call it [space] an ingredient of the sensation yielded to us 
by the retina or skin, which intuits the items? Everyone will admit the degree of 
intensity of a sensation to be a part of its sensible quality. The brightness of the blue 
sky, as I now look at it, betrays its intensity by pricking, as it were, my retina. The 
extent of the blue which I at this moment see, seems to be an attribute given quite as 
immediately. A broad blueness differs from a narrow blueness as immediately as a 
bright blueness from a sombre blueness. (EPs, 65) 
Nobody disputed that intensity is a property of sensation. James held that extensity 
is a property of sensation, as well. In fact, he held that all sensation had some level 
of extensity. He termed this property of sensation “the property of extension or 
spatial quale.”  
It may be useful to think of James’s basic notion of experience this way. Like a 
portion of an actual stream, a portion of James’s stream of thought has length, 
depth, and breadth. The length corresponds to the subject’s perception of temporal 
duration. The depth corresponds to the intensity of a sensation. And the breadth 
corresponds to the extensity, or spatial quale, of a sensation. 
In the above passage, the mention of “retina or skin” is not meant as an 
exhaustive list of modalities that contribute spatial qualia. James held that all 
sensation, regardless of modality, has a spatial quale: 
It seems to me that all our sensations, without exception, have this spatial quale. I am 
surprised that Riehl, whose article is in other respects so just, should regard it as an 
exclusive endowment of the retina. … The squeaking of a slate-pencil is less spatial 
than the voluminous reverberations of a thunderstorm; the prick of a pin less so than 
the feeling of a warm bath; a little neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, far less 
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so than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discomfort of a colic or lumbago. (EPs, 
67)207 
So for James, all sensation seems to have a spatial quale. 
We have already seen James’s attack on ‘psychological atomism.’ So clearly, the 
feeling of voluminousness cannot be built out of collections of minima sensibilia. 
Indeed, James emphasizes that my perception of an area or object as extended is 
“Given all at once, if at all. Any space which I can take in at one glance comes to me 
as an undivided plenum” (EPs, 66). The key is that sensation gives us rich material 
that is originally “undivided.”  
If proto-empiricists faced the question of how distinctly-perceived points could 
be knit together into a perception of a whole area, James’s explanatory problem ran 
in the opposite direction. James claimed that what is given in sensation is whole 
extended areas. His problem was to explain how subjects ever can come to perceive 
distinct points or positions. 
His answer was that in some sense our perception of whole areas must be 
carved or parsed into a perception of distinct spatial positions. Thus, he wrote that 
the spatial component of sensation 
exists at the outset in a simple and unitary form. The positions which ultimately come 
to be determined within it, in mutual relation to each other, are later developments of 
experience, guided by attention. (EPs, 63)  
What does James mean by saying that the perceived quality of extension “exists at 
the outset,” though? Here it will be helpful to place James’s view into context.  
 
Early modern philosophers and scientists sought to explain how human 
perception works. The goal was to show how a physiological input gets converted 
into a particular phenomenal experience. Around the middle of the seventeenth 
century, a consensus emerged that this process was to be modeled as a causal chain. 
The starting point is a physical object that stimulates, either directly or through an 
intermediary such as light or sound, an organism’s nerve-endings. The stimulation 
                                                 
207 James appended a footnote to this passage arguing that his use of “spatial” across sensory 
modalities is not to be taken as a metaphor. 
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causes a nerve signal eventually to be sent to an organ in the brain then known as 
the “sensorium.” The sensorium was supposed to be the organ which turned 
physiological signals into conscious experience.  
Consider the case of vision. We can discern a physical stage, where light 
impacts the retina, and forms an image there; a physiological stage of neural 
transmission; and a mental stage where the sensorium stimulates conscious 
experience, and where conscious experiences may themselves interact or be acted 
upon by processes that belong either to the physiological or to the mental stage. 
Theorists historically clashed over what stage, if any, contains the bulk of mental 
processing. In particular, theorists clashed over how much work goes into creating 
the character of conscious experience at the physical and physiological stages 
(sometimes these are jointly referred to as the “psychophysical” stage), and how 
much work the mind performs at the mental stage. Some theorists saw little gap 
between the output of psychophysical processes and conscious experience, and thus 
held that most mental processing actually occurred at the psychophysical level. 
Others assigned a relatively robust role for processing within conscious 
experience.208 
Though James is today remembered as an “introspectionist,” it is important to 
see that the Principles relied at least as heavily on psychophysical as on 
introspective explanations of the character of experience. His account of space is one 
important example that lays heavy weight on the psychophysical stage. When James 
wrote that the spatial quale “exists at the outset” of our experiences, he meant that 
the task of perceiving the bare quality of extension is accomplished at either the 
physical or physiological level. By the time nerve signals are converted into 
conscious experience, there is always a quality of extension already present.  
It is important to acknowledge that James’s theory of space perception is not 
only formulated in opposition to Idealists. Helmholtz and Wundt were even more 
obvious targets. These latter two both contended that a host of “unconscious 
                                                 
208 I draw this condensed history from (Hatfield 1991, 33-34). James presented his 
interpretation of the causal chain of perception at (PP, 95 ff.). 
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inferences” had to be performed on the raw materials being sent down our neural 
pathways in order to perceive space or extension. Unconscious inferences were 
supposed to be processes that occurred at the mental stage, but that nevertheless 
went unperceived.209 James’s view was explicitly presented as an alternative to such 
theories. The notion that James’s theory of space was to be an antidote to Helmholtz 
and Wundt has been well treated already, so I will not dwell on it.210 
So James held that the bare quality of extension clings to all outer experience. 
However, he denied that psychophysical processes produce an awareness of either 
distinct positions or relations between positions—this is just another way of saying 
that James rejected ‘psychological atomism.’ 
One final question is worth pursuing before discussing James’s theory of how we 
perceive spatial position. Did James hold that we have a native experience only of 
two dimensions, and that the third dimension was somehow to be constructed? Or 
did he hold that we natively perceive the third dimension as well?  
In “The Spatial Quale,” James offered empirical evidence that the bare, un-
mapped experience of spatial extension indeed is native even in the third dimension 
(EPs 68-69). His evidence, however, was relatively weak. He asked the reader to sit 
with closed eyes, and have a friend noiselessly hold a book up to the face. The 
subject will be aware of the book’s presence, and will be aware of its absence once it 
is removed. James claimed that this experience a) could not be due to education, 
and b) is an experience in three dimensions.  
                                                 
209 Herbert Spencer held a similar view. See below, Figures 6 and 7, p. 337. 
210 Reed, for example, shows that James rejected the notion of unconscious inference on the 
basis of introspective evidence about the nature of marginal conscious experience. For 
James, any data of experience worth counting as unconscious were really nothing but 
marginal experiences. James took his investigation of the “fringe” of our stream of thought, of 
experiences of which we are barely aware, to reveal such experiences to be vague, fuzzy, and 
ill-defined. Such experiential material is ill-suited to being premises in deductive inferences 
of the kind Helmholtz and Wundt suggested were required for space perception, James held. 
Premises in an inference have to contain sharply-specified data. Since James held that the 
only experiential data that were unconscious were vague, he rejected the claim that the mind 
could draw inferences from such data in order to produce conscious experience (see Reed 
1990). 
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The second claim seems correct—we feel, as James wrote, “shut in” by the 
book when it is present, and the empty space we feel when it is removed does seem 
to have depth. Yet James offered no argument for thinking that this experience of 
depth could not possibly be due to education. He wrote that some blind people may 
be very good at this sort of spatial perception. But I cannot see how that supports 
the claim that the perception of depth must be native.  
In fact, James himself expressed dissatisfaction with his own evidence about the 
experience of the third dimension in a letter to Stumpf, dated February 6, 1887 
(CWJ, VI.204). Accordingly, he changed his formulation of his view on the third 
dimension, though I am unsure whether the change amounts to anything substantial. 
He later wrote that spatial qualia are better described as having a property of 
voluminousness, and that only by discrimination do we learn to interpret this vague 
voluminousness as being composed of three dimensions (PP, 778; James 1887a, 2-
3). But this formulation makes it difficult to see what voluminousness could be if not 
a three-dimensional quality to perception. If our sensations are voluminous, why 
should we need to parse them to get an experience of three dimensions?  
 
In any case, let us return to the mechanics of James’s early view. Here is how 
he summarized his position in “The Spatial Quale.” 
To sum up briefly my thesis: I say that the feeling arising from the excitement of any 
extended part of the body is felt as extended—why, we cannot say. The primary 
retinal sensation is a simple vastness, a teeming muchness. The perception of positions 
within it results from subdividing it. The measurement of distances and direction 
comes later still. (EPs, 71-2) 
Again, James was using the retina only as an example. He held that sensations from 
all sensory modalities come equipped with a feeling of spatial extension. This feeling 
of extension is always given as a vague, jumbled, extended experience. Distinct 
spatial positions and relations must be actively carved into this stream of experience.  
Now what is the process through which minds carve distinct positions and 
relations? James wrote that while the experience of the visual field as extended 
involves no learning, “the mapping out of retinal space involves much experience” 
(EPs, 72). What kind of experience, exactly, teaches us to “map” locations in our 
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perceptual fields? How, in other words, does the mind learn to carve the stream of 
experience into distinct positions and relations?  
James cited two independent, factors. First, when “sensitive surfaces,” like a 
patch of skin, are excited in a uniform manner, we are unlikely to perceive distinct 
locations or relations on that surface. For example, when floating in luke-warm 
water, it is difficult to feel any distinct point on our skin. However, if one is then 
poked with a stick, one will have no trouble perceiving the point on the skin being 
stimulated. So the first factor which teaches us to identify spatial positions is the 
non-uniform stimulation of a patch of our sensory surfaces. These sensory surfaces 
include the retina, the skin, the ear drum or taste buds, or really any part of the 
body, inside and out, capable of producing sensation. We learn to map related spatial 
positions in the “teeming muchness” of experience when we learn to separate at 
least three distinct points inside one patch of perception (EPs, 72).211 
But James held that this first factor could not fully explain our ability to map 
our various perceptual fields. The problem is that there are cases where we 
sometimes identify distinct points in a perceptual field, though the identified points 
are qualitatively similar to those in the surrounding field. James gave the example of 
spotting a sail on the horizon. Compared to sensory contrasts we routinely ignore, 
the contrast of the sail against the horizon is exceedingly subtle. So there must be 
some further factor that explains our ability to map distinct locations in a perceptual 
field. 
The factor James came up with was selective attention. Patches of our 
perceptual fields which have a spatial quale can often be broken into smaller, related 
positions by the subject’s selectively attending to various portions of the experience. 
                                                 
211 For a recent debate over whether the spatial position of an item in the visual field is 
dependent on that position’s relation to other perceived positions, see (Casullo 1986; Casullo 
1989; Falkenstein 1989). Casullo holds (and Falkenstein denies) that at least some positions 
in the visual field are correctly described by monadic predicates, such as centrality or 
sinistrality. James would side with Falkenstein in this debate. Although James thinks we do 
have direct intuitional access to spatially-extended visual fields, the extended fields we 
initially perceive have no distinct positions. Positions only arise when the mind carves 
relations between different patches of the vague spatial field, for James. 
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For our purposes, this second factor in learning to parse the stream of thought is 
perhaps more interesting than the first.  
Above all, James held that our attention is guided by “emotional interests.” The 
relevant contrast with “emotional” is not “rational” but something like 
“nonpartisan” or “uninvested.” Features of our environment to which we are most 
likely to attend are those which hold some practical interest for us.  
I will quote at length the passage where James presented this second factor, 
because the factor is crucial for my interpretation.  
Now, the purely local peculiarities of feeling in different parts of a sensitive surface are 
locked into an invariable order in our experience. We should therefore naturally expect 
to have great difficulty in picking out any one point on the retinal surface; for example, 
if that surface never became the seat of other contrasts than these immutable, local 
differences. The difficulty would be still farther increased by the fact that, considered 
in abstracto, local differences are utterly insipid, and carry with them no difference of 
emotional interest. But emotional interests are the great guides to selective attention. 
One retinal position, therefore, could hardly be singled out from any other before an 
interesting object had come to occupy it. It might then share the interest of the object, 
and be noticed. Again, the local differences, per se, may be very slight quantitatively, 
and require an adventitious sensation, superinduced upon them, to awaken the 
attention. But after the attention has once been awakened in this way, it may continue 
to be conscious of the unaided difference; just as a sail on the horizon may be too faint 
for us to notice until someone’s finger placed against the spot has pointed it out to us, 
but may then remain visible after the finger has been withdrawn. (EPs, 75) 
In this passage, James argued that local contrasts inside a perceptual field may aid 
the subject in discriminating a particular object. But such differences cannot fully 
account for our ability to discriminate objects. Thus, James proposed that selective 
attention, which the mind deploys according to its own “emotional interests,” also 
helps accomplish the task. We select parts of our perceptual field to attend to 
according to what is interesting or important in our environment.  
Here we have the rudiments of a mental architecture James would develop and 
widely deploy in the Principles. He conceived of experience, at its most basic level, 
as a chaotic mass. To be made intelligible, distinct objects, positions, and relations 
must be discriminated via selective attention. The chaotic mass comes equipped 
with spatial qualia (or “feelings of extension”), but not with a clear map of distinct 
positions or relations.  
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This theory is striking because it builds a notion of choice or endorsement into 
the basic fabric of perception. On James’s view, dispassionate observation must be a 
more sophisticated perceptual achievement than interested observation. To break 
up the “blooming, buzzing, confusion” of experience into distinct objects, positions, 
and relations, we must take an interest some parts of our environment, and ignore 
other parts.  
An objection crops up here. It is hard to see how we could have emotional 
interest in features of our vague experience—our “teeming muchness”—before 
those features have been discriminated. James would presumably respond that the 
vague stream of consciousness does not require division or discrimination to be 
intelligible. For example, we can recognize a hand as such in the periphery of our 
visual field, even though we cannot sharply perceive the hand’s constituent visual 
features. James must hold that this vague form of recognition provides enough 
information for the mind to take disproportionate interest in some parts of the 
blooming, buzzing confusion, even before the stream has been subdivided. 
 
This theory bears much in common with Wilfrid Sellars’s later view in 
Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Sellars asked the reader to consider two 
varieties of perceptual claims. Statements like x looks green to Jones differ subtly 
from statements like Jones sees that x is green. The latter ascribes propositional 
content to Jones’ experience, and also endorses that content. The former merely 
ascribes propositional content. Sellars’s solution to problems he exposed with 
“traditional” empiricism (see above, pp. 210 ff.) involved treating such endorsement 
claims as logically prior to claims about what merely seems to be the case (Sellars 
1956/1997, 40-42). For James as for Sellars, claims about what seems to be the case 
amount to claims about what is the case, minus the speaker’s endorsement. For 
Sellars, this is a point about logic—seems like claims are to be logically analyzable 
into endorsement claims. For James, this is a point about perception—cases where 
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we see that something is the case are developmentally prior to cases where we 
withhold judgment (for his explicit claim to this effect, see PP, 917 ff).212 
We have seen that James actually confronted Green’s ancestral version of 
Sellars’s critique of empiricism. We are now in a position to see James’s response.  
Recall that Green’s version of the argument was essentially metaphysical. 
Science discloses a purely material world, he assumed, not a world populated with 
non-physical stuff like values or standards. Thus a genuinely scientific psychology 
could only purport to study a purely material animal—an animal that was nothing 
but a complex sensory mechanism rather than a genuine intellectual agent. Green 
argued that such a creature could never hew to standards, whether cognitive or 
moral, so could never be said to have real knowledge. 
James responded by showing that this was a mischaracterization of science. He 
showed this not by giving an a priori proof, but by actually helping to build a science 
of mind that included normative concepts at the most basic level.213 As we have just 
seen, James tried to show that perception itself is an inherently normative process, 
in the following sense. Organisms develop sharp perceptual maps of the world only 
by taking disproportionate interest in certain parts of the stream of thought. This is 
to say that perception itself, on James’s model, involves the organism’s endorsement 
                                                 
212 A troubling question is raised by the apparent similarity between James’s and Sellars’s 
respective forms of empiricism, along with the apparent similarity between Green’s and 
Sellars’s respective critiques of traditional empiricism (as noted in the last chapter). Green 
and James were not merely obscure figures in some corner of the history of philosophy whose 
views anticipate Sellars. They were arguably the two most important pillars of English and 
American philosophy, respectively, barely more than a generation before Sellars wrote. The 
troubling question is, how can such an important set of arguments from the late-19th century 
disappear so quickly, so that Sellars own critique and revision of empiricism could hit the 
philosophical scene with such a fresh scent? 
213 I devote Chapter Five to making sense of James’s claim that his psychology took certain 
facts to be “ultimate.” We will see that the stream thesis established which facts 
psychologists were to treat as ultimate. Here I only want to register the following. The fact 
that minds take a selective interest in certain parts of their environment is enshrined as the 
fifth postulate of the stream thesis (see below, p. 288). This is what I mean in claiming that 
normative concepts like interest and choice are employed at the most basic level of James’s 
psychology. 
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(via the mechanism of selective attention) of certain parts of its perceived 
environment as more useful, interesting, or valuable than other parts.  
James then developed a general account of science that countenances his own 
norm-laden project in the Principles. He argued that science is to be regarded as a 
particularly contrived form of perception. In science, the mind plays an even more 
radically selective role than it plays in the everyday mapping of its perceptual fields.  
The Principles develops such a theory of science in the final chapter (PP, 1230-
1236, 1258-1262). In one place (PP, 1231-1232.n), he quoted at length from an 
earlier article he had published, entitled “Reflex Action and Theism” (the quote 
comes from James 1881, 395-396). The passage helps give a broad outline of 
James’s account of science: 
The conceiving or theorizing faculty works exclusively for the sake of ends that do not 
exist at all in the world of the impressions received by way of our senses, but are set by 
our emotional and practical subjectivity. It is a transformer of the world of our 
impressions into a totally different world, the world of our conception; and the 
transformation is effected in the interests of our volitional nature, and for no other 
purpose whatsoever. Destroy the volitional nature, the definite subjective purposes, 
preferences, fondnesses for certain effects, forms, orders, and not the slightest motive 
would remain for the brute order of our experience to be remodelled at all.  
The passage started by discussing our capacity to think theoretically. We form 
abstract theories “exclusively for the sake of ends.” These ends do not derive 
directly from the senses. They are products of our subjective preferences and 
interests. If we did not have such preferences, there would be no reason to 
“remodel” experience using concepts at all. 
But, as we have the elaborate volitional constitution we do have, the remodelling must 
be effected, there is no escape. The world’s contents are given to each of us in an order 
so foreign to our subjective interests that we can hardly by an effort of the imagination 
picture to ourselves what it is like. We have to break that order altogether, and by 
picking out from it the items that concern us, and connecting them with others far 
away, which we say ‘belong’ with them, we are able to make out definite threads of 
sequence and tendency, to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for them, to enjoy 
simplicity and harmony in the place of what was chaos. …  
Our subjective interests spur us—indeed, force us—to use concepts to remodel our 
brute sensory experience. This is because the actual contents of reality are given to 
us in such a chaotic manner that we cannot effectively pursue our interests unless 
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we attend only to features of our environments that are important or interesting to 
us. We thereby “break” the given order of reality, and remodel it into a more 
workable form. James then presented science as a form of this conceptual 
remodeling of experience: 
The real world as it is given at this moment is the sum total of all its beings and events 
now. But can we think of such a sum? Can we realize for an instant what a cross-
section of all existence at a definite point of time would be? While I talk and the flies 
buzz, a sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the 
Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary, and twins 
are born in France. What does that mean? Does the contemporaneity of these events 
with each other and with a million more as disjointed as they form a rational bond 
between them, and unite them into anything that means for us a world? Yet just such a 
collateral contemporaneity, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. It is an 
order with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as fast as possible. As I 
said, we break it: we break it into histories, and we break it into arts, and we break it 
into sciences; and then we begin to feel at home. We make ten thousand separate 
serial orders of it. On any one of these, we may react as if the rest did not exist. We 
discover among its parts regulations that were never given to sense at all, —
mathematical relations, tangents, squares, and roots and logarithmic functions, —and 
out of an infinite number of these we call certain ones essential and lawgiving, and 
ignore the rest. Essential these relations are, but only for our purpose, the other 
relations being just as real and present as they; and our purpose is to conceive simply 
and to foresee. 
Science, history, and the arts all amount to imposing an order on reality that will suit 
some purpose of ours. What separates these fields of inquiry, according to James, is 
the different purposes each brings to bear on reality. Finally, he tells us what kind of 
purposes we employ in science, in particular. 
Are not simple conception and prevision subjective ends, pure and simple? They are 
the ends of what we call science; and the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet 
exhaustively cleared up by any philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the 
remodelling. It shows itself plastic to many of our scientific, to many of our æsthetic, to 
many of our practical purposes and ends. (PP, 1231-1232.n) 
Thus, this long passage claimed that reality itself is so inherently chaotic that human 
minds are forced to “break it up” into more manageable parts. Just as we quietly 
employ our own interests in mapping our perceptual fields, so scientists must 
employ their own interests in breaking reality into parts that display lawful 
regularities. What interests do scientists employ? James cited two cognitive values 
(as we would now regard them): “simple conception” and “prevision.” In other 
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words, the scientist tries to conceive of reality in a way that maximizes theoretical 
simplicity and predictive power. She breaks down reality into parts, parts between 
which she then tries to discover lawful regularities. 
On the basis of this passage, we can reconstruct the following response to 
Green.214 It is false that science discloses a world that is fundamentally valueless. 
The basic picture of the human mind emerging from empirical psychology—James’s 
psychology, at any rate—is an organ that makes sense of the world not in the 
absence of, but in virtue of subjective interests, preferences, and values.  
A critic like Green might retort that at best, James has shown how science uses 
normative concepts. He has not shown how science can be used to account for 
normativity itself. What are these mysterious values James’s psychology helps itself 
to, and why should they so help us order reality? 
Here it pays to reread the final two sentences in the passage just quoted. James 
claimed that the “miracle” of science is that reality itself ever cooperates with this 
process of “remodelling” our experiences according to “practical purposes and 
ends.” Crucially, James adds that this is “a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up 
by any philosophy.” As we will see in Chapter Five, this was a favorite strategy of 
James’s. He thought psychology should sidestep intractable metaphysical problems 
by relegating certain nagging questions to philosophy.  
Now Green’s argument may be given a relatively weaker or a relatively 
stronger reading. The weaker reading poses a challenge that James’s psychology 
overcomes. The stronger reading poses a question that James can safely leave to 
philosophical speculation. 
If critics of empiricism were charging that a science of mind presupposed a 
metaphysics that was incompatible with the existence of knowing agents, James can 
overcome this challenge. James’s actual accomplishments in psychology provide an 
                                                 
214 This is one case where I do not have evidence that James was directly responding to 
Green’s attack. In fact, “Reflex Action and Theism” was published before “Can There Be a 
Natural Science of Man?” was published—this was the article where Green first advanced 
the charge of naturalistic fallacy, publicly. So here I am reconstructing a response to Green 
based on theoretical resources James had been developing during the 1880s. 
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existence proof that science may incorporate normative concepts at its most basic 
level. If critics like Green where making a stronger charge—that the science of mind 
cannot, by itself, give a positive account of normative concepts like knowledge, 
James could safely deflect this question. In fact, this passage hints that critics like 
Green demand too much of psychology. Nobody, after all, can really explain why our 
abstract, scientific concepts should sometimes seem so accurately to latch onto the 
natural world.  
Instead, empiricists would be vindicated if psychology actually provided some 
philosophically useful results about the human mind. According to James, no 
science—psychology included—should be hobbled by incessant demands to answer 
the most intractable metaphysical questions. In Chapter Five, we will look more 
closely at James’s oft-used strategy of banishing tough questions from psychology 
and leaving them for philosophy to handle. 
5.   ANALYSIS AND ELABORATION OF THE STREAM THESIS 
We now have the basics of James’s account of space perception on the table. We 
have also seen how that account furnishes a response to Green’s charge that proto-
empiricists cannot account for the normativity of scientific knowledge. We now must 
face several further questions.  
First, how does James’s account provide a response to other Idealist arguments 
we have seen in this dissertation? Second, in what respect does that response count 
as an empiricist response? Third, what have we learned so far about the epistemic 
status of the stream thesis? I now devote one subsection to answering each question. 
5.1  The Response to Idealists 
Let us begin addressing the first question by recalling Green’s argument against 
proto-empiricist accounts of space perception. Green saddled his opponents with two 
core commitments. The reality principle states that what is real is to be associated 
with what we receive passively through sensation. ‘Psychological atomism’ is the 
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view that what we receive passively through sensation are just psychological 
atoms—for Berkeley and Hume, these are collections of minima sensibilia.215  
Green argued that the perception of space requires the grasping of relations 
between minima sensibilia. These relations cannot themselves be minima sensibilia, 
so they cannot be given passively in sensation. They have to be added by the 
intellect, Green argued. But the reality principle requires all information the mind 
adds to sensation to be counted as fantastical. So, Green concluded, proto-
empiricists could not claim that the perception of either spatial areas or extended 
objects amounts to the perception of anything real.  
To understand how James’s account sidesteps this problem, it will be helpful to 
consider proto-empiricists’ original motivation for espousing the reality principle. For 
Locke, simple ideas have a high degree of fidelity to their causes. This is because 
simple ideas have been stamped on the mind from without, and contain only 
information about whatever object is responsible for that stamping.216 Note that 
what assures us of the high fidelity of simple ideas, for Locke, is that the mind 
cannot actively create any such idea. These ideas can only have been formed 
passively, by external causes. In contrast, complex ideas may have been formed by 
the mind’s adding information to simple ideas, for example information concerning 
relations. Therefore, a complex idea may have a low degree of fidelity to its outward 
cause, because the idea may contain information actively contributed by the 
subject’s own mind, not by the object or cause of the idea.  
The reality principle is a theoretical tool for excluding such low fidelity ideas 
from our conception of reality. The proto-empiricist insists that we not regard any 
                                                 
215 Strictly speaking, Hume and Berkeley held that only the visual and tactile fields are 
composed of perceptual atoms. But they also held that these were the only two sensory 
modalities involved in space perception.   
216 For example, at (ECHU, II.xxx.2), Locke writes: “And thus our simple Ideas are all real 
and true, because they answer and agree to those Powers of Things, which produce them in 
our Minds, that being all that is requisite to make them real, and not fictions at Pleasure. 
For in simple Ideas, (as has been shewn,) the Mind is wholly confined to the Operation of 
things upon it; and can make to it self no simple Idea, more than what it has received.” 
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idea as real unless we can show that it only contains information derived from 
simple ideas (or impressions).  
Notice that the reality principle enshrined proto-empiricists’ deep suspicions of 
what we might call “active mental processing.” The mind actively constructs a 
complex idea by processing simple ideas. But this processing may involve adding 
fictitious information about the object of that complex idea, information that 
originates not in the object, but in the mind itself.  
The heart of Green’s criticism is that ideas of extension and spatial area can 
only be created by the mind’s actively bringing distinctly-perceived spatial positions 
into relation with one another. This is why proto-empiricists must always regard 
ideas of space and extension as fictitious, according to Green’s reading.  
The key to James’s response is that his stream-based view did not require him 
to treat mental processing—at least in the case of perceiving space and extension—
as involving distortion. Mapping spatial positions is the main aspect of Jamesean 
space perception that involves mental processing. But this variety of processing 
never involves adding information to what is given in sensation. Mapping spatial 
positions requires subtracting information from what is given in the stream of 
thought. We focus on a position or relation, and ignore much of the rest of the 
“blooming, buzzing confusion.”  
Thus, when the Jamesean mind actively constructs spatial positions and 
relations, those constructs need not be regarded as fictions. The mind has not 
contributed any new information that was not already present in the raw material of 
experience. It simply ignored what was not useful. 
At the end of the Principles, James emphasized that our ideas of space are 
directly “stamped” on the mind. There he contrasted ideas of spatial and temporal 
relations with more abstract concepts like cause and substance. These more abstract 
concepts must have been “spontaneously” dreamed up inside the mind, James 
argued. They came to form an important part of cognitive thought only because, as a 
matter of “good luck,” they turned out to help “steer us in our active dealings” with 
objects (PP, 1228). In contrast, the mind’s 
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…time- and space-relations, however, are impressed from without—for two outer 
things at least the evolutionary psychologist must believe to resemble our thoughts of 
them, these are the time and space in which the objects lie. The time- and space- 
relations between things do stamp copies of themselves within. Things juxtaposed in 
space impress us, and continue to be thought, in the relation in which they exist there. 
Things sequent in time, ditto. (PP, 1229; italics original) 
Again, in mapping spatial (and temporal) relations inside the stream of thought, the 
Jamesean mind only subtracts, never adds material to what is given in raw 
sensation. James thereby preserved the proto-empiricist notion that our spatial 
representations are built from sensations that are stamped on the mind from 
without. But he skirted the need for the mind to add fictitious, mind-born relations 
between the alleged constituents of raw sensation—minima sensibilia. He skirted 
this demand by showing that raw sensation is, in fact, a continuous stream.  
This is not to say that Jamesean spatial perception amounts to forming a simple 
and direct transcript of how the world is, independent of human interests. Here it 
will be helpful to look at a metaphor from James’s “Are We Automata.” The article 
appeared in Mind the very same month “The Spatial Quale” was published 
(January 1879). In the Mind piece, James likened the work an interested mind 
performs on its own sensory data to the work of a sculptor who chisels away at 
stone. The mind is active, but only in removing information it does not need.  
In contrast, proto-empiricists might have likened the mental processing of 
experiential data to a child who constructs a tower by arranging a collection of 
building blocks. The tower’s structure was not latent in the collection of blocks. It 
took a child’s creative imagination to design and build the tower. In contrast, the 
sculpture’s structure was, in a sense, latent in the stone before anyone took out a 
chisel. The sculptor added nothing. In particular, the sculptor added no new 
relations between parts of the stone that were not already there. He only chiseled 
away shards he did not find useful.217 
                                                 
217 Note that this distinction between the synthesis and analysis of experience lay at the 
heart of James’s entire methodology, which in the Briefer Course he termed “the ‘analytic’ 
method” (PBC, 139). There, he acknowledged that  
Most books adopt the so-called synthetic method. Starting with ‘simple ideas of 
sensation,’ and regarding these as so many atoms, they proceed to build up the higher 
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The text containing the metaphor was polished and reprinted in the Principles: 
The highest and most elaborated mental products are filtered from the data chosen by 
the faculty next beneath, out of the mass offered by the faculty below that, which mass 
in turn was sifted from a still larger amount of yet simpler material, and so on. The 
mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his 
block of stone. In a sense the statue stood there from eternity. But there were a 
thousand different ones beside it, and the sculptor alone is to thank for having 
extricated this one from the rest. Just so the world of each of us, howsoever different 
our several views of it may be, all lay embedded in the primordial chaos of sensations, 
which gave the mere matter to the thought of all of us indifferently. … [T]he world we 
feel and live in will be that which our ancestors and we, by slowly cumulative strokes 
of choice, have extricated out of this, like sculptors, by simply rejecting certain portions 
of the given stuff. Other sculptors, other statues from the same stone! Other minds, 
other worlds from the same monotonous and inexpressive chaos! My world is but one 
in a million alike embedded, alike real to those who may abstract them. How different 
must be the worlds in the consciousness of ant, cuttle-fish, or crab! (PP, 277;  also see 
EPs, 51-52) 
This passage may have been written earlier than “The Spatial Quale,”218 and it did 
not single out the perception of space. However, in nearby passages, both in “Are 
We Automata” and in reproduced portions of that article in the Principles, James 
applied the metaphor to spatial positions and relations, as well.219 And the passage I 
cited directly above (on p. 271) very clearly shows that ideas of spatial relations are 
drawn purely from sensation. When the mind selectively attends to a distinct 
                                                                                                                                       
states of mind out of their ‘association,’ ‘integration,’ or ‘fusion,’ as houses are built by 
the agglutination of bricks. 
But James objected that this  
commits one beforehand to the very questionable theory that our higher states of 
consciousness are compounds of units; and instead of starting with what the reader 
directly knows, namely his total concrete states of mind, it starts with a set of supposed 
‘simple ideas’ with which he has no immediate acquaintance at all…. 
218 James began “Are We Automata” in 1869, when still in medical school. He apparently 
abandoned the essay for a while, though there is no evidence when he finally finished it. The 
article was accepted by Robertson for Mind on November 20, 1878. So we cannot be sure 
when this particular passage was written. See EPs, 395-397.  
219 For example, at (PP, 273), James wrote: “Dots dispersed on a surface are perceived in 
rows and groups. Lines separate into diverse figures. The ubiquity of the distinctions, this 
and that, here and there, now and then, in our minds is the result of our laying the same 
selective emphasis on parts of place and time.” Clearly, James intended that we do not just 
selectively emphasize different the temporal parts of the stream (e.g., we hear the clock as 
“tick-tóck, tick-tóck, tick-tóck,” PP, 273). We also selectively emphasize, and organize, the 
spatial parts as well. Also see (EPs, 48-49). 
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position in the perceptual field, this necessarily involves ignoring or discarding other 
information not relevant or interesting to the organism.  
Notice the way James combined a commitment to common sense realism with a 
deep sensitivity to the ways human interests shape our perception of reality. On the 
one hand, he emphasized that the mind does not fortify, amplify, or otherwise distort 
“the data it receives” when it comes to space perception. Our spatial perceptions are 
culled from nothing more than raw sensation just as the sculpture is culled from 
nothing more than the block of stone. But on the other hand, it took a creative 
subject to choose which portions of those data to ignore, just as it took an artist to 
choose what parts of the stone to chisel away.  
If “The Spatial Quale” emphasized the role of the creative subject, “Are We 
Automata” emphasized the point about realism. The latter piece contains the seeds 
of James’s theory of the perception of reality.  
Consider any object, like a dinner plate. We view the plate from many different 
angles. In doing so, the retinal image of the plate will typically be an oval more or 
less elongated, not a circle. James claimed that we choose one perspective to regard 
as canonical. “The real form of the circle is deemed to be the sensation it gives when 
the line of vision is perpendicular to its centre” (EPs, 48). The real shape of the 
plate is given by the sensation we get when we view it from directly above.  
The passage goes on to emphasize that choice, here, does not involve adding 
information not originally present in some sensation: 
But all these essential characteristics [e.g., its shape when viewed from an appropriate 
angle, its color when viewed in an appropriate light, and so on], which together form 
the genuine objectivity of the thing and are contrasted with the subjective sensations 
we may happen to get from it at a given moment, are themselves sensations pure and 
simple, susceptible of being fully given at some other moment. The spontaneity of the 
mind does not consist in conjuring up any new non-sensational quality of objectivity. It 
consists solely in deciding what the particular sensation shall be whose native 
objectivity shall be held more valid than that of all the rest. 
When the mind actively constructs reality, James argued, it does not add any non-
sensational element to its representations. It only chooses which sensory elements to 
regard as canonical, as giving the “real” shape, size, color, and so on, of an object. 
Note, by the way, that James appended a footnote to this passage, emphasizing how 
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his own version of realism differed from the “old atomic doctrine of association, so 
thoroughly riddled of late by Professor Green” (EPs, 49). This lends further support 
to my claim that Green was an important critic for James to refute. 
 
Here it will be helpful to address a possible source of confusion. Some may be 
surprised to find me claiming that James’s defense of empiricism required him to 
defend a form of “realism,” as I called it in the previous paragraph. The surprise 
stems from the association between many 20th century empiricists and a position 
often called “anti-realism” or “non-realism.”  
For example, Cheryl Misak argues that the verificationist or empiricist must 
inevitably espouse an “anti-realist” conception of truth, where the true is just what 
we would be willing to believe if we inquired, in an appropriate manner, as far as 
possible. Misak calls “transcendentalism” or “realism” the contrary view, that what 
is true or real transcends actual or possible human inquiry (Misak 1995, xi, 159-
162). In philosophy of science, as well, empiricism is often taken to go along with a 
kind of anti-realism, especially concerning unobservable entities mentioned in 
scientific theories. Such anti-realist empiricism is perhaps most famously defended 
in (Van Fraassen 1980). So is there something illicit about my placing James’s 
defense of “real ideas about space” at the heart of his empiricism? 
The answer is that the contemporary notion of “realism” in epistemology and 
philosophy of science is not a helpful concept for understanding the argument 
between 19th-century Idealists and empiricists. The contemporary notion of 
“realism” typically involves an affirmative answer to the question of whether we 
should believe that there is a reality that transcends what we can know through 
experience. But this is not the concept of realism I am ascribing to James.  
Green simply did not demand that proto-empiricists give a positive proof that 
we can gain knowledge about mind-independent reality.220 Rather, he demanded an 
                                                 
220 If anything, he was far more inclined to launch such arguments against Kant, not against 
proto-empiricists. Though Green saw himself as modifying and extending the insights of 
Kant, one reason the latter’s views demanded modification in the first place was that they 
involved a flawed division between the phenomenal world and the real, allegedly 
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empirical theory of space perception and a criterion concerning which ideas are to 
count as real, such that spatial perceptions may consistently be regarded as real 
ideas. (Recall that in the late 19th century, a “real idea” was an idea that had what 
Descartes called “formal reality.” See above, fn. 140.)  
Thus, all I mean by calling James a “realist” about space is this. James was able 
to develop both a definition of reality and an empirical theory of space perception, 
such that spatial perceptions are properly (and without logical contradiction) 
regarded as real ideas.  
Should we retrospectively think of James as advocating a form of ‘realism’ in 
our contemporary sense? I can find nothing in James’s explicit writing (at least 
before 1893, while he was working on the Principles and the Briefer Course) that 
positively commits him to either realism or anti-realism in our contemporary 
sense.221 So I do not claim that James’s stream-based account demonstrates—or 
even is committed one way or the other—to the view that our ideas of space and 
                                                                                                                                       
unknowable, noumenal world. Evidence that Green saw this division as an important flaw 
can be found by in his lectures on Kant. For instance, at (GWR, II.8), Green argued that 
Kant’s notion of a “‘thing in itself’” that “produces appearances” yet “remains wholly 
unknown” is the source of Kant’s “antithesis of analytical and synthetical propositions.” This 
antithesis “will not hold,” Green wrote. At (GWR, II.58-64), he argued against the 
analytic/synthetic distinction in greater detail. He later cited Kant’s notion that thinking can 
be divided into analytic and synthetic varieties as “the least true or valuable side of Kant’s 
doctrine …” (GWR, II.161). 
221 I should acknowledge that a fine treatment of James’s theory of space perception 
characterizes the theory as a form of what the author calls “realism” (High 1981). One of 
High’s chief contentions is that contra (Pastore 1971), the empirism-nativism debate (see 
above, pp. 67 ff.) is not a helpful background against which to read James’s work on space. 
Instead, High thinks James sought to develop a “realist” rather than “constructionist” 
account of space perception. The realist denies that anything “must be added to what is 
given to arrive at normal perceptual experience.” In contrast, the constructionist holds that 
normal perceptual experience requires the psychological transformation of raw sensory data 
(p. 467). I agree with High that the empirist-nativist debate, particularly as contrasted with 
the empiricist-rationalist debate, is misleading in this context. And I agree that this notion of 
realism does capture a position James was eager to defend, in developing his theory of space. 
But I note that High’s notion of realism (which is essentially the same as my own, as far as I 
can tell) is quite different from our contemporary, philosophical notion of realism.  
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extension are accurate mental copies of mind-independent reality. Establishing this 
sort of realism was not the challenge from Idealists like Green.222  
Now let us look more closely at the relation between James’s account of reality 
and the older account that Green attributed to proto-empiricism. To see how James 
rescued empiricism, it is crucial to see that his realism about space required him to 
jettison not just the Lockean notion of ‘psychological atomism.’ He also had to 
jettison the Lockean criterion of real ideas—what I have called the “reality 
principle.” In other words, James ended up rejecting both of (what Green had 
portrayed as) the two core commitments of proto-empiricism. 
To see that James effectively gave up the reality principle, consider the 
following. For James, the real ideas are perceptions that the mind actively chooses to 
sanction, as we have just seen. He clearly did not hold (and did not have to hold) 
what is entailed by the reality principle—that whenever the mind is active, it 
distorts given sensory information. Again, this is because the Jamesean mind 
typically acts by subtracting, not adding information, to the stream of thought. 
This view is clearly consistent with James’s claim that spatial perception issues 
in real ideas. Although he portrayed the mind as actively carving spatial relations 
into vaguely-given, extended sensations (themselves “stamped” on the mind from 
without), this selective activity is an example of the process whereby a mind forms a 
representation of reality. 
Note that James gave up both of proto-empiricism’s core commitments, as 
Green portrayed that tradition. He clearly gave up the reality principle. But he 
obviously gave up ‘psychological atomism’ as well. After all, he argued that the 
                                                 
222 I take Misak to have shown that as a direct consequence of his pragmatic maxim, Peirce 
really was committed to a form of anti-realism—or “non-realism,” as she calls it (Misak 
1995, 120-127). But there would be no conflict in seeing Peirce as an empiricist, as well. 
After all, Peirce was a strong proponent of mental science (see Girel 2003). I suspect that 
James’s own pragmatism probably did have similar ‘non-realist’ consequences as Peirce’s. 
But James only began publicly defending pragmatism in (James 1898b). So while his earlier 
work no doubt had certain affinities with the later pragmatist doctrine, we should be careful 
in trying to assimilate such pragmatism (and attendant ‘non-realism’) to James’s earlier 
psychology. Such a move only stands to obscure the historian’s attempt to understand how 
and why James’s views evolved over the years. 
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existence of minima sensibilia was incompatible with the available empirical data, 
and that raw sensation instead had to be regarded as a continuous stream. 
That James gave up so much of what Green, at least, had seen as crucial to 
empiricism brings us to our second question: in what sense could James claim to be 
defending empiricism? I now turn to this issue.  
5.2  In What Sense is James an Empiricist? 
We have just seen that James gave up the two core principles with which Green 
saddled his opponents. So in what sense was James really “defending” those 
opponents? 
I claimed earlier that “The Spatial Quale” suggested that a necessary condition 
for counting as an empiricist is that one denies that there are native principles that 
both govern the operation of the mind and license necessary synthetic judgments. 
James’s notion of the stream of thought effectively blocked the prospect of deriving 
necessary synthetic geometric principles, because the stream can be spatially parsed 
in any way that is of interest.  
The crucial point is that our interests may change both over a phylogenetic 
(trans-generational) and an ontogenetic (developmental) scale. As our interests 
change, the systems of relations we parse in our larger stream of consciousness may 
change as well, for James. Thus, suppose it were discovered that all humans employ 
some particular spatial metric (perhaps the metric described by Euclid’s axioms) to 
map perceptual space. James would deny that we have any reason to think this 
metric is necessary for mapping perceptual space, because as our interests change, 
we could come to use a different metric. If this is right, then no particular metric for 
mapping perceptual space can be assumed to be necessary for having a spatial 
experience. In turn, no principles describing such a metric could be synthetic and a 
priori in Kant’s sense. 
Indeed, James concluded his paper by using Helmholtz’s recent work in non-
Euclidean geometry to support this claim that there exist consistent alternatives to a 
Euclidean metric for mapping perceptual space. If James was right, then it does not 
matter what metric we may presently be shown to use in spatially mapping the 
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stream of thought. One cannot conclude that any such metric will always be used in 
human space perception. This is because our interests may change, and/or our 
evolutionary needs may change. For all we now know, such changes could cause us 
to parse our streams of thought differently than we presently do. Thus, even if it 
were discovered that a Euclidean metric is used to map human visual space, that 
metric could not be used to support necessary and synthetic judgments about 
space—because there is no in-principle reason we could not come to employ a 
different metric, if that should suit our needs. 
Thus, here is how James concluded his article: 
One word more about Kant. Helmholtz says: [fn: “Mind, vol. iii, p. 213”] “By Kant 
the proof that space is an a priori form is based essentially on the position that the 
axioms are synthetic propositions a priori. But even if this position be dropped, the 
space-representation might still be the necessary a priori form in which every co-
extended manifold is perceived. This [i.e., dropping the axioms]223 is not surrendering 
any essential feature of the Kantian position.” 
 I make bold to differ from this. The mere innateness of the spatial form of 
sensibility is surely not the essence of the Kantian position. Every sensationalist 
empiricist must admit a wealth of native forms of sensibility. The important question 
is: Do they, or do they not, yield us a priori propositions, synthetic judgments? If our 
‘sensation’ space does this, we are still Kantians in a deeper sense by far than if we 
merely call the spatial quale a form of Anschauung [intuition],224 rather than an 
Empfindung [sensation]. But if the new geometry of Helmholtz and others has upset 
the necessity of our axioms (and this appears to be the case; see, especially, the article 
just quoted), then the Kantian doctrine seems literally left without a leg to stand upon. 
(EPs, 82) 
Helmholtz rightly pointed out that Kant based the claim that space is a necessary 
form of pure intuition on the proposition that Euclid’s axioms are synthetic a priori. 
But Helmholtz’s own development of a non-Euclidean geometry had forced the 
admission that Euclidean principles cannot, as Kant thought, be synthetic a priori. 
This is because synthetic a priori principles are supposed to be necessary rules that 
govern the structure of the phenomenal world. Since Helmholtz showed that there 
                                                 
223 James’ insertion. 
224 Literally, “Anschauung” is German for “view” or “outlook.” James clearly meant the 
word in its Kantian sense, though. Kant used Anschauung as a term of art conventionally 
translated as “intuition.” 
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are demonstrably consistent non-Euclidean geometries, this undercuts the alleged 
necessity of Euclid’s axioms.  
Helmholtz was a major proponent of the so-called “Back to Kant” movement in 
19th century Germany (Hatfield 1991, 109-110). Characteristically of his usual 
Kantian posture, Helmholtz presented his own view of geometry as not requiring a 
substantive abandonment of Kant. Even if the axioms that turn out to describe 
phenomenal space are not necessary, our general capacity to perceive space (using 
some metric or other) might still be native and necessary. In this sense, Helmholtz 
maintained that space was still a necessary form of pure intuition. 
But James countered that Helmholtz misidentified the essence of the Kantian 
account of space. For James, the essence of Kant’s position was not nativism—not 
the view that we have a native ability to perceive the property of spatial extension 
(that is, a native ability to perceive spatial qualia). Every “empiricist” must admit a 
wealth of native capacities. Rather, the essence of Kant’s view was the claim that 
there is only one possible metric we can use to map our perceptual field, and that 
this metric gives us necessary knowledge of the structure of space. This is why 
merely calling space a form of intuition rather than a sensation does not make one a 
Kantian, for James. To be a genuine Kantian, one has to hold that the particular 
form of our actual spatial perceptions is necessary. In other words, a genuine 
Kantian (says James) must claim that the metric by which we map perceptual space 
is necessary.  
Helmholtz’s proof that there are consistent non-Euclidean geometries counts 
against this latter claim. His proof may not affect the view that we have a native 
ability to perceive extension. But it does affect the claim that there is only one 
conceivable set of geometric axioms, and thus that these axioms must govern 
perceptual space. In turn, the proof damages the claim that Euclidean axioms 
support universally valid, synthetic, and yet a priori judgments about the structure 
of our experience of the outer world. It is this last claim that James was most 
concerned to resist.  
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In short, James held that Helmholtz’s geometric work supported his (James’) 
contention that there is a serious plasticity in our ability to map perceptual space. 
James appears to have held that we cannot know a priori the range and limits of 
such plasticity.225 Again, this is because we can measure or subdivide positions in 
spatial fields differently depending on our interests. James’s denial of the possibility 
of synthetic a priori judgments about space is significant for our story because he 
tells us this denial is precisely what makes his view a form of empiricism, as I have 
said. 
Thus, towards the end of “The Spatial Quale” James wrote:  
Such abundant room thus appears to be left for the achievements of empiricists in the 
study of this objective construction [of spatial positions and relations] that they need 
not grudge to the nativists the little gift of primordial bigness and collateral subdivision 
which the latter are contended to “beg” at the outset of their task. (EPs, 79-80) 
James had argued that empiricists should admit that there is a native experience of 
spatial extension, but that they should not concede226 that there is also a necessary 
metric for subdividing or mapping the spatial field.227   
                                                 
225 A more recent book that explores some distinctly Jamesean ideas about space perception 
is (Heelan 1983). Heelan argues that the metric of visual space may vary depending on 
items of interest in our environment. Heelan writes that “…visual space can take on any one 
of a family of geometries depending on the hermeneutical context of foreground and 
background” (p. 53). He sounds very much like James when he goes on to write that “… 
what is foreground and background depends from moment to moment on interest and 
attention, and with each change the parameters of visual space may also change” (p. 75). 
Heelan provides both a mathematical model and experimental support for a view very much 
like James’s, it seems to me. James receives only the briefest mention, though (on p. 176).  
226 James’s wording in this passage is a little awkward—“primordial” in the quoted passage 
must modify both “bigness” and “collateral subdivision.”  James was here urging empiricists 
not to accept the notion that our “primordial” experiences are already filled with 
subdivisions. Just because the empiricist, on James’s view, should acknowledge that we have 
a native ability to perceive spatial qualia, she need not concede that we also have a native 
awareness of spatial subdivision. 
227 How far can one push James’s denial that experience has a necessary structure? I have 
mainly considered James’s denial that experience has a necessary perceptual structure, and 
considered the role this denial played in his psychology. For some suggestions about the 
implications for philosophy of James’s denial that everyone’s experience has the same form, 
see (Hanson 2003). Hanson emphasizes experiential differences that break along lines of 
race, class, and gender, and she looks (pp. 57-61) especially at the connection between 
temperament and meta-philosophy as presented in Lecture One of Pragmatism (James 
1907/1975). One might reasonably see James’s later rejection of necessary experiential 
structures as routed in his earlier work in perceptual psychology. 
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 
What is the relationship, though, between James’s use of “empiricism” in this 
article and the evolving, historical-philosophical concept of empiricism I have been 
exploring in this dissertation? I have been writing as though James’s word 
“empiricism” in “The Spatial Quale” is intimately connected to the HP-concept. 
But now the time has come to defend this suggestion. 
Hatfield (as we saw on p. 67) points out that there are two senses of 
“empiricism” relevant to theories of perception. In the first sense, “empiricism” or 
“empirism” contrasts with “nativism,” and its advocates claim that all or most 
perceptual abilities are learned. I will call this “the psychological notion” of 
empiricism. Philosophers more often contrast “empiricism” with “rationalism,” and 
typically mean to indicate the view that knowledge is justified by appeal to 
experience. I will call this “the philosophical notion” of empiricism. Which view did 
James have in mind when he claimed to be defending empiricism? 
This is an urgent question for my project, because if James turns out to have 
been defending “empiricism” only in the psychological sense, that would be very 
damaging to my overall project in this dissertation. I am claiming that James’s early 
work played an important role in the evolution of a philosophical notion of 
“empiricism.” If it turns out that his “empiricism” is really just a technical thesis 
about the sources of perception, my claim is seriously undermined. 
I argued in Chapter One that philosophers’ understanding of the history of 
philosophy typically constrains the range of acceptable interpretations of 
“empiricism.” Might I be able to make the case that Hatfield’s distinction is not 
relevant to James’s article, because James is using an HP-conception of 
“empiricism”? 
No, this will not help. Philosophers’ contemporary interpretation of empiricism, 
which I am calling “CIE,” must still be contrasted with our contemporary 
interpretation of rationalism, not with any form of nativism. So if I am to make the 
case that James’s work on space plays an important role in the evolution of 
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empiricism, I still need to grapple with Hatfield’s distinction, mutatis mutandis the 
changes needed to historically infuse his philosophical notion of “empiricism.” 
Hatfield’s distinction seems to provide an even bigger hurdle when we take a 
first look at James’s text. It was Helmholtz who popularized the psychological notion 
of “empiricism” (Hatfield 1991, 271); and Helmholtz is one important figure who 
James had in view when he discussed “empiricism” in this article. Worse, several 
times in the essay, James contrasted “empiricism” with “nativism” (EPs, 63, 79-80). 
This further suggests James may be using Helmholtz’s psychological notion of 
“empiricism.” 
On closer inspection, though, Hatfield’s distinction is overly subtle for the 
purpose of interpreting “The Spatial Quale.”228 James did not draw a sharp division 
between a philosophical and a psychological notion of “empiricism.” This is evident 
in a passage where James accused Helmholtz of misunderstanding the real nature of 
“empiricism”: 
There are but three possible kinds of theory concerning space. Either (1) there is no 
spatial quale at all, and space is a mere symbol of succession; or (2) there is a quale 
given immediately in sensation; or, finally (3), there is a quale produced out of the 
inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations which, as given originally, are not 
spatial, but which, on being cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This 
last is the Kantian view. … Helmholtz is so sententious (and vacillating?) that it is a 
little hard to class him distinctly, but there is no doubt that visual space, at any rate, is 
constructed for him out of non-spatial sensations of sight. The word “empiricist” [sic] 
in his optics means just the opposite of its ordinary signification. Mill, Bain, and 
Spencer seem all to have gone astray, like lost sheep. … (EPs, 80) 
James first provided a taxonomy of theories of space perception. Theories could be 
classified according to whether they held (1), that there is no sensory experience of 
                                                 
228 Hatfield’s distinction between two senses of “empiricism” was first popularized, to my 
knowledge, in an influential historical survey of perceptual theories (Pastore 1971).  
A very fine article on James’s theory of space perception convincingly argues that Pastore’s 
notion of empirism (as contrasted with nativism) does not give a helpful context against 
which to read the Principles (High 1981). Pastore replied in (Pastore 1981), and High 
published a rejoinder (High 1981). Thus I am arguing, with High, that the 19th century 
empirist-nativist debate, as interpreted by Pastore (and Hatfield), is not the proper 
background against which to view James’s theory of spatial perception. (Note that only 
Pastore, not Hatfield, explicitly attempts to place James in this tradition. High discusses the 
intractable problems Pastore runs into in thus placing James.) 
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extension at all, and the perception of space is purely intellectual; (2) that the 
perception of spatial extension is immediately given in sensation; or (3) that 
sensations are originally non-spatial, but sensations somehow goad the mind to 
“envelop” them in spatial relations. James then notes that Helmholtz calls himself 
an “empiricist,” but that Helmholtz does not use this word in its standard way. 
James immediately goes on to discuss those his readers might have been more apt to 
call “empiricists”: Mill, Bain, and Spencer.  
This latter charge, that Helmholtz is using “empiricism” abnormally, does not 
make sense if James was using this word in Hatfield’s psychological sense. This is 
because the psychological sense of “empiricism” was invented by Helmholtz. James 
could reasonably be read as accusing Helmholtz of using “empiricism” in a way that 
fails to square with some standard meaning. But that standard meaning, the 
meaning James employed in the rest of the article, could not have been the 
Helmholtz-invented, psychological notion of “empiricism.” One cannot fail to use a 
term of art appropriately if that term is one’s own creation.  
At least, so long as one’s usage is consistent and not self refuting, one cannot fail 
in this way. But James did not accuse Helmholtz of inconsistency, in the last passage 
I quoted. The accusation was that Helmholtz was too long-winded and pompous229 
in spelling out his theory of space perception. As a result, James complained, 
Helmholtz could not be easily classed according to James’s anatomy of theories—
perhaps, James speculated, Helmholtz was vacillating. But there was no doubt in 
this passage about how Helmholtz used “empiricism.” James thought Helmholtz’s 
usage of the word was non-standard, but clear. 
So James expressed confusion over how to square Helmholtz’s use of 
“empiricism” with what he regarded as the usual sense of the word. What usual 
sense of “empiricism” might James have had in mind?  
                                                 
229 I suppose this might not be an accurate gloss on “sententious,” but it is hard to know for 
sure. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “sententious” had the same ambiguity in 
the late 19th century that it has today. “Sententious” could mean either pithy and full of 
meaning; or it could mean aphoristic, pompous, long-winded, and overly formal. James had 
such a mix of reverence and disdain for Helmholtz that it is hard to know for certain which 
usage he had in mind in this passage.  
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In Chapter Two, Section Nine, we saw a multitude of ways in which James was 
using the word “empiricism” during the 1870s. He had originally learned the word 
from a book he read in the 1860s, by David Masson. During the 70s, James came to 
associate the word with nominalism, the denial that experience had a necessary 
structure, the denial that there are necessary truths about nature, and the 
explanatory priority of parts over wholes. He associated the word with the Mills, 
Bain, and Renouvier. In “The Spatial Quale,” he added Spencer to the list, and by 
the late 1880s, Thomas Brown was added as well.230 
So in general, James used the word “empiricism” in a loose, historical-
philosophical fashion. James’s usage was loose in the sense that he did not associate 
the word with one exclusive thesis. Also, the group with whom he associated the 
word, including those mentioned in the previous paragraph, was loosely knit as well. 
Like Robertson, James used the word to denote a tradition of philosophers who saw 
the empirical study of mind as fruitful, and who thought such empirical study held 
the key to philosophical progress.  
Perhaps most importantly though, the specific sense of “empiricism” as James 
used it in “The Spatial Quale” echoed the way he used that word in his class on 
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Recall that James taught his students that an 
“empiricist” was one who denied that experience has a necessary structure (see 
above, p. 128). 
This helps explain why James was puzzled by Helmholtz’s use of “empiricist.” 
James saw empiricists as people who denied that experience has a necessary 
structure. Such an empiricist would have found himself perpetually at odds with 
Kantians, as we have seen throughout this dissertation. So it seems that James was 
confused by Helmholtz because the latter both called himself an “empiricist” and a 
“Kantian” (on Helmholtz’s Kantianism, see Hatfield 1991, 167-168, 276).  
Thus, I wrote that Hatfield’s distinction (between two conceptions of 
empiricism, one philosophical and the other psychological) is too subtle for my 
                                                 
230 Thus, at (James 1889, 107) James refers, derisively, to the “Brown-Bain-Spencer-Mill 
theory of Space perception.”  
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purposes because James did not wield the term with that much precision. Indeed, 
the block quote on page 280, above, shows James contrasting “empiricism” with 
“nativism”; and the block quote on page 278, above, shows James contrasting 
“empiricism” with a position affirmed by “Kantians.” Both usages occur in the same 
article, and it seems James took himself, in each case, to be referring to one and the 
same, loose-knit group of empirically-minded philosophers. 
It is worth noting that the last passage I quoted was reproduced, greatly 
expanded, in the Principles (PP, 902). The sentence about Helmholtz’s peculiar 
form of “empiricism” was deleted, and replaced with a more lengthy final 
assessment at (PP, 908-910). This new version substituted “empirist” for 
“empiricist” in the discussion. Helmholtz wrote about “empiristich” and 
“nativistisch” theories of space perception—English commentators quickly came to 
translate Helmholtz’s word as “empirism,” e.g. James’s friend, James Sully (Sully 
1878). And instead of sounding confused, in the Principles James sounded 
conclusive in his judgment that Helmholtz was guilty of an unholy mix of empirical 
psychology and Kantian metaphysics. 
5.3  Objection: Why Think James’s Work on Space Targets T. H. Green? 
I will now address a related objection that may have occurred to those who have 
read James’s work on space. If arguments from Idealists play an important role in 
this work, why are the likes of Green and Caird barely even mentioned in James’s 
work? After all, “The Spatial Quale” names neither Green nor Caird as targets. 
This paper would receive two major expansions, first into a longer article on space 
perception in Mind (James 1887a; James 1887b; James 1887c; James 1887d), and 
then into Chapter 20 of the Principles, entitled “The Perception of Space”—the 
longest chapter in that already long volume.231 Both the longer versions did conclude 
                                                 
231 It is worth mentioning that James’s work on space perception perhaps had a direct effect 
on early analytic philosophy as well as the later, indirect effect it would have through James’s 
students (as I have discussed in Section Three of this chapter). Russell apparently read, 
reread, and copiously notated his copy of the Principles, particularly the extensive chapter 
on space. His notations date back to the period when he was preparing his dissertation on 
the philosophy of geometry. Russell had a much more favorable reaction to James’s 
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with a discussion of Kantian views, as did “The Spatial Quale.” But in the mature 
works, the chief Kantian representatives discussed include Herbart, his followers, 
and Schopenhauer (James 1890/1981, 903). So what licenses my own attempt to 
read James’s work on space as a response to T. H. Green? 
The answer is that one cannot make sense of James’s own recollections of his 
work on space without taking Green and Idealists into account. On p. 134, above, I 
quoted one such reminiscence that deserves to be reprinted here: 
Years ago, when T. H. Green’s ideas were most influential, I was much troubled by his 
criticisms of english [sic] sensationalism. One of his disciples in particular [Max Fisch 
claims James was talking about Cabot, here] would always say to me, “Yes! terms 
may indeed be possibly sensational in origin; but relations, what are they but pure acts 
of the intellect coming upon the sensations from above, and of a higher nature?” Well, 
I remember the sudden relief it gave me to perceive one day that space-relations at 
any rate were homogeneous with the terms between which they mediated. The terms 
were spaces, and the relations were other intervening spaces. [Here, James inserted a 
footnote to a portion of his work on space perception: “See my Principles of 
Psychology,” PP, 790-794] For the Greenites space-relations had been saltatory, for 
me they became thenceforward ambulatory. (MT, 79)232 
James claimed that he was much troubled by Green’s criticisms of “English 
sensationalism” during the period when Green was most influential. James describes 
the relief he felt when he was able to overcome “Greenites” on the topic of space-
relations. This passage raises a question I have tried to answer in this dissertation: 
how does James’s work on space perception function as a response to Green? 
We could brush off such reminiscences as distorted memories of old age, were it 
not for the fact that we have historical evidence to corroborate the story. The 
evidence I have in mind is that which I already presented in Chapter Two, and 
reviewed again in this chapter at the start of Section Four. Again, we know that 
James’s early work on space was a response to Cabot’s club paper, written when the 
club was debating Green and Caird. 
                                                                                                                                       
Principles than he would later have to Pragmatism. For more on this interesting issue, see 
especially the discussion portion of (Brennan and Griffin 1997-1998). 
232 Again, Fisch’s claim that James is referring to Cabot can be found at (Fisch 1986a, 149).  
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5.4  The Epistemic Status of the Stream Thesis 
I will now address the third question I raised at the start of Section Five. What, 
if anything, can we glean about the epistemic status of the stream thesis from 
James’s early work on space?  
I have already presented and evaluated evidence from “The Spatial Quale” 
concerning the non-corpuscularity of perceptions of visual and tactile space. That 
evidence can only be described as empirical; some thesis James defended in that 
early work was clearly meant to be a posteriori. The question is whether the 
empirical thesis he defended in “The Spatial Quale” can convincingly be connected 
with the stream thesis. I shall argue that it can, and that therefore the stream thesis 
is best viewed as an a posteriori claim that rests primarily on experimental (not just 
introspective) evidence.  
To make the connection, we must begin with a more detailed look at the stream 
thesis. I gave a first approximation of the thesis at the start of the chapter. According 
to my approximation, the stream thesis asserts that all experience is given as a 
continuous stream, not as a set of discrete psychological atoms.  
In the Principles, James’s articulation of the stream thesis was far more richly 
articulated. He proposed five basic qualities psychologists should accept as ultimate 
features of the stream of thought. By “ultimate,” James meant that only 
metaphysics, not science, can attempt to explain why experience should have just 
these qualities.  
Here is how James first introduced the stream thesis in the Principles: 
The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on. I 
use the word thinking, in accordance with what was said on p. 186, for every form of 
consciousness indiscriminately. If we could say in English ‘it thinks,’ as we say ‘it rains’ 
or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of 
assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on.  
 
FIVE CHARACTERS IN THOUGHT. 
How does it go on? We notice immediately five important characters in the process, of 
which it shall be the duty of the present chapter to treat in a general way:  
1) Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.  
2) Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.  
3) Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.  
4) It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.  
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5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and 
welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the while. (PP, 220)  
My first approximation of the stream thesis dealt only with the most famous aspect 
of the stream of thought—its quality of being “sensibly continuous.” In fact, this is 
only the third of five sub-claims that compromise the full stream thesis. Henceforth, 
I will use “stream thesis” to refer to all five claims, together.233 When I want to refer 
only to the third aspect of the thesis, I will use the phrase “continuity claim.” 
The task of demonstrating that all five claims rest on empirical evidence is too 
big to attempt here. I will, however, argue that the continuity claim rests in part on 
experimental evidence—indeed, the evidence we have just seen from “The Spatial 
Quale.”  
The continuity claim was perhaps the most theoretically fruitful aspect of the 
stream thesis. Its importance is underscored by the fact that the bulk of the chapter 
entitled “The Stream of Thought” is devoted to a discussion of this particular claim. 
Also, it was in the context of this lengthy discussion that James officially introduced 
the phrase “stream of thought” in the Principles to begin with (PP, 233).  
To readers of this dissertation, the continuity claim may seem obviously to rest 
on James’s empirical evidence from his early work on space. This impression is 
solidified when one finds that in the Principles James explicitly presented the 
continuity claim as the negation of “the Humian doctrine that our thought is 
composed of separate independent parts … not a sensibly continuous stream.” He 
promised that his discussion of the continuity claim would show that Hume’s view 
                                                 
233 In this section, I deal primarily with the continuity claim. But here is a summary of how I 
understand the other four claims that comprise the stream thesis. The first claim is that all 
thought is attached to a subject. In a lecture room, there are many thoughts—some belong to 
my conscious life, some belong to yours. Whether there are any thoughts merely floating 
around, with no connection to anyone’s subjective life, cannot be determined by the 
psychologist, because by definition nobody could have an experience of such a thought (PP, 
220). The second claim is that no state of mind is ever exactly duplicated. We have different 
states of mind that are of the same object, but no state of mind can exactly recur (PP, 224). 
James devoted the bulk of the “Stream of Thought” chapter, from pages 231-262, to the 
third claim (the continuity claim). I examine this claim in the text. The fourth claim is that 
thoughts know independent objects that exist in “outer reality.” This claim is explicitly 
presented as a rebuff to “Absolute Idealists” (PP, 262). The fifth claim is that consciousness 
always selects some objects to attend to, and discards others (PP, 273). 
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“entirely misrepresents the natural appearances” (PP, 230). Similarly, I have 
presented “The Spatial Quale” as targeting the theory of ideas shared by a more 
recent group of proto-empiricists—Mill, Bain and Spencer. This latter group agreed 
with Hume that pointillistic ideas are prior to ideas of continuous areas (EPs, 64, 
66). So in his early work on space, James seems to have begun his attack on the 
proto-empiricist contention that ideas are spatially discontinuous. 
In short, James presented the continuity claim as the negation of the proto-
empiricist commitment to ‘psychological atomism’; and “The Spatial Quale” clearly 
provided evidence against such ‘psychological atomism.’ However, closer inspection 
reveals some hurdles that must be overcome before we can read the “The Spatial 
Quale” as providing support for the stream thesis. 
One such hurdle concerns James’s rhetoric. “The Spatial Quale” does not use 
the language of the stream thesis—in particular, it does not use the phrase “stream 
of thought.” On the surface, the language of this article suggests a narrow focus on 
explaining the facts of space perception, not on criticizing proto-empiricists’ 
conceptions of ideas or on developing a stream-based alternative. Some readers may 
therefore find it implausible to read this early article on space as contributing direct 
evidence to the stream thesis.  
Another hurdle concerns the scope of the continuity claim as it is presented in 
the Principles. The Principles’ discussion of this claim clearly ascribes temporal 
continuity to our stream of thought; but it is less clear that James meant to ascribe 
spatial continuity as well, at least in the “Stream of Thought” chapter. Let us take 
these difficulties in turn.  
 
First let us consider whether James’s rhetoric in “The Spatial Quale” is an 
obstacle to connecting that work with the stream thesis.  
“On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology” is commonly cited as the 
place where James first introduced the notion of a stream of thought. But this article 
was published in 1884, more than five years after “The Spatial Quale.” Some 
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readers might therefore worry that I am finding evidence for the stream thesis in an 
article written well before James had even conceived of a stream of thought. 
In fact, when one surveys James’s pre-1884 work, including the early work on 
space, one finds that “On Some Omissions” was the culmination of a critique James 
had been developing in various articles since at least 1878. That critique did not use 
the phrase “stream of thought” (at least not until 1884’s “On Some Omissions”), but 
it did have a characteristic rhetoric. Thus, although “The Spatial Quale” did not use 
the expression “stream of thought,” it did use this other characteristic rhetoric, as I 
will now show. It is in virtue of this shared rhetoric that “The Spatial Quale” can be 
tied to the stream thesis.  
The most important pre-“Omissions” articles that develop the stream thesis 
include “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence” (collected in 
EPh), “Brute and Human Intellect” (EPs), “Are We Automata?” (EPs), and to a 
lesser extent “The Sentiment of Rationality” (EPs). I can find four stream-related 
themes from these articles that also play important roles in “The Spatial Quale.”234  
The first theme concerns raw sensation, which James portrayed as a vague 
jumble that becomes intelligible through the selective deployment of attention. 
Thus, James often characterized raw sensation as a “confused unity,” as an 
“undivided plenum,” or as a “simple vague consciousness” in these articles. If we 
are to have coherent experiences, according to this characterization, then our chaotic 
sensory material must be “mentally discriminated,” a task accomplished by 
“attention singling out” salient features of sensation. These expressions come from 
“The Spatial Quale” (EPs, 64, 66, 67, 71-72, 75), and the language is consistent 
with James’s mature defense of the stream thesis.235 Similar descriptions of raw 
                                                 
234 Readers should take care not to confuse these early themes with James’s more mature, 
five-part articulation of the stream thesis.  
235 For example, in the chapter “Attention” (the second most important chapter that 
articulated the stream thesis, in my view), James argued that we have introspective access to 
the “confused unity” of relatively unprocessed sensation whenever we find ourselves staring 
vacantly off into space. This state amounts to the suspension of “attention”; when we resume 
attending to specific portions of our sensory fields, the state abates (PP, 382-383).  In the 
“Stream of Thought” chapter, James characterized our feelings of relations as “vague” (PP, 
246). He also called our senses “organs of selection” which choose what to attend to in the 
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sensation can be found in other pre-“Omissions” articles, especially in “Brute and 
Human Intellect”236 and “Are We Automata?”237 The language can also be found in 
notes for “The Sentiment of Rationality” (EPh, 348).238 
The second theme has to do with James’s attempt to resist Kant’s view of 
experience. As James developed his conception of a stream of thought, a recurring 
concern was to discover the “real” a priori element in experience. We have seen that 
James accepted many native perceptual skills, but denied that these skills give 
experience a necessary structure that supports synthetic a priori knowledge. In 
particular, he concluded “The Spatial Quale” by arguing that if his theory of space 
perception is correct, then space, at least, cannot be a form of pure intuition in 
                                                                                                                                       
“infinite chaos,” the “swarming continuum” of unprocessed experience. This is part of a 
lengthy passage reproduced from “Are We Automata” concerning the selection and 
discrimination of chaotic sensation (PP, 273-277). Also see (PP, 969-970) for the definition 
of vagueness used in both “The Spatial Quale” and “Brute and Human Intellect” (see 
below, fn. 236). 
236 For example, at (EPs, 14), James gave the same definition of vagueness as he used in 
“The Spatial Quale” (at EPs, 67). The former passage contained perhaps James’s first 
published description of the baby’s consciousness as an experience with “no subdivisions.” 
He had not yet hit on the famous phrase “blooming, buzzing confusion.” As in the work on 
space, “Brute and Human Intellect” also claimed that knowledge “begins thus with vague 
confusion.” This “Whole of experience” is made intelligible through a process of 
“dissociation” (EPs, 15). He also uses the phrase “grey chaotic unity” (EPs, 19).  
237 For example, at (EPs, 49n.), James distinguished his view from the “old atomic doctrine 
of association, so thoroughly riddled of late by Professor Green.” Associationists assumed 
that consciousness begins with the passive reception of intelligible sensory atoms that must 
be knit together, as it were, when we form an awareness of extended areas and such. But 
James held that quite the opposite was true. Intelligibility resulted from the mind’s “progress 
from vagueness to distinctness.” This article offered a more detailed view (compared with 
rudimentary remarks in “The Spatial Quale”) of the way in which the mind “selects” 
features of the “swarming continuum” of experience. In particular, James argued that the 
physiological organs involved in perception form a hierarchy of selective mechanisms. For 
example, from the retina up through the brain’s neural pathways, each higher perceptual 
level is responsible for filtering the relatively chaotic experiential material received from the 
lower. At each level, the mind attends to useful or interesting information, and discards the 
rest (EPs, 51). Further discussion of the sifting of chaotic sensation can be found in this 
article at (EPs, 46, 47, and 49).  
238 These notes are undated, so it is not clear whether James made them when he was 
preparing the earlier version of “Sentiment,” published in Mind, or when he was working on 
the later, substantially different version published in The Will to Believe. For more on the 
history of this article, see (EPh, 249-253; WB 326-333; Perry and McDermott 1967, 818-
819, 821). 
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Kant’s sense (EPs, 81-82). Similar concerns arise in “Remarks on Spencer’s 
Definition,” in a discussion of the role of “selective interest” in experience. James 
claimed that “These interests are the real a priori element in cognition” (EPh, 11), 
but denied that the interests thereby furnish synthetic, universal truths (EPh, 20).  
The third theme concerns an organism’s interests. James often claimed that 
when we discriminate our chaotic sensations via selective attention, we typically 
attend to that in which we are interested. Thus, in “The Spatial Quale,” James 
wrote that “…emotional interests are the great guides to selective attention” (EPs, 
75). In fn. 237, above, I mentioned James’s references to the role of “interests” in 
experience in “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition” (e.g., at EPs, 11, 18). This theme 
played a major role in “Brute and Human Intellect” and “Are We Automata?”239 as 
well. While the early work on space cited generic “emotional interests” as guides to 
attention, “Brute and Human Intellect” further divided these into “practical 
interests” and “aesthetic interests.” Each helps us “dissociate the elements of the 
originally vague syncretism of consciousness” (EPs, 15). He went as far as to claim 
that the more abundant and varied an organism’s interests, the better at cognitive 
reasoning the organism will be, and the richer will be its experience (EPs, 16).240 
The fourth theme concerns the sensory experience of relations. In “The Spatial 
Quale,” James discussed two sorts of spatial relations. On the one hand, James 
denied that all experiences of extension involve systems of clearly-grasped relations 
between sharply-given relata (EPs, 70-71). But on the other, he claimed that raw 
                                                 
239 In “Are We Automata,” James asserted that the study of consciousness inevitably brings 
us to “the mystery of interest and selective attention.” Consciousness is “passive and 
receptive” in many ways; but it cannot ultimately have clear, coherent experience without 
deploying attention, guided by interest, “always to choose out of the manifold experiences 
present to it at a given time some one for particular accentuation, and to ignore the rest” 
(EPs, 46). We ignore, and thereby strip away, features of our stream of thought which are 
“valueless” for helping us operate in our environments (EPs, 47). 
240 Thus James concluded (with the sort of racism common to the era and to which James 
was not immune): “Man, by his immensely varied practical wants, and his aesthetic feelings, 
to which every sense contributes, would, by dint of these alone, be sure to dissociate vastly 
more characters than any other animal, and, accordingly, we find that the lowest savages 
reason incomparably better than the highest brutes” (EPs, 16). Also see (EPs, 19) for 
further discussion. 
  293  
sensation does contain vague spatial relations. Sensation is given “with all its parts, 
alongside each other, in the full spatial collaterality which nativists claim for them” 
(EPs, 79). James argues that raw sensation contains an inherent set of “spatial 
relations” that appear “very uncertain” and “vague” (EPs, 69).241 The former brand 
of relation—the sharply-grasped “system of related positions”—is something that 
the “feeling of space … may later evolve…” (EPs, 70-71). A similar view is implied 
in one passage of “The Sentiment of Rationality.”242 By the mid-1880s, James 
would come to lay greater emphasis on the notion that vague spatial relations have a 
sensory origin, particularly in “On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology.”  
In this sub-section I have been considering the objection that “The Spatial 
Quale” appears not to use the rhetoric of the stream thesis, and thus cannot be 
viewed as offering evidence for that thesis. I take myself to have shown that the 
appearance is deceiving. I have isolated four specific respects in which “The Spatial 
Quale” did use rhetoric entirely typical of James’s late 1870s and early ’80s writing 
about (what he would only later call) “the stream of thought.” Thus, I conclude the 
rhetoric of “The Spatial Quale” is no obstacle to seeing the evidence offered there as 
providing empirical support for the continuity claim.   
 
Now let us consider the second objection I raised on p. 289, above. The issue is 
whether the continuity claim ascribes spatial continuity to experience, or only 
temporal continuity. I will argue that James did hold that the stream of thought was 
spatially as well as temporally continuous. Thus, to the extent that “The Spatial 
                                                 
241 James articulated his view of space relations in far greater detail in the Principles. There, 
he introduced his own view as an alternative to the “Platonizing school” (PP, 790), a school 
James took to be led by Green (PP, 659-660). James wrote that “in the field of space the 
relations are facts of the same order with the facts they relate. If these latter be patches in 
the circle of vision, the former are certain other patches between them. … [Spatial relations 
between positions are] simply the sensation of the line that joins the two points together” 
(PP, 791). Recall that towards the end of his life, James would regard this insight—that 
perceived spatial relations are just perceived spaces—as the fatal blow to Green’s Idealism, 
and a crucial building-block for his own empiricism (see above, p. 170). 
242 He wrote that the “British school” denies that relations can be “phenomenal elements” 
(EPs, 39). A page later he characterized this attitude as a “quasi-pathological excess.”  
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Quale” offered evidence of the spatial continuity of experience, it also offered 
evidence for the continuity claim.  
In the Principles, James described the continuity claim as itself having two 
aspects. First, consciousness is personally continuous, in that experiences always 
form one continuous part of someone’s subjective life.243 But inside the personally-
continuous stream of thought, James found another variety of continuity, which I will 
call “sensory continuity.” The actual data of sensation are also continuous, in the 
sense that they originally appear to the subject as a stream, not as broken atoms or 
corpuscles.  
Now, there are many senses in which experience might be “broken.” 
Experience might be broken into, among other things, temporal atoms, or logical 
atoms, or spatial atoms, or some combination of these. And indeed, the objection I 
am now considering crops up because much of James’s discussion of sensory 
continuity in the “Stream of Thought” chapter focused on the temporal continuity of 
sensory experience, as I have mentioned. Some of the discussion focused on logical 
continuity (i.e., the alleged experience of logical relations), but there are few 
examples of spatial continuity in this chapter.  
That the stream was also meant to be spatially continuous comes out best, I 
think, in James’s later discussion of the process through which we parse the stream. 
As in the discussion of sensory continuity from the “Stream” chapter, the continuity 
claim was again presented as an alternative to Hume, and here Locke was added for 
good measure. In the chapter entitled “Discrimination and Comparison,” James 
wrote: 
The ‘simple impression’ of Hume, the ‘simple idea’ of Locke are both abstractions, 
never realized in experience. Experience, from the very first, presents us with 
concreted objects, vaguely continuous with the rest of the world which envelops them 
in space and time, and potentially divisible into inward elements and parts. These 
objects we break asunder and reunite. (PP, 461) 
                                                 
243 To use James’s example, when Peter and Paul wake up in the same bed, Peter 
remembers his own stream of thought, but only conceives Paul’s stream. It does not matter 
whether we fall asleep, lose consciousness, or what have you, “this community of self is what 
the time-gap cannot break in twain …” (PP, 232). 
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Here, James claimed that we experience objects that are vaguely continuous with 
broad tracts of time and space they occupy. On the following page, he elaborated: 
The baby, assailed by eyes, ears, nose, skin, and entrails at once, feels it all as one 
great blooming, buzzing confusion; and to the very end of life, our location of all things 
in one space is due to the fact that the original extents or bignesses of all the sensations 
which came to our notice at once, coalesced together into one and the same space. 
There is no other reason than this why “the hand I touch and see coincides spatially 
with the hand I immediately feel.” (PP, 462) 
These passages must remove any suspicions that James did not intend our stream of 
thought to be spatially as well as temporally continuous. He wrote that the baby’s 
raw experience—which James took to exemplify adult unprocessed sensation, like 
many psychologists of the day—is both temporally and spatially continuous.  
I conclude that the experimental evidence from “The Spatial Quale” does 
provide empirical support for one aspect of the continuity claim. In particular, it 
provides support for the notion that raw sensation is spatially continuous. 
 As I have written, James offered other empirical support for other aspects of 
the stream thesis (e.g., support that our raw sensations are temporally continuous as 
well). I cannot discuss such further evidence here.  
6.   THE SECONDARY LITERATURE ON JAMES 
I conclude this chapter with an analysis of trends in relevant secondary 
literature on James. I divide my discussion into two parts. First, there is literature 
that deals more or less directly with James on space. My work adds, I hope, to this 
discussion. I find nothing in this literature that my work contradicts. Second, there is 
an influential literature that portrays James as a Kantian. My work does stand very 
much in tension with this literature. I present and refute the best available evidence 
proffered in favor of the various Kantian readings.  
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6.1  The Literature on James on Space 
I can find no recent accounts that claim James’s view of space perception is 
designed to resist Neo-Kantian attacks from the likes of Green.244 I do not hold that 
James’s work on space is usefully read as aimed exclusively at Idealists. But I 
cannot find commentators who even consider the way James’s work on space might 
have functioned as a response to Green-style arguments against psychology, or even 
to broadly Kantian philosophical positions.  
There is one work that does treat James’s Principles as providing an argument 
against Green and Idealism, though it does not deal with the issue of space 
perception. I have in mind Howard Knox’s 1914 The Philosophy of William 
James.245  
The secondary literature on James’s account of space perception can be usefully 
divided into two categories. In the first are articles and book chapters directly 
devoted to James’s account of space perception. All pieces that qualify for this 
category that I can find include: (High 1981; Jubin 1977; Myers 1986, Chapter 
                                                 
244 By “recent” I mean since about World War I. I have checked the Philosopher’s Index; 
JSTOR; Academic Search; Historical Abstracts; ProQuest Dissertations and Theses; 
PsychINFO; ScienceDirect; Web of Knowledge; History of Science, Technology and 
Medicine; various online card catalogues (including catalogs at Indiana University, Harvard 
University, and the New York Public Library); and (Skrupskelis 1977), an indispensable 
guide to writings about James from 1868-1974. I should note that there was certainly 
discussion of James’s theory of space in his own day. “The Spatial Quale” elicited a response 
from Cabot (Cabot 1879). James’s four-part Mind article, “The Perception of Space” (James 
1887a; James 1887b; James 1887c; James 1887d), elicited a response from Robertson 
(Robertson 1888), and a rejoinder (James 1889). Finally, James’s chapter on space 
perception in the Principles elicited a response from (Ford 1893), and another rejoinder 
(James 1893). 
245 I regret that I only discovered Knox’s book (Knox 1914b) as I was finishing this 
dissertation. Knox argued a) for the philosophical significance of the Principles, which b) was 
to be found in its refutation of Idealism. Knox seems to provide a precedent for my reading of 
James, in some respects. Recently the book was republished as (Knox 2001), with an 
introduction by Ellen Kappy Suckiel. Suckiel writes that Knox first articulated his reading of 
the Principles in an essay (Knox 1909) published while James was alive (the piece is 
reprinted in Knox 2001). James admired this article and recommended it to students and 
friends, Suckiel shows (Knox 2001, ix). Note that Knox also wrote two very critical articles 
about Green’s attack on empiricism (Knox 1900; Knox 1914a). 
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Four; Pastore 1971, Chapter 12; Reed 1990).246 In the second category are articles 
or chapters that deal with James on space perception in some detail, though not as 
the primary focus of the article or book chapter in question. No list of this second 
category can be exhaustive, but important examples include (Ayer 1968, 218-234; 
Girel 2003; Giuffrida 1980; High 1978; High 1982; Madden 1963; Madden and 
Madden 1978; Pastore 1977; Pastore 1981; Sprigge 1993, 143-149; Woodward 
1978, 581). 
I will not attempt to annotate this little bibliography here. Some of these articles 
I have already discussed in footnotes. Here I comment on how my reading fits with a 
few broad trends.  
The two groups of literature on James just cited is cross-cut by another 
distinction. Some of these pieces are produced by authors whose training is 
primarily in history, and others by those trained primarily in philosophy. Edward 
Reed is an excellent representative of the historians of psychology (Pastore, High, 
and Woodward are other such historians). Myers is an excellent example of work on 
this topic by philosophers.  
                                                 
246 A word is in order about (Jubin 1977). She claims that in “The Spatial Quale,” James 
allowed for the mind to play a more active, “Kantian” role in constructing space perception 
than he allowed in the Principles. She wrongly claims that the Principles only countenanced 
two types of relation—purely experiential relations, and purely intellectual relations (Jubin 
1977, 213). She then rightly points out that “The Spatial Quale” portrays the mind as 
playing an active role in mapping spatial relations in the stream of thought, even though in 
such cases the mind does not add anything new to raw sensation. She claims this is a third 
sort of relation not permitted in the Principles. The most important problem with her 
argument is that she has no good basis for showing that the Principles only permits two kinds 
of relations. Her basis for the claim that James allowed purely experiential relations is not 
even from the Principles, but a passage from Essays in Radical Empiricism (ERE, 42). Her 
basis for the claim that James allowed purely intellectual relations is taken wildly out of 
context from the Principles (PP, 1237; here he was writing specifically about relations 
evoked in scientific theories; he was not giving a general taxonomy of perceptual 
relations;Jubin 1977, 213). But she gives no indication that in either place, James claimed 
that these are the only kinds of relations he recognized. What is worse, she actually 
acknowledges that the very tertium quid kind of relation she finds in “The Spatial Quale” 
actually can be found in the Principles’s chapter on space perception (Jubin 1977, 21n.n26). 
She does not attempt to give an interpretation of the alternative account of space perception 
allegedly on offer in the Principles. Most of the article is confined to rehashing the claims of 
“The Spatial Quale.”  
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Reed places James’s theory of spatial perception in the context of the history of 
psychology. He shows how James (along with Mach and Stumpf) argued against 
Helmholtz and Wundt’s respective positions. These latter two held that spatial 
perception was only possible when the mind makes unconscious inferences on the 
basis of originally unextended, unspatial sensations. James was not the only one to 
revolt from such views. Reed writes: 
James’s theory of space perception was one of several sensationalistic theories that 
emerged (in partial reaction against Helmholtz and his followers) at the end of the 19th 
Century. The fundamental idea behind all these novel theories was that stimuli could 
be complex and relational. Hering had studied complexes of brightness contrasts as 
stimuli; Mach and Exner had begun to look at motion patterns as stimuli; and Stumpf 
had drawn important connections between auditory and visual space perception that 
relied on an analysis of relational stimuli. Thus the sensationalist aspect of his work 
was not innovative …. (Reed 1990, 238) 
Reed claims, in short, that James must be read as part of a larger revolt—other 
leaders of which include Hering, Mach, and Stumpf—against the influence of 
Helmholtz-style unconscious inference (or so-called “two-step”) theories of 
perception. 
My account contradicts nothing in Reed, nor does his account challenge 
anything I shall have to say. It is true that one important set of targets of James’s 
theory of space was empirical psychologists like Helmholtz.  
However, historians of psychology like Reed have been less attentive to what we 
now think of as more philosophical debates of the day.247 It is surely reasonable for 
historians of science to focus on the history of more empirical work. I only want to 
point out that we must not unwittingly read contemporary disciplinary boundaries 
back onto late 19th century psychologists and philosophers.  
                                                 
247 Some historians of science do devote some attention to figures typically remembered as 
philosophers (e.g., Pastore looks at Descartes and Locke). But they very rarely look at 
philosophers who were contemporaries of James. One notable exception is the historian 
David Leary, who is deft at portraying the history of psychology as interwoven with the 
history of philosophy. As it happens, Leary does not deal at length with James on space. I 
thank James Capshew for first pointing me towards Leary’s work. Finally, Gary Hatfield’s 
book on space (Hatfield 1991) is a model of historical and philosophical scholarship on space. 
He does not discuss James, instead focusing on the German tradition.  
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I claim that a full account of James’s theory of space cannot be had if one 
focuses exclusively on the context of the history of (what we now think of as) 
empirical psychology. This is not so much a criticism of historians of psychology—
Reed, for one, does not claim to have a “full account” of the relevant context of 
James’s theory. But there is still work to be done on James’s theories of perception 
even after the best histories of empirical psychology have been written. 
The second representative piece I want to comment on from the secondary 
literature comes from Myers, who portrays James’s theory as a reaction against two 
different groups. On one hand, James opposed “empiricists” like Herbert Spencer, 
Thomas Brown, Alexander Bain, and J. S. Mill, because this group held that 
sensations were given as sets of extensionless minima sensibilia that the mind has to 
knit together, through an act of association, in order to form an experience of space 
or extension. On the other hand, James opposed “Kantians” like Schopenhaur, who 
held that “space is generated from the mind’s internal resources” (Myers 1986, 
115-116). Myers does not cite any Kantians who were contemporaries of James.  
Now Myers’s work is a good representative of the literature on James 
emanating from philosophers. Those trained in the analytic tradition typically offer 
conceptual analyses of James’s various theses, in relative isolation from analyses of 
the empirical results by which James supported those theses. In other words, if 
historians of psychology have not been alive enough to the (traditionally) 
philosophical problems with which James wrestled, historians of philosophy have not 
been alive enough to James’s detailed, empirical results.  
For example, consider how Myers presents James’s attack on empiricists and 
Kantians:  
James charged that both the empiricists, with their concept of association, and the 
Kantians, with their concept of a priori mental machinery, had given accounts of 
space-perception which either had no supporting evidence or could not be tested 
experimentally. (Myers 1986, 116) 
In fact, as I have shown in this chapter, James charged that there was plenty of 
empirical evidence that was relevant to the Kantian and proto-empiricist accounts of 
space. The problem was precisely that the available evidence contradicted 
  300  
‘psychological atomism,’ which James held was a necessary presupposition of both 
views. Myers, however, does not cite any of James’s empirical evidence in this 
regard. 
6.2  Against Kantian Readings of James 
The general secondary literature on James is very large, and there is no way to 
summarize it briefly in a useful fashion. At the end of Chapter Two, I addressed 
ways in which my reading departs from some broad trends in that literature. 
However, there is one influential trend I need to address that is profoundly 
incompatible with the portrait of James I am advancing.  
Some scholars hold that James is best viewed as a Kantian in some important 
sense. There are more and less extreme versions of this view. I canvassed some of 
the less extreme versions of this view at the end of Chapter Two, and suggested they 
had failed to come to terms with James’s own explicit and continual repudiations of 
Kant.  
But there is a more extreme reading that portrays James as a neo-Kantian. 
This reading holds that James is best read as a “protophenomenologist” (in the 
words of Wilshire 1969).248 I find Wilshire’s pioneering work on this topic bold, 
ingenious, and spectacularly misguided.  
For Wilshire, phenomenology’s central thesis is that the world cannot be 
conceived except as it appears to the mind, and the mind cannot be conceived 
except as it takes the world as its object.249 This is meant to imply that there is a 
                                                 
248 Some of the pioneering texts that portray James through a phenomenological lens, 
particularly of a Husserlian tint, include (Edie 1987; Linschoten 1968; Wild 1969; Wilshire 
1968). I focus on Wilshire because I find his work to give the clearest, most bold account of 
what is at stake in reading James as an early member of the phenomenological tradition. A 
more moderate reading can be found in (Schuetz 1941), which suggests affinities between 
James and Husserl without trying to transform James’s scientific enterprise into 
transcendental phenomenology. 
249 There is a weak and a strong way of reading this thesis. The weak reading is that there 
can be no thought without some object, and no object without some thought. The strong 
reading is that thought has a necessary structure that places non-trivial constraints on the 
kinds of objects there can be; and that objects, in turn, place other necessary constraints on 
the structure of thought. As a description of James’s view, the weak reading is probably true, 
but trivial, in the sense that it does not force him to abandon empirical studies of the mind in 
  301  
“necessary,” “internal” connection between mind and world (Wilshire 1968, 3-4). 
Wilshire writes: 
To be sure, modes of being are linked with modes of being presented to mind, but this 
linkage is not [according to the phenomenologist] an external, contingent, or causal 
relationship (not merely factual), hence it cannot be the subject matter of any 
particular empirical science, e.g., psychology. The linkage is internal—exclusively 
conceptual. Truths about it [the linkage] are necessary in virtue of their very meaning, 
and it is apprehended by what Husserl calls a transcendental investigation. (Wilshire 
1968, 4) 
Husserl’s notion of transcendental investigation comes from Kant (CPR, B40).250 
For Wilshire, such investigation amounts to a technique for proving that some 
principle p is necessary. One begins with another principle, q, which one already 
knows to be true. Then one shows that in order for q to be true, it is necessary that 
p is true, as well (Wilshire 1968, 4-5). Phenomenology is to be characterized by the 
way in which it uses transcendental exposition to establish the necessary 
preconditions of phenomenological appearances.  
Husserl’s technique was to begin with the evident fact that we have 
perceptions, and that our perceptions have some determinate character or other. He 
then proposed that we “bracket” questions about whether these perceptions 
accurately represent their objects. Instead, he proposed that we ask what are the 
necessary preconditions of these perceptions even appearing to us in the first place. 
Indeed, the purpose of Husserl’s famous ‘bracket’ is to force investigations into the 
transcendental channel: to constrain us to give up the question, So we know this fact; 
now what other facts can we get on to know? And to ask instead, So we know what we 
take to be this fact; now how is this taking or intending—this meaning—possible? 
(Wilshire 1968, 5)  
The point I want to emphasize is that Wilshire takes phenomenology to be the a 
priori search for necessary preconditions of experience—a task that in principle 
cannot be accomplished empirically. He portrays James, particularly in the 
                                                                                                                                       
favor of transcendental, a priori analysis. So it must be the strong reading Wilshire and 
others want to advance. But the strong reading of James, as I will argue, is false.  
250 Note well that Kant’s chief example of a “transcendental exposition,” when he introduced 
the term, was a transcendental argument whose conclusion was that space is a form of pure 
intuition. Geometry could not be synthetic a priori, Kant argued, unless space was a form of 
pure intuition.  
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Principles, as engaged in a proto-Husserlian, transcendental phenomenology of just 
this sort.  
On first blush, this is an astonishing claim. First, the kind of transcendental 
exposition we are supposed to find hidden in the Principles is very close to the sort 
of project in which James’s opponents were engaged. As we have seen in detail, it 
was Idealists like T. H. Green and Edward Caird who argued that a priori 
investigation into the necessary preconditions of cognition was needed to reveal the 
mind’s true nature. The notion that the Principles actually undertakes such a priori 
investigation simply ignores the context in which that work was written. Specifically, 
it ignores the anti-psychological arguments from Idealists that James and his allies 
were working to refute.  
Second, the notion that James held that the mind could only be studied through 
transcendental techniques of Kantian design (Wilshire 1969, 36) must account for 
passages like those I quoted at the end of Chapter Two, above, where James 
expressed unrestrained vitriol against Kant. One might also cite (PP, 341-350) for 
James’s considered and wholesale rejection of the notion that the ultimate subject of 
knowledge is an Ego whose properties can only be ascertained through 
transcendental exposition.  
Perhaps most astonishing is the suggestion that the Principles should be read as 
an argument against the notion that the mind can be studied scientifically (Wilshire 
1968, 5-6). One need only read to page 6 of the Principles to find James announcing 
that he has “kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book.” 
Wilshire is well aware of this last problem, at least—nobody could read the 
Principles without noticing that it purports to investigate the mind scientifically. So 
Wilshire devises an ingenious gambit to account for the fact that the Principles is 
explicitly presented as a scientific analysis of experience. He claims that James 
backs into transcendental critique, as it were, by slowly showing that the empirical 
project as originally announced in the Principles is actually impossible to carry out. 
The final lesson of the Principles is supposed to be that when we try to build an 
empirical psychology, we find the task to be impossible until we have in hand a 
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workable transcendental analysis of the mind, according to Wilshire. Thus, the 
Principles is best read as a kind of crypto-phenomenology that prepares the way for 
such transcendental analysis by showing why a purely empirical analysis of the mind 
must fail.  
Unfortunately, this exhilarating reading rests on one piece of crucial evidence, 
and the evidence collapses upon inspection. What is supposed to invite the crypto-
Kantian reading is a short passage at the end of the Briefer Course. There, James is 
alleged explicitly to confess that his natural-scientific approach to mind has 
ultimately proved a failure.  
The Briefer Course was published in 1892, and was James’s abridgement of the 
1890 Principles. The abridgement contained some new material, notably an 
Epilogue entitled “Psychology and Philosophy.” It is here that Wilshire finds James’s 
“confession,” capping fourteen years and several thousand pages of psychological 
research.  
Here is how the reading works. At the start of all those pages, in the preface to 
the Principles, James is to have announced the goal of all scientific psychology: to 
show how brain states correlate with mental states (PP, 6-7). At the other end of all 
those pages, in the epilogue to the Briefer Course, James is to have finally 
“confessed that he did not know what a mental state is” (Wilshire 1969, 26).  
Mental states have intentionality, as we now call it—they point to, or 
cognitively take hold of their objects. James is to have finally confessed that the 
intentionality relation amounts to an intrinsic connection between a state of mind 
and its object. By “intrinsic,” I mean that the concept that picks out any given 
mental state must necessarily pick out the mental state’s object, too.  
For example, the fact that my present mental state represents the toothbrush in 
front of me is analytic, on this view—the concept that picks out my present state of 
mind is supposed conceptually to contain the toothbrush. The statement “Alex’s 
perception is of a toothbrush” becomes analytic in the same sense as “Cookie (the 
puppy) is a mammal” is analytic. Just as the concept mammal is part of the concept 
puppy, the concept toothbrush is contained in the concept that picks out Alex’s 
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present perception. Both statements can be determined true or false on the basis of 
conceptual analysis, allegedly. 
In the case of perception, what gets analyzed conceptually is Alex’s present 
phenomenological appearings. As Wilshire conceives it, a phenomenon is supposed 
to be metaphysically neutral between a subject and object. We only get a clear 
concept of a subject (Alex’s perception) and an object (the toothbrush) by reflecting 
on the transcendental conditions of the phenomenological appearing. This act of 
reflecting is a strictly a priori undertaking. 
Now according to Wilshire, the “Epilogue” is supposed to contain James’s 
confession that one cannot do empirical psychology unless one knows, in detail, how 
to perform this kind of a priori, transcendental analysis. Wilshire draws a dramatic 
conclusion: 
Notice in detail how James’s belated philosophical reversal upends his whole natural-
scientific program for psychology. He aims directly at the correlation of mental states 
and brain states. Such correlation requires that he specify what he means by mental 
states. But then this specification involves an internal, noncontingent relationship and 
a metaphysics in which a mental state and its cognitive object are discerned to be in 
some way identical. He is forced to conclude that such a metaphysics must be logically 
prior to his natural-scientific psychology, and that his psychology cannot stand by itself 
as an autonomous endeavor. The reversal is complete and its significance momentous. 
(Wilshire 1969, 27) 
Wilshire says we must go back and reread the entire Principles in light of this 
alleged “reversal” in the Briefer Course’s epilogue. Throughout, it is as though 
James began a race in the middle, and is running in reverse in search of the starting 
line, Wilshire tells us. Quite literally, we are asked to read the Principles as James 
slowly backing into Kant-style, transcendental metaphysics.  
So the key question on which this entire reading turns is, can the epilogue of the 
Briefer Course be read as the kind of confession Wilshire needs? We must answer in 
the negative. 
 
The first point to notice is that James did not actually claim that the only work 
for the empirical psychologist is the correlation of mental states with brain states. 
The passage Wilshire quotes (from the preface of the Principles) in fact only 
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describes the dividing-line between metaphysics and empirical psychology. Here is 
the actual passage: 
This book, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, 
thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical 
correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the 
brain, can go no farther—can go no farther, that is, as a natural science. If she goes 
farther she becomes metaphysical.  All attempts to explain our phenomenally given 
thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities (whether the latter be named ‘Soul,’ 
‘Transcendental Ego,’ ‘Ideas,’ or ‘Elementary Units of Consciousness’) are 
metaphysical. (PP, 6) 
Contra Wilshire, this passage does not say that the sole business of the empirical 
psychologist is the correlation of brain and mental states. The passage says that 
psychology cannot go “farther … as a natural science,” once it has correlated brain 
and mental states.  
What was the point of this comment, Wilshire might respond, if not to specify 
the project of the Principles? The point was to rule out certain types of explanation 
from the proper sphere of empirical psychology. This is clear from the gloss James 
gives immediately after claiming that if psychology goes beyond correlating mental 
and brain states, “she becomes metaphysical.” He rules out attempts to “explain” 
experiences “as products of deeper-lying entities.” What kinds of entities? He tells 
us, and the list includes, among others, “the transcendental ego”—the very entity 
about which transcendental speculation was traditionally supposed to teach us. 
Given that there is little actual correlating of brain states and mental states in the 
Principles, this passage is better read as telling us what empirical psychology cannot 
do.  
Let us now look at the epilogue of the Briefer Course, where James is supposed 
to have confessed his failure at the task of correlating brain and mental states. 
Wilshire gives vague evidence that this is the view James meant to express. Wilshire 
simply claims that “James confessed that he did not know what a mental state is,” 
and cites (PBC, 397-400).  
The first thing to notice about the epilogue is the subtitle of that chapter: 
“Psychology and Philosophy.” This is also the subtitle of the journal Mind. It is also 
the title of Robertson’s essay on the relationship between empirical and 
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metaphysical studies of the mind, which I discussed at length in Chapter Two. The 
title reflects a very popular topic of discussion among James and his friends—viz., 
the proper demarcation of philosophy and psychology.  
For example, one finds the journal Mind peppered with articles discussing the 
matter during this period. Some examples include (Bain 1888; Dewey 1886a; 
Dewey 1886b; Hodgson 1876; Robertson 1883; Stewart 1876; Ward 1883). In fact, 
we know James often read and marked up articles like these. His copy of the 
Stewart and Robertson pieces both show moderate markings. The Dewey piece 
appeared in two consecutive issues of Mind; the first has very heavy marginalia,251 
and the second has moderate markings (WJP, Phil 22.4.6*). In fact, in the 
Principles, James referred readers interested in “the relation between Psychology 
and General Philosophy” to the Ward, Robertson, and Dewey articles (PP, 184.n).  
As was so common in essays written from the empiricist side, James’s epilogue 
reflected on the proper relationship between metaphysics and psychology. Indeed, 
the epilogue continues the sketchy remarks from the preface of the Principles that I 
have just quoted—remarks to the effect that if one seeks certain types of explanation 
in psychology, one becomes “metaphysical.” 
So in the pages Wilshire cites from the Briefer Course’s epilogue, James indeed 
confessed he could not give a full account of what a “mental state” is. But this 
remark comes in the context of a more complete discussion of the relation between 
metaphysics and philosophy. The crucial point is this. The remark is prefaced by 
James’s explicit claim to be speaking in a metaphysical and not a scientific voice, in 
the epilogue. Far from conceding that the scientific project had failed to account for 
what a mental state was, in fact James was only illustrating that science must take 
certain metaphysical assumptions for granted. Questions about the metaphysical 
                                                 
251 The marginalia—cited by permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University—
indicate that James strongly disagreed with Dewey’s view of the relation between psychology 
and philosophy, at this early juncture. Dewey’s piece praised Green’s work, and carried the 
latter’s criticisms of empirical psychology forward. Dewey claimed that it was Green and his 
followers who really occupied “the psychological standpoint”—empiricists had actually 
abandoned it. 
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nature of mental states are difficult to answer, James argued, but these are not 
matters of immediate concern for the scientist.  
In short, James argued that we should as much as possible keep difficult 
metaphysical questions out of psychology, and take them up when we are doing 
philosophy proper. Note that this was a standard line among James’s empiricist 
allies in their frequent discussions of the relationship between psychology and 
philosophy (recall my discussion of Robertson in Chapter Two, above). 
But Wilshire writes as though the admission that there are questions properly 
dealt with in metaphysics, not science, amounts to the claim that science is deficient, 
or cannot begin without a completed, fully worked out metaphysics. But this simply 
ignores James’s own account, in the epilogue itself, of what metaphysics is. James 
began that chapter by noting that scientists assume that determinism is true, and 
that this is a helpful assumption for their purposes. Metaphysicians reply that there 
must be free-will, if we are to make sense of ethics. James pointedly avoids 
adjudicating the debate: 
… I only mention the conflict to show that all these special sciences, marked off for 
convenience from the remaining body of truth (cf. p. 9), must hold their assumptions 
and results subject to revision in the light of each other’s needs. The forum where they 
hold discussion is called metaphysics. Metaphysics means only an unusually obstinate 
attempt to think clearly and consistently. (italics mine, PBC, 395)  
Where Robertson held psychology to supply “neutral data” to philosophy, James 
had a different vision. For James, “metaphysics” (which he used interchangeably 
with “philosophy”) is the field that fosters discussion between the special sciences.  
But the special sciences themselves can—must—put aside metaphysical 
deliberation if they are to make progress. James continued this way:  
The special sciences all deal with data that are full of obscurity and contradiction; but 
from the point of view of their limited purposes these defects may be overlooked. … A 
geologist’s purposes fall short of understanding Time itself. A mechanist need not know 
how action and reaction are possible at all. A psychologist has enough to do without 
asking how both he and the mind which he studies are able to take cognizance of the 
same outer world. But it is obvious that problems irrelevant from one standpoint may 
be essential from another. And as soon as one’s purpose is the attainment of the 
maximum of possible insight into the world as a whole, the metaphysical puzzles 
become the most urgent ones of all. Psychology contributes to general philosophy her 
full share of these; and I propose in this last chapter to indicate briefly which of them 
seem the more important. (PBC, 395)   
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So the special sciences, including psychology, all set aside metaphysical questions 
that are not germane to their purposes. Metaphysics is an attempt to synthesize one 
coherent worldview from the conflicting perspectives of the special sciences, for 
James. Metaphysics therefore has a markedly broader and more general perspective 
than the special sciences themselves. In this passage, James clearly announced that 
the point of the epilogue was to consider the metaphysical puzzles psychology raises. 
But note that metaphysical puzzles are explicitly presented as not relevant to the 
“purposes” of the geologist, mechanic, or psychologist. It is no mark against the 
geologist if she cannot give an account of “Time itself.” Similarly, we are clearly not 
supposed to think that the metaphysical problems raised by psychology somehow 
show that the psychologist’s scientific task cannot, after all, be carried out. Instead, 
psychology is like all other special sciences in “overlook[ing]” metaphysical 
contradictions for the sake of accomplishing its own, more “limited purposes.”  
The two passages I just quoted come from the first page of the epilogue, which 
in its entirely is only seven pages long. The passages are not buried away 
somewhere obscure. There simply is no good way to read the epilogue as a 
confession of defeat. Contra Wilshire, the epilogue explicitly disavows the notion 
that metaphysics is a transcendental discipline that is “logically prior” to psychology.  
Lest there be any doubt, here is how James presented the discussion Wilshire 
cites, the discussion where James indeed confessed not to know what a mental state 
is: 
When psychology is treated as a natural science (after the fashion in which it has been 
treated in this book), ‘states of mind’ are taken for granted, as data immediately given 
in experience; and the working hypothesis (see p. 13) is the mere empirical law that to 
the entire state of the brain at any moment one unique state of mind always 
‘corresponds.’ This does very well till we begin to be metaphysical and ask ourselves 
just what we mean by such a word as ‘corresponds.’ (PBC, 396) 
Notice that last sentence. It is only “when we begin to be metaphysical” that the 
question of how to individuate mental states becomes troublesome. I repeat, this 
casts no shadow on empirical psychology, which like all sciences, must begin with a 
set of metaphysical assumptions.
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Chapter Five 
The Structure of  Empirical Psychology: 
The Stream of  Thought as Pragmatically A Priori 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Recall that we are in the middle of a sub-plot begun at the start of Chapter Four 
(see pp. 227 ff, above). I suggested that some of James’s early work on space 
provided experimental evidence for the stream thesis. I also suggested that this 
thesis acted as a new framework for empirical psychology. Chapter Four discussed 
empirical evidence for the stream thesis, and showed how the thesis helped James 
respond to Idealists. I have not yet explained the precise sense in which the stream 
thesis actually functioned as a framework for the Principles, though. This is now my 
chief remaining task. 
I will argue that the stream thesis worked as a framework in the sense that it 
helped constitute the scientific status of the Principles. The stream thesis performed 
this constitutive role by providing a clever definition of thought. “Thought” was 
James’s generic word for all experience. The definition specified what psychology’s 
legitimate object of scientific investigation was to be. 
What is perhaps most interesting about the definition is its role as an instrument 
for crystallizing a particular social organization. A necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition252 for psychology’s gaining scientific status was that an agreement be 
forged between philosophers and psychologists on how to divide labor in studying the 
mind. It was not enough for James to evade Idealist attacks on psychology only in 
theory. James also needed to affect a durable cease-fire between psychology and its 
hostile neighbor in practice. 
                                                 
252 Necessary condition is not quite the right concept, but it will take some work in this 
chapter to explain the actual relation between psychology’s scientific status and its division of 
labor with philosophy. I will argue that the division of labor is, in a special sense, a 
presupposition of psychology’s scientific status.  
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He did this by delineating the proper territory of mental science in a way that 
would be agreeable to all parties, he hoped. His crucial move in formulating his 
definition of thought, therefore, was to identify a set of what he called “ultimate 
facts” about experience, facts whose further explanation was to be left to 
philosophers rather than scientists. So conceptualizing an object of empirical 
investigation, for psychology, meant identifying a non-controversial line between 
mental science and metaphysics. This was no small task, given the heated debates 
over psychology then raging. 
James found his definition of thought had to be metaphysically loaded, in the 
following sense. The definition stipulated that thought has certain metaphysical 
properties that the psychologist must decline to explain. Were psychologists to wait 
around for a conception of the mind that was somehow metaphysically transparent 
or neutral, they might have waited forever. The task of specifying a proper object of 
scientific investigation, for psychology, therefore required figuring out which 
explanatory conundrums psychologists could leave aside for philosophers.  
The definition of thought—the stream thesis—is also interesting because its 
epistemic status turns out to be mixed, in a sense to be made precise. Qua model of 
experience, the stream thesis rested on empirical data, as we saw in the previous 
chapter. But qua constitutive principle, the stream thesis was an a priori stipulation, 
as I will show in this chapter. 
Admittedly, it seems unhelpful to explain the sense in which the stream thesis 
provided a “framework” for James’s psychology by saying that that the thesis played 
a “constitutive role.” If we were not sure what a scientific framework was, the notion 
of constitutivity seems even more befuddling. In this chapter we will work to develop 
a clear, precise notion of constitutivity that helps us understand the stream thesis’s 
supporting role in the Principles. This task is especially challenging because the 
leading accounts of constitutive scientific principles are typically drawn from 
theoretical physics. We will find that such notions only imperfectly fit the case of 
early empirical psychology. 
  311  
Thus, after looking more closely at the stream thesis itself, I will analyze some 
recent philosophical work on constitutive principles in the sciences. I show that our 
best available accounts do not capture the special sense in which psychology—
Jamesean psychology, at any rate—employs such principles. I adapt to my own 
purposes C. I. Lewis’s notion of pragmatic a priori principles, and H. P. Grice’s 
account of presuppositions.  
The result of my analysis is a novel account of constitutive principles designed 
to fit the case of a fledgling, special science like late 19th century psychology. In such 
a science, the privileged role of presuppositions is not due to their semantic place in 
a theory. It is due to their social role in making explicit agreements about how to 
divide labor between specialized intellectual communities.  
However, it will be important to see that these presuppositions are chosen for 
social, yet rational reasons. In James’s case, the particular presuppositions he 
accepted grew out of detailed debates with Idealists over the philosophical 
foundations of psychology. James had good reasons for the way he formulated the 
stream thesis. But his reasons were not ones that would compel anyone, anywhere, 
at any time, to conceive of psychology’s proper object in just the way he did.  
Instead, his reasons were rational given the state of debate over psychology in 
the late 19th century. He defined “thought” in a way that relegated to philosophy the 
explanation of some specific experiential features that late 19th century Idealists 
were actually challenging psychologists to explain. Were psychology actually 
confronted with wholly different challenges, James’s definition of thought might not 
have been appropriate. But given the context in which he actually worked, James’s 
choice of how to demarcate philosophy and psychology represented a rational, 
practical choice. 
In the penultimate section of the chapter, I sketch some epistemological 
implications of my analysis. James’s task of establishing a boundary between 
neighboring disciplines—especially philosophy—was a social, pragmatic problem. 
But the exigencies of this problem actually (and rightly, I will argue) influenced the 
shape of James’s scientific theory, itself. Philosophers like Helen Longino have 
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argued that the objective analysis of scientific theories requires certain social 
structures among the community of inquirers. If my analysis is right, we have before 
us an example of an even more profound connection between science and social 
factors. Sometimes, the very content of scientific theories are designed to affect 
social results, and ought to be evaluated accordingly. In James’s case, I suggest that 
his stream thesis was successful in its constitutive role just to the extent that it 
actually helped establish a demarcation between the community of philosophers and 
psychologists. 
2.   “A PLEA FOR PSYCHOLOGY AS A ‘NATURAL SCIENCE’” 
The proto-phenomenological reading will continue to provide a useful foil for 
our discussion. Recall that Wilshire’s version of this reading takes off from the claim 
that James made a shocking confession in the Briefer Course’s epilogue. The 
confession, allegedly, was that James’s own account of mental states had proved 
unworkable for the purposes of empirical psychology. 
At the end of Chapter Four, I offered some reasons to reject this reading. But 
the final blow comes from an essay James published within two months of the 
Briefer Course.253 The Principles had occasioned a negative review by George Ladd, 
an Idealist (Ladd 1892). Ladd had complained that the Principles merely pretended 
to develop a legitimate science of mind. “A Plea for Psychology as a ‘Natural 
Science’” was James’s response (James 1892). The article is useful to us because it 
helps establish James’s views about the role of metaphysical presuppositions in 
science. 
In this article, James explicitly contradicted two of Wilshire’s crucial claims. 
The first is the claim that James “confessed” that he had no account of the mental 
state, or at least no account workable for the purposes of empirical psychology. The 
second is the claim that James held empirical psychology to be impossible until we 
                                                 
253 The Briefer Course shipped to booksellers on January 11, 1892 (PBC, 473). “A Plea for 
Psychology as a ‘Natural Science’” appeared in the March issue of Philosophical Review. 
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answer a set of metaphysical questions about the mind, questions that can only be 
approached through transcendental exposition. 
Let us look at “A Plea for Psychology.” James began by claiming that he only 
hoped to help psychology advance in the direction of natural science. He denied 
having claimed that psychology was already a full natural science. “I wished, by 
treating Psychology like a natural science, to help her to become one” (EPs, 270). 
This is presumably why he placed “Natural Science” in scare quotes in the essay’s 
title.  
The rest of the essay explained and defended what his particular strategy had 
been, in the Principles, for treating psychology like a natural science. Natural 
science is “a mere fragment of truth broken out from the whole mass of it for the 
sake of practical effectiveness exclusively,” James wrote (EPs, 271). So for 
psychology to become a natural science it, too, had to break off a “fragment of truth” 
for practical purposes. He explained this idea further: 
Every special science, in order to get at its own particulars at all, must make a number 
of convenient assumptions and decline to be responsible for questions which the 
human mind will continue to ask about them. Thus physics assumes a material world, 
but never tries to show how our experience of such a world is ‘possible.’ It assumes the 
inter-action of bodies, and the completion by them of continuous changes, without 
pretending to know how such results can be. Between the things thus assumed, now, 
the various sciences find definite ‘laws’ of sequence; and so are enabled to furnish 
general Philosophy with materials properly shaped and simplified for her ulterior tasks. 
(EPs, 271) 
So every special science begins with a number of “convenient assumptions,” 
according to James. He then gave examples of such assumptions, all of which are 
metaphysically loaded. What do I mean by “metaphysical,” and what do I mean by 
“loaded”? First, the assumptions are metaphysical in the following sense. What the 
scientist assumes is that there exists some good answer to a nagging question that 
has actually been posed by metaphysicians. For instance, the physicist assumes 
there exists a material world, and that we have genuine knowledge of it. External-
world skepticism is an issue that metaphysicians really worried (and continue to 
worry) about. Second, the assumptions are loaded in the sense that the scientist 
“declines to be responsible” for them. The physicist does not try to give evidence 
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that there exists an external world. She simply assumes that skepticism is false, as 
far as her purposes go, and gets on with the task at hand—“practical prediction and 
control” of nature (EPs, 272). 
Notice that James saw a benefit to making such metaphysical assumptions, in 
science. The assumptions were supposed somehow to facilitate what we might call 
the construction of scientific objects. “…The things thus assumed”—that is, the 
things our metaphysical assumptions have helped us pick out—become the subjects 
of natural laws, according to the passage I just quoted. 
This account raises three important questions that I will now address. First, did 
James think psychology, too, must make metaphysical assumptions? Second, if so, 
what are to be psychology’s “things thus assumed”? In other words, what are the 
scientific objects psychology is to construct? And third, how are metaphysical 
assumptions involved in their construction? 
The answer to the first question is not far to seek: 
If, therefore, psychology is ever to conform to the type of the other natural sciences, it 
must also renounce certain ultimate solutions, and place itself on the usual common-
sense basis by uncritically begging such data as the existence of a physical world, of 
states of mind, and of the fact that these latter take cognizance of other things. What 
the ‘physical world’ may be in itself, how ‘states of mind’ can exist at all, and exactly 
what ‘taking cognizance’ may imply, are inevitable further questions; but they are 
questions of the kind for which general philosophy, not natural science, is held 
responsible. (EPs, 271) 
Like other natural sciences, psychology begins by accepting certain metaphysical 
assumptions “uncritically.” These assumptions include that there are mental states, 
and that these states “take cognizance of other things.” So James held that 
psychologists, like other scientists, must begin with metaphysical assumptions. 
The first sentence of this passage is a conditional claim—if one wants 
psychology to become a natural science, psychology must begin with metaphysical 
assumptions. Wilshire suggests that James actually rejected the antecedent. James’s 
admission that empirical psychology must make metaphysical assumptions shows, 
according to Wilshire, that psychology is somehow untenable as a science. 
In fact, James affirmed the antecedent of the aforementioned conditional. He 
argued that it really is desirable for psychology to be a natural science. The reason 
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he gave is that if psychology succeeds, it will be able to provide valuable assistance 
to certain authority figures who have a practical need for help “improving the ideas, 
dispositions, and conduct” of those in their charge. James cited authority figures like 
educators, jail-wardens, doctors, clergymen, and asylum-superintendents (EPs, 
272). 
The first question I raised just before the last block quote was whether James 
held that empirical psychology must make metaphysical assumptions. We now have 
an affirmative answer. The second question was what assumptions the empirical 
psychologist has to make. We know that the psychologist must assume that there 
exist mental states that “take cognizance” of the world, according to James. But 
there is more to say on this topic.  
For James, those studying the mind could be broken into two groups. One group 
consisted of biologists, naturalists, doctors, physiologists, and psychical researchers, 
who “already form a band of workers” producing practical results. “…Almost all the 
fresh life that has come into psychology of recent years has come from” this group. A 
second group was more philosophically inclined. James certainly did not dismiss the 
metaphysicians—but he argued that a “division of labor” was needed to free up the 
more scientifically-inclined to produce results of practical benefit (EPs, 272-273). Of 
the scientists, James wrote: 
…Wisdom lies, not in forcing the consideration of the more metaphysical aspects of 
human consciousness upon them, but, on the contrary, in carefully rescuing these 
aspects from their hands, and handing them over to those of the specialists in 
philosophy, where the metaphysical aspects of physics are already allowed to belong. 
(EPs, 273) 
Metaphysical assumptions were to help perform the task of “carefully” demarcating 
mental science from metaphysics. Instead of assailing psychologists for having 
unfounded metaphysical assumptions, James urged that philosophers simply grant 
psychologists certain assumptions for the sake of scientific progress. 
Later in the paragraph, James gave a better sense of what specific assumptions 
he wanted philosophers to grant to psychologists:  
We need a fair and square and explicit abandonment of such questions as that of the 
soul, the transcendental ego, the fusion of ideas or particles of mind stuff, etc., by the 
practical man; and a fair and square determination on the part of the philosophers to 
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keep such questions out of psychology and treat them only in their widest possible 
connections, amongst the objects of an ultimate critical review of all the elements of 
the world. (EPs, 273)  
It is crucial to see that James did not arbitrarily choose the metaphysical 
assumptions he wanted philosophers to grant to psychologists. Each assumption he 
mentioned in this passage, too, involved questions to which philosophers were 
actually demanding that psychologists answer. Indeed, the second question James 
cited in this passage directly concerns the Idealist critiques of psychology that we 
met with in Chapter Three, above. Idealists argued that empirical research could 
never shed light on the transcendental preconditions of experience—that is, on the 
structure of the transcendental ego. In this passage, James urged that psychologists 
be allowed to leave aside such issues.  
At least from what we have seen so far, it appears that James sought to create a 
demarcation between philosophy and psychology by the judicious use of 
metaphysical assumptions. The metaphysical assumptions functioned to specify 
questions the scientist is not responsible to answer. Again, if the scientist is to get on 
with empirical work, she must be released of the responsibility to give a 
metaphysical account of some basic set of data. 
James suggested that metaphysical assumptions not only help demarcate 
science from metaphysics; as we saw above, he also suggested that they are 
somehow involved in helping construct scientific objects. This is the third issue I 
proposed to address. 
We have seen that for James, scientists use metaphysical assumptions when 
they conceptualize the entities that will be the subjects of their empirical 
hypotheses. As he put it, scientific laws are relations between “things thus assumed” 
(see the passage quoted on p. 313, above).  
Now, what are the “things thus assumed” for psychologists? In other words, 
what kinds of scientific objects are created by psychologists’ metaphysical 
assumptions? Here we find another tension with Wilshire, who claimed that the 
epilogue of the Briefer Course finally abandoned mental states as legitimate objects 
of empirical inquiry. To the contrary, in this article James argued that 
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metaphysicians and psychologists should agree at least on the following point: 
psychology’s proper object was precisely the “mental state.”  
Cannot both [“philosophers and biologists”] forego ulterior inquiries, and agree that, 
provisionally at least, the mental state shall be the ultimate datum so far as psychology 
cares to go? (EPs, 274) 
A page later, James acknowledged that the Principles sometimes engaged in 
metaphysical disputes. But he offered the following explanation:  
…but these unfortunate episodes are for the most part incidental to the attempt to get 
the undivided ‘mental state’ once for all accepted by my colleagues as the fundamental 
datum for their science. To have proposed such a useful basis for united action in 
psychology is in my own eyes the chief originality and service of the book …. (EPs, 
275) 
This was a strong claim about the significance of the Principles. James held that his 
chief contribution was to have helped establish the mental state as the proper object 
of scientific investigation, in the field of psychology. How did he do this? By helping, 
he hoped, to forge a consensus. Philosophers should not demand that psychologists 
take responsibility for a certain set of metaphysical assumptions that are admittedly 
built into the notion of a mental state.  
What have we learned from “A Plea for Psychology as a ‘Natural Science,’” 
then? First, James held that science requires metaphysically-loaded assumptions. 
Second, these metaphysical assumptions are involved in constructing the objects 
about which science theorizes. Third, the assumptions are to be taken on 
“uncritically” by the scientist. Fourth, psychology ought to strive to be a legitimate 
natural science. To do this, it must also take on metaphysical assumptions. Fifth, the 
scientific objects the psychologist uses these assumptions to construct are mental 
states. Sixth and finally, we learn that one role of metaphysical assumptions in 
science is to help divide labor with “general philosophy.” In taking on these 
assumptions uncritically, the scientist agrees to leave responsibility about 
contemplating metaphysical questions about mental states more or less to 
philosophers. 
Several issues remain, however. It may still be unclear how, exactly, 
metaphysical assumptions are involved in constructing a scientific object. We might 
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also wonder why such assumptions should be needed in science. Does their being 
“uncritical” require them to be irrational? In other words, what do these 
assumptions do to our conception of scientific rationality? Finally, James wrote the 
article I have been considering only after both the Principles and the Briefer Course 
were both published. So one might wonder whether James’s retrospective 
description of his own project was accurate. I will take up the last of these issues 
first, by turning directly to the Principles’s use of the stream thesis to construct the 
mental state as a legitimate object of scientific inquiry.  
As far as Wilshire’s reading goes, recall from the end of Chapter Four that he 
makes the following claim. In the epilogue to the Briefer Course, James confessed 
not to have an answer to the metaphysical question of what a mental state is, or of 
how mental states come to know their objects. Wilshire claimed that this amounts to 
a confession that the entire scientific project of the Principles ultimately collapsed. I 
do not think Wilshire’s claim can be reconciled with the passages I have quoted in 
this section. In fact, James characterized science as necessarily involving 
metaphysically-loaded assumptions—metaphysical questions purposefully left 
unanswered. What is worse, consider the specific metaphysical questions James 
explicitly set aside for the purposes of psychology. These include the very 
unanswered questions Wilshire contends are to bring the collapse of the Principle’s 
scientific project. James claimed to have set aside the questions of how to give a 
metaphysical analysis of the mental state, and of how to explain what it is for the 
mind to “take cognizance of” its objects.  
Is it possible that James changed his mind after penning the epilogue, so that 
this article represents a modified view from what the Briefer Course articulated? I 
have already noted that the article was published within months of the Briefer 
Course. But to make matters worse for Wilshire, the article refers readers interested 
in the relation between metaphysics and psychology to the epilogue of the Briefer 
Course (EPs, 271)—the very place where Wilshire has James confessing that 
psychology cannot be a science. It does not make sense to suppose that in arguing 
for psychology’s legitimate progress towards becoming a natural science, James 
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appealed to a chapter of the Briefer Course that argued for exactly the opposite 
conclusion. But Wilshire would have to make just such an unsupportable claim if he 
is to defend his reading.  
3.   THE STREAM THESIS AND THE ENDS OF EMPIRICAL INQUIRY 
The notion that science requires metaphysical assumptions was not just an ex 
post facto claim. This idea was incorporated into the Principles from the start. In 
fact, this was the first substantive claim of the entire book.  
The opening paragraph of the preface contains preliminaries about the book’s 
structure. In the second paragraph, James announced his intention to treat 
psychology as a natural science. I will now go through the entire paragraph, though I 
have quoted parts of it already. I do this in order to bring out an interpretive 
difficulty concerning James’s views on presuppositions.  
Here is how the paragraph began: 
I have kept close to the point of view of natural science throughout the book.  Every 
natural science assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge the 
elements between which its own ‘laws’ obtain, and from which its own deductions are 
carried on. (PP, 6) 
James explained that keeping to the methods of science required accepting 
“uncritically” a basic description of entities that will be the subject of natural laws.  
He continued by specifying the basic elements of psychology:  
Psychology, the science of finite individual minds, assumes as its data (1) thoughts and 
feelings, and (2) a physical world in time and space with which they coexist and which 
(3) they know.  Of course these data themselves are discussable; but the discussion of 
them (as of other elements) is called metaphysics and falls outside the province of this 
book. (PP, 6)  
The data of psychology are “thoughts and feelings,” and a physical world. Moreover, 
mental states have a cognitive grasp of the world in which they exist. This is a basic 
property of mental states, a brute datum to be assumed “uncritically.” James 
admitted that the characterization of mental states—of the basic objects of 
psychology—includes metaphysical assumptions that are “discussable.” But he 
claimed that such discussion is part of philosophy, not psychology.  
The passage continued with sentences I quoted at the end of Chapter Four: 
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This book, assuming that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, 
thereupon contends that psychology when she has ascertained the empirical 
correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling with definite conditions of the 
brain, can go no farther—can go no farther, that is, as a natural science. If she goes 
farther she becomes metaphysical. (PP, 6)  
Psychology cannot go further than correlating mental states with brain states, James 
claimed. Again, if the field tries to go further, it becomes metaphysical.  
This is to be avoided, according to James: 
All attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying 
entities (whether the latter be named ‘Soul,’ ‘Transcendental Ego,’ ‘Ideas,’ or 
‘Elementary Units of Consciousness’) are metaphysical. This book consequently 
rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories; and in this strictly 
positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim 
originality. (PP, 6)  
Here is where this paragraph becomes difficult to interpret. On one hand, James had 
just asserted that science begins by making metaphysical assumptions. But on the 
other, he here claimed that some metaphysical assumptions are not to be allowed. 
Specifically, the psychologist should not posit a transcendental ego, a soul, or even 
the existence of simple ideas or sensations. This is puzzling. Why, the reader 
wonders, should James be permitted to make his own “uncritical,” metaphysical 
assumptions (viz., that there are thoughts and feelings that coexist in and know a 
physical world)? How can he condemn metaphysical assumptions about 
transcendental egos and simple ideas, but permit metaphysical assumptions he 
happens to prefer? 
His position only becomes more surprising in the remainder of this pregnant 
paragraph:  
Of course this point of view [the “strictly positivistic point of view”] is anything but 
ultimate. Men must keep thinking; and the data assumed by psychology, just like 
those assumed by physics and the other natural sciences, must some time be 
overhauled. The effort to overhaul them clearly and thoroughly is metaphysics; but 
metaphysics can only perform her task well when distinctly conscious of its great 
extent.  Metaphysics fragmentary, irresponsible, and half-awake, and unconscious that 
she is metaphysical, spoils two good things when she injects herself into a natural 
science.  And it seems to me that the theories both of a spiritual agent and of 
associated ‘ideas’ are, as they figure in the psychology-books, just such metaphysics as 
this.  Even if their results be true, it would be as well to keep them, as thus presented, 
out of psychology as it is to keep the results of idealism out of physics. (PP, 6) 
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James claimed that psychology, when treated as a natural science, takes on a point 
of view that is “anything but ultimate.” People can and must take a broader 
perspective on the mind, sometimes, than the psychological perspective. But when 
they do this, they should be clear that they are doing metaphysics, not psychology. 
James admitted that metaphysics could sometimes overhaul the basic conceptions of 
a science. But he held this to be a rare and drastic occurrence, a task performed 
only with a clear understanding of the stakes.  
The most surprising part of the passage just quoted comes in the final two 
sentences. James singled out two groups whom he accused of performing the bad 
kind of “half-awake” metaphysics. It is not surprising that he singled out the first 
group—old-fashioned, rational psychology that posits a supernatural “soul.” But 
James singled out a second group of half-awake metaphysicians—associationist 
psychologists. This would have been a shocking allegation to James’s peers. Most of 
his allies from the Mind community in England, for example, would have fallen 
under this category—including Robertson and Bain. So the preface leaves one 
wondering what grounds James could have had for dismissing what was then the 
most well-established school of empirical psychology as nothing but half-awake 
metaphysics, while in the same paragraph gladly accepting that his own psychology 
rested on metaphysical assumptions of its own. 
James must have thought that making metaphysical assumptions was not the 
same as being engaged in “half-awake” metaphysics. In the latter case, one perhaps 
makes assumptions without being aware of it; in the former, one makes assumptions 
self-consciously, and for good reason. But then what did James mean by calling his 
own metaphysical presuppositions “uncritical”? And how could one have good 
reason for uncritically taking on metaphysical assumptions? 
As we read on in the Principles, these questions grow more pressing. In some 
passages, James reiterated that the psychologist must make uncritical 
presuppositions (e.g., PP, 141, 177-178, 184, 185, 212, 214-215, 219-220, 350n.). 
Yet in other passages, he argued against other groups—particularly 
transcendentalists and associationists—precisely on the grounds that they make 
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unwarranted metaphysical assumptions (e.g., PP, 141, 148, 331-332, 334, 349-
350). How can these two attitudes—that science requires metaphysical 
presuppositions, and that it ought to shun them—be reconciled?   
We can answer these questions by taking a closer look at the actual role James’s 
own uncritical assumptions played in his psychology. 
 
In the 1892 essay I reviewed above, James held that things he called “mental 
states” were to be the fundamental objects of psychological investigation. In the 
Principles’s preface, we just saw James use the phrase “thoughts and feelings” to 
describe psychology’s fundamental objects. Later in the Principles, the reader 
discovers that these two sets of expressions were meant to be synonymous. James 
did not like the phrase “mental state,” because there are no verbs associated with it. 
He settled on “feeling and “thought” as two phrases both meant to be synonymous 
with “mental state.” The former two expressions are preferable to “mental state” 
for their useful verb forms (“feel” and “think”). Here is James’s conclusion: 
My own partiality is for either FEELING or THOUGHT. I shall probably often use 
both words in a wider sense than usual, and alternately startle two classes of readers 
by their unusual sound; but if the connection makes it clear that mental states at large, 
irrespective of their kind, are meant, this will do no harm, and may even do some 
good. (PP, 186) 
Thus, James used both “feeling” and “thought” as rough synonyms for “mental 
state.” So if we want to learn more about the metaphysical assumptions packed into 
James’s notion of a mental state, we must also look at his basic account of what he 
calls “feelings” or “thoughts.” 
That basic account is most fully articulated in the Principles chapter entitled 
“The Stream of Thought.” James began that chapter by returning to the theme of 
uncritical assumptions: 
The only thing which psychology has a right to postulate at the outset is the fact of 
thinking itself, and that must first be taken up and analyzed. …  
 The first fact for us, then, as psychologists, is that thinking of some sort goes on. I 
use the word thinking, in accordance with what was said on p. 186 [where “thought” is 
defined as synonymous with “feeling” and “mental state”], for every form of 
consciousness indiscriminately. If we could say in English ‘it thinks,’ as we say ‘it rains’ 
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or ‘it blows,’ we should be stating the fact most simply and with the minimum of 
assumption. As we cannot, we must simply say that thought goes on. (PP, 219-220) 
James claimed that psychology’s first assumption concerned the existence of 
thought, where “thought” is understood in the general sense I just described. Here, 
James gave more detail than he had in the preface concerning psychology’s basic 
assumption.  
Not only should the psychologist simply assume that thought exists, James now 
claimed, but she should assume that thought has five basic properties that we 
“notice immediately”: 
How does it [“thought”] go on? We notice immediately five important characters in 
the process, of which it shall be the duty of the present chapter to treat in a general 
way:  
1)  Every thought tends to be part of a personal consciousness.  
2)  Within each personal consciousness thought is always changing.  
3)  Within each personal consciousness thought is sensibly continuous.  
4)  It always appears to deal with objects independent of itself.  
5)  It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others, and  
 welcomes or rejects—chooses from among them, in a word—all the while.  
I take it that each of these postulates is to be a metaphysical assumption in the 
sense first depicted in the preface to the Principles. The “Stream of Thought” 
chapter went on to describe each of these postulates in more detail, in some cases 
providing introspective evidence that thought really has the ascribed properties. But 
the properties are described, not explained in terms of some deeper or more basic 
psychological fact.  
Later, James would refer to the stream of thought as the “ultimate fact for 
psychology” (PP, 341). It seems that the metaphysical assumptions provided in the 
“Stream of Thought” chapter thus provide a detailed characterization of 
psychology’s ultimate fact—the stream of thought, or mental state. An “ultimate 
fact” in psychology appears to be a fact such that, when we try to explain it, we are 
being “metaphysical,” to use the language I have already quoted from James’s 
preface. “Ultimate facts,” especially the facts described by the stream thesis, specify 
a legitimate stopping-point for scientific analysis. When we analyze a complex 
phenomenon into “ultimate facts,” we have taken the analysis as far as possible 
without becoming metaphysical. Thus, we may postulate perceptual laws that 
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ascribe some particular relation between swaths of the stream of thought. But we 
cannot then ask why there is a stream of thought, or why it always has the five basic 
features cited above.  
I take myself to have shown that if we want to understand the way James 
actually used metaphysical assumptions, we ought to look at the basic postulates of 
the stream thesis. Recall now the question at hand (from p. 322, above). We wanted 
to know whether it was defensible for James to use metaphysical assumptions 
himself, given that he criticized his opponents for serving up unholy mixtures of 
metaphysics and science. Let us look more closely at one postulate to see how 
metaphysical assumptions are built into the notion of a mental state, these “ultimate 
facts” of Jamesean psychology. 
The stream thesis’s first postulate stated that all thought is part of some 
personal consciousness. There are several important points to bring out about this 
postulate. First, note that in keeping with his own claims about metaphysical 
assumptions, James’s further discussion of this point (at PP, 220-224) did not explain 
why thought should tend to a personal form. The discussion only offered evidence 
that this is the case. Second, I call this assumption “metaphysical” because it was 
designed to skirt an Idealist attack that was itself metaphysical in nature. To see 
how uncritical assumptions are involved in James’s response, I now turn to the 
attack this particular postulate was designed to skirt. 
The language James used in articulating this first feature of the stream of 
thought makes it clear that the assumption was meant to guard specifically against 
Kantians. James described the first postulate of the stream thesis this way: “The 
universal conscious fact is not ‘feelings and thoughts exist,’ but ‘I think’ and ‘I feel’” 
(PP, 221). James often used the phrase “I think” to evoke Kant’s notion of a 
transcendental self as well as Green’s similar notion of a transcendental ego. For 
instance, James called the transcendental unity of apperception—an important 
feature of Kant’s transcendental self—an attempt to explain the fact that “The 
awareness that I think is … implied in all experience” (italics original; PP, 342).  
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The language was not James’s invention. Kant famously wrote that “It must be 
possible for the ‘I think’ to accompany all my representations …” (CPR, B131). 
Roughly, his point had been that for anything to be a mental representation, it had 
to belong to someone’s conscious life. Mental representations cannot simply float 
free of any subject. For instance, were I to have a mental representation of a 
particular sculpture, I would have to be able to represent myself as thinking of that 
sculpture. This is what Kant meant by saying that it must be possible for “the ‘I 
think’ to accompany” any legitimate representation.  
To understand how James’s first postulate was related to this Kantian claim, it 
is crucial to see that Kant went further than merely pointing out that 
representations must always be binded to someone’s mental life, however. Kant also 
tried to give an account of how such a unified conscious life was possible in the first 
place. He called “pure apperception” the kind of consciousness that generates “the 
‘I think.’” He then argued that such self-consciousness is made possible by pure 
apperception’s “transcendental unity” (B132). Put briefly, it is necessary that there 
be some unified subject in relation to whom our scattered, outer perceptions can be 
brought together in one conscious life, Kant argued (B136-137). This subject, the 
transcendental self, must (for reasons I must leave aside, here) stand outside of 
space and time, and is what makes possible the transcendental unity of 
apperception. 
Now my point is that in articulating the first postulate of the stream thesis, 
James used the phrase “I think” to evoke Kant (see the passage quoted three 
paragraphs above). Specifically, he used the phrase as a kind of loose shorthand for 
Kant’s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception.  
If there is any doubt that James used the phrase “I think” to evoke Kant, one 
might consult some of James’s unpublished notes, where it is transparently clear 
that he used the phrase with this connotation. His detailed notes on Kant’s 
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics can be found at the Houghton Library. 
Some of the notes deal with Victor Cousin’s criticisms of Kant, and in this context 
James wrote: 
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“Transcendental unity of apperception” wh. comprehends all other acts of union wh. 
the understanding performs, including those of matter given by the “Inner sense. [sic] 
The “conscience” Cousin says Kant makes empiric is merely the unity of the different 
intuitions of the Inner sense. The transcendental unity aforesaid (“I think”) dominates 
these as well as all other intuitions. (WJP, bMS 1092.9 (4448); emphasis original; by 
permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University) 
Notice that last sentence. James introduced “I think” as a shorthand  for “the 
transcendental unity aforesaid.” This phrase refers back to the first sentence quoted, 
where James mentioned the “transcendental unity of apperception.” Whether or not 
these phrases were meant to be precisely synonymous, it is clear that James used 
the phrase “I think” at least to evoke the transcendental unity of apperception. It is 
reasonable also to read the occurrence of “I think” in the description of the stream 
thesis’s first postulate in a similar way—as calculated to evoke the transcendental 
unity of apperception.  
I will now argue that the point of evoking the unity of apperception in that first 
postulate was twofold. First, James meant to accept Kant’s claim that all 
representations are in fact binded together in someone (or other’s) conscious life. 
But second, James wanted to deny Kant’s further attempt to explain this 
bindedness in terms of the synthetic unity of a deeper-lying, transcendental self.  It 
is not that James thought he could refute the existence of a transcendental self 
standing behind all experience. Rather, James denied that the psychologist needed 
to accept the burden of explaining the bindedness of experience at all. This was the 
point of building self awareness—the capacity to say “I think” along with any mental 
representation—into the first postulate of the stream of thought. James’s move was 
to acknowledge this self-conscious aspect of representation as a brute fact of mental 
life, but to decline to give a metaphysical explanation of it.  
Let us look at how James took up this issue with respect to neo-Kantian 
Idealists, who had adapted Kant’s line into an argument against empirical 
psychology. Green claimed that psychologists, with their purely empirical methods, 
could not explain why all our several experiences should be bound into one unified 
life. Consider one passage where Green focused on the temporal character of 
experience. He argued that there must be a part of the mind, itself existing outside 
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of time, which binds together fleeting perceptions into one continuous “plot,” so to 
speak:  
…Every object we perceive is a congeries of related facts of which the simplest 
component, no less than the composite whole, requires in order to its presentation the 
action of a principle of consciousness, not itself subject to conditions of time, upon 
successive appearances, such action as may hold the appearances together, without 
fusion, in an apprehended fact. (Green 1882b, 185) 
Without getting bogged down in Green’s obscure prose, the gist of his argument was 
that there must be a “principle of consciousness” that lies outside of time, in order 
that all our successive appearances in time can be bound together into one 
continuous life. He connected this principle of consciousness with what he called an 
“Ego” (e.g., at Green and Bradley 1882, 338, 346). Transcendental analysis was 
supposed to reveal that our perceptions of scattered, temporal events (as well as of 
scattered, extended objects) were impossible unless we postulated an Ego standing 
outside of time (and space), that binds together all perceptions into one personal 
experience.   
This point was important to Green because the Ego, standing as it does outside 
of time and space, has no observable properties, so cannot be an object of empirical 
investigation. The Ego is what makes empirical observation possible in the first 
place, allegedly. Thus, the existence of a transcendental Ego would mean that 
empirical psychology could never reveal the true nature of the mind. 
So by building the notion that “thought tends to personal form” into his 
fundamental definition of the mental state, James was rejecting Green’s question 
(What binds experiences into a single conscious life?) as too metaphysical for the 
psychologist to bother with. This did not mean that Green’s question was 
meaningless or uninteresting or even unimportant. It just meant that the 
psychologist was not to take responsibility for answering it. Instead, the psychologist 
should proceed by simply acknowledging the fact that our experiences are binded 
into one conscious life, and then by insisting that this fact is “ultimate,” and admits 
no further scientific explanation.   
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Indeed, in the Principles chapter entitled “The Consciousness of Self,” James 
considered the “transcendentalist theory,” and made this point explicitly, against 
both Kant and Green. He began with Kant: 
Kant starts, as I understand him, from a view of the Object essentially like our own 
description of it on p. 265 ff., that is, it is a system of things, qualities or facts in 
relation. … But whereas we simply begged the vehicle of this connected knowledge in 
the shape of what we call the present Thought, or section of the Stream of 
Consciousness (which we declared to be the ultimate fact for psychology), Kant denies 
this to be an ultimate fact and insists on analyzing it …. (PP, 341) 
In this passage, James claimed that the psychologist simply observes that 
experiences always appear binded together, and treats this bindedness as an 
ultimate feature of the stream of thought. But Kant insisted on going further by 
explaining this bindedness in terms of a deeper ego that stands behind experience.  
Then, citing the passage from Green that I reproduced just above, James made 
a similar point about the neo-Kantian conception of a transcendental ego.254 James 
again argued that further metaphysical explanation of the binded character of 
consciousness was not likely to be profitable to the psychologist. Instead, the 
psychologist had simply to assume at the outset that thought exists in a personal 
form. After quoting Green, James wrote: 
Were we to follow these remarks, we should have to abandon our notion of the 
‘Thought’ (perennially renewed in time, but always cognitive thereof), and to espouse 
instead of it an entity copied from thought in all essential respects, but differing from it 
in being ‘out of time.’ What psychology can gain by this barter would be hard to divine. 
(PP, 347-348) 
There is no potential profit for the psychologist, James argued, in accepting 
responsibility for explaining the binded character of conscious life particularly if that 
means speculating about a metaphysical entity like a transcendental ego. 
So the first postulate of the stream of thought was an assumption in the sense 
that it simply stipulated that the personal character of experience is an “ultimate 
fact” for the scientist, and not subject to further psychological explanation. The 
assumption was metaphysical in the sense that the personal character of 
consciousness featured prominently in metaphysical attacks from Idealists.  
                                                 
254 The reference comes at (PP, 348).  
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Several pages back, I asked why James should have wanted uncritical 
assumptions in his project at all. We can now answer this question. As was so often 
the case, these Idealist attacks were meant to show that mental science was an 
oxymoron. Any attempt to explain the personal character of consciousness would 
require a transcendental analysis of the ego, Idealists argued. Such an analysis had 
to be a purely a priori undertaking, and thus had to outstrip the broadly empirical 
methods to which psychologists purported to confine themselves. James did not 
directly answer the attack, however. Instead, he declined the demand for an 
explanation of consciousness’s personal (or “binded,” as I have been writing) 
character. This is where metaphysical assumptions were useful. James carved out an 
object for psychology, the mental state, which was defined as appearing bound up in 
one person’s conscious life. This was to be an “ultimate” feature of the mental state, 
not a fact that demanded further explanation. 
On p. 317, above, I asked what the connection could be between metaphysical 
presuppositions and the construction of scientific objects, in James’s psychology. The 
answer is that any science must decide what the ultimate features are of the objects 
that will figure in its theories. An ultimate feature is a feature the scientist declines 
to take responsibility for explaining. James’s insight was that in the case of a young 
science like psychology, it is especially pressing that the science’s basic objects be 
defined in a way that makes clear these objects’ ultimate features. This was made 
pressing by metaphysicians who tried to have a turf war with psychologists over the 
study of the mind, a study that allegedly could not proceed until certain 
metaphysical puzzles were solved. Stipulating a set of ultimate features of mental 
states was a way for James to launch his science without waiting for a proof of first 
principles. Yet making such features explicit in the basic definition of a mental state 
was a way to acknowledge that metaphysicians had a legitimate business to transact, 
too. He accomplished this by cleanly showing where labor was to be divided among 
those studying the mind.  
Notice that the choice of which features are to be treated as ultimate is not an 
empirical matter. Empirical data cannot, by itself, establish which demands for 
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explanation a scientist ought to take responsibility for, and which she should feel 
comfortable parrying. Instead, this choice must be made on the basis of non-
empirical reasons. This seems to raise a problem for my reading of James, which I 
will now try to resolve.  
 
I characterized the debate between Idealists and empirical psychologists as a 
debate over the question of whether the mind can be studied via empirical 
techniques, or whether one must ultimately resort to some a priori form of 
investigation. In effect, I have just claimed that James did not see this as a forced 
choice. A priori investigation of the mental state is legitimate, but such investigation 
should be relegated to philosophy, while the psychologist is to focus on its empirical 
study. The problem is whether this way of striking a “division of labor” can be 
reconciled with the notion that the scientist must also rely on some form of non-
empirical reasoning when figuring out where to draw the line with metaphysics. 
The problem is even more troubling when one considers that it is in virtue of 
“uncritical assumptions,” as James called them, that the psychologist is to 
differentiate her work from that of the philosopher. This suggests that drawing a 
division between mental science and metaphysics requires a particularly bad form of 
non-empirical reasoning—namely, the bald, unsupported, a priori assumption.  
The first problem can be dispensed of more easily. The division between 
psychology and philosophy, for James, is not simply a division between a priori and 
empirical investigations of the mind simpliciter. Instead, the division concerns how 
the mind is to be conceptualized by each field. Psychologists are to keep strictly to 
the study of the mental state (or what is equivalent, the stream of thought). They 
are to concentrate on empirical questions concerning the stream, to be sure. But as 
“A Plea for Psychology” made clear, what distinguishes psychology is its focus on the 
mental state as such. So there is no tension in my claim that James saw non-
empirical reasoning as figuring into the practice of psychology.  
But the second problem is more delicate. It brings us back around to a more 
general question I raised on p. 317, above: How can a science that relies on 
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uncritical assumptions produce theories it would be rational to believe? If uncritical 
assumptions are permitted into science, that seems to put science on a footing with 
myth.  
To answer this question, one must first distinguish different senses in which an 
assumption might be called “uncritical.” Consider the following, very crude 
distinction: 
 Defensible Indefensible 
Empirical assumptions  x 
A Priori assumptions x x 
On one hand, one typically wants to guard against empirical assumptions wherever 
possible. By “empirical assumption,” I mean a descriptive claim made without 
evidence, where “evidence” is construed broadly.255 Such assumptions deserve to be 
called “uncritical,” and in this case the word should have negative connotations. For 
instance, imagine a patient who complains he has trouble sleeping, is unable to 
concentrate, and sometimes feels as though worms are crawling under the skin of his 
legs. His doctor thinks to herself, “aha, restless leg syndrome,” and quickly records 
in her notes a collection of symptoms common to this disorder: “patient reports 
trouble sleeping, feeling of worms crawling under the skin of legs, and that leg 
movement alleviates other symptoms.” The problem is that the patient did not 
actually report that leg movement alleviates the other symptoms. The rushing 
doctor simply made an unwarranted assumption about the patient’s symptoms. 
After months of strong medication meant to curb restless leg syndrome, the patient 
is finally diagnosed correctly: he actually suffers from a psychiatric condition called 
“delusional parasitosis,” which must be treated differently. The doctor’s empirical 
assumption turns out to have been a costly mistake, as the painful symptoms of 
                                                 
255 Nobody can personally verify every descriptive claim she makes, but every responsible 
knower should want to be in a position where she knows how to find evidence, should her 
descriptive claims be challenged. I am being purposefully agnostic about what constitutes 
empirical “evidence,” as this is not the place to enter into debates about this disputed 
concept. 
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restless leg syndrome, but not of delusional parasitosis, are alleviated by leg 
movement (Klein 2007).256 
On the other hand, an a priori assumption may also be pernicious if it has not 
been argued for. For instance, if a biologist assumes without argument that every 
trait has an adaptive origin, the biologist may legitimately be criticized.257 This bad 
sort of a priori assumption amounts to cases of bias.  
However, there are also defensible cases of a priori assumptions. We will see (in 
the next section) other examples where a priori assumptions play a crucial and 
justifiable role in scientific theories, and should not be regarded as cases of bias. One 
example I will consider is Einstein’s definition of simultaneity. He himself described 
this definition as an a priori stipulation, rather than an empirical result. However, 
Einstein did not accept this assumption willy nilly, but crafted it for the purposes of 
developing his theory of relativity. If philosophers like C. I. Lewis and Michael 
Friedman are correct, there need be nothing untoward about this variety of a priori 
assumption. 
Now when James recommended that the psychologist accept “uncritical 
assumptions,” what sort of assumption did he have in mind? I will now argue that 
insofar as the stream thesis played an empirical role in James’s psychology, it is not 
an assumption at all. But it also played an important a priori role, and it is in virtue 
of this second role that James called it an “uncritical assumption.” I will try to show 
that though the assumptions are uncritical, they are more like Einstein’s definition 
of simultaneity than like an adaptationist bias in evolutionary biology or a hasty 
medical diagnosis. I will also argue that the salubrious kind of a priori assumptions 
used in James’s psychology functioned quite differently from the kind of assumptions 
                                                 
256 One might argue that James held there to be defensible empirical assumptions, too. Faith 
in God’s existence might count as a kind of empirical assumption, and James’s argument in 
“The Will to Believe” might be read as seeking to establish that such assumptions really are 
warranted. This does not affect my point about “uncritical assumptions” in the Principles. I 
am only interested in distinguishing a pernicious variety of empirical assumption that James 
avoids, and a fruitful variety of a priori assumption that he embraces. In any case, a clear 
and helpful starting point for readers interested in “The Will to Believe” is (Jackman 1999). 
257 Biologists (Gould and Lewontin 1979) and philosophers (Lloyd 1993; Lloyd 2005), for 
example, have made such a case against what they call an “adaptationist” bias. 
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used in physics. However, I will not discuss this last point further until Sections Four, 
Five, and Six, below. 
 
I believe that each postulate of the stream thesis played dual roles, one 
empirical and the other a priori. I cannot consider every postulate in detail. But to 
better understand the a priori role, it should be enough to focus on the third 
postulate of the stream thesis.  
The third postulate stated that “Within each personal consciousness thought is 
sensibly continuous.” I called this “the continuity claim” in Chapter Four. In that 
chapter, I take myself to have explained the empirical evidence on which the 
continuity claim rests. In one sense, the continuity claim was important to James as 
a description of experience. Recall that James showed how both Idealists and 
associationist psychologists relied on a basic description of experience that was 
contradicted by available evidence, evidence that supported the continuity claim 
rather than ‘psychological atomism.’  
But that solution was tenuous, in a way. Suppose associationists responded that 
the continuous character of perception is itself a fact that needs to be explained. 
Indeed, they did make such arguments, and we are about to see that James actually 
cited and responded to them. It is true that as a description of experience, the 
continuity claim rested on sound experimental evidence. However, from saying that 
this claim rested on experimental evidence, it is quite a leap to saying that this 
feature of experience should be considered an “ultimate fact” for the psychologist. 
This is exactly the leap James took when he made the continuity claim the third 
postulate of his stream thesis. He defined sensory continuity as an explanatorily 
basic feature of the stream of thought. So there is no logical reason an associationist 
could not posit minima sensibilia as theoretical entities that, in some sense, stand 
behind our apparently continuous experience.  
An associationist who made just such a case was the eminent evolutionary 
psychologist Herbert Spencer, who argued as follows. Helmholtz and others had 
shown that when sound pulses are repeated less than sixteen times a second, this 
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results in the perception of a string of distinct tones. But when one increases the 
sound pulses to more than sixteen times a second, the sound is perceived as one 
continuous tone. In a passage James quoted at length in the Principles, Spencer 
tried to extrapolate a robust ‘psychological atomism’ from this result: 
Can we stop short here? If the different sensations known as sounds are built out of a 
common unit, is it not to be rationally inferred that so likewise are the different 
sensations known as tastes, and the different sensations known as odours, and the 
different sensations known as colours? Nay, shall we not regard it as probable that 
there is a unit common to all these strongly-contrasted classes of sensations?(Spencer, 
quoted at PP, 155) 
Spencer was even more radical in his ‘atomism’ than Hume. The latter held that 
only our senses of sight and touch are built from minima sensibilia. In contrast, 
Spencer argued that all senses produce fundamentally atomic perceptions. Spencer 
even held that there was ultimately one conscious unit common to all sensory 
modalities, a unit he called a “nervous shock” (quoted at PP, 155).  
 James responded by pointing out that in the case of tone perception, Spencer 
had only identified a correlation between a continuous experience and a discrete 
outward cause.  
Somewhere, then, there is a transformation, reduction, or fusion [of discrete sound 
pulses into a continuous tone perception]. The question is, Where?—in the nerve-
world or in the mind-world? Really we have no experimental proof by which to decide; 
and if decide we must, analogy and a priori probability can alone guide us. (PP, 157) 
James illustrated the point with two diagrams I have reproduced as Figure 6 and 
Figure 7, below. He granted that somewhere, the discrete tone pulses were 
transformed into a continuous perception. But he denied that this transformation 
took place inside the conscious, mental state—that is, inside the province of 
psychology. Instead, he held that the transformation took place at the level of nerve 
cells and fibers. 
Now in one sense this is a purely empirical claim. I reviewed evidence in 
Chapter Four that the spatial and tactile fields, at least, cannot be composed of 
minima sensibilia that are synthesized into continuous experiences. And in fact, 
even Spencer seems to accept that in any sensory modality the basic “nervous 
shock,” his version of a minima sensibilium, is not something that can be directly 
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experienced, but rather is a (psychic? material?) entity that we only uncover in the 
context of a controlled experiment.258  
But in another sense it really is an a priori matter, as James emphasized in the 
last quoted passage, whether we regard the transformation from discrete sound 
pulse to continuous tone perception as occurring within the mental state. For this 
transformation to occur inside the mental state just means that it occurs inside 
psychology’s proper sphere of investigation. The decision to draw a line, so to speak, 
around mental states in a way that excludes any unobservable experiential items 
standing behind our perceptions is an a priori, stipulated decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
258 See the start of the passage James quoted:  
Although the individual sensations and emotions, real or ideal, of which consciousness is 
built up, appear to be severally simple, homogonous, unanalyzable, or of inscrutable 
natures, yet they are not so. (Spencer, quoted at PP, 154; italics mine) 
Spencer granted that even on more serious introspection, continuous tone perceptions 
produced by discrete sound pulses really appear in consciousness as continuous. It is only in 
the context of “experiments” (quoted at PP, 154) that we can resolve continuous perceptions 
into their discrete components. It is not clear to me whether Spencer might have had 
independent reasons for regarding these discrete components nevertheless as experiential 
components.  
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Figure 6: Spencer’s model of tone perception. The line ab represents the threshold of 
consciousness. Spencer held that the synthesis of tone pulses into one continuous perception 
occurs above the threshold of consciousness. The circles represent cells, the vertical lines 
represent nerve fibers. (PP, 157) 
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James seemed to hold psychologists responsible for giving empirical evidence for 
all descriptions of experience. Even when it came to perceptual continuity, one of 
thought’s ultimate features, James sought to supply evidence that this feature 
correctly described experience (as we saw in Chapter Four). But there is not any 
empirical evidence that could support the choice of which features of experience one 
should then peg as ultimate, in James’s sense. In other words, qua description of 
experience, the postulates of the stream thesis rested on empirical evidence. But 
qua criteria for drawing a division between psychology and metaphysics, the 
postulates did not—could not—rest on empirical evidence at all.  
This is not to say that qua criteria for demarcating psychology and metaphysics, 
or psychology and physiology, James’s assumptions were not rational. They were 
certainly not logical, in the strict sense of the word. Logic alone cannot establish 
whether unobservable entities like minima sensibilia belong in psychology.  
And James’s assumptions were not empirical, either. No experiment can show 
us where psychology ends and metaphysics or physiology begin. After all, the 
Figure 7: James’s model of tone perception. The synthesis of tone pulses happens at the 
level of physiology, not experience. (PP, 159) 
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Principles are rife with features of experience that James did try to explain (such as 
the perception of distinct position). Why should he have chosen just the five features 
outlined in the stream thesis as the “ultimate facts” psychology was exempt from 
explaining? Whatever James’s reasons, they could not have been empirical. I now 
want to suggest that his reasons were pragmatic, but rational nevertheless.  
So we have a tentative answer to the question I raised on p. 322, above. If 
James held that uncritical, metaphysically-loaded assumptions are necessary to 
practice science, what license does he have for deriding Hume, for example, as “at 
bottom as much of a metaphysician as Thomas Aquinas” (PP, 334)? We should not 
ascribe to James, on the basis of such quips, the view that psychologists are to have 
metaphysically pure assumptions. After all, he clearly denied such a view.  
Rather, we should read James as insisting that when psychologists purport to 
describe experience—as Hume did when he claimed that there exist minima 
sensibilia—they should provide empirical evidence for their descriptions. This is why 
Hume is supposed to have been guilty of the sort of “half-awake metaphysics” 
James mentioned in the passage cited on p. 320, above. Hume’s conception of 
simple perceptions amounted to an empirically unsupported description of 
experience—a hasty mistake of a piece with the case of the hasty physician I 
described above.  
 
James’s choice of how to define the “ultimate facts” of psychology grew out of 
extensive deliberation with his peers. We have reviewed some of James’s disputes 
with philosophers and psychologists towards whom he was mostly hostile, such as 
Green and Spencer. But it is important to acknowledge that the kind of deliberation 
over how to peg the ultimate facts of psychology raged inside James’s own group of 
friends, not just between enemies. In fact, some important arguments with 
Robertson apparently figured into James’s choice of how to demarcate psychology. 
After James’s long space perception article appeared in Mind, his old friend 
issued a critical response (Robertson 1888). Robertson’s chief complaint was that 
making extension a native quality of perception was tantamount to admitting 
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“psychological impotence” (Robertson 1888, 418). He meant that James was ceding 
too much ground to Idealists like Green. 
The effort … to construct a psychological theory of Extension has so far had results 
that appear to be hardly more satisfactory to those who may be supposed to maintain 
than to those who discount the enterprise in principle. . . . 
 … [William James and his ally James Ward have been] driven to make assumption 
of an inherent character in sensation that brings them perilously near, if it does not 
quite carry them over, to the position of those who contend that a psychological theory 
must always include among the elements of the explanation, though it may be under 
some disguise or other, the very fact of extension to be explained. (Robertson 1888, 
418-419) 
“…Those who discount the enterprise” of constructing a psychological theory of 
extension were Idealists.259 James was confessing impotence, according to 
Robertson, by admitting extensity to be a native property of all sensation—that is, to 
be an ultimate feature of mental states that cannot be further explained. As 
Robertson rightly pointed out, in a sense this was Green’s position—that any 
empirical explanation of spatial perception would have to beg the explanatory 
question at the outset, and begin with extended ideas already in hand.  
This is not the place to pursue the details of James’s response to Robertson. I 
only want to register that the particular way the stream thesis demarcated 
psychology from metaphysics was the result of debate not just between James and 
his enemies, but within his own community of friends, as well. 
 
We now can sketch an answer to a persistent question that has been lingering 
since the beginning of Chapter Four—in what sense did the stream thesis provide a 
framework for the principles?  
The stream thesis provided a framework in the sense that it enabled the 
construction of legitimately scientific theories about the mind. It achieved this by 
specifying a loose set of rules for theory construction, rules that were actually built 
                                                 
259 This point comes out clearly in Robertson’s own psychology textbook. After discussing the 
“Empiricist” position, that there is “a psychological explanation” of the facts of spatial 
perception, Robertson acknowledged that “some schools deny that this is possible,” citing 
Kant in particular (Robertson 1896, 105). On the following page, he reiterated his claim that 
James’s attempt to carve a middle path between these two “suggests to me Don Quixote 
tilting at windmills” (p. 106).   
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into the basic definition of the mental state. Recall that James stipulatively defined 
the mental state in terms of ultimate features. Once he decided which features of 
mental states were to be ultimate, he then had a kind of negative guideline for what 
sorts of mental facts demand explanation. Attempts to “explain” the thesis’s five 
postulates James relegated to metaphysics or other neighboring disciplines. So in the 
sense that the basic objects of Jamesean psychology were defined in terms of 
ultimate features, the guidelines for how to construct a legitimately scientific theory 
about the mind were built into the very fabric of the objects themselves.  
Thus, I want to claim that the stream thesis was constitutive of the scientific 
status of the Principles’ specific theories. I quickly explained what constitutive 
scientific principles are at the beginning of Chapter Four. We are now ready to refine 
this account to fit the case of Jamesean psychology. 
4.  FRIEDMAN ON CONSTITUTIVE PRINCIPLES 
Early in Chapter Four, I asked what the epistemic status of James’s stream 
thesis is. I canvassed leading accounts of James, and found them wanting in two 
respects. They lack a viable account of the evidence on which the stream thesis 
rests. And they lack a viable account of the sense in which that thesis might provide 
a framework for the specific theories of the Principles—surprising, since it is a 
commonplace in the secondary literature to call the stream thesis a “framework.”  
At this point, I have only sketched the sense in which the stream thesis 
provided a framework for James’s Principles. In the remainder of this chapter, I turn 
the sketch into a more complete drawing. 
Here is a summary of the evidence on which the stream thesis rests. I proposed 
that some evidence for the stream thesis was experimental, and came from James’s 
early work on space perception. But the stream thesis rests on empirical evidence 
only insofar as it functions as a description of experience, I have suggested.  
The stream thesis also functioned as an a priori definition, and thereby played a 
constitutive role of some sort with respect to James’s psychology. So far, I have 
focused on primary sources to establish that James really intended the stream thesis 
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to play an a priori role in his psychology. The role was to help demarcate psychology 
from neighboring disciplines, particularly from philosophy.  
But I have not given much explanation yet of how it is the stream thesis, qua 
definition of psychology’s proper object, helps constitute the scientific status of 
James’s special theories. We are now ready to develop a more precise account of this 
constitutive role. To do this, I will draw on theoretical resources from more recent 
philosophy of science and epistemology.  
I have alluded to Michael Friedman’s work on constitutive scientific principles, 
and suggested that the stream thesis might be constitutive in a related sense. To 
what extent can we apply Friedman’s model to James’s work in psychology?  
Friedman developed his account to help analyze the structure of theories in the 
exact sciences—particularly in Newtonian and Einsteinian physics. It is thus not 
surprising to find that as it stands, Friedman’s model needs to be modified if it is to 
fit an immature, human science like Jamesean psychology. By “immature science” I 
mean one still struggling for institutional and intellectual autonomy, particularly 
autonomy from philosophy. Friedman himself acknowledges the need for further 
work if his model is to be adapted to the special sciences (see the last chapter of 
Friedman 2001). Accordingly, my analysis is an attempt to extend Friedman’s 
account to the case of early empirical psychology. 
I begin with a summary of Friedman’s view, from which I extract a crucial 
insight—that in science not all parts of a given theory can face empirical evidence 
“symmetrically,” to use his phrase. This is because some empirical claims in a given 
theory presuppose (or are constituted by) other claims which cannot themselves be 
subject to empirical disconfirmation, for reasons we will examine. I will argue that 
the stream thesis does play a constitutive role in James’s psychology, but we will 
have to develop a different notion of presupposition to grasp the sense in which this 
is so. 
We will find three payoffs for examining Friedman’s theory in some detail. First, 
his theory calls our attention to some constitutive features of psychology that have 
not yet been noticed by philosophers of science. Second, this notion of a constitutive 
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part of psychological theories will help us understand the structure and function of 
James’s scientific conception of experience, which influenced later empiricists.260  
Third, Friedman’s conception of constitutive a priori principles plays a crucial 
role in his attack on Quinean naturalism. The modifications I propose to Friedman’s 
view thus have ramifications for his attack. 
 
Friedman has been drawing on his historical scholarship both to criticize Quine’s 
account of scientific rationality and to provide a positive alternative.261 For 
Friedman, Quinean naturalism comprises four theses. First, there can be no 
principled distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.262 Second, the 
collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction is supposed to show that all statements 
in our scientific theories are synthetic and a posteriori, in the following sense. The 
conjunction of our scientific statements faces empirical evidence as a whole. 
Recalcitrant evidence, in principle, can count against any conjunct we choose, 
including even the laws of logic. 
Third, scientific beliefs are organized into a vast web. Some beliefs sit closer to 
the center, others closer to the periphery, of our belief web. The more central beliefs 
are more costly to revise, in the sense that such revision requires corrective 
adjustments in large portions of the rest of our belief web. Peripheral beliefs can be 
adjusted with less demand for correlative belief revision (Friedman 2001, 28, 32-
25).  
Fourth, since all statements are subject to empirical confirmation, there is no 
longer any specially secure knowledge philosophy can employ for justifying natural 
science. Therefore, philosophy is to conduct its business inside the same empirical 
                                                 
260 See above, pp. 236 ff. 
261 See especially (Friedman 1997; Friedman 2001). The “Preface” of the later work 
provides a succinct summary of the relation between Friedman’s historical work and his 
critique of Quine. For another revisionist historian sympathetic to Friedman’s critique of 
Quine, see, e.g., (Richardson 2002b, 270). 
262 Friedman thinks this is fundamental for Quine’s naturalism. It is fundamental in the sense 
that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction is what supports his subsequent 
claim that no belief, in principle, is immune from revision. 
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framework as science. In short, philosophy becomes continuous with science 
(Friedman 1997, 7-8). 
I will return to the fourth claim below. The upshot of the first three is this, for 
Friedman:  
Our reasons for adopting one or another system of geometry or mechanics (or, indeed, 
of mathematics more generally or of logic) are at bottom of the very same kind as the 
purely empirical considerations that support any other part of our total theory of 
nature. (Friedman 2001, 28) 
For Friedman’s Quine, all parts of our scientific theories, from abstract mathematical 
structures to concrete empirical statements, are to be supported or disconfirmed by 
considerations that are ultimately empirical. There are to be no a priori elements to 
our scientific knowledge.  
This aspect of Quinean naturalism is its chief defect, for Friedman. As a 
preferable alternative, he seeks to revive Rudolph Carnap’s view about the way 
various parts of scientific theories confront experience.   
Carnap did draw a distinction between an analytic and a synthetic element of 
scientific theories (Friedman 2001, 33). The analytic element is composed of 
mathematical structures that are true in virtue of the meanings of the terms 
employed. These structures make possible the meaningfulness of precise empirical 
assertions. The synthetic element of theories is composed of properly empirical 
assertions. Such assertions come in the form of empirical laws. As we shall see, the 
analytic or a priori part of scientific theories itself breaks into two parts.263 
Friedman uses Newtonian physics as an example. The law of universal 
gravitation cannot be formulated without two a priori structures already in place. 
The first is the calculus, then a new form of mathematics dealing with infinite limits 
and instantaneous rates of change. The calculus made it possible for Newton to 
formulate physical notions like force with mathematical rigor. For example, the 
second law of motion defines force as the product of mass and acceleration. 
Acceleration is defined as the instantaneous rate of change in velocity; and velocity 
                                                 
263 A helpful summary of Friedman’s tripartite division of theories can be found at (Friedman 
2001, 79-80.)  
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is defined as the instantaneous rate of change of position. But without the 
mathematics of the calculus, the notion of instantaneous change cannot be 
formulated precisely enough for the laws of motion to have a precise empirical 
content (Friedman 2001, 35). Friedman thus calls the mathematics of the calculus a 
“presupposition” or “condition” of even formulating the laws of motion.  
In turn, these laws of motion play their own constitutive role with respect to 
Newton’s universal law of gravitation. Since Newton, the trend in physics has been 
towards ever more abstract representations of empirical laws. Newton himself was 
faced with the problem of how to specify which concrete, observable phenomena his 
radically abstruse laws are supposed to describe. Friedman here draws on Hans 
Reichenbach’s notion of coordinating principles to characterize the part of physical 
theories that coordinates abstractly-formulated laws with observable magnitudes. In 
Newtonian physics, the laws of motion play such a coordinating role by giving rules 
for comparing concrete measurements (for example, of planetary motion) with 
predictions made by the universal law of gravitation. The universal law is highly 
abstract, and the coordinating principles are needed to generate predictions about 
what will happen not in some theoretical realm, but in the world of our actual 
experience (Friedman 2001, 76-77). 
It is important to note that Carnap and Reichenbach, as Friedman points out, 
held that the constitutively a priori parts of scientific theories were actually 
revisable, not necessary as Kant had taught. For Positivists, this is the great lesson 
of the development of non-Euclidean geometries, and of Einstein’s application of 
such geometry to nature. Kant had argued that Euclidean geometry was a 
constitutively a priori part of Newton’s physics. So when Einstein developed a 
theory of gravity based on a non-Euclidean framework, this helped destroy the idea 
that science rests on necessary, unrevisable principles.  
However, Positivists prised apart two different meanings of the Kantian a priori, 
discarded one, and salvaged the other. On the one hand, Kant held synthetic a priori 
principles (chief among them, the principles of Euclidean geometry) to be necessary 
and unrevisable. This is the notion Positivists discarded in the wake of turn-of-the-
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century developments in math and physics. But Kant also held that synthetic a 
priori principles gave conditions for the empirical meaningfulness of scientific 
theories. Positivists—particularly Reichenbach—argued that science still employed 
constitutive a priori principles in this second sense (Friedman 2001, 30-31).  
For example, the general theory of relativity describes trajectories through 
variably-curved space. But this notion of a variably-curved space could not have 
been precisely articulated without the formal results of non-Euclidean geometries in 
the late 19th century. In particular, it could not have been articulated without 
Riemann’s pioneering work in the theory of manifolds. So while the theory of 
manifolds is not constitutively a priori in the sense of being a necessary component 
of any conceivable physical theory, it is constitutively a priori with respect to 
Einstein’s particular physical theory (Friedman 2001, 38).  
So Friedman follows Carnap and Reichenbach in holding that science indeed 
employs constitutively a priori principles. But unlike in Kant’s day, we now know 
these principles to be dynamical or relativized in the sense that they change along 
with new developments in the exact sciences.264 They are still constitutive in the 
sense that they make possible the precise, meaningful articulation of empirical 
claims within given scientific theories.265 
                                                 
264 What can make us change our a priori principles? Consider the case of Einstein’s 
prediction of the advancement of Mercury’s perihelion. Friedman claims it is a “profound 
mistake of Quinean holism” to view trials like this as providing empirical tests of all 
components of Einstein’s theory symmetrically. The empirical part of the theory is what is 
tested. The mathematical structures by themselves are surely not (Friedman 2001, 80-82). 
Friedman does allow that in special cases we can put empirical pressure even on the 
constitutive a priori parts of our theories, though; but we cannot see such tests as logically 
rigorous. If we do revise the a priori component of our theory, that revision will be “purely 
pragmatic” (Friedman 2001, 71 ff.). His extensive discussion of this point comes at pp. 83-
92. 
265 Also see (Friedman 2001, 73) for discussion of the similarities and differences between 
the Carnap/Reichenbach notion of constitutive a priori principles, and Kant’s notion of 
synthetic a priori principles.  
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Now Quine, by denying a distinction between analytic and synthetic statements, 
is unable to capture the asymmetric way266 in which these various parts of physical 
theories confront empirical evidence. This is one of Friedman’s major complaints 
against Quinean naturalism. It is not appropriate to describe the calculus together 
with Newton’s laws of motion and the universal law of gravitation as three conjuncts 
all facing empirical evidence in the same fashion, with some conjuncts more deeply 
“entrenched” than others. This is because one can drop or revise the laws of motion 
without having any effect on the meanings of statements in the calculus, for 
example—but the reverse is not true. Without the calculus, the laws of motion 
simply have no determinate meaning. And without the laws of motion, the universal 
law of gravitation also cannot be given empirical meaning (Friedman 2001, 35-36).  
Friedman further argues that the entrenchment metaphor not only fails to 
capture the constitutive role of certain parts of scientific theories, it also contradicts 
what we know about scientific revolutions. When physicists go so far as to revise the 
mathematical parts of their theory, the new mathematical parts are certainly not 
distinguished by their being deeply entrenched in a web of belief, as Quine would 
have it. In fact, the mathematical parts can be among the most controversial, least 
accepted parts of the theory. For example, the calculus was highly controversial 
when Newton employed it. So its special status in Newton’s theory of gravity 
certainly does not stem from its have been widely-believed267 or deeply-entrenched 
                                                 
266 The word “symmetric” is Friedman’s: “The combination of calculus plus the laws of 
motion is not happily viewed, therefore, as a conjunction of elements symmetrically 
contributing to a single total result” (Friedman 2001, 36).  
267 Friedman is on secure ground when he glosses “entrenchment” in terms of beliefs that are 
widely shared in a community. Quine says that the way to “distinguish between information 
that goes into understanding a sentence”—presumably, these are the more entrenched 
beliefs—“and information that goes beyond” is to appeal to statements that are “subscribed 
to by all fluent speakers in the community.” Famously, though no one would treat it as 
analytic, “there have been black dogs” is a Quinean example of a deeply entrenched 
statement among English-speakers. It would be hard to find someone fluent in the language 
who denies this statement, even though it is not an analytic truth. Friedman is right to point 
out that in Newton’s day the mathematics of the calculus could not be described as 
entrenched in this sense. It could not be described as thus entrenched even in the 
community of physicists. 
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(Friedman 2001, 39). Rather, its special status comes from its being presupposed by 
the properly empirical parts of Newton’s theory.   
Quine is not remembered for contributions to the philosophy of physics. Since 
one thing he is remembered for is advocating that epistemology become a branch of 
empirical psychology, one might expect that his general claims about science are 
better suited to this latter field. We will find related but distinct reasons why 
Quinean holism cannot, in fact, account for the stratification of psychological theories 
any better than it can account for stratification in physics.  
Friedman’s account of science does not perfectly fit the case of empirical 
psychology, either. But his account gives us a more helpful starting point for 
understanding the role of metaphysical assumptions in James’s work. At the start of 
Chapter Four, I gave a brief explanation of Friedman’s notion of presupposition. We 
must now probe deeper into this troublesome concept if we are to see to what degree 
Friedman’s model fits the case of James’s psychology. 
 
Recall from Chapter Four that on Friedman’s view, a sentence P constitutes (or 
is presupposed by) a sentence Q just in case Q is meaningless unless P is true. Of 
course, not every presupposition of an empirical statement is constitutively a priori 
in the sense in which Friedman is interested.268 Genuine, constitutively a priori 
principles of a theory must belong to the theory in question. Friedman thinks all 
such principles turn out to fall under one of the two categories described above—
they are all either mathematical or coordinating principles.  
How one cashes out the presupposition relation is an important question, for 
Friedman, because the constitutively a priori parts of a theory are supposed to take 
on a special status in virtue of playing a presuppositional role. Understanding this 
relation is also important to my story, because I will argue that no part of James’s 
theory plays exactly the presuppositional role of mathematical or coordinating 
principles in physics. In other words, an important kernel that needs to be modified 
                                                 
268 For example, all logical truths will be presupposed by any given statement that is 
meaningful, on Friedman’s view.   
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in Friedman’s view, if it is to fit James’s psychology, is precisely the way we cash out 
the presupposition relation.  
Let us begin our analysis of this concept by noting that there is something 
unexpected about the conception of presupposition I have attributed to Friedman. 
Let B stand for the sentence “The present King of France is bald.” Let A stand for 
“There exists exactly one present King of France.” For Friedman, B presupposes (is 
constituted by) A just in case B is meaningless unless A is true (Friedman 2001, 
74—he also uses the expression “empirically meaningless”). This is a stronger 
notion of the presupposition relation than is usual, as I will now show.   
The “present King of France” example is originally due to (Russell 1905), who 
posed the following paradox. B is obviously not true (uttered in 1905, say). Suppose 
we render the negation of B “The present King of France is not bald.” This 
statement appears also to be false, since there is no present King of France. But 
then assuming that B is logically simple (as it looks to be), we seem to have a 
violation of the law of the excluded third, which requires either B or its negation to 
be true. 
Here is Russell’s solution. Consider statements of the form “X is φ,” where X is 
understood to be a denoting phrase like “the term having the property m.” Russell 
argued that the real meaning of such a phrase is given by the following beastly 
construction: exactly one term has the property m, and that one term also has the 
property φ (Russell 1905, 490). For example, the real meaning of an expression like 
“the present King of France is bald” would then be given by the following 
conjunction, on Russell’s view:  
there exists exactly one King of France, and he is bald.269 
We can then allow that B is clearly false, because the first conjunct of its real 
meaning is false.  
                                                 
269 I am simplifying. Actually, “there exists exactly one present King of France” must itself 
be analyzed into two simpler claims, in classical logic: “there exists at least one present King 
of France” and “there exists at most one present King of France.” This does not affect the 
point about bivalence. 
  349  
Russell argued that the negation of B is ambiguous, though. “The present King 
of France is not bald” may mean the denial of the first or the second of the above 
conjuncts. If it is the first conjunct that is denied (so the intended statement reads 
“It is false that there exists a present King of France who is bald”), then ~B has the 
value true. If it is the second conjunct that is denied (“There exists exactly one 
present King of France, and he is not bald”), then ~B has the value false.  
Russell’s analysis solves the paradox—that is to say, it shows how to analyze B 
without sacrificing the law of the excluded middle (or the principle of bivalence, 
either). Russell could admit that “The present King of France” is meaningful, even 
though both it and its denial appear to be false. Why? Because the appearance that 
~B is false is an illusion. The real, meaningful way to deny B is to deny its first 
conjunct, Russell argued. This makes B have the value true, and ~ B have the 
value false—exactly the desired outcome. B only appears to violate the law of the 
excluded third when we fail to appreciate its real meaning. 
Though Russell did not use the expression, we might say that the first 
conjunct—there exists exactly one present King of France—is a “presupposition” of 
B. Then we can give the following, Russellian view of presuppositions: B 
presupposes A just in case if A is false, then B is false.270 
This view received an influential criticism in (Strawson 1950). It simply does 
not fit ordinary language, Strawson argued, to insist that the “real meaning” of a 
statement like B is given by what I called Russell’s “beastly construction,” above. If 
someone really uttered B, our natural reaction would not be to say that the 
statement is false, as Russell would have it. We would want to say that the question 
of B’s truth or falsity simply “doesn’t arise,” because it has a false presupposition 
(Strawson 1950, 330). For Strawson, the false presupposition prevents B from being 
a candidate for truth or falsity at all.  
However, note that Strawson’s analysis has its own drawback. He must either 
deny that B is a meaningful statement, or he must give up the principle of bivalence. 
                                                 
270 Strictly speaking, Russell is only committed to this view in cases where B is a declarative 
statement whose subject is a denoting phrase.  
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The first option is untenable, because when someone utters B we have no trouble 
understanding what he means. But suppose B is meaningful. On Strawson’s 
analysis, B must then be a statement that cannot be assigned a truth value. This 
would entail that meaningful statements can be true, false, or neither, and so the 
principle of bivalence must be given up.  
He chose this second option, insisting that when A is false, B is still “significant” 
or meaningful (Strawson 1950, 330), though B can be assigned no truth value. 
Hence, for Strawson, if some sentence Q presupposes another sentence P, if P is 
false, then Q is a “misplaced”271 (but meaningful) statement.  
Finally, a semantics for a formal language containing presuppositions of a 
roughly Strawsonian sort was developed in (Van Fraassen 1968), and on first blush 
this seems to be the conception of presupposition on which Friedman relies (he cites 
Van Fraassen at (Friedman 2001, 74)).  
However, Friedman thinks that, in the case of a scientific theory T and a 
presupposition P, if P is false, that renders T outright meaningless, not either false 
(as Russell might have held) or misplaced (as Strawson and van Fraassen do hold). 
This is a subtle but important point. Remember, Friedman holds that the a priori 
part of a scientific theory literally gives meaning to the empirical part. Without the 
calculus and the laws of motion, the universal law of gravitation actually becomes 
meaningless, not just misplaced. Thus, Friedman’s appeal to Van Fraassen’s work on 
presupposition actually turns out to be a red herring.272 
                                                 
271 This is my word, not Strawson’s. 
272 Friedman is explicitly indebted to the interpretation of Kantian constitutive conditions 
developed in (Brittan 1978), and to van Fraassen’s semantic notion of presupposition (Van 
Fraassen 1968). I note that Brittan vacillates on the question of whether a statement with a 
false presupposition is only misplaced, or altogether meaningless. Like Friedman, Brittan 
wants to apply van Fraassen’s notion of the presupposition relation to Kant—the primary 
discussion is on pp. 35-42. Brittan first argues that like van Fraassen, Kant gives up 
bivalence (p. 36-38). Now, van Fraassen must give up bivalence because he allows that a 
statement can be meaningful, yet not a candidate for being assigned a truth value. 
(Meaningless statements already cannot be assigned truth values—this is no challenge to 
bivalence.) So when Brittan argues that Kant gives up bivalence for similar reasons as van 
Fraassen, this suggests that a statement with a false presupposition, for Kant, is meaningful 
but in some way misplaced. But several pages later, Brittan writes that if some synthetic 
judgments presuppose true synthetic a priori principles, this guarantees that the synthetic 
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Friedman faces a dilemma, although I do not think the dilemma is fatal. He 
must either give his own account of presuppositions that does not appeal to van 
Fraassen’s or Strawson’s work (or to Brittan’s, who is himself indebted to van 
Fraassen; see fn. 272). Or Friedman must concede that in science, false 
presuppositions do not after all render the empirical parts of theories outright 
meaningless, but only misplaced.273 
 
Now what is the significance of all this?  
Friedman attaches far-reaching consequences to his notion of constitutive 
principles. He thinks that historical analysis reveals such principles to be the 
hallmark of science itself: 
                                                                                                                                       
judgments can be assigned a truth value—“i.e., [this guarantees] their meaningfulness …” 
(p. 41). This statement treats “meaningfulness” as a synonym for “being a candidate for 
having a truth value.” But in that case, Kant does not need to give up bivalence, because 
any statement with a false presupposition will simply be rendered meaningless. Bivalence 
places no constraints on meaningless statements. Moreover, the appeal to van Fraassen’s 
work on presupposition thereby becomes irrelevant to Kant. So I am not wholly clear on 
what presupposition relation Brittan is ascribing to Kant. The point is relevant to my story 
because Friedman cites Brittan’s and van Fraassen’s respective discussions of the 
presupposition relation. Unlike Brittan, Friedman does consistently stick to the view that a 
statement with a false presupposition is thereby rendered meaningless—so perhaps the 
reference to van Fraassen’s work, in this context, is simply not needed. But this raises 
problems of its own. See below, fn. 273. 
273 The first horn seems unattractive because it cuts Friedman off from more familiar 
examples of statements with false presuppositions (such as the Present King of France 
example, which Friedman himself uses). We have a clear idea of how those kinds of 
presuppositions work. But without those familiar examples, the sort of presuppositions 
Friedman claims to find in science seem ad hoc, possibly mysterious. Do we have other 
examples where the falsity of one statement really renders another statement outright 
meaningless? The second horn also comes with risks. Friedman’s basic critique of Quinean 
naturalism turns on the claim that various parts of scientific theories face evidence 
asymmetrically. But as we have seen, Friedman portrays the asymmetry as arising because 
the empirical part of a given theory turns out to be meaningless unless one has certain a 
priori principles already in hand. Perhaps this critique can be maintained if Friedman 
substitutes the actual presupposition relation van Fraassen and Strawson actually developed. 
But this will take some work. Friedman’s own strong reading of the presupposition relation is 
precisely what gives bite to the critique of Quinean naturalism, after all. It is not simply that 
some statements in a scientific theory are necessary conditions of other statements in the 
sense of entailing them. Rather, some statements render others meaningful in the first 
place—this is what Quinean naturalism allegedly cannot make sense of. 
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Quine is correct that pure formal logic is insufficient to characterize the relativized and 
dynamical, yet still constitutive notion of a priori principles Carnap was aiming at. … 
Although Carnap may have failed in giving a precise logical characterization or 
explication of such principles, it does not follow that the phenomenon he was 
attempting to characterize does not exist. On the contrary, everything we know about 
the history of science, I want to suggest, indicates that precisely this phenomenon is an 
absolutely fundamental feature of science as we know it—and a fundamental feature, 
in particular of the great scientific revolutions that have eventually led, in our time, to 
the Carnap-Quine debate. (Friedman 2001, 41) 
Our best history, Friedman writes, reveals that science itself is characterized by the 
use of constitutive a priori principles to formulate precise empirical theories. 
Friedman grants that Quine’s attack on the analytic/synthetic distinction did show 
Carnap’s formal account of constitutive principles to be a failure. But Friedman 
holds that the lesson is only that “pure formal logic” is not enough to characterize 
constitutive scientific principles. He maintains that even if Carnap’s formal 
characterization failed, these principles are nevertheless the very hallmarks of 
science as we know it. 
In other places, Friedman softens his rhetoric, restricting the claim that 
relativized a priori principles characterize all science. For example, at (Friedman 
2001, 71) these principles are presented as characteristic features of “advanced 
theories in mathematical physics.” He uses similar language eight pages later. 
Indeed, he eventually acknowledges that his analysis of constitutive principles in 
Newton and Einstein’s physics in fact do not obviously fit revolutions in the history 
of other sciences. He discusses quantum physics, chemistry, and the Darwinian 
revolution. In the latter case, he acknowledges that there is relatively little 
of a direct connection with our present philosophical framework. The primary 
innovations in this case were not mathematical in nature, and so there is no question at 
all here of coordinating or (more generally) constitutive principles in our sense. 
(Friedman 2001, 126) 
In the end, Friedman gives an intriguing analysis of mathematical physics that is put 
to use in a suggestive attack on Quinean naturalism. But we are left with an 
uncertain picture of how to understand the presupposition relation between parts of 
scientific theories, and with an uncertain picture of how to extend the analysis to 
other sciences.  
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We are finally ready to see that the stream thesis cannot be constitutive of 
James’s specific theories in Friedman’s sense. The stream thesis obviously cannot be 
constitutive in the sense of being a “mathematical part” of the empirical theories of 
the Principles, and it cannot be a “coordinating principle” either.  
The reason is entirely straightforward. Both the stream thesis and the special 
theories of the Principles are cast in natural language. They require no abstruse 
mathematics at all to be given empirical content. If James participated in a 
revolution in the science of mind, he certainly did not do so in virtue of bringing a 
new mathematical formalism to bear on empirical studies, like Newton or Einstein. 
So the theories of the Principles surely do not have what Friedman calls a 
special “mathematical part.” A fortiori, there is no mathematical part to give an 
“empirical part” precise meaning. All parts of James’s various theories, I want to 
suggest, “get” their meaning from one place—the plain English language as it was 
spoken and written in the late 19th century.  
True, we have seen that when appropriate, both the specific theories and the 
stream thesis are supported by quantitative evidence. But in counting the 
quantitative data as evidence for his theory, James faced nothing like Newton’s or 
Einstein’s problems. We need nothing more than basic arithmetic to see how the 
quantitative evidence supports James’s theories. Unlike Newton or Einstein, James 
therefore required no a priori coordinating principles to connect his theories with 
observation. Remember, what motivates the need for constitutive a priori principles, 
on Friedman’s view, is not the mere use of quantitative data. It is the use of formal 
models that are so abstract they have no straightforward fit with experience, and 
thus no precise empirical meaning, until we find appropriate a priori principles.  
Now none of this would surprise Friedman, who would certainly deny that only 
theories with highly abstract mathematical components count as genuinely 
scientific.274 Nevertheless, his neo-Carnapian analysis is meant to get at something 
fundamental about science itself. I now develop an analysis that seeks to preserve 
                                                 
274 See his discussion of chemistry and biology (Friedman 2001, 124, 126).  
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what I take to be Friedman’s most important insight about general science, but that 
can help make sense of the structure of James’s psychology. 
 
If it is abstract, formal structures that create a need for constitutive principles in 
the exact sciences, what creates a need for constitutive principles in James’s 
psychology? In a word, the answer is demarcation. 
A major theme of this dissertation has been that psychology was under 
philosophical attack in James’s day. But this was a philosophical attack with 
practical consequences. Particularly in Britain and the United States, various groups 
struggled to establish themselves in the new research universities. Idealist attacks 
amounted to a direct challenge to psychology’s bid for a legitimate place inside these 
universities. And the attacks could not be brushed aside, because they had a broad 
appeal. Not only did Idealists purport to show that the crass materialism 
psychologists allegedly peddled was inconsistent. Idealists went as far as to present 
their own alternative—transcendental metaphysics—as a path to intellectual or even 
spiritual enlightenment. As we saw in Chapter Two, Idealist philosophy became 
widely popular in universities of the period. Psychologists had to respond. 
I contend that this dynamic forced empirical psychologists to fight a war on two 
fronts. They had to produce enough explanatory successes to underwrite their claim 
to be a legitimate, if fledgling science. This was their ticket to intellectual respect in 
universities. But psychologists simultaneously had to rebut Idealists, who claimed to 
reduce the very idea of a science of mind to absurdity.  
In my view, James’s single greatest accomplishment was to have successfully 
prosecuted both wars at once in the Principles. If James deserves to be called a 
grandfather of empirical psychology, it is in virtue of his ability to generate Janus-
faced theories that both advanced the empirical successes of psychology and at the 
same time engaged in subtle philosophical rebuttal. 
We have already seen one way in which he accomplished these tasks in tandem. 
On one hand, James’s work on space was a major contribution to empirical theories 
of perception, as historians of psychology have noted (e.g., Pastore 1971, Chapter 
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12). But on the other, the work on space also functioned as a philosophical response 
to Idealists like T. H. Green, as I tried to show in Chapter Four.  
In this chapter, I am claiming that James had another Janus-faced strategy for 
responding to Idealists. His definition of the mental state stipulated what was to 
constitute a legitimate endpoint for empirical-psychological analysis. The effect was 
to divide labor with philosophers, so that certain pesky arguments about the mind 
could be kept out of psychology. James used the stream thesis to establish this 
demarcation of psychological from philosophical explanation.  
Borrowing a page from Friedman, I want to claim that qua demarcation 
criterion, the stream thesis did not face empirical evidence symmetrically with 
respect to the special theories of the Principles, in the following sense. A workable 
demarcation criterion is a presupposition of psychology’s scientific status. This is to 
say that if a given demarcation criterion is rejected, then empirical psychology 
cannot advance legitimately scientific theories at all. But the reverse is not true. If 
any of psychology’s scientific theories turn out to be false, this does not force us to 
reject our demarcation criterion.  
So with Friedman and against Quine, I hold that scientific theories are often 
stratified in the sense that not all parts face empirical evidence symmetrically. Even 
empirical psychology, if James’s case is an indication, is stratified in an important 
respect.  
Yet as I have said, we cannot use Friedman’s analysis of presuppositions in 
physics to explain the precise respect in which James’s theory is stratified, because 
the Principles incorporates no abstruse mathematical models that need to be 
coordinated with observation. We thus need a different analysis of the 
presupposition relation if we are to see how early empirical psychology is stratified. 
Towards this end, I will now explore some of H. P. Grice’s work on presuppositions. 
Friedman also raises the question of how a priori presuppositions can be 
adopted for good reason. He answers this question by adapting a Habermasean 
account of communicative rationality. I will be altering Friedman’s account of the 
presupposition relation enough that I shall have to look elsewhere for a useful 
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account of how a priori stipulations in psychology can be rational. We will find that 
C. I. Lewis’s account of pragmatic a priori principles will provide helpful insights.275 
But first I turn to Grice.  
5.   GRICE ON PRESUPPOSITIONS 
In the last section, I began a discussion of the presupposition relation. Recall 
that Strawson had been dissatisfied with Russell’s analysis of denotation.   
Let us call “vacuous statements” those which make claims about non-existent 
objects. “The present King of France is bald” is an example of a vacuous statement.  
Strawson argued that Russell’s analysis failed to do justice to our most natural 
reaction to vacuous statements, which is to deny that the question of truth or falsity 
can even arise. Strawson’s explanation of vacuity was that some meaningful 
statements have presuppositions. A meaningful statement with a false (Strawsonian) 
presupposition is misplaced.  
Grice was sensitive to cases where our best logical analysis of a given sentence 
fails to match neatly with our intuitive sense of what that sentence actually means in 
natural language. But Grice did not conclude that our best logical analyses should be 
amended or jettisoned on that account. He held that we could account for this 
divergence by attending to the conversational context in which natural-language 
statements are uttered. In the case of denoting phrases, Grice wanted to preserve 
Russell’s logical analysis. But this meant finding a way to deal with presuppositions 
that (unlike on Strawson’s account) preserved bivalence.  
Grice’s solution was to distinguish between the literal meaning of a sentence, 
and the meaning speakers will often attach to sentences in the context of an actual 
                                                 
275 One shortcoming of Lewis’s work, for our purposes, is that he did not have a very clear 
notion of the presupposition relation. In fact, he claims that presupposition is equivalent to 
the implication relation in classical logic (Lewis 1929/1956, 200-201). Accordingly, though 
he does discuss cases where a priori definitions literally give meaning to empirical statements 
(e.g., Lewis 1929/1956, 230), he does not regard this relationship as one of presupposition. 
So we still need an interpretation of presupposition that will suit James’s psychology—this is 
why my discussion of Grice is necessary. 
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conversation. For example, consider the following exchange. Evan is standing next to 
his car, which is obviously not working. Evan’s friend Jeff happens by. 
Evan:  I am out of gas 
Jeff:  There’s a gas station around the corner (my words, adapted from 
Grice 1989, 32)  
Jeff does not literally say that Evan is likely to be able to get gas from the station 
around the corner. Neither does Jeff literally say that the gas station is likely to be 
open, to have gas to sell, and so on. But these meanings are nevertheless 
communicated. Grice called these unspoken meanings “conversational 
implicatures.”  
He argued that rational speakers have certain expectations, which he described 
via a series of maxims or rules of thumb. For example, he proposed a “maxim of 
relation”: Be relevant. Since Evan and Jeff are both rational speakers, they 
(according to Grice) both expect discourse to be relevant. In virtue of this 
expectation, Jeff ’s expression conversationally implicates that Evan is likely to be 
able to get gas from the station. A rational speaker would presumably not have told 
Evan about this particular gas station unless this information were relevant to 
Evan’s predicament. And the information is only relevant if Evan could actually get 
gas at this particular station (now or soon). 
Here is how Grice used implicatures to preserve Russell’s analysis of denoting 
phrases, while doing justice to Strawson’s concerns276 about natural language. He 
argued that vacuous statements like B (“The present King of France is bald”) 
presuppose statements like A (“There exists exactly one King of France”) in the 
sense of conversationally “implicating” them. Unlike on Strawson’s view, for Grice 
the literal meaning of B does not entail A.277 Rather for Grice, a speaker who utters 
B under normal conversational conditions will implicate A.  
To see how Grice’s analysis works, we must look at the maxim he proposed to 
deal specifically with presuppositions—“Frame whatever you say in the form most 
                                                 
276 Strawson was Grice’s student, so I do not mean to imply that Grice learned such concerns 
through his student. He might have, but I do not know that this is the case.  
277 On Strawson’s view, when Q presupposes P, Q also entails P. This is because Q is only a 
candidate for truth or falsity when P is true. So if Q is true, then P must be as well. 
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suitable for any reply that would be regarded as appropriate” (Grice 1989, 273). I 
will call this Grice’s “presupposition maxim.” Here is how the maxim helps account 
for presuppositions. 
… It is quite natural to say to somebody, when we are discussing some concert, My 
aunt’s cousin went to that concert, when we know perfectly well that the person we 
are talking to is very likely not even to know that we have an aunt, let alone know that 
our aunt has a cousin. So the supposition must be … that it is noncontroversial, in the 
sense that it is something that we would expect the hearer to take from us (if he does 
not already know). That is to say, I do not expect, when I tell someone that my aunt’s 
cousin went to a concert, to be questioned whether I have an aunt and, if so, whether 
my aunt has a cousin. This is the sort of thing that I would expect him to take from 
me, that is, to take my word for. (Grice 1989, 274) 
One typically will only say things like “my aunt’s cousin went to that concert” when 
the existence of the aunt or her cousin are not issues on which one expects to be 
questioned. The statement is framed in a way that facilitates certain appropriate 
responses (“how did she like the concert?” or “when did she go?”). But by the same 
token, the statement is framed in a way that makes other responses more 
awkward—such as challenges to the very idea of the aunt or aunt’s cousin’s 
existence. Grice thus regards the existence of the aunt and of her cousin as 
presuppositions of the statement in question. This is because the statement 
conversationally implicates the aunt’s cousin’s existence via the presupposition 
maxim. In other words, the statement is framed in such a way that the speaker 
appears to take the aunt’s cousin’s existence as “noncontroversial.”  
Grice argues that if this maxim describes a rational expectation of typical 
interlocutors, we can surmise that one who utters B takes A to be noncontroversial, 
as well. We can surmise this not because B logically entails A, on Grice’s reading, 
but because B conversationally implicates A via this maxim.  
Now Grice used his account of presuppositions to argue against Strawson’s 
analysis of B. Recall that Strawson had argued that Russell’s analysis of B must be 
abandoned, because the appropriate response to that statement is not to deny it, but 
to treat it as misplaced in the sense of not being a candidate for having a truth value 
at all. According to Grice, on the other hand, Russell really did give the correct 
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logical analysis of B. If we accept this, then with Russell we can preserve bivalence 
at least in the face of this particular paradox.  
But Grice also tried to accommodate Strawson’s intuition by using this new, 
conversational-implicature account of presuppositions. For Grice, B seems 
misplaced because it has a false presupposition. But a false presupposition, for 
Grice, is not one that renders another statement false or misplaced. Rather, a false 
presupposition places another statement in violation of the conventions of rational 
conversation. The fact that “there exists exactly one present King of France” is false 
means that one who utters B has violated the presupposition maxim. 
Again, this is because a reasonable response to a statement like B would be 
denial. But the way in which B is framed makes it more convenient for an 
interlocutor to deny the King’s baldness than to deny his existence.278  
Now despite the differences between Russell, Strawson, Van Fraassen, and 
Friedman’s respective views of presupposition, notice that their respective notions of 
presupposition all make this a semantic relation. Grice, on the other hand, makes 
the relation pragmatic. Under the construals of each in the former group, if a 
statement Q presupposes another statement P, then certain semantic relations must 
hold between these two. In particular, Q must also entail P (see above, fn. 277, 
where I discuss Strawson; the point holds with respect to the others in the group, as 
well). But for Grice this is not the case. For Grice, if Q presupposes P, then one who 
hears Q uttered may rationally expect that P is noncontroversial. But this 
expectation is due to conversational convention, not to logical implication.  
Henceforth, I will use “conversational presupposition” to refer to Grice’s notion 
of a presupposition. I will use “semantic presupposition” to refer to presuppositions 
like those advocated by Russell, Strawson, Van Fraassen, and Friedman.  
                                                 
278 The original theory of conversational implicature (I happily note) was developed in 
Grice’s William James lecture at Harvard in 1967. The lecture was first published as (Grice 
1975; also see Grice 1978). The theory of presupposition was first published in (Grice 1981). 
All three articles are collected in (Grice 1989). 
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Here is what I am finally driving at. I want to claim that the stream thesis was a 
conversational presupposition of James’s psychology. Specifically, the scientific 
legitimacy of James’s psychology conversationally presupposed the stream thesis. 
I hope I have made clear that the stream thesis was not a presupposition in the 
sense of bearing any special semantic relationship to any of James’s special 
theories—it could not be said to confer meaning on those theories. Perhaps this is an 
important way in which human sciences are different from exact sciences like 
theoretical physics. Instead (and to repeat), I claim that the stream thesis was a 
presupposition in the sense of having given scientific legitimacy to James’s 
psychology. It conferred scientific legitimacy precisely by playing the role of a 
conversational presupposition.  
To see that this is the case, compare Grice’s treatment of utterance B, “The 
present King of France is bald,” with the case of James’s theory of space perception. 
Grice holds that B is framed in a reasonable way if rational interlocutors are likely to 
take the conversational presupposition A, “There exists exactly one present King of 
France,” to be noncontroversial. Similarly, James’s theory of space perception is 
reasonably framed as a scientific theory if the stream thesis’s acceptance by 
qualified colleagues is (more or less) noncontroversial. 
One can think of James’s theory of space perception as loosely adhering to 
Grice’s presupposition maxim, with respect to the stream thesis, in the following 
manner. Chapter 20 of the Principles advanced a rich theory of how the mental 
state—that is, the stream of thought—is “mapped” into distinctly-perceived 
positions and spatial relations. But one may reasonably purport to give a scientific 
theory of mental states, I submit, only where there is agreement among relevant 
inquirers that mental states are legitimate objects of scientific investigation.  
One would not typically say “my aunt’s cousin went to the concert” if one 
expected to be challenged on having an aunt. Similarly, one would not typically 
purport to have a scientific theory of how the mental state is mapped if one expected 
to be challenged on the very existence of mental states, or on their status as 
legitimate objects of scientific inquiry. So James’s theory of space perception is 
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framed in such a way as to facilitate further debate about how the stream is actually 
mapped. By the same token, the theory is also framed in a way that discourages 
challenges to the very existence of mental states as such. 
If the stream thesis is false, then generating scientific theories about how mental 
states are mapped is something like speculating about how the present King of 
France is wearing his hair. My point is not that if the stream thesis is false, this 
makes James’s theory of space perception false as well—the theory would, indeed, 
be false, but that is just because the theory of space perception entails that there 
really are mental states. This does not capture the sense in which the stream thesis 
was a presupposition of, or provided a framework for, the theory of space perception.  
Instead, if the stream thesis is false, then James’s theory of space perception 
would be in danger of losing its credibility as a scientific theory. I write “would be in 
danger of losing” rather than “would lose” because scientific legitimacy in this case 
demands some stipulation of what the ultimate features are to be of mental states. 
But there may well have been other ways of defining the mental state that would 
have served this purpose just as well as the stream thesis.  
My account entails that the problems Friedman diagnosed with Quinean 
naturalism cannot be confined to the failure of Quinean analyses of the history of 
physics. These problems extend all the way to the science closest to the Quinean 
heart: empirical psychology. If my own analysis is correct, then even psychological 
theories have privileged parts that do not face empirical evidence symmetrically. For 
James’s psychology at least, the stream thesis must be noncontroversially 
established among relevant inquirers before the rest of the theories can have 
scientific legitimacy. But if any of James’s specific theories (e.g., about how the mind 
identifies spatial and temporal relations in the stream of thought) turn out to be 
false, this need have no bearing on the truth or falsity of the stream thesis. This is 
because the stream thesis provides a scientific framework for (in other words, is a 
Gricean presupposition of) the specific theories of the Principles. 
We must now wonder, though, what evidence could bear on the truth or falsity 
of the stream thesis (qua demarcation criterion). This finally brings us back around 
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to the question of how, if at all, an uncritical stipulation like the stream thesis could 
ever be a rational part of a scientific theory. To answer this question, I turn to C. I. 
Lewis. 
6.   THE STREAM THESIS AS PRAGMATICALLY A PRIORI 
I have already shown that qua demarcation criterion, James took the stream 
thesis to be an a priori stipulation. The question of how a priori stipulations could 
ever be rational, particularly in the context of science, is a question that James and 
his friend Charles Peirce both sought to answer.279 C. I. Lewis further developed a 
James and Peirce-flavored account of the a priori.280  
                                                 
279 James’s account of a priori truths in science can be found in the final chapter of the 
Principles, particularly at (PP, 1255-1264). James was concerned to fit a robust account of a 
priori truth into the Principles’s conception of the mind as a product of Darwinian natural 
selection. This is a fascinating part of James’s response to Idealists. Cheryl Misak has written 
about Peirce’s important work on the role of regulative a priori assumptions in science 
(Misak 1991, 140 ff.). Peirce held that rational inquiry requires regulative assumptions, such 
as the assumption that we may someday find a good answer to whatever question we are 
inquiring about. But he distinguished his view from “a transcendentalist” who would attach 
greater weight to such presuppositions. Unlike the Kantian, Peirce held that the 
indispensability of presuppositions was not good grounds for believing them true. He wrote:  
…I do not admit that indispensability is any ground of belief. It may be indispensable 
that I should have $500 in the bank—because I have given checks to that amount. But 
I have never found that the indispensability directly affected my balance, in the least. 
(Peirce 1931, 2.113) 
Nevertheless, to deny a regulative assumption is to block inquiry. What justifies us in 
adopting regulative assumptions is “the justification of desperation,” as Peirce called it. We 
simply have no hope of “know[ing] anything of positive fact” unless we adopt such 
assumptions (Peirce 1931, 5.603). James might have said something similar about the 
stream thesis, qua demarcation criterion. It is indispensable to scientific inquiry that we 
adopt some such criterion. However, demarcation criteria are different from Peircean 
regulative assumptions in an important respect. Demarcation criteria are simply stipulations, 
so our “desperate” gamble is not that they will prove to be true. Rather, we must gamble 
that our demarcation criteria specify a disciplinary boundary that will prove stable and 
practically workable. We have no sure way of knowing, in advance. 
280 I am obviously developing theoretical tools for understanding James, tools that James 
himself did not have at his disposal. However there is a good case to be made that James’s 
own conception of the a priori was an important source for Lewis’s (admittedly more 
developed) work on this topic. In addition to the final chapter of the Principles, James dealt 
at length with the genesis of a priori knowledge in the in his posthumously published Some 
Problems of Philosophy. Like Lewis, James held that a priori truths are necessary in the 
sense of being unrevisable. But James  also held that which a priori truths we choose to use 
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At this point in the dissertation, I am attempting to draw general 
epistemological lessons from my study of how James’s psychology actually 
functioned. Lewis’s work on the a priori turns out to be more suited than James’s to 
drawing out those lessons. 
In some ways, Lewis’s model is remarkably similar to the (neo)Positivist view 
we have already sketched.281 For Lewis, science relies on two varieties of a priori 
truth: purely abstract truths such as those in mathematics (Lewis 1929/1956, 239-
249), and truths based on “definitive concepts,” which make empirical tests 
possible. An example of this second type is Einstein’s definition of simultaneity. If we 
want to measure whether two bolts of lightning strike at once, we need to stipulate a 
definition of simultaneity before we can have a standard by which to make a 
meaningful measurement (Lewis 1923, 173-174; Lewis 1929/1956, 230-231, 254-
258). So Like Friedman, Lewis portrays scientific theories as having three parts—
one empirical, and two a priori. 
But Lewis’s notion of the a priori departs from the (neo)Positivist account in 
some important respects. Lewis argued that a confusion lay at the heart of 
traditional notions of a priori knowledge. What is a priori is typically thought to be 
necessary. But “necessary” is an ambiguous word. Sometimes this word is 
contrasted with “contingent,” but sometimes it is contrasted with “voluntary” (as in, 
“it is necessary for anyone who understands P to believe P,” Lewis 1929/1956, 196).  
Lewis accepted that a priori knowledge is necessary in the first sense—or in 
other words, true “come what will” (Lewis 1929/1956, 231). This is different from 
the (neo)Positivist view of relativized or dynamical a priori principles that are only 
necessary with respect to a particular scientific theory. But Lewis denied that a 
priori truths are necessary in the second sense, where what is necessary is 
sometimes held to coerce belief.  
                                                                                                                                       
is a pragmatic matter. An under-appreciated article on this topic (Pancheri 1971) documents 
important affinities between James’s conception of the a priori and Lewis’s. 
281 For an intriguing paper that argues for deep pragmatist similarities between Carnap and 
Lewis, see (Richardson forthcoming). 
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Lewis took definitions in Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica as 
exemplars of a priori truths (Lewis 1929/1956, 239-240, 244-245). These 
definitions are necessary (unrevisable) because they are stipulated. Once a 
definition is established in this fashion, no future experience can un-make the 
definition. However, whether or not we accept or use a definition is an entirely 
different matter. Just because a definition is necessary, this cannot force anyone 
actually to use it. For Lewis, only experience can coerce belief, not what is a priori 
(Lewis 1929/1956, 196-197).  
It is instructive that Lewis thought of definitions in the Principia as exemplars of 
the a priori. Lewis was famously unhappy with Whitehead and Russell’s logic, 
particularly with their definition of the conditional. The Principia employed what is 
now called the material conditional.282 Lewis built his own logic that instead 
employed the strict conditional,283 a relation which maps more naturally onto the 
English “if … then ….” Lewis regarded both his own logic, which he called “System 
S,” as well as the logic of the Principia as consistent. But which system one chooses 
Lewis regarded as a pragmatic matter. He thought there was no conceivable fact 
that could truly coerce anyone into choosing one system over the other. This is one 
reason he regarded the a priori element in knowledge—exemplified by logical 
definitions—to be characteristically voluntary. 
For our purposes, the important point is that our choice of what a priori 
principles to employ may be voluntary, but the choice remains rational, according to 
                                                 
282 This is the conditional of classical logic, which is true whenever the antecedent is false or 
the consequent true (or both).  
283 The strict conditional is true just in case the following holds (to use anachronistic but 
illustrative terminology). In every possible world in which the antecedent is true, the 
consequent is true as well. For example, consider the sentence “if Lincoln survives his 
second term, then William James is never born.” This sentence is true when “if … then …” 
is construed as the classical, material conditional. Lincoln did not survive his second term, so 
the antecedent is false, and the conditional statement is true. The problem is that in regular 
English, the actual sentence appears to be false. Whether or not Booth actually succeeded in 
assassinating Lincoln has no bearing on whether James ever lived. If we construe the Lincoln 
conditional using Lewis’s notion of strict implication, the sentence does turn out to be false, 
for the following reason. There are possible worlds in which Lincoln did survive his second 
term, but where James was never born. So on this reading the conditional statement is false, 
just as common sense would dictate.  
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Lewis. In the case of purely abstract principles, we are bound by consistency in 
choosing what principles to accept. In the case of applying abstract principles to 
experience, we typically have some “practical business to perform,” and those 
principles most helpful to our task are to be preferred (Lewis 1929/1956, 237-238).  
Lewis also characterized the a priori element of general knowledge, not just of 
scientific knowledge. Like James, he held that for there to be genuine knowledge, 
the mind must in some way impose a conceptual order on the chaos of sensory 
experience. This conceptual order is a priori, but again, a priori in an unusual sense. 
Any given conceptual framework we use to organize the stream of thought is a priori 
in the sense of being freely created and adopted by the mind, not in the sense of 
being such that an organism is coerced into accepting it. Lewis wrote: 
It is given experience, the brute-fact element of knowledge, which the mind must 
accept willy-nilly. The a priori represents the activity of the mind itself; it represents 
an attitude in some sense freely taken.  
 And the a priori is independent of experience, not because it prescribes a form 
which experience must fit or anticipates some preestablished harmony of the given 
with the categories of the mind, but precisely because it prescribes nothing to the 
content of experience. (Lewis 1929/1956, 197)  
For Lewis, the a priori element in knowledge amounts to a set of concepts we use to 
organize our chaotic sensory (and scientific) experiences. But what makes these 
concepts a priori is that we can freely adopt or discard such conceptual frameworks 
for pragmatic reasons. Thus, the “Pragmatic Element in Knowledge” alluded to in 
the title of one of Lewis’s famous papers is precisely the a priori element of 
knowledge (Lewis 1926). 
In fact, Positivists may well have accepted many features of the a priori I have 
attributed to Lewis. But the important difference, for my purposes, is that Lewis 
was operating with a different notion of what it is that makes certain principles—
including principles in a scientific theory—a priori. For Lewis, a principle counts as a 
priori in virtue of being a principle that we freely stipulate, and then adopt for 
pragmatic reasons.   
Similarly, I want to claim that qua demarcation principle, the stream thesis 
represents a stipulated boundary between mental science and neighboring 
disciplines (primarily metaphysics). What finally makes the stream thesis a rational, 
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yet stipulated assumption, is that the thesis was adopted for good pragmatic reasons. 
When I say that James had “pragmatic reasons” for demarcating psychology and 
metaphysics in the manner specified by the stream thesis, I mean that James had a 
pressing task to accomplish, and the thesis was rational to adopt just to the extent 
that it helped him accomplish this task. To borrow Peirce’s phrase, James’s 
justification for adopting the stream thesis was the “justification of desperation” (see 
above, fn. 279). 
The task at hand was to provide enough insulation from metaphysicians’ arrows 
so that psychology could start producing real empirical successes without having to 
be bogged down in a priori speculation. But James had to provide insulation for 
psychology in a way that did at least some justice to metaphysicians’ widely 
influential criticisms. To the extent that the stream thesis actually stood to help 
affect this cease fire, we should think of the thesis as rational.  
It will not do to insist that one pronounce the stream thesis either rational or 
irrational independently of what anyone happened to think of it. This is because it 
was precisely by actually persuading warring factions—persuading them how to 
divide labor between mental science and metaphysics—that the thesis could 
function to secure psychology’s scientific legitimacy. Thus I repeat, James had good 
reason to demarcate psychology and philosophy in the way specified by the stream 
thesis only to the extent that the stream thesis stood actually to be accepted as 
noncontroversial by disputants. 
In fact, I think we really do have grounds for seeing James’s choice of how to 
demarcate psychology and metaphysics as rational, because James’s choice really 
did stand to satisfy these disputants.284 This is because the stream thesis was the 
product of a kind of negotiation between them.  
                                                 
284 I confine myself to the claim that this thesis was well suited to affect a cease-fire between 
philosophy and psychology. A full assessment of the actual impact of James’s stream thesis in 
psychology would be a very large task indeed, one that I cannot take up here. Luckily, 
others have begun to show that James’s stream thesis really was influential in psychology 
(see above, fn. 194). 
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I do not mean that the stream thesis was the result of negotiation in the manner 
of a political treaty, where representatives literally sit together and hash out an 
agreement. Rather, it was one product of a more remote form of negotiation. 
Looking back over this dissertation, I hope it is clear what a wide variety of concerns 
James actually took account of in building his psychology. He may have stipulated a 
boundary between mental science and metaphysics. But in doing so he took account 
of a complicated set of concerns from either side. 
There were historical and meta-historical disputes that had to be quelled if 
psychology was to claim the status of a legitimate science, as we saw in Chapter 
One. The tradition of conceiving of the mind as a legitimate object of empirical 
study, a tradition allegedly founded by Locke, had to be shown not to dead-end in 
Humean skepticism.  
In Chapter Two we saw that there were professional, social, and even spiritual 
concerns that psychologists had in some way to accommodate. For instance, the 
viability of psychology was closely connected with debates over how to make 
philosophy more rigorous. Green and Robertson agreed that British philosophy was 
marked by amateurism, but they disagreed on a solution. Robertson advocated that 
philosophy should become professionalized, and should do this by appropriating the 
methods of science. He also held that it should hitch itself to the fledgling science of 
mind by incorporating data from the new psychology. Green agreed that British 
philosophy needed to be professionalized, but held that any alliance with psychology 
was a recipe for spiritual and intellectual decay. Psychology, he argued, was an 
attempt to make a science out of Locke’s form of “popular philosophy,” a set of 
general principles that were fundamentally incompatible with human 
enlightenment. Instead, Green advocated that the path to both rigor and 
enlightenment led directly through the kind of academic metaphysics flourishing in 
19th-century German universities. 
Psychology’s prospects of demarcating itself from philosophy hinged on even 
more than the fate of rival conceptions of intellectual history, rival conceptions of 
philosophical rigor, and rival conceptions of spiritual enlightenment. It also hinged on 
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the need for persuasive responses to Green’s highly influential philosophical 
arguments. In Chapter Three, we saw in close detail how Green attacked the 
philosophical foundations of empirical psychology.  
I do not claim that the stream thesis magically solved all these disputes at once. 
Some of the disputes were not really dealt with in the Principles at all, but were put 
off for future research. For instance, I think The Varieties of Religious Experience is 
best read as an attempt to accommodate Idealist concerns about spirituality given 
the naturalistic worldview of mental science. But in any case, I review the disputes 
we have met with in this dissertation to reinforce my claim that the boundary James 
drew between mental science and metaphysics was a boundary whose position was 
shaped by a dizzying variety of concerns among mental scientists and 
metaphysicians.  
 
Some may object that there is something untoward about my claim that the 
stream thesis was a concept that was at once “stipulated” and “negotiated.” My 
response is that we routinely use more prosaic concepts that have both these 
properties. 
For example, my friend Jon may stipulate different roles for his children in the 
kitchen—Emelia Jane will bus the table, say, and Gregory will wash the dishes. But 
the children may still have a say in which tasks each prefers. Maybe Gregory will 
hate scrubbing silverware, and will be able to convince Jon to leave this task to 
Emelia Jane. Perhaps Emelia Jane will then have leverage for placing responsibility 
back on Gregory for wiping the table. 
Similarly, James also got to stipulate the Principles’ definition of the mental 
state (because he was the author of that book, after all). But this does not mean he 
may stipulate his definition in a way that ignores the much more complicated 
negotiations that had been raging between metaphysicians and psychologists.  
As a parent, perhaps Jon is at liberty to stipulate chores for the children without 
listening to negotiation, if he is in an authoritarian mood. But this is where the 
analogy ends. James was not at liberty to stipulate a definition of the mental state in 
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any old way he pleased. He had to find a way to stipulate a boundary between 
psychology and metaphysics that would help affect a cease-fire between these 
warring factions.  
The compliment I am paying James is much like the compliment one might pay 
to an engineer who figures out how to build a better bicycle. For instance, in the 
1890s bicycles began being mass produced with pneumatic tires, for the first time—
an invention (by John Boyd Dunlop) that made for greater traction and a smoother 
ride. Dunlop’s new design was rational not because it revealed some fundamental 
truth about nature. It was rational because it provided an ingenious solution to 
problems inherent in older bicycle designs. Similarly, I want to claim that James’s 
stream thesis was rational in that it was an ingenious invention for quelling the 
metaphysical squabbling that had hobbled earlier psychology—it provided, as it 
were, greater traction and a smoother ride for empirical psychology. 
 
Philosophers and sociologists of science have been interested in the so-called 
“demarcation problem” since at least Karl Popper. It will be helpful here to compare 
James’s demarcation problem.  
We now think of the demarcation problem as the challenge of finding abstract 
criteria for distinguishing science from pseudo-science. Popper argued that science’s 
intellectual authority stems from the fact that it makes risky, empirically-falsifiable 
claims, whereas pseudo-science does not. This view has been subject to a battery of 
criticism that I cannot review in detail.285 
                                                 
285 To my knowledge, the article most responsible for igniting debate about the so-called 
“demarcation problem” was (Popper 1962). A philosophical history of other attempts to 
demarcate science from non-science can be found in (Laudan 1983), which concludes that a 
priori attempts to demarcate science from non-science are ultimately futile. Laudan argues 
that we should instead be concerned with the difference between well-founded and non-well 
founded beliefs, and that concepts like “unscientific” play only an emotive role in our 
vocabulary. Some, especially sociologists of science, have maintained that the demarcation 
problem is still worth pursuing because science plays such a distinctively influential role in 
modern societies. For example, see (Fuller 1991, 175-189; Gieryn 1983). Gieryn 
emphasizes the flexibility of criteria scientists have historically used to distinguish their 
practice from non-science. I have considerable sympathy with his claim that scientists 
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But notice that James’s demarcation problem was starkly different from 
Popper’s. James’s burden was not to distinguish all science from non-science, but to 
erect a practical boundary between philosophers and scientists studying the mind. 
Popper proposed a philosophical theory about science from the top down. But James 
did not need a general philosophical theory, per se. He needed to solve a problem 
that was far more practical and local. 
If one thinks that only a general rule about what shall constitute Science can 
settle whether some enterprise is genuinely scientific, then one must see James’s 
demarcation solution as patently irrational. But I suggest that there is no good 
reason to take such a severe position.  
Just as early psychologists ought not to have put off empirical investigation until 
they had a completed account of the transcendental ego, so they would have been 
foolish to wait around for an ideal criterion for distinguishing all science from non-
science. They faced an engineering problem that needed to be solved quickly. 
James’s stream thesis was rationally formulated, in my view, because it ingeniously 
solved the problem of how to engineer a legitimate social boundary inside which 
psychologists could pursue scientific work. 
Some readers will raise the following worry. Perhaps the task of quieting the 
front between psychology and philosophy was necessary for creating conditions 
conducive to empirical-psychological research. But this is different from the stronger 
claim I seem to be making, that quieting the front between psychology and 
philosophy actively conferred scientific legitimacy on psychology. How can a mere 
social boundary between groups of inquirers serve as a license for intellectual 
authority?  
There is much debate over the significance of social structures to the production 
of knowledge. I can at least address the objection by tethering my account of James 
to other, more fully articulated accounts of the social production of knowledge.  
                                                                                                                                       
typically distinguish their own practice from non-science in whatever way is best suited to 
help establish intellectual authority. 
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At some point, psychologists had to build for themselves the kind of social 
conditions conducive to objective research—social conditions of the sort philosophers 
like Helen Longino have emphasized. Psychologists had to establish recognized 
avenues for criticizing the work of other psychologists, for example. They also had to 
establish shared standards that applied to everyone inside the specialized 
community. And so on.286 
But social epistemologists and philosophers of science have been less attentive 
to what is required for a sub-community—well structured as it might be internally—
to establish intellectual authority in the larger academic world.287 For example, the 
social structures that Longino proposes as requirements for objective, scientific 
research (see above, fn. 286) are all internal structures of sub-communities in this 
respect.  
To see that establishing these structures is not sufficient for establishing 
intellectual authority, consider the more recent case of intelligent design. One might 
argue that advocates like Michael Behe or Phillip Johnson have managed to 
establish a kind of intellectual subcommunity with many of the trappings of 
legitimate science. For example, they have scholarly institutes (the Discovery 
Institute, the Center for Science and Culture),  peer-reviewed journals (Creation 
                                                 
286 For the argument that the rationality of theory choice requires at least shared “maxims” 
or “values” among scientists, see (Kuhn 1977). All things considered, the Kuhnian scientist 
values (and should value) theories that are relatively more accurate, consistent, simple, 
fruitful, and that have a broader scope than rival theories. Longino expands on Kuhn’s 
insights, developing a social theory of scientific objectivity (Longino 1992; Longino 2002). On 
her view, objective inquiry is a property of well-organized communities, rather than a matter 
of an individual’s intellectual hygiene. Objectivity is only possible in a community that meets 
at least four criteria. First, there must be recognized avenues for criticizing a theory or 
method. Second, the community must actually take such criticism seriously by responding. 
Third, there must be some shared standards to which critics can appeal—standards like 
those Kuhn articulated. And fourth, qualified members of the community must share 
intellectual authority in a just fashion. Two important volumes that collects articles on the 
social dimensions of epistemology, particularly in the case of science, include (McMullin 
1992; Schmitt 1994b). The Schmitt volume contains an influential criticism of Longino 
(Kitcher 1994), as well as a helpful overview of the literature on social factors in 
epistemology (Schmitt 1994a).  
287 A summary of existing work on “the organization of cognitive labor” can be found at 
(Schmitt 1994a, 18-19). None of the cited projects consider the significance of boundaries 
between intellectual subcommunities.  
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Research Society Quarterly Journal), and theories that display the kind of 
intellectual virtues Kuhn advocated—they (at least claim to be) accurate, consistent, 
fruitful, simple, and so on. But intelligent design has not been able to establish itself 
as a functioning subcommunity inside the larger academic world.288  
If one grants, with philosophers like Longino, that a scientific community only 
needs to be well structured from the inside, one is perilously close to admitting that 
fringe sciences like intelligent design deserve scientific authority. Indeed, it was not 
enough for early psychologists to organize themselves as an isolated island of people 
studying the mind objectively, in Longino’s sense. Psychologists had to establish 
themselves as a legitimate scientific community inside the larger intellectual world. 
This meant establishing criteria for how to demarcate empirical psychology from 
neighboring disciplines. But crucially, the demarcation criterion had to be respected 
both inside and outside the fledgling science. 
So while I am deeply sympathetic to Longino’s analysis of social structures in 
scientific communities, I think her account needs to be supplemented with an 
explanation of how the community of all these academic communities (scientific and 
otherwise) fit together to produce intellectual authority. Part of this explanation 
must address legitimate ways a contested boundary between communities can be 
replaced by a peaceful division of intellectual labor. I propose that demarcation 
criteria of the sort we have seen in this chapter are one good way to affect such 
divisions.  
In any case, I am defending the view that the stream thesis conferred scientific 
legitimacy on James’s psychology by specifying a noncontroversial boundary 
between mental science and metaphysics. My response to the objection at hand is 
that establishing a noncontroversial social boundary can be a legitimate source of 
scientific authority because it is in virtue of such boundaries that subcommunities 
find a place of respect and acceptance inside the larger academic world. 
                                                 
288 Just one piece of evidence of this is Richard Sternberg’s decision to publish a pro-
intelligent design article when he was editor of Proceedings of the Biological Society of 
Washington. The article had been peer-reviewed, but the outcry by other scientists was loud 
and lengthy. See (Hagerty 2005). 
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I acknowledge that the case of early empirical psychology is unlike the case of 
intelligent design in one respect. The early controversies about empirical psychology 
were not between psychology and other established sciences, but rather between 
psychology and philosophy. Still, even in our own day the struggle for scientific 
authority is not always confined to struggles between accepted and aspiring sciences. 
For instance, evolutionary psychology is now struggling to establish its scientific 
credibility in the face of criticism not (mainly) from psychologists and biologists, but 
from philosophers.289 So as a matter of historical record, I do not think scientific 
authority need be regarded as concerning relations between established and aspiring 
sciences only.  
If the Principles is any indication, establishing a new science requires 
establishing a stable, conversational presupposition among qualified inquirers about 
where demands for explanation may legitimately end, when it comes to the fledgling 
science. Such conversational presuppositions are typically pragmatically a priori, in 
Lewis’s sense. They are stipulated, social conventions that are adopted for rational, 
yet pragmatic reasons. These conversational presuppositions are, to borrow a 
phrase,290 a pragmatic element in science. 
7.   SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
There are several issues I have raised in this dissertation that I hope to flesh out 
more fully in future research. One such issue is the historical relationship between 
philosophy and fledgling, human sciences.  
By all accounts, the publication of the Principles in 1890 was a pivotal moment 
in the history of psychology (e.g., see Leary 2003). It set the agenda for the so-
called “New Psychology” in America, and indeed in the entire English-speaking 
                                                 
289 For example, evolutionary psychology’s claim to be a legitimate science have come under 
philosophical attack from (Buller 2005; Lloyd 1993; Lloyd 1999; Lloyd 2001; Lloyd 2003; 
Lloyd 2005). Evolutionary psychologists will have to find responses to such criticism if they 
are to establish their own credentials as real scientists, if our study is any indication. 
290 Lewis wrote an early, influential paper on the pragmatic a priori entitled “The Pragmatic 
Element in Knowledge” (Lewis 1926). 
  374  
world. Psychology was in its infancy at the time, and James helped it take a major 
step away from philosophy, and towards becoming a legitimate science.  
But the impact of psychology’s separation from philosophy has been virtually 
ignored by historically-inclined philosophers interested in the sciences. Such 
philosophers have typically focused on the relationship between philosophy and 
mature sciences, especially mathematical physics.291  
I suggest that fledgling sciences may be more profoundly shaped by disputes 
with philosophers than are more mature sciences, based on the analyses of this 
dissertation. And in turn, philosophy itself tends to be more profoundly shaped by 
interaction with fledgling sciences than it is by interaction with mature sciences. 
Historically, philosophers have tended to grapple with mature sciences on a purely 
theoretical level. But in a debate with a fledgling science, there may be far more at 
stake.  
For example, we have seen that the concept of empiricism, which is often used 
to signal one’s most basic philosophical commitments, was originally forged in an 
argument between philosophy and the fledgling science of mind. That debate was 
over nothing less than the future character of the entire philosophic enterprise. 
When it came to secular studies of the mind, philosophers could traditionally lay 
claim to being the ultimate arbiters. The rise of psychology forced them to grapple 
with the prospect of sacrificing a piece of themselves, very literally. Early empiricists 
like James and Robertson advocated a particular view about how philosophy should 
remodel itself.  
James saw choices like this—choices about what kind of character one wants to 
develop—as having weighty, even moral implications:  
                                                 
291 In general, historically-inclined philosophers have neglected relationships between 
philosophy and fledgling, human sciences, such as psychology was in the late 19th century. 
Hatfield’s work on the history and philosophy of space perception and Wilson’s work on 
early modern microscopy are notable exceptions. Another exception is (Pojman 2000), a 
doctoral dissertation on Mach that looks at the relationship between philosophy and the 
infant science of mind. Also, I should note that scholars trained as historians have looked in 
some detail at relations between the history of philosophy and of the human sciences. A few 
leaders in this area in include Michael Ash, Kurt Danziger, David Hollinger, David Leary, 
Timothy Lenoir, Robert Richards, Michael Ruse, Daniel Wilson, and William Woodward.   
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To sustain the arguments for the good course and keep them ever before us, to stifle 
our longing for more flowery ways, to keep the foot unflinchingly on the arduous path, 
these are characteristic ethical energies. But more than these; for these but deal with 
the means of compassing interests already felt by the man to be supreme. The ethical 
energy par excellence has to go farther and choose which interest out of several, 
equally coercive, shall become supreme. The issue here is of the utmost pregnancy, for 
it decides a man’s entire career. When he debates, Shall I commit this crime? choose 
that profession? accept that office, or marry this fortune?—his choice really lies 
between one of several equally possible future Characters. What he shall become is 
fixed by the conduct of this moment. … The problem with the man is less what act he 
shall now choose to do, than what being he shall now resolve to become. (PP, 276-277) 
“The ethical energy par excellence,” for James, is most needed when one chooses 
“which interest out of several, equally coercive, shall become supreme.”  
James was making a point about morally-pregnant choices made by individuals, 
but the point can be extended to collective choices like those faced by academic 
disciplines. As it was confronted with psychologists’ separatist ambitions, philosophy 
itself had to muster “the ethical energy par excellence.” It had a far more difficult 
choice than simply figuring out the next move in an ongoing intellectual game. This 
was a kind of “critical ethical moment” in which philosophers had to figure out how 
to modify the game itself, since a whole group of players were leaving and taking 
part of the deck with them. 
Figuring out how to proceed in such desperate moments is a question that 
ultimately has a moral dimension, I am suggesting, because it amounts to a choice of 
what kind of character a discipline shall cultivate. How and why entire intellectual 
communities come to make such weighty choices is a difficult question that I leave to 
future research.  
 
This study also raises a question about the fate of empiricism. Why did the 
meaning of this HP concept evolve into its contemporary interpretation?  
What has changed is not so much the way we formulate empiricism as an HP 
concept (recall my discussion of Robertsonian empiricism). What has changed is 
what we now understand to be at stake in defending empiricism. The concept used 
to signal a special affinity between philosophy and empirical psychology, along with 
the notion that the mind is a legitimate object of scientific investigation. In contrast, 
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today we are typically interested in empiricist epistemology either because we want 
to give a theoretical account of knowledge that will resist skeptical challenges, or 
because we want to give a theoretical account of science that does justice to actual 
practice.  
The shifting stakes of philosophical empiricism are relevant to a question I 
raised in the introduction. There, I asked what accounted for the popularity of 
empiricism in the American 1930s. I take myself to have shown that James was 
instrumental in protecting empiricism’s reputation in the face of Idealist attacks. But 
what I have not ventured to explain is why the stakes of empiricism should have 
shifted away from James and Robertson’s interpretation.  
I suspect that the 1930s vision of empiricism had already moved closer to our 
contemporary interpretation. By that time, the struggle over psychology had died 
down, and the science was firmly entrenched in American and British universities. 
Perhaps philosophical concepts like empiricism were no longer needed to fight 
battles over the now-established science of mind. But then one wonders why the 
concept should have been retained at all.  
In Chapter Two, I wrote the following lines about empiricism’s fate, but we 
must read this passage in a new light if the analyses of the present chapter are 
accurate: 
… As mental science matured, it splintered off from philosophy and became an 
independent field. But philosophy did not then draw on the new psychology’s empirical 
research, as Robertson had hoped. It consigned empirical research to its increasingly-
estranged sister field. In the wake of empirical psychology’s exodus, English-speaking 
philosophers began to see their work as confined to non-empirical issues. Thus, even as 
British philosophers of the next generation (led by Russell and Moore) abandoned 
Idealism, the surviving conception of what it was to be a philosopher was largely 
Green’s, by default. Though they abandoned the Hegelian vocabulary, philosophers of 
Russell’s generation became academics whose specialty was a priori deliberation. 
Robertson died in 1892, but he, James, and most other Mind empiricists would have 
lamented this development had they lived to see it flourish. (See above, p. 78) 
What casts this passage in a new light is that James himself directly contributed to 
the splintering of philosophy and psychology, a splintering that considerably 
narrowed philosophy’s—and therefore philosophical empiricism’s—legitimate 
subject matter. 
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Thirteen years after the Principles appeared, James published a well known 
essay entitled “The Ph.D. Octopus” (James 1987, 67-74). In it, he complained that 
the professionalization of philosophy had made the field sterile and increasingly 
irrelevant to the actual human plight. But some blame for philosophy’s narrowing 
probably lays at James’s own feet, insofar as the narrowing was a direct result of 
psychology’s departure. 
It is hard to know whether James had some responsibility only for the 
separation of philosophy and psychology, or whether he also has some responsibility 
for the subsequent estrangement of philosophy from psychology. Recall that 
Robertson held that philosophy should take its basic description of the mind from 
psychology, on the grounds that psychology offered a “neutral” (rather than 
philosophically controversial) description of experience. But this was a point on 
which James deeply disagreed with Robertson. Indeed, James held that psychology 
could only progress if it made philosophically loaded assumptions about the mind. 
Philosophy’s job was to probe those assumptions in a more thorough fashion. 
I suspect that as empirical psychology matured, its practitioners less and less 
saw the need to lay out its metaphysical presuppositions for the scrutiny of 
philosophers as neatly as James had. And for their part, philosophers bothered less 
and less to engage with the latest empirical research, probably because that research 
was increasingly impenetrable to them. Here is Ralph Barton Perry’s reflection on 
the separation of philosophy and psychology, which I quoted in fn. 67, above.  
The to me regrettable chasm between the first and third floors of Emerson Hall, 
Cambridge [where Harvard’s Psychology and Philosophy Departments were housed, 
respectively], is symbolic of a change in the relations between philosophy and 
psychology which has taken place during my own professional life-time. Time was 
when the difference was one of emphasis, but now it is a difference of vocation, 
profession, problems and technique. We came to the parting of the ways when, some 
years ago, the philosophers were asked to sit in judgment on a series of candidates 
whose doctoral dissertations dealt with the a-mazed rodent. Feeling ourselves to be 
rank amateurs in the field, we sat in silence and accepted the expert judgment of our 
junior colleagues who, having been reared in a new age, were as ignorant of philosophy 
as were we of what is now called ‘psychology.’ … William James was at one and the 
same time one of the first of the scientific psychologists and one of the last of the 
philosophical psychologists. (Perry 1943, 122)  
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A third issue for future research concerns the 1950s resurgence of criticisms of 
empiricism. The case against empiricism at the end of the 19th century closely 
resembles the more famous attacks on analytic and logical positivist philosophy—
against, that is, their shared empiricism—brought by the likes of Quine and Sellars 
in the 1950s. In both the 1870s and in the 1950s, empiricism was accused of failing 
to supply an account of the sensorily-given that was robustly normative, as we saw 
in Chapter Three. Empiricism was also accused, in both eras, of drawing an overly-
sharp, untenable distinction between analytic and synthetic statements.  
Though I have not reviewed his argument in this dissertation, Green (like 
Quine) attacked the analytic/synthetic distinction at length, arguing against both 
Kant and Mill that which statements counted as analytic and which synthetic 
depended on the context in which a statement was put forward (GWR, II.58-64, 
II.221-232). So the idea of separating knowledge into a purely intellectual 
component and a purely sensory component was, for Green, futile. One upshot was 
to be that psychology was also futile, because it purported to investigate the mind’s 
sensory capacities without reference to its intellectual capacities. This is a mirror-
image of the lesson Quine learned from the collapse of the analytic/synthetic 
distinction. 
Green took the collapse of this distinction to entail that empirical psychology 
really dissolves into transcendental philosophy. If all mental representations have 
some intellectual component, then purely empirical techniques for studying the 
mind, Green thought, failed. Quine, in contrast, took the collapse of the distinction to 
entail that a priori epistemology really dissolves into empirical psychology. If there 
are no purely a priori contributions to our representations of reality, then the best 
epistemological insights we can hope to achieve will come from empirical study, 
Quine held (Quine 1969). 
The reappearance of these similar criticisms, even if the criticisms were taken 
to have quite different import, provides very tentative support for a hypothesis 
about empiricism’s evolution. In the introduction, I noted that A. J. Ayer is often 
cited as having pushed logical positivism towards more overt forms of empiricism in 
  379  
the 1930s. I suggested that whether or not this was Ayer’s intention, framing 
positivism as a form of empiricism was a move sure to play well in North America, 
where James-inspired forms of empiricism had long-flourished.  
Ayer and his ilk may have been happy to piggyback analytic philosophy and 
logical positivism on the by-then philosophical respectability of empiricism. But 
perhaps they cashed in on the reputation of a bastardized form of the philosophy 
James and his allies had worked so hard to set on sound footing. Indeed, one of the 
two quotes I used as an inscription to this dissertation was written by Dewey in 
1942. He complained that the empiricism then in vogue was premised not on the 
best scientific account of experience (which came from James, he held), but on an 
atomistic account of mind so stale it dated back to the 17th and 18th centuries. 
If I am right that these two sets of critics (in the 1870s, and in the 1950s, 
respectively) diagnosed similar flaws in traditional empiricism, then we stand to 
learn a great deal from looking at James’ response to these problems. The details of 
James’ response have been largely forgotten. But in this dissertation I hope to have 
taken a small step towards recovering some important aspects of that response.  
More work needs to be done to see whether James had a reply, for example, to 
Green’s arguments about the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction. And more 
work needs to be done to see whether an empiricism immune to Green’s criticisms 
would also be immune to Quine’s or Sellars’s. 
Although the similarity between criticisms of empiricism during these two eras 
has not often been noted, a few others have seen a similarity. Alan Gewirth wrote a 
1953 summary of what had become a heated controversy over the nature of the 
analytic/synthetic distinction: 
It should come as no surprise, therefore, that many of the contentions of the 
contemporary opponents of the analytic-synthetic distinction echo the arguments of 
such idealists as Hegel, [fn. omitted], T. H. Green, [fn. omitted], Bradley, [fn. 
omitted] and Bosanquet, [fn. omitted] who held that the distinction is one of degree 
rather than of kind, that it reflects the growth of our knowledge rather than any fixed 
dichotomy and is therefore relative to the knower, and that indeed every judgment is 
both analytic and synthetic. While the pragmatists did not discuss the distinction as 
fully as did the idealists, similar assertions can be found in Peirce [fn. omitted] and 
Schiller [fn. omitted]. Thus what is represented by the current recrudescence of 
opposition to the distinction is that the victory of the atomistic empiricist interpretation 
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(as against its technical development) of logic in the twentieth century is being 
challenged, and inevitably that challenge is marked by a return to the arguments over 
logic which divided the analytical atomists [“those … like Locke, Hume, and Mill, who 
… draw a sharp distinction between two realms, the one ‘logical,’ … the other 
‘physical’ …”], the idealists, and the pragmatists around the turn of the century. 
(Gewirth 1953, 399) 
For Gewirth, the new debate over analyticity marks a “recrudescence of opposition” 
to this distinction for the first time since the late 19th-century. He might have noted 
that like Peirce and Schiller, James also held that a clear analytic/synthetic 
distinction could not be maintained (PP, Chapter XXVIIIn.23). With Gewirth, I am 
struck by the similarity between attacks on “atomistic” empiricism during these two 
eras. This similarity deserves further investigation. 
For those still troubled by Quine and Sellars’s attacks on empiricism, I hope in 
the future to develop the following response. Some still worry that these critics 
destroyed the prospect of building a skeptic-proof epistemology that shows 
knowledge claims to be based on incorrigible sense experience. But if my analyses 
are substantially correct, then the concept of empiricism is a tool invented for 
radically different purposes than for refuting the skeptic. True, many epistemologists 
will reasonably insist that any attempt to historicize the project of empiricist 
epistemology is to confuse the context of justification with the context of discovery 
(for more on my response, see Appendix II). But I suggest that philosophers 
sometimes invent problems for themselves by appropriating conceptual tool for tasks 
those tools were not designed to perform.  
Imagine someone trying to drive screws with a hammer. We should council that 
person to go get a screwdriver, a tool actually designed for the task at hand. Suppose 
that person responded that the question of whether the hammer actually works well 
for driving screws is logically independent of whether the hammer was originally 
designed to drive screws. That person would be correct, but foolish. If the hammer 
is not turning out to be adaptable to this new task, one does better to go find a 
different tool.  
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I submit that empiricist epistemologists still fretting over Quine and Sellars’ 
attacks are like our tool-wielder. They are using a historical-philosophical concept—
empiricism—to accomplish a task it is not well suited to perform.  
For my part, I find James and Robertson’s original vision of empiricism more 
compelling. In their hands, empiricism amounted to having an empirical attitude 
about philosophical problems. These old-school empiricists held that philosophy is 
an enterprise closely related to, but not a part of, the human sciences. They found 
empirical findings in such sciences to provide a useful starting point for philosophical 
investigation, particularly when those findings shed light on the human mind. 
This is quite different from holding that all meaningful concepts must be 
reduced to concepts derived from sense data, or from holding that all knowledge is 
ultimately sensory. So it seems to me that the real question concerning Quine and 
Sellars’ critique of empiricism is not how to respond directly. Rather, the question is 
whether we have come to use our concept of empiricism for a task it was ill-designed 
to perform.
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Appendix I 
Historical Study of  Dictionary Definitions of  “Empiricism” 
Key 
AM = American Dictionary 
BR = British Dictionary 
1841 
(1) AM. (Webster 1841, vol. I, 582) 
Em-Pir'I-Cism, n. Dependence of a physician on his experience in practice, without the 
aid of a regular medical education. 
2. The practice of medicine without a medical education. Hence, quackery ; the 
pretensions of an ignorant man to medical skill.  
Shudder to destroy life, either by the naked knife, or by the surer and safer medium of 
empiricism.                      Dwight. 
1850 
(2) BR (Boag 1850) 
Empiricism, … n. Dependence of a physician on his experience in practice, without the 
aid of a regular medical education. The practice of medicine without a medical 
education; quackery. 
1860 
(3) AM (Webster 1860, 391) 
[Definition: identical to (1)] 
1883 
(4) BR (Ogilvie and Annandale 1883, 155) 
Empiricism (em-pi'ri-sizm), n. 1. The quality or method of being empirical; reliance on 
experience and observation rather than on theory. –2. The practice of medicine 
founded on experience and neglecting the aid of science; hence, quackery; the 
pretensions of an ignorant man to medical skill.  
Shudder to destroy life, either by the naked knife, or by the surer and safer medium of 
empiricism.                                         Dwight. 
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1885 
(5) AM (Stormonth and Phelp 1885) 
empiric, n. … [… Gr. Empei'rikoi, physicians who followed a system based on practical 
experience alone—from Gr. em, in ; peira, an effort, a trial] one whose knowledge and 
practice are founded on experience; one who practises medicine without being 
regularly educated; a pretender to medical skill; a quack; … empir'icism, n. –sĭzm, 
reliance on observation and experience without rational theories as to the cause; the 
practice of medicine without a medical education; quackery. 
1889 
(6) AM (Whitney 1889, 1903) 
empiricism … , n. … 1. The character of being empirical; reliance on direct experience 
and observation rather than on theory; empirical method; especially, an undue reliance 
upon mere individual experience.  
[examples] … 
What is called empiricism is the application of superficial truths, recognized in a loose, 
unsystematic way, to immediate and special needs.  
            L. F. Ward, Dynam. Sociol., II 203. 
2. In med., the practice of empirics; hence, quackery; the pretension of an ignorant person 
to medical skill.  
[example] … 
3. The metaphysical theory that all ideas are derived from sensuous experience—that is, 
that there are no innate or a priori conceptions. 
The terms Empiricism, Empiricist, Empirical, although commonly employed by 
metaphysicians with contempt to mark a mode of investigation which admits no higher 
source than experience (by them often unwarrantably restricted to Sensation), may be 
accepted without demur, since even the flavor of contempt only serves to emphasize 
the distinction.                           
                 G. H. Lewes, Probs. Of Life and Mind, I. ii. §14. 
 
Empiricist …, n. … 1. One who believes in philosophical empiricism; one who regards 
sensuous experience as the sole source of all ideas and knowledge.  
Berkeley, as a consistent empiricist, saw that Sensation shuts itself up within its own 
home, and does not include its object. The object must be supplied from without, and 
he supplied it provisionally by the name of God.              N. A. Rev., CXX. 409 
The empiricist can take no cognizance of anything that transcends experience.  
                                                                          New Princeton Rev., II. 169. 
1891 
(7) BR (Murray and Bradley 1891, 129) 
Empiricism (empi·risiz’m). [f. EMPIRIC + -ISM.] The method or practice of an empiric.  
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Med. Practice founded upon experiment and observation; ignorant and unscientific 
practice; quackery. Also transf.  
[examples] … 
a. The use of empirical methods in any art or science. b. Philos. The doctrine which 
regards experience as the only source of knowledge.  
1803 Edin. Rev. I. 257 Made acquainted with the division of empiricism and rationalism.  
1817 JAS MILL  Brit. India I. II. Ix. 399 Mere observation and empiricism, not even 
the commencement of science.  1872 MINTO Eng. Lit. II. Viii. 547 The empiricism 
popularly associated with the name of Locke.   1881 Huxley in Nature No. 615. 343  
All true science begins with empiricism. 
concr. A conclusion arrived at on empirical grounds 
1846 MILL Logic III. Xii. §5 The instances of new theories agreeing with .. [stet]old 
empiricisms, are innumerable. 
Empiricist (empi·risist). [f. as prec. + IST.] 
An upholder of philosophical empiricism. b. One who follows empirical methods. 
1857  T. E. Webb Intell. Locke i. 17 Kant. .regarded Aristotle as the head of the 
Empiricists.  1875 N. Amer. Rev. cxx.  469  Berkeley. .a consistent empiricist. 1876 
tr. Wagner’s Gen. Pathol. 5 Medical men have been designated as Empiricists and 
Rationalists in matters of pathology.”  
1906 
(8) AM (Whitney 1906, 1903) 
[Definition: identical to (6)]
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Appendix II 
Context of  Discovery vs. Context of  Justification:  
A Methodological Objection Addressed 
Given the strategy I have followed throughout this dissertation, some may accuse 
me of confusing the context of discovery with the context of justification. For example, 
in Chapter Four, I began by asking what justifies the stream thesis. I then announced 
my intention to investigate the historical genesis of that thesis. This second task 
appears to be logically irrelevant to the question of whether the thesis itself is justified.  
My response is that evaluating a philosophical thesis typically requires evaluating 
whether the thesis succeeds in accomplishing some particular intellectual task. But 
figuring out just what task a thesis ought to be required to accomplish can be 
deceptively difficult, particularly when studying dead philosophers. In the case at hand, 
I think commentators have struggled to see James’s evidence for the stream thesis 
because they have too quickly assumed they understood what the thesis asserted. In 
my view, one cannot fully understand what a thesis is supposed to assert—and thus 
what evidence might be adduced in its support—unless one looks closely at what task 
the thesis was supposed to accomplish.  
In this case, I have argued that the stream thesis was supposed to postulate an 
empirically defensible framework for mental science that could help draw a stable line 
between philosophy and psychology. But if one did not know about the context in which 
James developed this thesis—especially about the context of Idealist attacks on 
psychology—one could easily miss the tasks for which that thesis was designed, and 
thus could miss the evidence on which it rested. 
I have tried to make a similar case about the concept of empiricism. Without 
knowledge of 19th-century arguments over psychology, one easily assumes that the 
epistemology then associated with empiricism was primarily intended to advance the 
theory of knowledge. Instead, I have argued that defenders of empiricism were more 
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interested in vindicating the fledgling science of mind than in developing a theory of 
knowledge for its own sake.  
There is a good explanation for why one must sometimes work hard to uncover 
what was at stake in defending a philosophical or scientific thesis. Professional 
intellectual communities typically share extensive, specialized knowledge of intellectual 
terrain. Community members usually leave the contours of that terrain unspoken in 
their publications. This is because the contours are tacitly understood by most anyone 
who might be interested in the thesis in the first place. Qualified community members 
share extensive background knowledge acquired through similar professional training, 
so they do not need to be told what is at stake in defending a particular thesis. This 
makes technical discussions inside intellectual communities more efficient. But it 
makes it difficult to study debates from outside those communities.  
To see the point, think of contemporary philosophy. We easily and silently 
understand the explanatory tasks contentious theses are supposed to accomplish. We 
gain such understanding through professional training and through participation in a 
community of philosophers. But the sort of knowledge we gain is richly shaded, and is 
usually left in the background of published material. Indeed, this is what typically 
makes professional philosophy unintelligible to those without graduate training. Even 
with a handbook to explain relevant terms of art, the uninitiated do not possess the 
background knowledge needed to understand what is at stake in a philosophical 
debate.  
Consider an example with special resonance for this dissertation: the recent debate 
among analytic epistemologists over empiricism and the status of a priori knowledge. 
One camp, led by people like Albert Casullo and Lawrence Bonjour, call themselves 
“rationalists.” They criticize a position they call “empiricism,” and typically try to 
parlay that attack into a defense of a priori knowledge (for an assessment of this 
strategy, see Casullo 2000). Now I think this debate would remain perfectly obscure to 
someone who does not understand that “rationalism” denotes a far richer set of 
commitments than simply to the existence of genuine a priori knowledge. Rationalism 
is what I have called an HP concept, a concept that relies on a particular reading of 
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history to efficiently call to mind a range of philosophical positions at stake in defending 
some thesis. Thus, the chief thesis a neo-rationalist affirms is clearly that there is 
robust a priori knowledge. But by espousing the label “rationalist,” such philosophers 
call to mind a set of positions variously articulated by people like Descartes, Spinoza, 
Leibniz, and in this context Kant. Rationalists who see themselves as part of such a 
tradition take characteristic positions in areas ranging from epistemology to 
metaphysics to philosophy of religion. 
Suppose someone claimed to defend neo-rationalism by arguing that we have 
genuine a priori knowledge, but only in basic arithmetic, and never in logic or 
metaphysics. That person would hardly be taken seriously, because he or she would 
have failed to understand what is at stake in the debate to begin with. The point of the 
debate is to establish a lynchpin claim for an entire family of philosophical theses that 
we associate with Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant (a point acknowledged by 
Casullo 2003, 3). Though those projects are rarely mentioned in the literature, I claim 
that one simply is not a qualified judge of such epistemological arguments unless one 
sees what is at stake more broadly.292  
Further evidence of this point can be had by comparing a debate over what is 
ostensibly the same thesis being carried out in a different philosophical sub-community. 
Philosophers of science are also engaged in a debate over whether there is robust a 
priori knowledge. One finds neo-Kantian critics like Michael Friedman on one side, 
and “naturalists” like Philip Kitcher on the other. If one does not understand something 
about Quine’s criticism of Carnap, and how (Quine 1969) changed the face of 
philosophy, one will simply not be able to join this debate.293 
These philosophers of science and analytic epistemologists appear to debate more 
or less the same thesis—the claim that there is legitimate, non-trivial, a priori 
knowledge. But what is at stake in each debate is very different. For philosophers of 
                                                 
292 Some important pieces in the literature I have in mind include (Bealer 2000; Boghossian 
1996; Boghossian 2003; Boghossian and Peacocke 2000; BonJour 1998; Casullo 2000; Casullo 
2003; Van Fraassen 2000; Van Fraassen 2002). 
293 Some important pieces in this literature include (Devitt 1998; DiSalle 2002; Friedman 
1997; Kim 1994; Kitcher 1992; Richardson 2002b; Stump 2003; Van Fraassen 1995). 
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science, the key question is whether various conceptions of the a priori can make sense 
of actual science as it has historically been practiced. For analytic epistemologists, the 
key question is whether one can give an account of knowledge strong enough to resist a 
much-feared interlocutor, The Skeptic. One has only to imagine an undergraduate fresh 
from a course in analytic epistemology walking into a debate over naturalism among 
philosophers of science. If the student complained that some account of the a priori 
failed to refute the Skeptic, that student’s question would be politely ignored.  
My claims are that a) what is at stake in a philosophical debate is typically left 
unspoken among participants in a specialized intellectual community; b) what counts as 
appropriate evidence in such a debate depends on what is at stake; and c) without 
appropriate background knowledge, it may be difficult to discern what is at stake in 
such a debate, and thus to discern what counts as appropriate evidence.  
If these claims are correct, there are important implications for historical 
methodology. How is one to evaluate theses that were advanced in the context of 
debate among some long-dead intellectual community? Since we have an education in 
philosophy ourselves, we should begin with the assumption that we do understand the 
stakes of a historical debate. But when we have trouble seeing how some historical 
arguments were supposed to work—trouble seeing, for example, what evidence James 
took himself to have for the view that consciousness is a “stream”—we should then ask 
whether we have rightly understood what was at stake in the debate. We sometimes294 
need, in other words, to extract the richly shaded background knowledge we might 
have had if we actually attended the philosophical clubs and lectures of our historical 
subjects. 
                                                 
294 I do not claim that we must always begin doing the history of philosophy by probing the 
historical context in which someone wrote. That suggestion threatens to dissolve philosophical 
history into the history of ideas. Philosophers must somewhere rest with a workable 
interpretation of history, so they can go on and analyze arguments. My suggestion is that 
historians resort to the history of ideas only when the arguments under study prove recalcitrant 
to reasonable interpretation. The catch is that some of the most interesting puzzles in the 
history of philosophy are cases where arguments advanced by someone long-dead prove 
recalcitrant to reasonable interpretation. 
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Appendix III 
The Impact of  North American Philosophy on Positivism 
In the introduction, I conjectured that the popularity of empiricism in American 
philosophy through the 1930s may have influenced the subsequent development of 
logical positivist and analytic philosophy. Particularly after many positivists became 
refugees in the United States, I speculated that their shift towards empiricism may 
have been a product of their new intellectual environment. 
This is a causal conjecture that will not be convincing until it receives 
evidentiary support. In this appendix, I first outline a set of evidence that, if 
proffered, would make the causal claim plausible. The task of supplying this full set 
of evidence is too big to take on here, but I do provide a subset of this evidence. I 
also explain what work remains in order to make my causal conjecture persuasive. 
I will refer to the following three claims as my “causal conjecture”: 
1) Up through the 1930s, empiricism was disproportionately popular in 
the United States as compared to Great Britain, Germany, or Austria.  
2) The disproportionate popularity of empiricism among American 
philosophers owes something substantial to William James’s earlier 
defense of this historical-philosophical concept. 
3) The disproportionate popularity of empiricism among American 
philosophers came to influence the subsequent development of logical 
positivism and analytic philosophy. 
This conjecture can be made convincing by providing evidence against a set of 
objections one might have to the three sub-claims. I will label the objections (a) – 
(c).  
(A) 
The first claim refers to a disproportionate popularity of empiricism in the 
American 1930s. In my introduction, I cited a large set of literature that portrays 
early positivists and analytic philosophers as more engaged with neo-Kantian than 
with empiricist philosophy (see above, fn. 5). However, I have only provided sketchy 
evidence (see above, Chapter Four, Section Three) that 1930s Americans really 
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were heavily engaged with empiricism, and only sketchy evidence (see above, 
Introduction, Section Two) that they were more heavily engaged with empiricism 
than their European colleagues during this period.  
Moreover, while the secondary literature I cited in the Introduction covers the 
context of German-language philosophy through the 1920s, the literature I cited on 
early analytic philosophy covers a period in Britain that ends considerably earlier. 
For instance, Hylton’s work on Russell, Moore, and British Idealism ends around 
1913. Thus, some may wonder whether between 1913 and the early 1930s some 
form of empiricism may not have rocketed to popularity in Britain, and thereby 
provided a more important influence on the development of positivism. This is a 
legitimate worry that I cannot adequately address here.  
However, even if some form of empiricism can be shown to have been on the 
rise in Britain during this period, this does not absolve historians of analytic 
philosophy of the need to explore the pre-1930s North American context. As I wrote 
in the introduction, it is naïve to portray North American philosophy departments of 
the era as empty greenhouses ready to nurture transplanted European philosophies 
without affecting their subsequent development. 
(B) 
The first two claims both refer to “empiricism.” One wonders whether there is a 
legitimate link between the notions of empiricism at play in each claim. James and 
his psychologist-philosopher allies defended one version of this concept, and later 
advocates like John Dewey, Charles Morris, and Ralph Barton Perry defended other 
versions. So to bear out the causal conjecture, one would ideally like to have 
evidence of a historical and philosophical link between these two notions of 
empiricism.  
We have seen preliminary evidence of such a link in Chapter Four, Section 
Three (above). We saw that Dewey advocated a position he called “empiricism,” 
and credited James as a chief source. More work is needed to show what Dewey 
meant by “empiricism,” and whether his debt to James was more than a matter of 
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convenient rhetoric. Similar studies of other American empiricists who might have 
influenced the development of logical positivism are also needed.  
(C) 
The third claim requires showing that positivists really did change the way they 
did philosophy after they arrived in the United States. It also requires showing that 
upon their arrival, positivists really were constructively engaged with Americans, 
particularly with Americans who advocated forms of empiricism.  
Finally, given that the form of empiricism that came to be associated with 
positivism and analytic philosophy (roughly the empiricism of CIE) was quite 
different from the empiricism I have ascribed to James, one would hope for an 
explanation of how empiricism evolved from the form James and his allies advocated 
into CIE. Again, I offered only conjecture about the post-Jamesean evolution of 
empiricism (at the end of Chapter Five).   
In the remainder of this introduction, I will principally offer evidence that helps 
answer objection (c), though more work is obviously needed to meet this and the 
other two objections more thoroughly. 
 
For preliminary evidence that positivists did, in fact, change the way they did 
philosophy upon arrival in North America, see (Giere 1996, 337-339). Giere points 
out that positivism’s most important founding texts from the ’10s and ’20s—
Carnap’s Aufbau, Reichenbach’s work on relativity theory, and Schlick’s Allgemeine 
Erkenntnislehre—were not even translated into English until the 1950s 
(Reichenbach), 60s (Carnap), and 70s (Schlick)—see (Carnap 1929/1967; 
Reichenbach 1920/1965; Reichenbach 1924/1969; Reichenbach 1928/1958; Schlick 
1918/1985). This suggests a serious disconnect between the projects positivists 
developed in Europe and those that came to be influential in North American 
philosophy, at least during the first few decades after the positivists’ arrival. 
What accounts for this disconnect? Giere writes,  
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My hypothesis is that the scientific philosophers, such as Carnap and Reichenbach, 
realized that their future, if they were to have a future, lay in North America. And 
they realized, quite rightly, that works like the Aufbau and Relativitätstheorie, which 
were written in the context of a cultural, scientific, and philosophical tradition that did 
not then exist in North America, would not be much appreciated in the north 
American context (Giere 1996, 337).  
With Giere, I hold that important changes in positivism starting in the 1930s must 
be understood in light of the fact that many positivists became refugees during this 
period.295 Their professional, and even their personal survival depended on the 
challenge of successfully integrating into North American philosophy departments. 
Giere’s claim is consistent with the overall arc of recent scholarship on early 
logical positivism (see above, fn. 5). This scholarship suggests that before the 1930s, 
positivists were more heavily engaged with neo-Kantian philosophy than with 
empiricism.  
As far as the American influence on post-migration positivism goes, my chief 
hypothesis is that philosophers on this continent had been far more steeped in 
Jamesean empiricism than their Continental peers. Empiricisms with distinct 
Jamesean imprints were propagated up through the 1930s by students and 
sympathetic colleagues. John Dewey was, among other things, one main carrier of 
such an empiricism. C. I. Lewis and R. B. Perry were important in this regard, as 
well.296 
There is evidence that 1930s American philosophers greeted logical positivism 
by trying to assimilate it to the framework of American empiricism. That is, the 
Americans understood positivism to be a movement in scientific philosophy of the 
                                                 
295 Giere’s treatment of the American context is brief, however, and shows an assumption 
that I find dubious (as does Richardson 2003, 2-6)—that positivism eventually conquered or 
eliminated pragmatism. 
296 Some of his polemical articles on the revived empiricism he gave James so much credit for 
sparking include (Dewey 1906; Dewey 1917; Dewey 1935; Dewey 1940), and (Dewey 
1905b), which instigated the following letters and responses: (Bakewell 1905a; Bakewell 
1905b; Dewey 1905a). Aside from pragmatism, other movements that propagated forms of 
empiricism influenced by James include radical empiricism, new realism, and critical 
realism. See above, fn. 13. 
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sort pioneered by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and advanced by James, Peirce, and 
Dewey. One example comes from the American-trained Ernest Nagel.  
The fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science was held at Harvard 
University in 1940, the first of the Vienna Circle’s congresses to be convened in the 
United States. Nagel gave a lecture entitled “Charles S. Peirce: Pioneer of Modern 
Empiricism.” The piece argued that unlike in Europe, empiricism had been thriving 
in America since the time of Peirce. Nagel remarked that  
One is not minimizing the contributions of the Vienna Circle by pointing out that many 
of its recent views have been taken for granted for some time by American colleagues, 
largely because the latter have come to intellectual maturity under the influence of 
Peirce.  
Peirce’s influence was “propagated by William James and Josiah Royce,” since 
Peirce lived out his life in relative obscurity (Nagel 1940, 69-70). Nagel saw 
positivism as continuing a form of empiricism he associated with Peirce and James, 
among others.  
In 1942, Nagel would acknowledge James’s original contribution to American 
empiricism:  
It is true that not all the positions for which [James] fought in psychology and 
philosophy have become widely accepted; nor did he leave behind him a sizable 
following of disciples who subscribed to the essential details of his thought. But the 
larger features of his work—its voluntaristic naturalism and empiricism, its distrust of 
dogmatic claims to final truth, whether in science, philosophy or religion, and its 
emphasis upon the novelties and contingencies which characterize the operations of 
nature—have been intimately absorbed into our own modes of thought …. (quoted at 
Myers 1986, 483n.483)  
Nagel overlapped as a student at Columbia with Dewey during the latter’s long 
tenure there. So I take these passages as initial evidence that philosophers educated 
in America tried initially to fit logical positivism into the context of homegrown 
varieties of empiricism.  
Another example of Americans assimilating logical positivism to more familiar 
forms of empiricism comes from a 1936 reflection on the International Congress for 
the Unity of Science by John Sommerville, a philosopher at City College of New 
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York. Sommerville noted that the name “logical positivism” had fallen out of favor, 
and former members of the Wiener Kreis now preferred  
“scientific empiricism” or “logical empiricism.” These terms may call to mind the 
“Radical Empiricism” of William James, and appropriately so, for this movement has 
significant connections, some premeditated and some unconscious, with the pragmatic 
thought of James and Dewey. (Sommerville 1936, 296)297 
“Scientific empiricism” was actually Charles Morris’s term, which the latter meant 
to be an umbrella that covered both pragmatism and logical positivism. Morris was a 
student of Mead’s at Chicago, and was perhaps the major American figure to try to 
synthesize pragmatism and positivism (in works like Morris 1937; Morris 1938; 
Morris 1963). Thus Carnap would later write: 
Logical empiricists from Berlin and from the Vienna Circle came into closer contact 
with pragmatism chiefly after they had come to the United States. A mutual 
understanding between the two schools was mainly fostered by Charles Morris and 
Ernest Nagel. Both attended the International Congress of Philosophy in Prague in 
1934, where I became acquainted with them, and where they met their colleagues 
from Vienna and Berlin. Nagel was influenced by both movements, but avoided the 
application of any school label to his own view. Morris had the explicit aim of merging 
the two philosophical movements into one to which he sometimes applied the term 
“scientific empiricism.” (Carnap 1963, 860) 
Carnap went on to acknowledge that his views had “clearly been influenced by 
pragmatist ideas” after emigrating, particularly when it came to issues surrounding 
the social factors of language, “… and upon the fact that all knowledge begins with 
and serves the relations between a living organism and its environment.” Carnap 
here also cited the pragmatic influence of C. I. Lewis and Sidney Hook.  
For his part, Morris wrote that his own thought is  
near to that of Mead and the pragmatists. At first sight there seems to be an 
unbridgeable gap between the bio-social orientation of a Mead and the logico-
analytical orientation of a Carnap. But at that time [the 1930s] it appeared to me that 
pragmatism and logical empiricism had many features in common and much to 
contribute to each other, and that the further growth of each would be such that the 
two movements would become convergent. In a number of articles written at that 
period I tried to analyze some of the similarities and differences between the two 
groups, and to outline a position (called scientific empiricism) toward which they might 
converge. (Morris 1963, 87). 
                                                 
297 My attention was called to this article by reading (Wilson 1990, 132). 
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In short, Morris was optimistic that a shared empiricism could unite pragmatism 
with logical positivism.  
Morris was perhaps the most important American contact for Vienna Circle 
members looking to move to America in the late 1930s, eventually helping Carnap 
land a job at the University of Chicago. He managed to play such a role through his 
close association with Neurath, becoming one of the editors for the latter’s 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. In fact, Morris provided crucial personal links to 
one of the Encyclopedia’s main sources of funding: the Rockefeller Foundation.298  
Morris himself pitched logical positivists to American audiences as sharing 
pragmatists’ empiricism. For example, in response to a query from The New York 
Times’s science writer Waldemar Kaempffert, Morris wrote a letter that gave a brief 
history of the Unity of Science movement. He wrote that the movement grows out of 
a variety of empiricism that combines attention to the latest advances in science and 
logic, citing Peirce, James, and Dewey as key forerunners (along with Mach, 
Avenarius, and others).299  
The letter was never published, but Kaempffert used it to write two articles 
about positivism in the Times. In the articles, he repeated the story that American 
empiricism was a precursor to the Unity of Science movement. In one piece, on 
Philipp Frank, Kaempffert wrote that the Vienna Circle  
seeks to strike the metaphysical shackles from science. Our own William James had 
the same object in view when he laid the foundations of what he called ‘pragmatism.’ 
(Kaempffert 1937)  
A year later, Kaempffert wrote:  
At Harvard Peirce had been preaching what he called ‘commonsenseism’ and William 
James ‘pragmatism’ long before the Viennese Circle came into existence.” (Kaempffert 
1938)  
What I want to emphasize is not just the sense that logical positivists and 
scientifically-minded American philosophers saw themselves as fellow-travelers in 
                                                 
298 See (Galison 1996, 35-40) for a fascinating discussion of Morris’ influence on logical 
positivism. 
299 Letter to Waldemar Kaempffert, June 17, 1935 (CMP; cited by permission). 
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the 1930s—this is both true, and still not widely enough recognized.300 I want to 
emphasize the way in which the Americans saw logical positivists as fellow travelers. 
What they were supposed to have in common, from the American perspective, was 
a shared commitment to empiricism—at any rate, to some position they called 
“empiricism.”  
Several other documents highlight this point. The first article to announce the 
arrival of logical positivism in America, by Feigl and Blumberg, presented the 
movement as attempting a synthesis of Kantian and empiricist philosophies, much 
as Kant had tried to synthesize older rationalist and empiricist traditions himself 
(Blumberg and Feigl 1931). For Feigl and Blumberg, the pragmatists fit with a long 
line of empiricists who had fallen “into the error of carrying their empiricism too far” 
by neglecting the strong role of logic in human knowledge (Blumberg and Feigl 
1931, 282). In contrast, the logical positivists wanted to develop a more moderate 
version of empiricism that incorporated a Kantian emphasis on rationality. But 
positivists also wanted to avoid Kant’s excesses. Kant “concedes too much to 
rationalism by assuming the existence of synthetic a priori truths” (Blumberg and 
Feigl 1931, 282). Feigl and Blumberg thus presented logical positivism as a 
movement that mixes a brand of empiricism shared by pragmatists with more 
Kantian sensibilities.  
Several years later, Reichenbach published another programmatic 
announcement. He echoed the notion that pragmatists had developed a form of 
empiricism that logical positivists301 sought to refine (Reichenbach 1936). And the 
point was echoed from the American side. C. I. Lewis would later reflect that 
“empiricism” was “the point of clearest agreement amongst the pragmatists 
                                                 
300 However, scattered works are beginning to appear that emphasize this point. See the 
works I cite above, at fn. 8. I would also like to single out (Wilson 1990), which is a neat, 
turgid summary of the case for a shared scientific outlook between pragmatists and 
positivists. 
301 Reichenbach called his position “logical empiricism” rather than “logical positivism.” 
Perhaps the name was designed to emphasize commonality with his (hoped for) American 
colleagues.  
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themselves.” This is important for understanding pragmatism’s relationship to 
logical positivism because “both movements present themselves as forms of 
empiricism” (Lewis 1941/1970, 93). 
Finally, there is evidence that American empiricism may have exerted perhaps 
a mild, earlier influence on positivists, even before their migration. Hans Hahn, 
Philipp Frank, and Otto Neurath were each admirers of American pragmatism in 
one form or another, but especially of Dewey’s version of this doctrine, as Thomas 
Uebel has documented. Uebel writes that Neurath “was immensely pleased to have 
won over Dewey to contribute to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science 
in the late 1930s” (Uebel 2004, 266).  
The admiration for Dewey among the so-called “left-wing” of the logical 
positivists apparently is related to James’s earlier pull on this group during the 
1910s and ’20s. Uebel argues that James’ Pragmatism had been widely discussed, 
and widely dismissed, in Germany and Austria between about 1908-1910. Thus, 
Championing preferred views as ‘pragmatist’ was yet another way for Hahn and Frank 
to signal dissent from the Germanic Sonderweg, the self-styled cultural separatism 
celebrated by much of the German professoriate at the time, and instead declare their 
own allegiance to the Western scientific enlightenment tradition. (Uebel 2004, 266) 
Uebel argues that the left-wing of the Vienna Circle regarded James and Dewey’s 
pragmatism as first steps towards building what Frank called a “scientific world-
conception” (Uebel 2004, 263). 
 
So positivists found more common ground with their new colleagues than we 
have come to think. Scores of American philosophers already shared a modernist 
aspiration to develop what Richardson has lately called a “scientific philosophy,” for 
example.302 That is, many American philosophers in the pragmatist tradition (for 
                                                 
302 A general history of scientific philosophy in late 19th century Europe can be found in 
(Richardson 1997). The analysis is extended in (Richardson 2002a; Richardson 2003) to the 
case of American philosophy in the early 20th century. 
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example, John Dewey) were, like their European colleagues, pursuing the utopian 
goal of using science to transform both philosophy and the society at large.303 
But this shared background puts into stark relief substantial differences 
between the American and German-Austrian traditions—differences with which job-
seeking immigrants would have been at pains to come to terms. These differences 
slowly disappeared, as the two traditions fused.304 In some cases, it was the 
European vision that came to dominate mainstream philosophy. But in other cases, 
it was refugee Europeans whose projects apparently shifted towards 
characteristically American views.  
I must acknowledge some examples where the European vision came to 
dominate. Pragmatists like C. I. Lewis and John Dewey followed James in insisting 
that a theory of cognition is impossible without a theory of how valid judgments of 
value are possible (e.g., see Lewis 1970, 112). Many positivists, on the other hand, 
                                                 
303 The issue of theoretical similarities between pragmatism and logical positivism has begun 
to be treated by several commentators. For a sketch of how the debate over protocol-
sentences led certain logical positivists towards forms of pragmatism, see (Misak 1995, 89-
96). She offers references to publications by positivists in the 1930s that explicitly 
acknowledged shared ground with pragmatists, at (Misak 1995, 216n.212). For a detailed 
evaluation of the form of pragmatism Carnap eventually espoused, particularly as it relates 
to Dewey’s pragmatism, see (Richardson forthcoming). For documentation of the reception 
of pragmatism in Germany during the 1910s and 20s, and Hahn, Frank, and Neurath’s 
sympathies with pragmatism, see (Uebel 2004, 263-267). Russell Goodman argues (in 
Goodman 2002) that William James provided a non-trivial influence on Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. Finally, Ayer himself came to see a deep affinity between positivism and 
pragmatism, eventually publishing a volume on the latter movement (Ayer 1968). 
304 Note my claim that the two traditions fused, rather than that one conquered the other. 
Some evidence for my position comes from tracing the academic ancestry of leading 20th-
century philosophers. It is not only characters like Carnap, Reichenbach, Moore, and Russell 
who can count their philosophical descendents as leading lights of the next generation. Many 
pragmatists can too. For example, James and Royce had C. I. Lewis as one of their many 
influential students. Lewis (who also spent much of the 1920s working with Peirce’s 
unpublished papers at Harvard) went on to teach Quine, Goodman, Frankena, Chisolm, and 
Firth. It is not clear in what sense positivism can be taken to have killed off pragmatism, as 
the popular story has it, given that these leading 20th-century figures trace both a historical 
and a philosophical lineage to James, Royce, and Peirce. Richardson (at Richardson 2003, 2-
6) also argues against the view that positivism simply vanquished pragmatism. He 
emphasizes the coexistence of many varieties of scientific philosophy in 1930s America—not 
just pragmatism and positivism, but also New and Critical Realism as well. 
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wanted to set aside the theory of value as metaphysical confusion (c.f. Reisch 2005; 
Richardson 2002a, S46 ff.). Dewey and Lewis clearly lost this fight, as most 
philosophers of science came to follow the positivists’ view (or, as Reisch argues, the 
view of an eventually-dominant faction of positivists centering around Reichenbach 
and Feigl).  
Similarly, there had been a long-standing debate in America over the viability of 
formal techniques in philosophy (Lewis 1970, 96-99; Richardson 2002a; Wilson 
1990, 121-179). Perhaps positivists helped tip the balance on this issue, too, as their 
arrival coincided with a shift towards a formal mode of scientific philosophy in 
America.  
But there were other issues where American views seem to have prevailed. I 
claim, of course, that one distinct philosophical trend (with respect to European 
philosophy of the period) was the Americans’ widespread focus on something they 
called “empiricism.” In fact, empiricism was not just a banner that united analytic 
philosophy and logical positivism. Pragmatists saw themselves as united with 
positivists, almost as soon as the latter group migrated to the United States, under 
the shared banner of empiricism. So I suggest that positivism’s shift towards 
empiricism may be an important example of North American philosophy influencing 
the post-migration development of logical positivism. 
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Note on Typography 
The chapter headings of this work are set in Linotype’s digital version of 
Centaur, a font originally designed by Bruce Rogers in 1914. The text is set in 
Bitstream’s digital version of Bookman.  
The earliest avatar of Bookman was Alexander Phemister’s Antique Old Style, 
published in 1858. Antique Old Style was first issued in Edinburgh, where 
Phemister was working as a punchcutter (see Bringhurst 2002, 131-132). He 
eventually moved to Boston. Antique Old Style was later reworked by a Kentucky 
printer and salesman named Chauncey H. Griffith, who renamed the font 
“Bookman” when it was published in 1936. 
A modernist spirit swept across 1930s printmaking just as it had swept across 
1930s philosophy. Historians typically cite Germany as the center of a “new 
typography” during the period (e.g. Kinross 1992, 85-90), where Bauhaus designers 
like Maholy-Nagy were issuing manifestos on how to employ science for socially 
useful printmaking (c.f. Galison 1996). But United States typographers of the era 
like Rogers and Griffith also fashioned their own modernism.  
Like many Wiener Kreis philosophers, Bauhaus designers such as Maholy-
Nagy were forced out of Europe by the rise of Nazism. While Carnap and his 
American ally Charles Morris were continuing the Vienna Circle’s Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science in Chicago (see above, fn. 7), Maholy-Nagy set up a school called 
the “New Bauhaus” just across town. Subsequent American typography would 
blend such European and American influences, just as American philosophy would 
blend positivist and pragmatist influences.  
There were distinct differences between American and European forms of 
typographic modernism, though. American typography in the early 20th-century had 
been fueled by an exploding advertising industry (Loxley 2004, 72). Often reacting 
against this consumerist ethos, a group of American iconoclasts emerged styling 
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themselves craftspeople and artists rather than industrialists (Loxley 2004, 93, 95-
96). Frederic Goudy was perhaps the most influential figure in this movement.  
German typographers of the era were emphasizing mannered sans-serif designs 
(as in the stark geometry of Paul Renner’s Futura). But Goudy articulated a 
distinctively American vision: 
Fine printing demands a type without mannerisms, one that is easily and pleasantly 
readable, … its forms distinct and not made to display the skill of their designer, but 
instead to help the reader. Type must be … decorative, but not ornate; … simple in 
design, but not with the bastard simplicity of form which is mere crudity of outline; … 
and above all it must possess unmistakably the quality we call “art”—that something 
which comes from the spirit the designer puts unconsciously into the body of his work. 
(From Goudy’s 1940 Typologia, quoted at Bruckner 1990, 38) 
In this spirit, Griffith’s Bookman—the font used in this dissertation—shows a 
graceful, human sensibility that echoes the art deco aesthetics of 1930s jazz culture. 
So Bookman is a font invented in Victorian Britain and restyled in America 
during a remarkable period for art, science, and philosophy. The legacy of such fonts 
can be seen in the later work of typographers like Robert Brownjohn, who would 
create title sequences for stylish films and record covers during the 1960s. 
Brownjohn was a New Bauhaus student who combined European constructivist 
influences with the homegrown sensibilities of American jazz. 
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Science of Evolution (Harvard University Press) 
Research Associate—Spring 2002 
Richard Lewontin’s Population Genetics Laboratory; Department of Organismic and 
Evolutionary Biology; Harvard University 
• Helped Professor Elisabeth Lloyd with research and editing while she was 
visiting in Professor Lewontin’s lab.  
Research Assistant—Fall 2000-Spring 2002 
To Professor Elisabeth Lloyd; History and Philosophy of Science Department. Indiana 
University, Bloomington 
  
• Helped Professor Lloyd research and edit The Case of the Female 
Orgasm: Bias in the Science of Evolution, among other projects. Lloyd 
was then the Chair of the History and Philosophy of Science Department. 
Referee, Philosophy of Science 
President, Graduate Association of Philosophy Students—Fall 2002-Fall 2003 
Philosophy Department; Indiana University, Bloomington 
Student Representative, Graduate-Curriculum Committee—Fall 2002-Fall 2003 
Philosophy Department; Indiana University, Bloomington 
Founder, Director—2000-2001 
The Thought Exchange; Bloomington, Indiana 
• Founded and directed weekly forum for public, philosophical discussion 
Founder, Director—1997 
Wesleyan University Undergraduate Philosophy Club 
N O N-A C A D E M I C  PU B L I C A T I O N S 
(Forthcoming). “On Cheating,” Toronto Star.  
(1998). “Pop-Mart Religion,” The Other Side Magazine, 34(4): 34-35. 
(1997). [Untitled Editorial], Morning Edition, dir. Bob Paquette, WFCR-FM, Amherst, 
MA.  
(1997). [Various original features, interviews, editorials, and ‘vox populi’], The Live Wire, 
dir. Phyllis Jaffe, WESU-FM, Middletown, CT.  
(1994-1995). [Various short pop-music reviews], Interview Magazine. 
R E A D I N G  L A N G U A G E S  
French; German 
M E M B E R 
American Philosophical Association 
International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science (HOPOS) 
Philosophy of Science Association 
Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy 
 
